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Abstract 
 
Through the figure of the transgender prisoner, this thesis examines both the 
transformative potential, and the limits, of law and human rights, in redrawing the lines 
of sex/gender and expanding the possibilities and liveability of transgender lives.  The 
prison, with its sex-segregated estate and binary gender society/regime, is a 
particularly useful site to examine how transgender people and their bodies are 
problematised in broader society.  It magnifies the challenges faced by law and human 
rights in attempting to alter certain historically entrenched “truths” about sex/gender 
and transgender people.  Drawing on post-Foucauldian legal scholarship, queer, 
feminist and transgender literature, and risk theory, the thesis examines the impact of 
recent human rights-based legal developments on English and Welsh prison policy, and 
considers the potential of human rights discourse to alter the prison administration’s 
governance of sex/gender, as it relates to transgender prisoners.  It focuses on three 
areas: prison allocation and segregation, gender presentation and access to medical 
treatment.  The thesis identifies an emerging tension between human rights and risk in 
the prison’s construction and governance of transgender prisoners.  It reflects on a 
particularly deeply-entrenched anxiety about the gender authenticity and bodies of 
transgender women prisoners, especially those who transition whilst in prison and wish 
to transfer to the female estate.   It concludes by arguing that there are certain 
inescapable “truths” that society cannot seem to get beyond, and that, whatever law 
and policy say, both bodies and normative gender performance still matter in cultural 
and institutional constructions of “authentic” gender and risk.   
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Introduction: Setting the Scene 
 
Through the figure of the transgender prisoner, this thesis examines both the 
transformative potential, and the limits, of law and human rights in redrawing the lines of 
sex/gender and expanding the possibilities and liveability of trans/gendered lives.  It focuses 
on the situation in England and Wales.2  In particular, the thesis highlights an emerging 
tension between human rights and risk in the construction of the transgender prisoner, and 
in the governance of transgender prisoners’ daily lives.  This introduction sets the scene for 
the thesis.  After discussing the origins of the research, the introduction is divided into five 
parts: first, it describes the contemporary socio-political landscape in which the thesis is 
situated; second, it outlines the core aims of the thesis; in the third part, it explains the 
contribution the thesis will make to the literature; the fourth part concerns the 
methodology and research sources; and the fifth and final part concludes with the overall 
structure of the thesis and chapter outlines.   
Two recent cases provide a snapshot of some of the struggles faced by transgender people 
who are sent to prison, and some of the issues explored by this thesis:    
                                                          
2 The thesis focuses on the English and Welsh prison system, managed by the National Offender Management 
Service (“NOMS”), and since February 2017, by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (“HMPPS”).  The 
Scottish and Northern Ireland prison systems are managed separately, under devolved powers, by the Scottish 
Prison Service and Northern Ireland Prison Service, respectively.  On 12 March 2014, the Scottish Prison 
Service, in conjunction with the Scottish Transgender Alliance, introduced a Gender Identity and Gender 
Reassignment Policy for people in custody, based on a self-determination model (Scottish Prison Service 2014). 
The Northern Ireland Prison Service interestingly reported to the House of Commons in 2016 that it had no 
recent record of any prisoners who have self-identified as transgender, but that their needs would be 
considered on a case by case basis, to include arrangements for where they would be accommodated and how 
they would engage in the prison regime (Strickland 2016: 13).  On the situation in the Republic of Ireland, see 
Irish Penal Reform Trust 2016. 
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On 5 January 2017, the press reported the third apparent suicide by a transgender prisoner 
in just over a year.  Jenny Swift was found dead in her cell on 30 December 2016, whilst on 
remand3 in a male prison.   According to various reports (e.g. Fenton 2017; Fae 2017a; 
Halliday 2017a), her requests to be assigned to a female prison had been rejected on the 
basis that she did not have a Gender Recognition Certificate (“GRC”) and was therefore 
legally male.  Refusing to wear the male prison uniform, she allegedly entered prison naked.  
She was referred to as “Mr” by some prison staff and taunted by other prisoners.  Although 
she had been living as a woman and taking oestrogen for three years, she was denied 
hormones when she arrived in prison, on the basis that they had been purchased via the 
internet, rather than obtained by prescription.4 She was experiencing withdrawal symptoms 
and, according to a friend, was feeling “miserable, sad and ill” (Halliday 2017a).5    
On 21 March 2017, it was widely reported in the media that Jessica Winfield, a transgender 
woman who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1995 for the rapes of two girls, had been 
transferred from the male to the female prison estate (e.g. Doran and Diaz 2017; Fox 2017; 
Shaw 2017). Winfield had reassigned her gender, obtained a GRC, which legally recognised 
her as a woman, and had undergone gender reassignment surgery6 whilst in the male 
estate.  News of her transfer to a women’s prison and her National Health Service (“NHS”)-
                                                          
3
 She was not granted bail and was therefore sent, or “remanded”, to prison until her trial date. 
4
 Due, in particular, to long waiting times for appointments at NHS Gender Identity Clinics, some transgender 
people resort to purchasing hormones on the internet (Newman and Jeory 2016).  The inquest heard that Swift 
had subsequently been prescribed HRT medication, and was due to start taking it on 3 January 2017, a few 
days after her death (Halliday 2017b). 
5
 The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (“PPO”) report and inquest into Swift’s death were pending at the 
time of submitting the thesis.  The inquest subsequently took place at Doncaster Coroner’s Court from 18 to 21 
December 2017. The jury’s verdict, reported in the press on 22 December 2017, was “death by misadventure” 
(Tamplin 2017). 
6
 Later reports suggest this was partial genital surgery and did not involve a penectomy (Joseph 2017). On the 
significance of this fact, see Chapter 6. 
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funded surgery generated disquiet, alarm even. BBC Radio 4’s PM programme commented 
that Winfield “is being placed in a prison for women, which has obviously provoked some 
alarm and distress among prisoners who are going to be sharing that prison with him [sic+” 
(Shaw 2017), whilst the Sun’s headline announced “Victims’ fury as double rapist who 
attacked two young girls is moved to a women-only jail after £10k NHS sex-change op” 
(Doran and Diaz 2017).   
The issues reflected in these two cases are not new.  Transgender prisoners and their bodies 
have long been problematised by prison administration, and have given rise to practical 
questions about whose gender is authentic and should be accepted as legitimate for prison 
allocation purposes, access to gender-affirming clothing, and access to medical treatment.  
Prison administration has also been concerned about how best to manage transgender 
prisoners as both an “at risk” and “risky” prison population.  At a more fundamental level, 
transgender prisoners’ lives and bodies have long been culturally and institutionally 
unintelligible, and have been regarded as a risk to the binary sex/gender order of the prison.  
What is relatively new, however, is the reconfiguration of the transgender prisoner as a 
human-rights bearer,7 and official recognition of the human rights – albeit couched in the 
language of “care” and “needs” – of transgender prisoners in prison policy.  It was only in 
                                                          
7
 Concern about the situation of transgender prisoners is also increasingly being expressed in international 
human rights fora. Within the United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms, for example, the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture has been at the forefront of drawing attention to this issue, e.g. UN Doc. A/56/156 of 3 
July 2001.  Other recent examples include the report of Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Discrimination and Violence against Individuals based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) of 4 
May 2015, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/23, paras 34 -36; the report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (Applicability 
of the Prohibition of Torture in International Law to the Unique Experiences of Women, Girls, and Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Persons) of 5 January 2016, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/57, paras 34-35; and the 
report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (Pathways to, Conditions and Consequences of 
Incarceration for Women), UN Doc. A/68/340 of 21 August 2013, paras 60 and 63.  Unfortunately, the scope of 
this thesis does not permit a fuller analysis of developments in the international human rights arena. 
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2011, after an extraordinary fifteen years in the pipeline (Whittle et al 2007),8 that the UK’s 
first ever official prison policy on transgender prisoners was introduced.   
Driven by, and reflecting, human rights-based legislative developments in the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 and Equality Act 2010, as well as the landmark ruling in R (on the 
application of AB) v Secretary of State for Justice and Another [2009] EWHC 2220 (Admin) 
(“AB”), the new prison policy not only officially recognised the existence of the transgender 
prison population for the first time, but also set out a comprehensive regime for their 
governance.  Prison Service Instruction 07/2011 on the Care and Management of 
Transsexual Prisoners (“PSI 2011”) requires prison administrators to allocate “transsexual 
prisoners” to a prison corresponding to their legal gender, and provides discretion in 
allocation decisions where a person does not have a GRC legally certifying their gender.  PSI 
2011 also makes it mandatory for prison administrators to permit prisoners “who consider 
themselves transsexual” to live and dress in accordance with their gender, whichever part of 
the prison estate they are allocated to, and to provide them with NHS-equivalent medical 
treatment.  It was this potentially significant “reform” moment that was originally intended 
to form the centrepiece of this thesis.  However, such is the rapid speed of developments in 
the field, that the thesis can now take the story even further.   
After a series of events in 2015 shone a spotlight on the situation of transgender prisoners 
housed in prisons inappropriate for their gender, PSI 2011 was reviewed and fundamentally 
                                                          
8
In 1996, Press for Change and the (since disbanded) Sexuality and Gender Alliance were commissioned to 
present a report to the Home Office, which detailed issues experienced by transgender prisoners, and tabled a 
draft policy (Whittle et al 2007). This policy went through numerous drafts, which the Home Office circulated 
to various voluntary sector organisations for comments, but its finalisation was repeatedly stalled (ibid).  The 
author’s attempts to locate the 1996 initial report have proved unsuccessful, despite the valuable assistance of 
Stephen Whittle (Press for Change), Richard Elkins (re Transgender Archives at University of Ulster), and Aaron 
Devor (re Transgender Archives at University of Victoria, Canada).   
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revised. Prison Service Instruction 17/2016 on the Care and Management of Transgender 
Offenders (“PSI 2016”) came into full effect on 1 January 2017, promising, amongst other 
things, a “more flexible approach” to prison allocation – only days after Jenny Swift’s death 
in the male estate.  In an internationally ground-breaking move, it also extended PSI 2011’s 
provision that transgender prisoners must be permitted to live and dress in their gender, to 
prisoners with non-binary and fluid genders.   
The thesis examines the actual and potential effects of human-rights based legal 
developments on prison policy, and on the prison administration’s construction and 
governance of transgender prisoners as a risky and at risk prison population. It takes a two-
pronged approach to law.  It not only considers law’s direct effects on the governance of 
transgender prisoners’ lives, but also explores, at a deeper, discursive level, the way in 
which the “new” human rights discourse has started to unfold in the prison, and has altered, 
or has the potential to alter, culturally and institutionally entrenched understandings of 
transgender people/prisoners as Other, inauthentic and, above all, risky.  Combining these 
two different approaches to law –  namely, fusing a more traditional legal analysis with a 
Foucauldian analysis of law as a productive power with normative effects – is, at times, 
conceptually and structurally tricky.  Whilst the resulting product is perhaps not as 
academically “neat” as it would otherwise be, it will hopefully result in a more 
comprehensive and richer analysis of law’s power effects in this field, than if one approach 
or the other was adopted exclusively.    
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The Contemporary Socio-Political Landscape 
In order to examine the effects of law and human rights on the prison administration’s 
construction and governance of transgender prisoners, it is imperative to situate the thesis 
in its broader socio-political context.  The following section discusses the catalyst for the 
most recent prison policy reform, only five years after the introduction of PSI 2011, and 
presents an overview of the contemporary landscape in which this thesis is situated.  This 
landscape is characterised by political hostility towards prisoners’ rights, a deepening prison 
crisis, a culture of fear and anxiety around trans/gender authenticity and transgender 
bodies, and public concern about possible further liberalisation of the regulation of gender.  
The catalyst for further policy reform: PSI 2016 
As noted, in 2015, a series of events triggered unprecedented public and political concern 
about the situation of transgender prisoners housed in prisons inappropriate to their 
gender, because they did not have a GRC legally certifying their gender. It started when Tara 
Hudson, who had lived as a woman for many years but did not have a GRC, was sentenced 
in October 2015 to 12 weeks’ imprisonment, and placed in a male prison, on a small unit 
reserved for prisoners with complex mental and physical needs (of which she had neither).  
Within a week, widespread social media and press coverage of her plight, and an on-line 
petition signed by around 160,000 people, helped secure her transfer to a female prison, 
where she served the remainder of her sentence. After her release, Hudson spoke about her 
distressing experience in the male prison, including the humiliation she had felt at her “half-
and-half” strip-search (i.e. her top half was searched by a woman prison officer and bottom 
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half by a male prison officer),9 the sexual harassment she had suffered from other prisoners, 
her fears for her own safety, and the isolation and despair she had felt spending 23 hours a 
day alone in a cell.  Even after being transferred to the female estate, she was housed on a 
special wing, and was not allowed into other prisoners’ cells (see e.g. Gayle 2015; Curtis 
2015; Duffy 2015; Sanghani 2016).10    
Weeks later, in November 2015, the press widely reported the death of Vikki Thompson, 
who had been housed in a men’s prison for the previous six weeks, awaiting sentencing 
(Quinn 2015; Clarke-Billings 2015; Slawson 2015).  Like Tara Hudson, she had lived for many 
years as a woman, but did not have a GRC.   Both at court, and on reception to prison, she 
said that she did not want to be in a male prison (PPO 2017: para 108), but the Prisons and 
Probation Ombudsman (“PPO”) later found “no evidence that anyone advised her that she 
could ask to move to a woman’s prison, or that anyone considered her location, without an 
application” (ibid). After complaining of harassment from other prisoners on the wing, she 
was moved, at her request, from the main estate to the vulnerable prisoners’ wing.   
Although identified as at risk of suicide and self-harm and placed on an ACCT,11 she hanged 
herself between hourly cell checks.  At the coroner’s inquest into her death, in May 2017, 
                                                          
9
 In June 2017, Avon and Somerset Constabulary formally admitted liability for discrimination on the basis of 
gender reassignment under the Equality Act 2010, after three male officers were present at a strip-search of a 
transgender woman at a police station. They also admitted assault (Bhatt Murphy 2017a; Fae 2017b).  This 
case may have implications for the practice of “half-and half” strip searches of transgender prisoners who do 
not have a GRC, and whose bodies/ genitalia are not congruent with their gender, see PSI 67/2011 on Strip 
Searching. 
10
 In January 2018, Tara Hudson commenced legal action against the Ministry of Justice for sexual assault and 
discrimination.  The Ministry of Justice and Government lawyers’ response was, reportedly, that they did not 
consider her to be a woman, and that she “is as a matter of biological fact a man” (Townsend 2018).  Although 
initially scheduled for April 2018, the case has yet to be heard by the courts. 
11
 Broadly, the Prison Service uses a system called ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody, Teamwork) to identify 
prisoners at particular risk of self-harm or suicide, to monitor the prisoner closely, and to engage and support 
them in prison. 
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the jury acknowledged “the day-to-day pressures” on all services involved, which were 
“under immense pressure, understaffed and working in extremely difficult … situations” 
(West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s Court 2017), but concluded that the management of 
ACCT procedures were inadequate, and that some of the mandatory requirements of PSI 
2011 had not been complied with (ibid).  Ten days later, Joanne Latham, who was serving a 
life sentence in a Close Supervision Centre in the male estate12, and had started to live as a 
woman four months’ earlier, also took her own life (PPO 2017). 
These three events, in such close proximity, and the publicity surrounding them, led 
Parliament to hold an emergency debate on the situation of transgender prisoners 
(Hansard, HC Debates, 15 December 2015, vol 603, col 1524-1532).   The House of 
Commons’ Women and Equalities Select Committee’s (“WESC”) report on Transgender 
Equality, published on 8 December 2015, also expressed concern, and drew attention to 
apparent misunderstandings and inconsistencies in the implementation of PSI 2011 (2015: 
paras 300-321). Indeed, to WESC, it appeared that “all too often the Instruction was simply 
being ignored” (ibid: para 309).  The very same day, the Ministry of Justice announced that it 
would undertake a “fundamental review” of the situation of transgender offenders and 
prisoners (2015b), rather than the more limited revision of PSI 2011, which was already 
underway internally.13  Two external reviewers were appointed, who interviewed prison 
                                                          
12
 There are three Close Supervision Centres in the male estate, and none in the female estate.   They hold 
around 60 of the “most dangerous, challenging and disruptive prisoners” in the prison system (HMI Prisons: 
2015).  It is an extreme form of custody, sometimes called “deep custody”, with highly restrictive conditions, 
limited stimuli and human contact (ibid).  There are units at HMP Woodhill, Wakefield and Whitemoor. A 
prisoner would not be placed in a CSC solely because they are transgender. For an in-depth review, see Edgar 
and Shalev 2015.  
13
 Unlike Prison Service Orders (“PSOs”), Prison Service Instructions (“PSIs”) have a fixed expiry date.  PSI 2011 
had officially expired on 14 March 2015, and was already being reviewed internally.  According to the Minister 
for Justice and PPO, PSI 2011 continued to be valid until the revised policy was issued (WESC 2015, para 315). 
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staff and transgender prisoners, amongst others, and sought submissions from a wide-range 
of stakeholders.14  The mandate of the review was to ensure that the care and management 
of transgender offenders and prisoners is “fit for purpose and provides an appropriate 
balance between the needs of the individual and the responsibility to manage risk and 
safeguard the well-being of all prisoners” (Ministry of Justice 2015).  Thus, the terms of the 
review render explicit the need to balance transgender prisoners’ “needs” (notably, still not 
expressed in terms of “rights”) with the prison’s risk management and safeguarding duties.   
The report of the review and the “refreshed” policy (which now covers not only transgender 
prisoners but transgender offenders more broadly) were published on 8 November 2016 
(Ministry of Justice 2016a).  The first official, ad hoc, statistics on the number of transgender 
prisoners were also released.  These identified 70 transgender prisoners in 33 different 
prisons (of a total public and private prison estate of 123) between March 2016 and April 
2016 (Ministry of Justice 2016b).  The statistics do not include prisoners who have already 
transitioned and hold a GRC, or transgender prisoners who are not known to prison staff, 
however, so are not definitive.  The Ministry of Justice recognised there “may be some 
under-counting” (ibid: 2).15  No other demographic data is available on the transgender 
prisoner population in England and Wales.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, some prisoners were told by prison management that since PSI 2011 had expired, it no longer 
applied (Interview with Press for Change, 26 Oct 2015). 
14
 The author contributed to a joint-submission with Sharpe and Emmerich (2016).  
15
 Indeed, the next set of official statistics, published 20 November 2017, identified 125 prisoners living in, or 
presenting in, a gender different to their sex assigned at birth and who had had a local transgender case board 
in the period between 31 March 2017 and 28 April 2017.   47 of the 124 public and private prisons (38%) in 
England and Wales said that they had one or more transgender prisoners in the same period (Ministry of 
Justice: 2017).   
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PSI 2016 became fully effective on 1 January 2017. The revised policy emphasises the need 
for prison administration to consider a person’s gender as a whole, rather than focusing on 
their “sex”, “anatomy” or “sexual functioning”, and promises that the National Offender 
Management Service (“NOMS”, now Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, “HMPPS”) 
will adopt “a more flexible approach” in prison allocation decisions, which will take into 
account not only legally-certified gender, but also “consistent evidence” of living in one’s 
gender.   In an internationally ground-breaking move, PSI 2016 also extends PSI 2011’s 
provisions on access to gender-affirming items to non-binary and gender-fluid prisoners, 
going beyond law’s binary construction of gender.  PSI 2016’s “soft” launch on the day the 
US presidential election results were announced meant the launch of the revised policy 
passed almost unnoticed (Emerton and Harris 2016).  Arguably, this timing was not 
coincidental, but indicative of ministerial anxiety about introducing such a progressive policy 
in a political climate which is hostile to any further expansion of prisoners’ rights. 
Harsh political climate 
The current political environment is not receptive to human rights developments, generally, 
and is particularly critical of the part played by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European 
Court of Human Rights in upholding human rights for “undesirables” such as terrorists, 
prisoners and criminals (Robinson 2015). The Coalition Government vehemently objected to 
the European Court’s ruling in 2005 that prisoners were entitled to the right to vote (Hirst v 
UK (No. 2) [2005] ECHR 681), for example, and the Government has steadfastly refused to 
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implement the court’s decision.16 In 2013, the Conservative Government also “profoundly 
disagreed” with the European Court’s judgment in Vinter and Others v UK [2013] ECHR 645, 
that whole life tariffs without the possibility of parole are inhumane and therefore breach 
prisoners’ human rights (Casciani  2013).  This issue was finally resolved in 2017.17  The 
finalisation of Brexit has put on hold the long-standing Conservative agenda to scrap the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and replace it with a Bill of Rights (Watt 2015; Stone 2016; Bowcott 
2016), and withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights has 
been deferred until at least 2022 (Hope 2017). However, together with Brexit (and 
withdrawal from the European Union’s judicial body, the European Court of Justice), these 
plans remain central to the Government’s agenda to reassert national sovereignty over 
human rights issues.    
In addition to criticising the European Court’s “meddling” in the prisoners’ rights field, the 
Government has reinforced the message that prisoners are less deserving, or “less eligible”, 
than other citizens in terms of human rights, by introducing (in 2013) sweeping legal aid 
cuts, which severely curtail prisoners’ access to legal advice, and to legal representation in 
parole hearings and court (Renaud-Komiya 2013).   Prisoners who wish to challenge their 
conditions or treatment in prison are now only funded on an “exceptional case basis”.18  
                                                          
16
 On 2 November 2017, the Justice Minister announced the Government’s proposal to give the right to vote to 
“around 100 prisoners”, who are on licence for short-term sentences, in the hope of drawing a line under the 
12 year dispute with the European Court (Travis 2017b).   
17
There are around 60 prisoners currently serving whole-life tariffs.  In January 2017, the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Grand Chamber held that whole-life sentences are compatible with article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, after legal clarification by the English courts that such sentences are open to 
review in exceptional circumstances, and therefore do not completely extinguish prisoners’ “right to hope”, 
see Hutchinson v UK [2017] ECHR (App no. 57592/08).  
18
 In April 2017, the Court of Appeal held that the removal of legal aid in three categories – pre-tariff reviews 
by the Parole Board, category A reviews, and decisions on placing prisoners in Close Supervision Centres – was 
unlawful (Howard League for Penal Reform & The Prisoners’ Advice Service, R (On the Application of) v The 
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Even then, use of public funds for prisoner litigation is unpopular under the UK’s rising tide 
of penal populism (Jennings et al 2015), as evidenced in the critical media coverage of the 
handful of cases in which transgender prisoners have exceptionally been granted legal aid to 
bring cases to court (Allen 2009; Doughty 2013).   
Prison crisis 
Meanwhile, at the time this thesis is written, the situation in the English and Welsh prison 
estate is becoming increasingly unstable. Overcrowding, understaffing and underfunding 
have led to impoverished regimes and to prisoners in some prisons regularly spending 23 
hours a day in their cells. Together with the widespread availability of the synthetic drug 
“spice”, violence against staff and other prisoners has surged, and has rendered many 
prisons unsafe, both for prisoners and prison staff.  Unprecedented levels of self-harm and 
suicide are reported amongst prisoners (Travis 2017b; Watt 2017). Her Majesty’s Chief 
Prison Inspector himself has described many prisons as “violent and dangerous” places 
(2015-16: 8). In November 2016, some 10,000 prison officers went on a 24 hour-strike in 
protest at “the volatile and dangerous state of prisons” (Prison Officers’ Association 2016), 
after riots occurred at HMP Lewes and HMP Bedford prisons.   Further riots broke out at 
HMP Birmingham at the end of 2016.   Phil Wheatley, former Chief Executive of NOMS and 
Director General of the Prison Service, has described the custodial system as having been 
brought to the “brink of collapse” by the “deep budget cuts” and “wild swings in 
government policy” under three successive Conservative justice secretaries, Ken Clarke, 
Chris Grayling and Michael Gove (Travis 2016).   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lord Chancellor [2017] EWCA Civ 244).  The lack of legal aid for prisoners to challenge their treatment in 
prison, other than in exceptionally funded cases, remains.   
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Although the current Conservative prime minister, Theresa May, promised a £1.3 billion 
injection of funding into new prisons in the next five years, and an extra 250,000 front-line 
staff, the prison crisis is expected to get worse before it gets better (Wright and Palumbo 
2016).  The Prisons and Court Bill, which prioritised prison safety and reform over the 
warehousing of prisoners (and passed its second reading in the House of Commons in March 
2017), was put on hold when the snap General Election was called in April 2017 and fell with 
the dissolution of parliament in May 2017.  The new Justice Secretary, David Lidington,19 has 
promised to build on previous reforms (Lidington 2017), but there appear to be no plans to 
resurrect the Bill (Bulman 2017).  Meanwhile, the prison crisis shows no signs of abating; in 
August 2017, riots broke out at HMP The Mount, in September 2017, at HMP Birmingham, 
and in October, at HMP Long Lartin.  Whilst prison administrators are coming under 
increasing pressure to absorb human and equality rights in their governance of prisoners, 
maintaining security and good order, and safeguarding prisoners, are of heightened concern 
at a time when many prisons are under considerable strain.  
Fear around trans/gender authenticity and transgender bodies 
Finally, it is important to situate the thesis in the context of current cultural fears and 
anxieties around trans/gender authenticity and transgender bodies. Transgender women’s 
access to “women-only spaces”, including public toilets, prisons and centres for women who 
have experienced rape and domestic violence from men, remains a particularly highly 
charged topic.  This is exemplified by the deep-seated, emotional response to Jessica 
Winfield’s transfer from the male to the women’s prison estate in March 2017 (referred to 
above).  Despite the fact that she had obtained legal recognition of her gender, through a 
                                                          
19
 Subsequently replaced, in January 2018, by David Gauke. 
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GRC, the media coverage of her transfer is indicative of a widespread public view that she is 
not a “real” woman, but a man, and, moreover, that she represents both a psychological 
and physical threat to (cis)women prisoners in the female estate.20 Whilst this fear was 
heightened by the fact that Jessica Winfield was in prison for raping two girls, a similar 
anxiety is evident in relation to the (trans)gender authenticity and bodies of transgender 
women in general.  In January 2017, for example, the Girl Guides’ new guidelines, which 
welcome transgender girls and women into the association, produced the following media 
headlines: “now BOYS can be Girl Guides if they think they’re the wrong gender, and anyone 
who says they’re a woman can be at girls’ sleepovers without telling parents” (Manning 
2017).  Not only do such headlines question transgender women’s authenticity, they also 
imply that they are a threat to children, that they are paedophiles.  Similar anxieties 
followed Top Shop’s announcement that its changing rooms would now be gender-neutral 
(e.g. Petter 2017; Brennan 2017; Jones 2017).   
Although the state has not endorsed the view that transgender people are risky to 
children,21 it has legitimised cultural anxieties around trans/gender authenticity and bodies, 
by permitting the exclusion of transgender people from single-sex spaces and from 
employment which involves close, personal contact with others in its equality legislation.22 
The recent spate of criminal prosecutions for “gender identity fraud” has further 
contributed to this “politics of fear” (Sharpe 2016). Since 2012, six people assigned female 
                                                          
20
 Similar concerns were expressed about trans/gender authenticity and transgender women’s access to 
“women-only spaces”, including prisons, in various submissions to the WESC Transgender Equality Inquiry in 
2015, e.g. submissions by Jeffreys (2015), Campaign to End Rape (2015), Radical Feminist Legal Support 
Network (2015), Women Analysing Policy on Women (2015), and Women and Girls Equality Network (2015).     
21
 Such discourse is reminiscent of the mid-twentieth century conflation between “homosexuality” and 
paedophilia, addressed in the Wolfenden Committee’s report (Home Office: 1957). 
22
 See Chapter 3 for further discussion.   
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at birth (two of whom specifically identified as transgender men)23 have been successfully 
prosecuted for “duping” (cisgender) women into sexual relations with them, by fraudulently 
representing themselves as male24 (see, e.g. Sharpe 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).   
At the same time, the Government’s proposals to further liberalise the legal governance of 
gender (whilst they have cross-party support25 and have been welcomed in some quarters) 
appear to be generating widespread concern.  In July 2017, it was announced that a public 
consultation on the Gender Recognition Act will take place in Autumn 2017 (Government 
Equalities Office 2017), although this consultation is still pending as at 20 December 2017.26  
The proposed consultation is in response to a recommendation in WESC’s report on 
Transgender Equality that the Gender Recognition Act should be updated “in line with the 
principles of gender self-declaration” (2015, para 45). Proposals will include dispensing with 
the requirement for a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and, among other options, 
“reducing the length and intrusiveness of the gender recognition system” (ibid).  In October 
2017, meanwhile, the press reported that the Office for National Statistics (“ONS”) was 
considering whether to make it optional to indicate one’s “sex” in the next 2021 census, on 
the basis that the “question is considered to be irrelevant, unacceptable and intrusive, 
particularly to trans participants, due to asking about sex rather than gender” (Telegraph 
                                                          
23
 Kyran Lee had identified as a man for a decade before the alleged offence, but did not have a GRC.  He has 
since been accepted into a Gender Clinic treatment programme (Sharpe 2015).  As Lee decided to plead guilty, 
the question whether he was in fact guilty of gender fraud was not legally argued or judicially examined.  Chris 
Wilson also identified as a man (ibid). 
24
 This “false representation” was found to vitiate consent, leading to charges of sexual assault and assault by 
penetration. 
25
 Jeremy Corbyn, Leader of the Opposition, has announced that Labour would support “self-determination” of 
gender (Mason 2017). 
26
 As of 20 June 2018, the consultation has still not been announced.  In the meantime, the Scottish parliament 
has conducted its own separate public consultation on reform of the GRA 2004. See: 
https://consult.gov.scot/family-law/review-of-the-gender-recognition-act-2004/. (20 June 2018). The results of 
the Scottish consultation, which closed on 1 March 2018, have not been reported as of 20 June 2018.   
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Reporters 2017c). The ONS report cited by the press was actually directed at generating 
more information about gender identity, and canvassed various options to capture this 
information in the next census. This type of selective media reporting seems intent on 
fuelling anxiety, and generating backlash, among the general public.  It is difficult to assess 
to what extent press coverage reflects the current mood, although it is generally accepted in 
the literature that the media tends to both reflect and shape dominant norms among the 
public (e.g. Gamson et al 1992).  
Strong criticisms also come from feminists who wish to insist on an understanding of 
sex/gender that excludes transgender women from “women-only” spaces, and regard the 
state’s endorsement of psychological “gender identity” through the Gender Recognition Act, 
and its proposed protection in equality law,27 as eroding (cisgender) women’s rights.  As 
prominent radical feminist Germaine Greer has remarked: “we keep arguing that women 
have won everything they need to win. They haven’t even won the right to exist” (Roberts 
2017).  Others have expressed incredulity at the extent of recent developments. In response 
to the ONS report, Philip Davies, MP (interestingly a member of the WESC), said “the world 
is going mad – political correctness is taking over the country” (Hughes 2017). Allison 
Pearson’s opinion piece for the Telegraph decried the Government for being at the 
“forefront of the lunacy”, when “its instinct should be to resist change for change’s sake” 
(2017).  Under the headline, “When will the madness end in this brave new transgender 
world?”, she argues that a “tiny minority” is being allowed “to dictate to the majority” and 
                                                          
27
  WESC proposed that the current protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” in the Equality Act 2010 
should be amended to “gender identity” (2015: para 108).  This proposal has not been taken forward by the 
Government.   
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“what’s at stake here is nothing less than our millennia-old understanding of human beings” 
(ibid).   
Core Aims of the Thesis 
The overarching purpose of the thesis is to show how the historical consolidation of legal, 
medical and penal power in the construction and governance of transgender prisoners has 
had harmful, often violent, effects on their bodies and lives, and to consider the extent to 
which human rights-based legal developments, and human rights and equality discourse, 
have the potential to improve the liveability of their lives.  This central objective can be sub-
divided into three more specific aims.  
The first aim of the thesis is to shed light on law’s direct, “sovereign” or instrumental effects 
on the lives of transgender prisoners; to answer, for example, the more straight-forward 
questions such as how law (i.e. legislation and court judgments) has historically affected 
which prison a transgender prisoner is allocated to, what they may wear, and whether they 
are provided access to medical treatment, such as hormones and gender reassignment 
surgery (if so desired).  The thesis will examine how recent human rights-based legal 
developments, including the Human Rights Act 1998, Gender Recognition Act 2004 and 
Equality Act 2010, have impacted on formal prison policy in relation to transgender 
prisoners.  It will chart the prison authorities’ response to human rights-based shifts in the 
legal boundaries of sex/gender,28 the broadening of equality protection to transgender 
                                                          
28
 As discussed further in Chapter 2, any neat division between sex and gender is conceptually problematic, 
and presenting “sex” as a biological “fact” of the body is misleading, since “biological sex” is a legal and cultural 
construct (Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 ALL ER 33) and medical developments suggest that there may be a 
biological basis for gender identity (e.g. Zhou et al 1995 and Rosenthal 2014). As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Gender Recognition Act now collapses the two terms – hence the reference here to “sex/gender”.  For two 
recent accounts of the relationship between sex and gender, see e.g. Conaghan 2013: 17-23 and Cowan 2005. 
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prisoners, and the replacement of the principle of “less eligibility”29 with “NHS-equivalence” 
in prisoner healthcare. The thesis seeks to identify the emerging fault-lines on the ground, 
to trace specific problems as they migrate from the prison to the courts, and to analyse the 
specific conflicts and their judicial resolution.   
The second, and perhaps more important, aim of the thesis is to go beyond the confines of 
traditional legal analysis to explore the deeper, normative effects of law on the prison’s 
conceptual understanding of sex/gender and on its production of the transgender prisoner. 
This is where a Foucauldian approach to law enriches the analysis.  As detailed in Chapter 2, 
this aspect of the thesis will consider the way in which law acts as a norm-producing power, 
and will examine its power/knowledge effects on the previous discursive terrain.  The thesis 
will argue that, historically, the criminal justice system has been one of many regulatory 
mechanisms that have collectively worked to steer bodies into pre-determined binary 
sex/gender categories as part of the governmentality of sex and gender (Foucault 1978).  
Consequently, transgender prisoners and their bodies have been produced not only as 
culturally and institutionally unintelligible (Butler 1990), but also as risky, as they depart 
from the norm.  They have also been medicalised and pathologised.  The thesis seeks to 
examine the effects of recent human rights and equality discourse on this prior discursive 
terrain.  It considers whether this “new” discourse has the potential to alter the way prison 
administration understands sex/ gender and constructs transgender prisoners, and thus the 
way it governs them.  It asks, for example, whether human rights-based developments have 
                                                          
29
 The principle of less eligibility is understood to come from English poor law, which was regulated by the 
principle that “the condition of the pauper supported from public funds must always be inferior to that which 
could be obtained by working at the lowest-paid job available… lest men prefer idleness to labour” (MacKenzie 
and MacKenzie 1977: 318, cited in Sieh 1980: 160).  In its application to imprisonment, the principle of less 
eligibility stipulates that, to act as a deterrent, prisoners should not receive better treatment than “the lowest 
classes of the free population” (ibid).   
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led the prison administration to redraw its gendered lines conceptually, as well as 
instrumentally, and whether they have had a deeper impact on the prison administration’s 
internal logic, i.e. the way it makes internal sense, against the backdrop of the “new 
penology” (Feeley and Simon 1992) and its “inexorable logic of risk” (Ericson and Haggerty 
1997).  It reflects on whether human rights and equality discourse has the potential to 
recalibrate the transgender prisoner as a human rights-bearer, rather than as a supplicant; 
to alter the deeply entrenched cultural and institutional construction of transgender 
prisoners’ gender as inauthentic, and their bodies as risky; and to stem the resurgence of 
the political and popularist view that prisoners are less deserving of rights, and public 
resources to meet those rights, than “law-abiding citizens”.  
The third aim of the thesis is to reflect on the transformative potential of law and human 
rights, as well as the limits and risks of turning to law and human rights, as a solution to the 
problems presented/ experienced by transgender prisoners whilst they are in prison.  This 
probably begs the question: is the everyday improvement of transgender prisoners’ lives all 
there is to the author’s concept of transformation? There will undoubtedly be some who 
would argue that this conceptualisation of transformation is impoverished, that simply 
aiming for everyday improvements in transgender prisoners’ lives, without challenging the 
broader normative structures at play which increase transgender people’s pathways to 
imprisonment,30 and without interrogating the social normalisation of the prison as an 
                                                          
30
Earlier research suggests that transgender prisoners may be overrepresented in the UK prison system 
(Whittle and Stephens 2001), although up-to-date research is urgently needed in this regard. The harm caused 
to transgender people by the binary gendered norms which structure society at large is reflected in many 
transgender people’s experiences of shame and stigma, exclusion, isolation, discrimination, harassment and 
violence.  These experiences are increasingly well-documented, as are the harmful effects on transgender 
people’s mental health and socio-economic status, in terms of accessing education, employment, housing etc. 
On the UK situation, see, for example, Engendered Penalties: Transgender People’s Experiences of Inequality 
and Discrimination (Whittle et al 2007), the Trans Mental Health Survey 2012 (McNeil et al 2012) and 
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institution (both as a highly gendered institution, and as an institution per se), is not a 
transformative vision at all.  Indeed, some might argue that legal and policy reform in this 
field not only serves to shore-up the status quo, but also actively prevents more radical 
transformation – a process Reva Siegal has aptly called “preservation through 
transformation” (1977, as cited in Harris 2006: 1540).  
The author would not disagree that seeking improvements in the everyday lives of 
transgender prisoners is a narrow (albeit pragmatic/realistic) conceptualisation of 
transformation, and that broader visions of transformation must be pursued alongside.  She 
also recognises the “paradox” of human rights (Brown 2000), whereby engagement with 
human rights is unpredictable and short-term gains may sometimes come at the expense of 
long-term objectives. 31  The author would respond, however, there is an urgency to the 
situation of transgender prisoners, as clearly attested by the cases of suicide, self-harm and 
suffering referred to in this thesis, which justifies recourse to human rights, notwithstanding 
its unpredictability, limits and risks.  It is not a matter of pursuing a human rights “luxury”, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stonewalls’ recent Trans Report (2018). The government’s LGBT consultation and survey, the report of which is 
due to be published in summer 2018, also promises to be highly informative of the experiences of LGBT 
(including non-binary) people living in the UK today. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-lgbt-survey. (20 June 2018). 
31
 In an excellent article entitled “From Stonewall to the Suburbs?  Towards a Political Economy of Sexuality”, 
Angela Harris explores this paradox through an analysis of the long-term political implications for the queer 
movement of the landmark US Supreme Court gay rights decision in Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003).  
Citing Siegal, Harris expresses concern that the fight for same-sex marriage in the US risks becoming yet 
another example of “preservation through transformation”, as the absorption of queering the family into 
same-sex marriage threatens to silence the deeper gay and feminist critique of marriage per se. Adding a note 
of caution to other scholars’ optimism surrounding Lawrence v Texas (which declared sodomy laws 
unconstitutional) and its potential for long-term transformation, notwithstanding the short-term, vicious 
backlash against same-sex marriage laws that followed, Harris argues that, fifty years after the US Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) (which struck down state laws establishing 
separate schools for black and white students), many regard the decision in Brown as “a story of winning the 
battle but losing the war” as “despite the contemporary judicial embrace of the benefits of ‘diversity’” the 
more transformative vision of “integration as a social ideal, not to mention a material reality, seems to have 
been lost” (2006: 1545).  Brown, Harris argues, is in fact “a story about the taming of a radical vision through 
law” (1546, emphasis added).  
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as some might regard the right of same-sex couples to marry, for example, the stakes are far 
higher, they literally concern the liveability of transgender people’s lives.   As many 
commentators have remarked, it easy to critique from the shadows, and to keep one’s 
hands clean,32 but Foucault himself urged us to get our hands dirty, to make decisions and 
act, even if we make the wrong decisions, tie ourselves in knots and no longer know what to 
do.  In the transgender law field, scholars and activists such as Paisley Currah (e.g. 2003) and 
Dean Spade (e.g. 2009, 2012) have written compellingly on the importance of remaining 
grounded in the urgent needs of transgender people in the here and now, whilst working 
towards a broader set of demands, and a larger political imaginary.   Spade argues that, in 
order to confront this challenge in law reform and policy work, we must centre the 
experiences of those most vulnerable in our communities, such as prisoners (2009:312) and 
measure the quality of law reform work in terms of “meaningful changes to trans lives” 
(311).  He includes prison health care, prison placement and gender change on identification 
documents as examples of “urgent areas affecting the survival of vulnerable trans people 
today” (312). 
Having briefly addressed this issue, it is time to return to the current (third) aim of the 
thesis, namely to assess the transformative potential of law and human rights to improve 
the everyday lives of transgender prisoners.  In the same way that Foucault critiqued the 
grand narrative of rational scientific discovery and progress in the Enlightenment period, 
Smart has argued that law is often presented as “a force of linear progress, a beacon to lead 
us out of darkness” (1989:12) and warned that we should not be “seduced” by law as a 
                                                          
32
 In the educational field, Allen Luke similarly responds to those who would argue that anything done to 
improve the educational system simply services the existing project, by urging us to “draw the line about our 
intervention somewhere”, or we and our work “may be destined to critique”, preventing us from “getting our 
hands dirty”.  As he astutely observes, “there is a haven in critique” (1995: 75).  
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solution to social problems or assume that “rights” will correct “wrongs”.  The thesis seeks 
to demonstrate how human rights-based legal developments have a tendency to re-
entrench hegemonic norms in the very moment of reform and to exclude as they include.  It 
aims to show through a critical discourse analysis33 of the first judgments to emanate from 
the UK transgender prisoner rights’ field, that prisoners’ recourse to, and resistance 
through, human rights is unpredictable, both in terms of its immediate outcome and its 
potentially negative discursive effects; that it often comes at a price.   The prison, with its 
literal division of prisoners into the male and female estate, offers a particularly useful case 
study for how transgender people and their bodies are problematised in broader society.  
The prison acts not simply as a mirror, but as a magnifying glass on society, and on the 
challenges faced by law, and its human rights and equality discourse, in changing historically 
entrenched cultural “truths” about sex/gender, and in adapting to the rapidly changing 
gender landscape.  
In the final analysis, after analysing recent developments in law, policy and case-law in 
relation to transgender prisoners, the thesis will argue that there is a certain inescapable 
“truth” that contemporary society cannot (yet) seem to get beyond, namely that gender is 
about anatomical bodies and a certain biological “truth”, and that transgender people are 
fundamentally inauthentic and inherently risky, both to cisgender people and to the 
established gender order.  This particular truth returns like a Foucauldian wheel of power; it 
is not only that prison administration tends to revert to the way things were always done 
(Pat Carlen has referred to this propensity as “carceral clawback” (2002)), but that it tends 
                                                          
33 The thesis uses critical discourse analysis to examine the various legal, policy and other texts relied upon in 
this thesis, as informed by post-structuralism and the work of Foucault.  This approach is well-known and does 
not need to be expounded upon here (see e.g. Hall 2001 and Graham 2011 for good overviews).   
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to revert to the way it has always thought about transgender people and always understood 
them, and made internal sense through its binary categorisation and division of sexed 
bodies and its gendered disciplinary regimes.   
The thesis proposes that the way that gender and bodies have always been interpreted is so 
historically and culturally entrenched that law, prison administration, and society as a 
whole, are struggling to adjust.  Whilst human rights and equality discourse has led to an 
apparently liberalising moment in the re-conceptualisation of gender, the situation of 
transgender prisoners highlights the fact that law and policy doesn’t yet fully translate, 
culturally or institutionally.  It demonstrates that the tensions are too great at this point, 
and that recourse to human rights always meets its limits on the ground, in flesh and blood.  
The optimistic discourse of human rights meets with, competes with, and is often trumped 
by the unshakeable, inexorable, discourse of risk.  Yet, this thesis will argue that human 
rights is not an empty discourse, and that human rights are not illusory, but that changing 
the gender order is a slow legal, political and cultural struggle, in which law and its powerful 
human rights discourse can play a valuable part. 
Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis will make an original and timely contribution to the literature.  It will be the first 
in-depth piece of research into the historical and contemporary situation of transgender 
prisoners in England and Wales - not only in law, but across the disciplines.  By collating 
materials and information from a wide range of sources (see Methodology and Research 
Sources below) and mapping the field, it will be of value to many scholars and activists, 
especially given the recent, burgeoning interest in this topic.  It will also contribute to wider 
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academic scholarship on trans/gender, prisons, law and human rights.  The following review 
will show how the thesis will fill a gap in the current, limited literature in the field. 
There is surprisingly little UK scholarly literature on the situation of transgender prisoners, 
and hardly any which directly informs either a traditional legal analysis, or a Foucauldian 
analysis of the effects of law and human rights on the governance, and liveability, of 
transgender prisoners’ lives.  Traditional legal scholarship on prisoners’ human rights in the 
UK (e.g. Livingstone et al 2008) and in the European context (e.g. Livingstone 2000; Van Zyl 
Smit and Snacken 2009) has yet to engage with the situation of transgender prisoners.  UK 
criminological literature, whilst alive to the effects of penal power on gendered bodies, 
especially women’s bodies (e.g. Carlen 1983; Dobash, Dobash and Gutteridge 1986; Zedner 
1991a, 1991b; Bosworth 2000; Sim 1990; Carlen and Worrell 2004; Corcoran 2006) and to 
the effects of the prison’s institutionally entrenched, exaggerated gender norms on prison 
masculinities (e.g. Sim 1994; Newburn and Stanko (eds) 1994; Jewkes 2005; Philipps 2014) 
has tended to take the subjects of “women in prison” and “men in prison” as fixed, rather 
than fluid and contested sites, although the new field of queer criminology is starting to 
address this shortcoming, as discussed below.    
In the last few years, new strands of literature have started to emerge which specifically 
focus on the transgender prisoner population in the English and Welsh prison system, but to 
date, none offers an in-depth, theoretically-based analysis of the transgender prisoner as a 
subject of law, human rights and/or risk discourse.  In sum, academic literature on UK legal 
and policy developments relating to the governance of transgender prisoners is sparse.  The 
following outlines three areas in which a literature is developing:  the first relates to law and 
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prison policy, the second to professional practice of working with transgender prisoners, 
and the third to transgender prisoners’ experiences. 
First, there is a small body of literature on law and prison policy relating to transgender 
prisoners in the UK, mainly in the form of short overviews and commentaries.  Commentary 
on PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 comprises several brief summaries in the prisoner newsletter 
Inside Time (Cooney 2009; Harman 2016), Sarah Lamble’s concise, perceptive critique of PSI 
2011 in the Howard League for Penal Reform ECAN Bulletin (2012), and Robyn Emerton and 
Mia Harris’s comment on PSI 2016 in Inherently Human (2016).  Jane Ryan, a solicitor who 
has advised a number of transgender prisoners in actions against the state, provides an 
excellent synopsis of recent developments in policy and case-law in Legal Action (2016b), 
and has offered an insightful critique of prison policy and practice at various conferences 
(e.g. 2016a).  Some other literature informs the field, but does not comprehensively deal 
with the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the Equality Act 2010, PSI 2011 or PSI 2016.  Set 
against the backdrop of the Equality Act 2010 and prison policy on Ensuring Equality (PSI 
32/2011), for example, Peter Dunn (2013) examines the quality of engagement with sexual 
orientation and transgender issues in the English and Welsh prison system, through an 
analysis of HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ findings, but does not relate this to PSI 2011.  Sarah 
Pemberton’s comparative analysis of US and UK’s prison placement and healthcare policies 
for transgender prisoners acts as a forerunner for this thesis in its Foucauldian and Butlerian 
approach to the material (2013), but unfortunately the policy discussion is (by the author’s 
own admission) very broad brush, and neglects recent developments in the UK field, 
including PSI 2011.   
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The only other example in the legal and policy field is Petra Boldt’s and Chris Philipps’ article 
for the Scottish Law Journal (2011).  This article is highly revealing of the negative 
stereotyping which can occur in this field and is useful to the thesis’s analysis of the 
seemingly widespread, enduring view that transgender prisoners’ gender is inauthentic, and 
that transgender women prisoners are especially risky.  Without citing any evidence, the 
authors uncritically portray transgender women – especially those who they characterise as 
being “obviously of the opposite sex” (ibid:3) – as representing a threat to cisgender women 
prisoners in women’s prisons, causing the latter emotional distress and even insomnia (ibid).  
They further mention the problems which can occur where “a transgender male is dressed 
as a woman” in a male prison (ibid).  The authors do not situate their analysis in the feminist 
literature, nor do they demonstrate any awareness that these statements are anything 
other than taken-for-granted “truths” about transgender prisoners, which disavow their 
gender authenticity.   Yet, their comments are suggestive of the trans-exclusionary radical 
feminist position adopted, for example, by Jeffreys in Gender Hurts: A Feminist Analysis of 
the Politics of Transgenderism (2014).  Referring to a smattering of transgender prisoners 
imprisoned for violence against women in the US, Canada and the UK, Jeffreys critiques the 
progressive realisation of transgender prisoners’ rights, whereby “a man’s right to wear 
make-up and be housed with vulnerable women who are incarcerated trumps the right of 
those women to be protected from violent men” (ibid, 161).  Whilst not reflective of the 
trans-inclusive feminist position the author adopts in this thesis, such discourse seems to 
have considerable traction with the general public.  It must therefore be taken into account 
in the thesis, as a competing discourse to transgender prisoners’ rights (see Chapter 3). 
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Outside the legal and policy field, the second area of burgeoning UK-based research relates 
to professionals working with transgender prisoners.  This literature offers useful 
background for this thesis, but is more practically- rather than theoretically-driven.  This is 
true, for example, of Stephen Whittle and Lindsey Poole’s early pilot study into the provision 
for transgender offenders in the criminal justice system and the information needs of 
probation officers working with transgender offenders (2001; Poole, Whittle and Stephens 
2002) which was, for a long time, the only research in the field, and regularly cited in 
transgender equality reports (e.g. Whittle et al 2007; Mitchell and Howarth 2009).  After a 
gap of more than a decade, new research has started to emerge, largely in the forensic 
psychiatry and psychology field: a literature review seeking insights into the question of how 
to coordinate prisoners’ gender reassignment with offender behaviour therapy in prison 
therapeutic communities (Jones and Brookes 2013),34 and a paper examining one 
transgender woman’s experience thereof (Disspain et al 2015). Another paper examines 
prison staff’s experiences of working with transgender women who are sex offenders in a 
male prison (Marlow, Winder and Elliot 2017). 
Transgender prisoners’ experiences have also started to be documented, contributing to a 
nascent knowledge about them as a prison population in England and Wales.  This third area 
of literature includes Phil Forder’s Released Inside: Conversations with Transgender 
Prisoners and the Staff that Care for them (2017), which relays the experiences of 13 
transgender prisoners, and several staff, in HMP Albany, HMP Parkhurst, HMP Rye Hill, HMP 
Parc and HMP Stafford.  In compiling these accounts, the author (a community inclusion 
manager from HMP Parc in South Wales) seeks to give some “practical insights to assist 
                                                          
34
 On HMP Grendon’s therapeutic prison community, see Genders and Player (2010). See also Shefer (2012). 
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prison staff working on a daily basis with transgender prisoners” (ibid: 6). Sarah Jane Baker’s 
Transgender behind Prison Walls (2017) gives a first-hand account of her experience of 
transitioning in prison, reviews prison policy, and offers practical guidance and information 
directed at “all transgender prisoners, their families and prison staff” (ibid: 17).   Both works 
provide valuable insights into experiences of transgender prisoners, and give a personal 
dimension to some of the issues identified by this thesis.  For example, Baker observes that 
transgender prisoners face “cultural resistance and marginalisation behind bars”, and “what 
rights we do have are seen as privileges, rather than a humane and civilised way of treating 
some of the most vulnerable inmates without our penal system” (ibid: 19). 
This newly emerging body of literature is a sign of increasing interest in the transgender 
prison population in England and Wales, a population which has, for many years, been 
largely invisible (Gordon et al 2017).  It makes an important contribution to knowledge 
about the experiences of transgender prisoners – which, Gordon et al conclude, is “an 
under-researched area generally, but particularly in the UK” (ibid: 11) – and of the 
experiences of those working with them.  However, the academic literature does not yet 
examine law and policy in this field, nor has it engaged with the effects of recent human-
rights based developments and discourse on the governance of transgender prisoners’ daily 
lives.   
By stark contrast to the limited academic scholarship in the UK, a substantial body of 
academic literature (and jurisprudence) on transgender prisoners exists in the US, including 
detailed legal and human rights analyses.  Particularly valuable examples include: 
Rosenblum 1999; Tarzwell 2006; Lee 2008; Arkles 2009; Okamura 2011; Arkles 2012 and 
Harvard Law Review 2013-14.  The US literature also benefits from the rich research output 
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of a large-scale empirical research project into the views of transgender women housed in 
men’s prisons regarding their preferred prison allocation (Sexton, Jenness and Sumner 2010; 
Jenness 2010; Jenness 2014), their sense of community (Sexton and Jenness 2016) and the 
“dilemma of difference” (Sumner and Sexton 2016).  This project also generated an 
insightful gender analysis of the women’s desire to be recognised as authentic women, or 
what they call the “real deal” (Jenness and Fenstermaker 2014).  US trans/queer scholarship 
has also started to engage with the prison system from a prison abolitionist stance (e.g. 
Spade 2011 and 2015; Stanley and Smith (eds) 2011; Vitulli 2013).  Further, Regina Kunzel’s 
history of sexuality in the American prison (2008) provides a rich source of material relating 
to the historical governance of sexually and gender “deviant” prisoners, which is absent in 
the UK literature.   
Beyond the US, scholars have analysed the legal situation of transgender prisoners in 
Australia (e.g. Edney 2004), Canada (e.g. Mann 2006, Smith 2014), Hong Kong (Erni 2013) 
and Israel (Yona 2016).  Whilst the author has studied this comparative literature in depth, it 
is referred to in this thesis only where it particularly enriches the analysis and/or UK-specific 
literature is lacking. Aside from the fact that the prison systems and prison policies are very 
different, the US literature in particular is so well-established that she was concerned that 
over-reliance on it would run the risk of eclipsing the UK analysis.  By focusing on 
transgender prisoners in the English and Welsh prison system, this thesis will make an 
original contribution to the literature and will map the field for future research.   
The fact that the thesis concentrates on transgender prisoners, and not gender non-
conforming people more broadly, may lead to criticisms that the research upholds, rather 
  
30 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
than challenges, existing identity-based categories.35 That is not its intention.  As queer 
criminology is emerging, there are inevitably different views on the direction it should take, 
and it is recognised that this thesis is relatively moderate in its “queer ambitions”. Matthew 
Ball (2014) persuasively calls for “queer/ed criminology” to take “queer” as denoting a mode 
of doing something, and a position from which something can be done, rather than as an 
identity (2014: 23) and draws on Foucault’s understanding of critique as “the art of not 
being governed” (1978:44) to chart a possible path for critical queer/ed criminology.  Whilst 
Ball recognises the value of representing LGBTQ people in criminological research, and 
producing knowledge about their experiences, he expresses concern that such “inclusion 
projects” (ibid: 24) may potentially lead to the use of essentialised understandings of 
identity.36 Ball continues that “even works that do engage with queer theoretical insights 
regarding sexuality and gender diversity, that unpack the homo/hetero binary and are 
attuned to matters of essentialism … can often limit the boundaries of the critique that they 
offer” (ibid: 22), in that “they use queer concepts to more effectively understand and 
represent the subjects of the research, and not in the other ways they could be used, such 
as to think differently about the broader criminological enterprise itself” (ibid: 23).  This 
critique is partially true of this thesis; its aim is indeed to engage with queer (and other) 
theoretical insights to better understand the regulation of transgender prisoners as a 
defined subject of law and prison policy. It is not concerned with deconstructing the 
criminological enterprise.  It leaves that more radical work to other scholars, such as those 
                                                          
35 Further, although an intersectional approach is preferable when researching and writing about marginalised 
groups (see e.g. Arkles’ pioneering study of the enforcement of racialised gender norms through prison dress 
in US prisons, 2012), such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
36
 Indeed, this was the experience of feminism in its early efforts to define the “woman” of its representational 
politics, which led inter alia to the exclusion of transgender women and other women who did not conform to 
the heteronormative matrix, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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who argue that trans/queer liberation and prison abolition must be grown together (e.g. 
Stanley and Smith (eds) 2011, Spade 2011 and 2015, Lamble 2013).  In criminological terms, 
its more moderate aims are aligned with “queer realism” (Woods 2014).  This approach 
treads a path between identity-based perspectives, which assume that existing categories of 
sexual orientation and gender identity (e.g. gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender) correspond 
to collective identities, and deconstructive approaches, that seek to disrupt fixed or 
stabilised notions of sexual orientation and gender identity (Ball et al 2014:6).  
Borrowing from Adrian Howe’s reflections on the disjunction between postmodern critique 
and feminist practice in the context of research on women prisoners, the author is mindful 
that we must be careful not to risk losing sight of transgender prisoners, just as they are 
beginning to become visible (1994: 164).  It is important not to become paralysed by the 
rigorous demands of postmodernism and poststructuralism to question and deconstruct 
everything – despite Foucault’s poststructuralist desire to disrupt equilibrium and certainty 
so that “all those who speak for others or to others” no longer know what to do (ibid: 288) – 
for otherwise there would be no progress in the field, even if law’s solutions are not perfect.  
Similarly, as Laureen Snider has remarked in relation to reforms in relation to women’s 
imprisonment, it is important not to arrive at an “ironic impasse”, where one group 
fervently works towards legal and policy advances for transgender prisoners on the basis of 
existing knowledge of their needs, whilst another group works just as fast to deconstruct 
that knowledge and to critique legal and policy reform as not radical enough (2003).  There 
is also a sentiment here, that it is important to attend to the needs of those here and now, 
rather than sacrifice them and their hard-won identities to some notional better future.   
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Beyond the UK literature on transgender prisoners, the thesis draws on, and, in turn hopes 
to contribute to, a broad base of literature in the legal, gender and criminological field.  
Rather than review this wide range of literature here, it will be integrated, as relevant, into 
subsequent chapters.  The purpose of the above, brief review is simply to show how this 
thesis fits into the existing small body of literature on transgender prisoners in the UK, and 
to demonstrate how it will contribute to it. 
Methodology and Research Sources 
Before turning to the historical background to the thesis, an explanation of its methodology 
and research sources is apposite, particularly given that some might regard its mixed-
methods as somewhat unorthodox, and, as with many research projects, the final thesis 
does not directly reflect the much broader research base it started out from. 
The author is mindful of Vivien Namaste’s critique that transgender people have not been 
served by the queer academic project (2000 and 2009), and that a “truly transformative 
intellectual practice would collaborate” with the transgender people under investigation, to 
ensure that it is useful to them, and “to ensure that their political and intellectual priorities 
are addressed” (2009:27). That more ambitious, collaborative task lies ahead.  The first task, 
and the one that most suits the author’s legal skill-set, is to map the field.  This essential, 
preliminary work has not yet been done.   It is important to note, however, that in the early 
phases of research, the author spent considerable time and energy exploring the viability of 
conducting a more traditional criminological or socio-legal piece of research into the way in 
which recent human rights law and policy developments are playing out on the ground, 
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which would be examined through interviews with prison governors, prison staff and 
transgender prisoners.   
In addition to reviewing the literature on conducting research inside English and Welsh 
prisons (e.g. Liebling 1999; Bosworth et al 2005; Crewe 2009; Phillips and Earle 2010; Rowe 
2011 and Phillips 2012: Chapter 3), this exploratory phase included meeting with Jamie 
Bennett (governor, HMP Grendon) and Sarah Disspain (forensic psychologist, then at HMP 
Grendon) about research possibilities at HMP Grendon, which has housed several 
transgender prisoners over the years and was interested in supporting further research in 
this field (see Disspain et al 2015).  It also included very helpful conversations with staff at 
the Howard League for Penal Reform and with Alisa Stevens, University of Southampton, 
regarding the methodology used to research prisoners’ experiences for the Sex in Prison 
project (Howard League for Penal Reform 2014 and 2015).   
In order to obtain a sufficiently robust sample of what the author, from her preliminary 
research,37 understood to be a small and highly dispersed transgender prisoner population, 
and their management, interviews for this project would need to be carried out in 
numerous prisons across the country.   It became clear that the need to obtain approval 
from NOMS National Research Committee (“NRC”) to such a research project, in addition to 
University ethics approval, would present a major challenge in the context of a three-year 
funded doctoral research project.  Indeed, Michelle Jaffe, a previous doctoral candidate at 
Keele University, spent two years negotiating with the NRC to obtain approval for a research 
                                                          
37
 This preliminary research involved mapping details of known transgender prisoners in the English and Welsh 
prison system from press reports, HM Prison Inspectorate reports, IMB reports, case law and other public 
sources. It will be recalled that, at this time, there was no official data on the numbers or locations of 
transgender prisoners. The first official statistics, released in November 2016, identified 70 transgender 
prisoners across 33 prisons, in a one month window (Ministry of Justice 2016b). 
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project on the Samaritans’ Listening Project, which involved a survey and interviews with 
prisoners, staff and “listeners” in four prisons. Her doctoral thesis (Jaffe 2015) was 
accompanied by a volume of correspondence with the NRC which was as thick as the thesis 
itself, and made for sobering reading; this was clearly a political minefield (see ibid: 118-125 
in particular).   
Even if NRC approval were ultimately obtained, the author and her supervisors concluded 
that the logistics of such an ambitious project were simply not viable in the context and 
time-frame of a PhD, and that the time and costs involved would outweigh the benefits.  
Moreover, there was a very real risk that the research would not yield the amount, quality 
and depth of data needed to test the author’s primary research questions relating to the 
impact of law and policy in this field and its interrelationship with the governance of risk.  In 
addition, the data would be unlikely to be representative of the transgender prisoner 
population.38  Instead, by mapping the field, from a wide and creative range of research 
sources, it is hoped that this thesis will act as a spring-board for further research, including, 
as a priority, prison-based research of the nature described above (see Conclusion). 
The thesis therefore seeks to at least indirectly account for the experiences and concerns of 
some transgender prisoners, and to assess the potential and limits of legal and policy 
developments to improve transgender prisoners’ lives, not through on-the-ground research 
into transgender prisoners’ and prison management’s day-to-day experiences, but through 
an analysis of the types of issues which have reached the courts, voluntary sector 
                                                          
38
 Aside from the issue of obtaining NRC (and relevant prisons’) consent, interviews would be much more likely 
to be of long-term prisoners. The problems of identifying and capturing (in time) the experiences of short-term 
transgender prisoners and their management, via all the necessary approvals and security clearances, might 
well be insurmountable. 
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organisations and the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, all of which are researchable 
from the “outside”.   
Complaints which have reached the courts provided the richest textual material for the 
analysis in this thesis; the judgments in AB (2009) and Green (2013) offer an invaluable 
window on the prison’s construction of the transgender prisoner and important insights into 
the emerging fault-lines between the “new” human rights discourse and established risk-
based governance of transgender prisoners, the official rationale behind prison decisions, 
and the courts’ resolution of the issues.  Press announcements on recent cases settled out 
of court (e.g. XT, Bhatt Murphy Solicitors 2017b), and the judgment in the preliminary 
hearing for Hunnisett (2017) have since added to these important research sources (see 
Chapter 4).  In order to supplement these core materials, the author conducted four semi-
structured, qualitative interviews with voluntary sector organisations who have engaged in 
providing support, advice and advocacy for transgender prisoners.  These comprised: the 
Gender Identity Research and Education Society (“GIRES”) (13 Oct 2015), Press for Change 
(“PFC”) (26 Oct 2015), the Prison Reform Trust (“PRT”) (17 Nov 2015) and the Prisoners’ 
Advice Service (“PAS”) (13 April 2016).  The author also interviewed a solicitor who has 
represented several transgender prisoners pursuing legal cases against the Ministry of 
Justice (Jane Ryan, Bhatt Murphy Solicitors) (18 May 2016).   
These interviews sought to enhance the desk-based research by tapping into the accounts, 
experiences and insights of voluntary sector organisations and solicitors regarding their 
work on behalf of transgender prisoners, and to seek their views on the extent to which (if 
any) recent human rights developments, and particularly the PSI 2011, have helped them to 
advocate on behalf of transgender prisoners, whether through policy reform efforts and/or 
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in individual cases.  Appendix 1 contains Keele Research Ethics Committee approval, granted 
in July 2015, and Appendix 2 contains the schedule of questions used to guide the 
interviews.    
The main contribution these interviews made to the research data was the information they 
provided about a number of cases settled outside the court process (albeit details were 
necessarily limited, due to client confidentiality), and the fact that the author was kept 
aware of subsequent developments in the field by Press for Change and Jane Ryan.  Whilst 
the interviews provided extremely helpful background for the project, and in particular, 
gave the author a sense of the important work that voluntary sector organisations do 
“behind the scenes”, the data gathered was not sufficiently robust to advance the central 
analysis around the power of human rights to improve the situation of transgender 
prisoners, so no further interviews were pursued.  The author recognises that solicitors 
working in this very small legal field have to be particularly careful to retain client 
confidentiality, and that voluntary sector organisations have to tread a cautious, non-
political path, in order to retain their reputations and to support their clients and meet their 
needs.  Thus the content of the interviews was probably not only limited by client 
confidentiality, but also by “realpolitik”.  For example, one voluntary sector organisation 
approached by the author did not wish to be interviewed, or for advertisements to be 
placed in their magazine, on the basis that it was extremely important for them to remain 
independent from academic research projects.  Another example of caution on the part of 
solicitors and voluntary sector organisations, is that most of the interviews were not 
recorded, at the request of the interviewees.  This brief account is given to help explain the 
sparse use made of the interviews in the thesis.   Although they were a very valuable source 
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of information (and in particular helped to fill in some gaps regarding transgender men’s 
experiences, which are entirely absent from existing case law and literature), they are not 
presented in the thesis as a source of qualitative research data which is subjected to 
systematic analysis within its overall aims and objectives.     
During the course of the research, the author had around  50 more informal conversations, 
in person or on the telephone, and ranging from 5 minutes to 45 minutes, with a wide range 
of people including voluntary sector workers, prison governors, prison wing staff, prison 
equality officers, prison mental healthcare staff, prison GPs, prison-based forensic 
psychologists, members of the Independent Monitoring Board and HM Prison Inspectorate, 
coroners, solicitors and barristers, and others working in the field.  These opportunities 
mainly arose out of various conferences, seminars and inquests.  In particular  Joanne 
Roberts,39 who was working as a volunteer at Only Connect, spent an hour talking to the 
author about her experiences of the issues facing transgender prisoners (both transgender 
men and women) she had lived alongside in various women’s prisons, which provided 
invaluable insights from the “inside” (7 July 2014).  James Barrett, lead consultant at the 
Charing Cross Gender Identity Clinic, and president of the British Association of Gender 
Identity Specialists, shared his views on PSI 2011, his clinical experience of dealing with 
transgender prisoners, and his thoughts on the need for comprehensive research in this 
field (including an urgent need to explore the views of prison governors and prison 
psychiatrists on the subject), in a long telephone conversation (13 Oct 2015).  Louise Finer, 
Senior Policy Officer and National Preventive Mechanism Coordinator at HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons, met to discuss the author’s research and HM Inspectorate of Prison’s work on the 
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 Name changed. 
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issue (24 June 2016).  Since these conversations were not conducted as formal interviews, 
they cannot be directly cited, but they greatly enriched the author’s overall understanding 
of the subject, from many different perspectives.   They are mentioned here not as formal 
research methodology, but to show the extent of the author’s deeper and broader 
engagement with the research, beyond that which is more clearly evident from the text of 
the thesis. They also demonstrate the need for future qualitative research, to capture these 
different experiences and insights in a very fast-moving field.  
Similarly, as well as examining PPO reports on investigations into the deaths of transgender 
prisoners in custody, the author attended part of the coroners’ inquests relating to the 
deaths in custody of Senthooram Kanagasingham (2015) and Vikki Thompson (2017) (two 
and four days, respectively), to gain a deeper insight into these cases.    
Finally, turning back to research sources, given the lack of previous research in the field, the 
thesis draws on wide range of sources outside the traditional literature, including 
parliamentary debates and “grey” materials such as voluntary sector reports and 
government reports.  It has also had to rely fairly heavily on press reports for information 
about transgender prisoners.  Apart from various on-line data bases, the Lesbian and Gay 
Newspaper Archives (“LAGNA”) has been an invaluable source for otherwise hard-to-find 
historical press cuttings.  The Prison Service College Library kindly provided the author with 
access to the complete collection of the Prison Service Medical Journal and other historical, 
in-house publications.  Staff at the Hull History Centre, Hull University (Liberty Archives), and 
at the Transgender Archives at University of Victoria, Canada assisted the author in trying to 
track down historical materials.  Drawing on such a wide range of sources has produced a 
much broader picture of the contemporary situation than available in the current literature, 
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and has helped piece together what the author believes to be the first, albeit preliminary, 
history of the treatment of transgender prisoners in England and Wales.   
Structure of the Thesis and Chapter Outlines  
The thesis begins by laying the broad historical, theoretical and legal ground, in Chapters 1 
through to 3. It then analyses the effects of law and human rights on the prison 
administration’s construction of transgender prisoners, and its governance of their lives in 
three specific areas, namely prison allocation and segregation (Chapter 4), gender 
presentation (Chapter 5) and access to medical gender reassignment treatment (Chapter 6).   
The following provides a synopsis of each chapter and simultaneously highlights some of the 
core themes that will run through the thesis.  
Chapter 1 sets the historical scene for the thesis.  Whilst the “transsexual” was named in 
British medicine in 1949 (Cauldwell 1949), it is important to have a sense of the longer 
history of the gender non-conforming figure, not only in order to contextualise later legal, 
medical and penal developments, but also for understanding the deeply-entrenched 
historical roots of much contemporary discourse around transgender prisoners, and 
especially transgender women prisoners.  The chapter highlights the criminalisation of men 
for “personating women for immoral purposes” in the Victorian era, which has had enduring 
discursive power in the construction of transgender women’s gender performance as 
inauthentic, artificial and imitative, and their bodies as potentially risky to cisgender women 
in close, confined sex-segregated spaces, such as prisons.   The chapter then traces the 
historical pathologisation of transgender people, and the medicalisation of “transsexuality” 
through the curative model of hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery.   The 
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chapter shows how these two historical discourses converged in law’s first medico-legal 
construction of the “transsexual”.  As the thesis will demonstrate, the first legal definition of 
sex, laid down in Corbett v Corbett *1970+ 2 All ER 33 (“Corbett”), was based on certain 
biological factors (especially genitalia) at birth, and refused to recognise transgender 
people’s gender.  This case governed the legal regulation of sex/gender for the next 30 
years.   
Chapter 2 sets out the three theoretical “pillars” which structure the thesis in its analysis of 
law and human rights, gender and risk.  It shows how a Foucauldian-based approach links 
the three fields together.  Although Foucault is widely understood to have narrated the 
demise of law in modern power relations, and to have rejected human rights as an illusory 
form of resistance to state power, this chapter draws on post-Foucauldian legal scholarship 
to argue that law is a powerful force in contemporary society, and that human rights 
discourse has considerable political purchase, even though recourse to rights carries risk. It 
argues that is important to examine law as a productive power, which not only represents 
but also constitutes its subjects, and has powerful norm-producing effects on the way that 
society thinks, speaks and acts about sex/gender and transgender people.  The second 
theoretical pillar comprises feminist, queer and transgender theory on the constitution, 
performativity and embodiment of gender. Following Butler (1990), the chapter argues that 
dominant scripts of sex/gender have restricted the possibilities of gendered lives, and 
rendered certain trans/gender lives and bodies “culturally unintelligible”. It addresses the 
powerful, trans-exclusionary radical feminist discourse that transgender women’s bodies 
present a physical and psychological risk to cisgender women in “women-only” spaces.  This 
construction of transgender people and their bodies as risky intersects with the third 
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theoretical pillar of the thesis.  This third part draws on risk literature, to argue that, in 
contemporary “risk society” (Beck 1992), and under the continuing conditions of the “new 
penology” (Feeley and Simon 1992), risk has become a key driving force in prison 
management and pervades prison thinking at every level. Approaching risk through a 
governmentality approach, the chapter argues that transgender prisoners are primarily 
constructed and governed as a fundamental risk to the prison’s established binary 
sex/gender order.  It argues that transgender prisoners present a myriad of new and 
uncertain challenges for prison governance, which are constructed primarily as risks, and 
approached through a precautionary logic.   
Chapter 3 returns to the story of law.  It charts the emergence of the transgender prisoner 
as a human rights-bearer, through cumulative developments in transgender rights and 
prisoner rights.  Drawing on the theoretical insights of Chapter 2, this chapter explores both 
the transformative potential, and the potentially negative discursive effects, of human-
rights based law reform.   In particular, it examines law’s re-conceptualisation of sex/gender 
in the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which finally made legal space for certain transgender 
people, but, in the very moment of reform, entrenched the gender binary, and perpetuated 
the historically pathologising, medicalised model of transgender people.  Following Sharpe 
(2007), the chapter shows that, whilst the Gender Recognition Act ostensibly delinks gender 
from sexed bodies, anatomical bodies and “biological sex” as determined at birth still matter 
in law.  The chapter then traces the broadening of transgender people’s legal protection 
against discrimination, culminating in the Equality Act 2010.  It draws attention to law’s 
continuing production of transgender people’s gender performance as inauthentic, artificial 
and imitative, in order to bolster cisgender identity as natural, real and original.  In the 
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prisoners’ rights field, the chapter highlights the significance of developments in prisoners’ 
right to access the courts, and the introduction, in 1994, of NHS-equivalence in prisoner 
healthcare, which paved the way for transgender prisoners to access medical gender 
reassignment treatment, including surgery, on the same basis as those in the outside 
community.  The chapter concludes with an analysis of law’s first construction of the 
transgender prisoner as a human rights-bearer, in AB (2009), and with an overview of the 
subsequent, first construction of the transgender prisoner in official prison policy, in PSI 
2011. 
Chapter 4 examines the prison authorities’ power to determine a transgender prisoner’s 
sex/gender in prison allocation decisions.  Against the historical backdrop of the sex-
segregated prison estate in England and Wales, it shows how the prison’s regulation of 
trans/gender developed separately from law, and was based on transgender prisoners’ 
genitalia upon entry to prison, rather than their genitalia at birth (Corbett (1970)). It 
examines the first official statements on transgender prisoners’ allocation within the prison 
estate, and the perceived need for their protective segregation.  The chapter highlights the 
emergence of a specific risk discourse around transgender women prisoners’ bodies and 
“biology”, which casts them as potentially psychologically and sexually harmful to cisgender 
women prisoners.  Through an in-depth analysis of the High Court judgment in AB (2009), 
the chapter examines judicial resolution of the tensions between human rights and risk 
discourse. It then addresses the routine practice of separating transgender prisoners from 
the main prison population, ostensibly to protect them from harm.  It considers the equality 
and health implications of placement in segregation, vulnerable prisoners’ units (“VPUs”) 
and healthcare on transgender prisoners’ lives, as well as the symbolic effects, in terms of 
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othering them, and perpetuating the notion that they are risky, rather than addressing 
transphobia in the main estate.  Finally, through various recent court cases and press 
reports, the chapter questions the ability of the potentially transformative policy 
developments in PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 to achieve fundamental change in the way that 
sex/gender is perceived, and the way in which transgender women prisoners are 
constructed as especially risky. 
Chapter 5 examines transgender prisoners’ struggles to express their gender through hair, 
clothing, and other gender-affirming items, when they are placed in prisons which do not 
reflect their gender.  It shows how, historically, prison uniform and hair-cutting was used as 
a technique of power to discipline and normalise prisoners into dominant gender and class-
based norms, and how prisoners’ dress is now disciplined and controlled in much more 
subtle and pervasive ways. Against this broader backdrop, the chapter examines prison 
management responses to transgender prisoners’ desire to express their gender, and 
reflects on the transformative potential of PSI 2011, which provides that transgender 
prisoners must be permitted to live and dress in their self-identified gender, whichever 
prison they are allocated to.  Through an in-depth analysis of R (on the application of 
Green) v Secretary of State for Justice *2013+ EWHC 3491 (Admin) (“Green”), the chapter 
explores the tension between PSI 2011’s human rights and equality discourse, and the 
prison’s precautionary approach to security- and risk- management, in relation to 
transgender prisoners’ right to access gender-affirming items. Green also provides an 
opportunity to critically examine the “hierarchy of authenticity” (Serano 2007) which law 
perpetuates between transgender and cisgender people’s gender performance, and judicial 
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endorsement of the seemingly widespread view that permitting and enabling transgender 
prisoners to live and dress in their gender is a “privilege”, rather than a right.    
Chapter 6 examines penal power over prisoners’ access to specialist medical gender 
reassignment treatment, in light of the powerful legacy of the medico-legal model of 
transgender.  It charts how, historically, far from being benevolent, prison medicine was 
part of the wider discipline and control of prisoners, and was embedded in the broader 
doctrine of “less eligibility” (Sim 1990).  The chapter shows how prison medical power was 
used to violently enforce normative sexuality and gender on prisoners considered “deviant”, 
including the first “transsexual” prisoners. The chapter charts developments in transgender 
prisoners’ right to access medical gender reassignment treatment, through the significant 
introduction, in 1994, of a policy of “NHS-equivalent” prisoner healthcare, and the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling in NW Lancashire Health Authority v A, D &G [1999] EWCA Civ 2022 (“NW 
Lancashire”) that treatment for “gender dysphoria” falls within the remit of the NHS.  The 
chapter reflects on PSI 2011 and PSI 2016’s contribution to the field, and the enduring 
expectation that transgender prisoners submit to a medical model of gender reassignment, 
if they wish to obtain legal recognition, and be allocated to a gender-appropriate prison. The 
chapter considers the remaining structural and conceptual barriers to the full realisation of 
transgender prisoners’ right to NHS-equivalent medical treatment. It explores the paradox 
whereby transgender prisoners are not considered deserving of gender reassignment 
surgery on the NHS, but unless and until they have full genital surgery, they are viewed as 
suspicious and risky – particularly transgender women prisoners.  The chapter concludes 
with some reflections on the more subtle gatekeeping powers now at play, including gender 
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clinicians’ authority over whether prison is a sufficiently “real life experience” to qualify for 
gender reassignment surgery. 
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Chapter 1: A Brief History of the Legal and Medical 
Regulation of Gender Non-Conforming People 
This chapter provides important historical background for this thesis.  It traces legal and 
medical developments in relation to gender non-conforming people from the Victorian era, 
through to the medical naming of the “transsexual” in England, in 1949 (Cauldwell 1949), 
and the establishment of the first medico-legal model of “transsexuality” in Corbett (1970).    
Whilst the main jumping-off point for the thesis is the medical naming of the “transsexual”, 
gender non-conforming people have a much longer history.  It is important to have a sense 
of this history both to contextualise the significance of later legal, medical and penal 
developments, and to be alive to the deeply-entrenched, historical roots of much 
contemporary discourse around transgender people, including as prisoners.  In this sense, 
this chapter is intended as a brief Foucauldian “history of the present”,40 connecting the 
past to the present.   Unfortunately, space prohibits a more detailed review. 
Although the criminal justice system has long problematised gender non-conforming 
people, this particular history appears to be untold.  Notably, whilst Foucault traced both 
the history of the prison (1977) and the history of sexuality (1979), he did not consider these 
subjects in conjunction with each other, nor did he explore the concept of gender separately 
from sex.  Also absent from the literature is the closely interrelated history of sexuality in 
the English prison (cf. Regina Kunzel’s excellent history of sexuality in the American prison 
(2008)).   
                                                          
40
 For an excellent account of Foucault’s method of writing a “history of the present”, compared to 
conventional histories, see Garland 2014. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts.  The first part examines law’s regulation of “gender 
deviance” in Victorian times, and in particular its criminalisation of men for “personating a 
woman for immoral purposes”, which has had enduring normative power in relation to 
transgender women and their access to “women-only” spaces.41 It also shows how the later 
offence of “importuning for immoral purposes” was disproportionately used to police and 
punish men who cross-dressed or were simply perceived to be “effeminate”, culminating in 
the 1940s and 50s.  Part two discusses the science of sexology in England at the turn of the 
twentieth century, which, like in Germany, was initially developed to challenge law’s 
criminalisation of sexual relations between men, on the basis that the “sexual invert” was 
simply a variation of nature.  It shows how the separate, gender non-normative figure of the 
“sexual invert” was soon pathologised and collapsed into the narrower figure of the 
“homosexual” under the psychoanalytical school.  It specifically considers the effects of 
these different medical models on the prison’s construction and governance of the 
“constitutional homosexual” or “invert”.  Part three turns to the 1949 naming of the 
“transsexual” in British medical science, and subsequent developments in the medicalisation 
and treatment of “true transsexuals”, through to Fisk’s broader conceptualisation of 
“gender dysphoria” in 1973.  The fourth part examines the first “transsexual of law” and the 
first medico-legal model of “transsexuality”, established in Corbett (1970).  It explains 
Corbett’s narrow conceptualisation of “legal sex”, which placed transgender people outside 
the law for the next 30 years.  
Before turning to the analysis, it must be noted that before the popularisation of the term 
“transsexual” and its medical conceptualisation in the late 1960s, it is difficult to prize apart 
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 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the trans-exclusionary radical feminist construction of transgender women.   
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historical material on gender non-conforming people from historical material on the 
“homosexual”.  This historical conflation between gender and sexuality persists today, in 
popular (mis)understandings of transgender.  This chapter adopts the relevant terminology 
of the day,42 and for the sake of clarity, refers to “men” and “women” as those assigned 
male and female at birth. This may not sit comfortably with the modern scholar of 
(trans)gender. However, there is a concern that applying today’s interpretative framework 
to the past would erase the discursive power of specific terminology, and blur the shifts in 
discourse which are central to the historical analysis in this chapter.    
Law’s Regulation of Sexual and Gender “Deviance” 
A rich literature now exists on the history of sexual and gender “deviance” and its regulation 
in England, and particularly London (e.g. Weeks 1981/2012; Cohen 1993; Trumbach 1998; 
Kaplan 2005; Moran 1996; Cocks and Houlbrook 2006; Cocks 2010; Upchurch 2009).  This 
part focuses on those aspects which relate to law’s direct or indirect regulation of cross-
dressing and/or non-normative gender, and surrounding discourse. This is not always easy, 
as historically, cross-dressing, non-normative gender expression and homosexuality were 
conflated.  It starts with the trial of Ernest Boulton and Frederick Park in 1870/1, which sets 
up several recurring themes in this thesis.  Although there had previously been prosecutions 
and convictions of men for “impersonating women for immoral purposes” in the mid-
nineteenth century, Boulton and Park’s case was the first to receive widespread press 
                                                          
42
 It has, however, relied on English translations of German and Italian language texts.  It is not possible to 
ascertain the closeness to the original text of the particular terminology adopted by the translator, but 
different translations vary considerably.  The hidden power of the translator is particularly apparent in 
Lombroso’s The Female Offender (1895), which, it has since been revealed, was “sanitised” in the original 1909 
English translation, to avoid offending Victorian sensibilities, see Lombroso and Ferrero (2004).   
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coverage and national notoriety: The Times referred to it as “the most extraordinary case 
we can remember to have occurred in our time” (1870:9).   
Impersonating a woman for immoral purposes 
Boulton and Park were arrested whilst attending a West End theatre, dressed as women.  
The police had been called many times before by the manager of the particular theatre 
about their exhibitionist and rowdy behaviour, but only agreed to attend this time as Park 
had entered the ladies’ restroom, where he asked a female attendant to help pin his dress.  
It was this intrusion into a designated women’s space by a man “masquerading” as a 
woman, and the need to protect “vulnerable” women from such “abhorrent imposters” that 
became a central element of the prosecution’s case. 
Much to the public gallery’s delight, the defendants were made to appear in court in the 
clothes and wigs in which they had been arrested (Upchurch 2000:137). This was clearly 
meant to discipline the defendants and to act as a deterrent to others. The Times reported 
that “Boulton wore a cherry-coloured evening silk dress trimmed with white lace; his arms 
were bare, and he had on bracelets.  He wore a wig and a plaited chignon” and “Park’s 
costume consisted of a dark green satin dress, low necked, trimmed with black lace, of 
which material he also had a shawl round his shoulders.  His fair was flaxen and in curls.” 
(1870: 9).  Whilst there was initially considerable public sympathy for the young defendants, 
the mood turned when it emerged during the committal proceedings that Boulton had been 
in a long-term, live-in relationship with Lord Clinton, and described himself in private 
correspondence as Clinton’s “wife”.  As this relationship was assumed to involve sex, much 
more serious sodomy-related charged were laid and tried instead, one year later.  The 
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“Penny Press” revelled in the scandal of the “he-she ladies”. Upchurch maintains that, for 
the general newspaper-reading public, “the link between cross-dressing and sodomy had 
been neither absolute, nor even assumed”, but now “it was difficult to ignore”. Thus, he 
argues, the categories of cross-dresser and sodomite collapsed into each other, and became 
conflated in the public and legal imaginary (2000).  (Although note that Trumbach (1998) 
dates this collapse much earlier, to the so-called “gender revolution” of the eighteenth 
century).  
During the proceedings, it became clear that Boulton and Park were part of a well-
developed community of upper- and middle-class men who enjoyed cross-dressing and/or 
sexual relations with men.  Public knowledge of this fact threatened to cast a shadow on the 
Victorian middle-class masculine ideal and to bring the nation’s honour into disrepute 
(Upchurch 2000:130).  Such was the concern, that the Attorney General took the unusual 
step of presenting the case for the Crown himself.  Upchurch argues that the Attorney 
General deliberately sought to portray the defendants as isolated deviant individuals, 
reminding the jury in his closing speech that “no stain is inflicted upon the honour of this 
country by such offences being committed by comparatively few” (ibid).  He also celebrated 
the lack of “learning or knowledge” about sodomy among the English medical profession, 
contrasting it with the “learned treatises” written on the subject elsewhere (ibid).  As 
Crozier has remarked, the medical profession’s ignorance was seen to act as a “vindication 
of the morality of the English nation” (Crozier 2001:72, see also Edmond 2004).  After being 
acquitted of the more serious sodomy-related charges, Boulton and Park were found guilty 
of impersonating a woman for immoral purposes.  They received a fine and two years’ 
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probation, which prohibited them from wearing women’s clothes for any reason (The Times, 
7 June 1871: 10).  
No prohibition on impersonating a man 
There are historical accounts – including in the criminal justice system – of women who 
cross-dressed and lived permanently as men, but there appear to be no recorded 
prosecutions against women for “impersonating a man for immoral purposes”.  It seems 
that women’s cross-dressing was generally less visible than men’s and was rarely perceived 
as “immoral”; their motives were largely assumed to be economic, such as gaining 
employment in traditionally male occupations.  Even where they had intimate relationships 
with women, such relationships were assumed to be of a non-sexual nature, and therefore 
not of moral or legal concern.  Occasionally courts did express disapproval, but they had no 
legal powers at their disposal to discipline and punish those concerned.  For example, when 
Bill (Mary) Chapman – who was variously described by the press as a “man-woman”, a 
“thing”, a “creature” and “it” (Jackson 2015:68) – came before the courts with her partner 
Isabella Watson in 1835 for creating a public disturbance, dressed in conventional male 
attire and presenting as a man (as the police officer attested she had done for at least ten 
years as a ballad-singer and speech-crier “known all over England”), the magistrate 
lamented his lack of legal powers to deal with her. He declared that “she may be a 
disorderly and disreputable character, which in fact her dressing as a man clearly shows, but 
I know of no law to punish her for wearing male attire” (ibid). Noting that “she may have 
more than one reason for dressing in that manner, and passing as the husband of the 
woman Watson”, he added, “I wish it was in my power to imprison her” (ibid).  
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Tightening the screw on sexual and gender deviance 
The period following Boulton and Park witnessed a tightening of laws on sexual deviance, as 
the Victorian concern with morality and sexual health led to greater regulation of 
prostitution and sexual relations between men.   In 1885, the offence of “gross indecency” 
was added to the statute books through “Labouchère’s Amendment”.  This new offence 
criminalised sexual relations between men, including in private.43  Foucault referred to 
Labouchère’s Amendment as the moment when the law turned its gaze on homosexuality 
as an identity rather than a sexual act (1979).  In 1898, the new offence of importuning 
made it illegal for a “male persistently to solicit or importune in a public place for immoral 
purposes”.   
Originally intended to criminalise “bullies” or “pimps” who lived off the earnings of female 
prostitution (Wolfenden Committee 1957:42), the offence of importuning “for immoral 
purposes” was soon exclusively deployed by the police to target men perceived to be 
importuning other men for private sexual relations (itself regarded as a form of prostitution) 
(ibid). The policing of this offence disproportionately affected men who cross-dressed 
and/or whose appearance and mannerisms were perceived to be effeminate, whom the 
police assumed to be seeking out homosexual relations, even if they were simply standing 
somewhere or walking down the street (Schofield 1965).  In 1912, Parliament specifically 
confirmed that the law applied to this scenario, notwithstanding its original legislative intent 
and, in Horton v Mead [1913] KB 154, the courts held that a man could be charged with 
importuning even if he had not spoken to or touched anybody, or attempted to do so, and 
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 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s.11. 
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even if no-one had complained. Effectively, the judiciary endorsed the construction and 
policing of homosexual identity as identifiable by effeminate appearance or cross-dressing. 
Notably, the criminal offences of gross indecency and importuning applied solely to men.  
This explains the lack of historical discourse around “lesbian offenders” compared to 
“homosexual offenders” as a specific legal44 or penal category.  In 1921, the House of 
Commons’ attempt to amend the offence of “gross indecency” to include women stalled, 
when the House of Lords feared that increasing women’s knowledge of lesbianism might 
further encourage it (HL Deb 15 August 1921, vol 43, cc567-77; see further e.g. Weeks 
1985/2012: 105-106).  The obscenity trial and banning of Radclyffe Halls’ lesbian (or, as 
Prosser 1998 has argued, transgender) novel The Well of Loneliness (1928), sparked further 
debate (see e.g. Souhami 1998/2013; Doan and Prosser (eds) 1991).  Publication of the 
novel was not only considered scandalous, but also liable to encourage women into 
lesbianism, given the shortage of men after the First World War.  Sir William Henry Willcox, 
medical adviser to the Home Office, advised the Director of Prosecutions that lesbianism 
leads to “gross mental illness” and “nervous instability … it is a vice which, if widespread, 
becomes a danger to the well-being of a nation” (cited in Arnold 2011: 295-296). 
The same concerns emerged after the morally and sexually liberating years of the Second 
World War, when there was a marked cultural shift, and traditional values of marriage, 
family and heterosexuality were reasserted, including through the criminal justice system.  A 
significant increase – some called it a witch hunt – in the policing and prosecution of 
“homosexual offences”, and in the number of men being imprisoned for such offences 
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 Whilst certain offences criminalised same-sex relations between men, there was no defined “homosexual of 
the law” until the Wolfenden Committee was mandated, in 1957, to review the laws on prostitution and 
“homosexual offences”, which it then had to define (Moran 2002). 
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followed in the post-war years, as the police developed new tactics of small-scale 
entrapment on the streets and parks, acted as agent provocateurs in public toilets, and 
launched raids on drag balls and public houses.  Effeminate and/or cross-dressing men were 
particularly targeted, as they were assumed to be homosexual.  Schofield’s 1965 study on 
homosexuality for the Home Office found that men with feminine appearance and 
mannerisms were greatly over-represented among prisoners serving sentences for 
importuning.  This policing led to a climate of fear among homosexual and/or gender non-
conforming men in the 1950s and 60s, as recounted in the autobiographies of Peter 
Wildeblood (1955), Edward Montagu (2000) and Quentin Crisp (1977).   
Decriminalisation  
Public concern around the high-profile prosecutions, convictions and imprisonment of 
Montagu, Wildeblood and others for private, consensual adult sex led to the setting up of 
the Wolfenden Committee, which was mandated in 1957 to review the laws on prostitution 
and “homosexual offences”.  Such was the enduring power of the link between prostitution 
and homosexuality, that it was not considered at all problematic for the Wolfenden 
Committee’s mandate to comprise these two fields of law (see Moran 1996).   In 1967, the 
Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations were finally followed, and the Sexual Offences 
Act 1967 decriminalised private consensual sex between men over the age of 21.  Whilst the 
Act retained the offence of importuning for immoral purposes, it stipulated that 
prosecutions should not be brought where the impugned “immoral purpose” was engaging 
in private, homosexual relations.  This finally drew to a close years of misuse of the offence 
of importuning to police gender-non conforming men, who were perceived to be 
homosexuals purely on the basis of their cross-dressing and/or effeminate appearance and 
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mannerisms.  However, the Act still criminalised certain specific “homosexual offences” 
(ibid), including sexual relations with a man under the age of 21, and sexual relations other 
than in private.    
The Science of Sexology, the “Sexual Invert”, the “Homosexual”, 
and the Prison 
As well as law’s regulation of sexual and gender non-normativity, it important to have some 
background on the medical profession’s interpretation of transgender narratives which 
preceded the medical naming of the “transsexual”, as these understandings fed into prison 
responses to gender non-conforming prisoners.   
The “sexual invert” of the science of sexology  
As the law tightened its grip around sexual and gender non-conformity, the late nineteenth 
century also witnessed a burgeoning production of scientific knowledge in the fields of 
criminality and sexology.  As Kunzel has remarked, “criminality and sexual perversion had 
long been understood to be in a tautological relationship with one another, such that 
attention to one naturally and inevitably invited attention to the other” (2008: 7). On the 
Continent, knowledge-production in the field of sexology was profiting from the captive 
subjects offered by the asylum and the prison,45 but England’s first sexologists eschewed this 
approach, as they were keen to avoid making any link between same-sex sexual acts and 
criminality.  Their political impetus was to call for the decriminalisation of same-sex 
relations, on the basis that same-sex desire was a simple variation of nature, a congenital 
abnormality, rather than a chosen sexual perversion.   Thus, in the first English-authored 
                                                          
45
 There was considerable professional “cross-fertilisation” between these sites, since members of the medical 
profession commonly worked at both the prison and the asylum in the course of their careers.   
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book on sexology, Sexual Inversion, Havelock Ellis and John Addington Symonds informed 
readers that “we are not dealing with subjects belonging to the lunatic asylum or the prison.  
We are concerned with people who live in freedom, sometimes suffering intensely from 
their abnormal organisation, but otherwise ordinary members of society” (1897:94).46   
The ideas developed by Ellis, Symonds and others within the conceptual framework of 
“sexual inversion” are important to the historical analysis as they started to map identities 
that today would be considered transgender (Prosser 2008:143),47 many years before the 
“transsexual” was named in medical science.  Whilst Ellis and Symonds were the first to coin 
the term “sexual inversion”, the concept of inversion is generally credited to German lawyer 
Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who advanced a theory of natural “Uranian” love between people of 
the same sex, and introduced the transgender figure of the “Urning”, in advocating for law 
reform. Ulrichs’ theory was that, through a migration of the soul during foetal development, 
the male “Urning” possessed a female soul enclosed within a male body,48 and the female 
“Urningin” possessed a male soul within a female body. Indeed, although Ulrichs is 
unproblematically described by his main biographer, Hubert Kennedy, as “the first self-
proclaimed homosexual to speak out publicly for the rights of homosexuals” (1988: 9), his 
self-description clearly presents a transgender, rather than a homosexual narrative: “have I 
                                                          
46
 Although Sexual Inversion received mixed reviews from the British medical profession (Crozier 2008:60-65), 
and was even banned as an obscene publication (see Craig 1937), it was gradually established as the most 
authoritative work in the field, and was still published well into the 1960s. 
47
 In the first edition of Sexual Inversion, most of the case studies read primarily as homosexual and bisexual 
narratives, apart from case 19, a short description of a man “who thinks he ought to have been a woman” (Ellis 
and Symonds 1897/2008: 147). In Appendix F, however, the authors also re-tell in considerable detail the 
infamous case of Count/ess Sarolta V: how “this man-woman” (ibid, 317) had been assigned female at birth, 
had been brought up as a boy until the age of 13 and had lived as a man for over 10 years before marrying a 
woman in 1888.  In later, solo-authored editions of Sexual Inversion, Ellis included several new case studies 
which present a distinctly transgender narrative (1901).   
48
 On female inversion, and the historical construction of female sexuality, see further Chauncey (1982) and 
Bauer (2009). 
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a masculine beard and manly limbs and body;/ Yes, confined by these: but I am and remain 
a woman” (cited in Prosser 1998: 56).  As Prosser has noted, Ulrich’s “wrong body” formula 
recurred as a popular trope for transsexuality over a century later (ibid: 143), and, despite 
today’s broader understanding of transgenderism, still has considerable discursive power in 
the medical and public arena.  Ulrich’s theory also connects uncannily with contemporary 
developments in endocrinology, which have established that there are “sexually-dimorphic” 
brain structures that have different morphological characteristics in males and females (see 
e.g. Zhou et al 1995 and Rosenthal 2014).   
According to Ellis and Symonds, Ulrich’s work (probably because he was a lawyer, not a 
medic) had limited influence. Rather, it was Carl Westphal who first put the study of sexual 
inversion on an “assured scientific basis” (1897/2008:115).  Indeed, Foucault credits 
Westphal’s influential paper on “contrary sexual feeling” as the birth of the science of 
sexology (1990:43).  Westphal (an eminent professor of psychiatry in Austria) presented 
case studies of two patients – one assigned male, and one assigned female at birth – who 
had approached him for clinical help (1869).  In today’s terms, both case studies would 
undoubtedly be read as transgender narratives. Like Ulrichs, Westphal believed that sexual 
inversion was congenital. However, he proposed that it was a symptom of a neuropathic or 
psychopathic condition.  His work therefore sowed the seed that sexual inversion was a 
pathological condition, a theory which was further developed in the work of Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing. 
In 1886, Kraftt-Ebing published a highly influential, detailed medical encyclopaedia of sexual 
“perversions” entitled Psychopathia Sexualis. In its 1893 edition, it contained over 200 case 
histories, some of which would now be regarded as transgender histories.  Under the 
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heading of “antipathetic sexual instinct”, Kraftt-Ebing described a whole range of 
“perversions”, from pure sexual-desire, to “fully developed cases in which males are females 
in feeling; and vice versa” (1893: 253).  He used Ulrich’s term “Urnings” to describe these 
cases, and thought that they evidenced a type of hereditary “disease-process” (ibid: 216), or 
“pathological sexuality” (ibid: 332).  Whilst the hereditary theory soon lost favour, Krafft-
Ebing’s pathologising discourse took firm root and displaced the “natural variation” theory 
posited by Ulrichs, Ellis, Symonds and others to advocate for law reform. Krafft-Ebing’s 
conceptualisation of transgender as a mental disorder dominated the medical and legal 
response to transgender people for the entire twentieth century, and has only recently 
started to be challenged.   
Sexology and the conundrum of the prison 
In documenting and theorising sexual inversion, sexologists were faced with the conundrum 
presented by the seemingly widely-acknowledged proliferation of homosexual activity in 
prisons, ships, boarding schools and other same-sex environments. Ellis and Symonds 
observed that “homosexual practices everywhere flourish and abound among prisoners” 
and noted that “the initiated are familiar with the fact in English prisons” (2008: 105, note 
22). This fact did not align neatly with their theory of the congenital nature of sexual 
inversion.  Both Ellis and Symonds (ibid: 105) and Krafft-Ebing (1965: 188) advanced the 
proposition that some people might have a “latent predisposition” to “homosexuality”, 
which is “excited” from its dormant state by a “powerful external cause”, such as the same-
sex environment of the prison.  These “acquired” or “situational” homosexuals returned to 
“normal sexual intercourse” as soon as the “obstacles to it were removed” (Krafft-Ebing: 
188).   
  
59 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
Significantly, the authors distinguished congenital “inverts” or “constitutional homosexuals” 
from “acquired homosexuals” by their perceived effeminate gender presentation.  Thus, 
Ellis and Symonds uncritically cite a US prison physician, who had written to them that 
“there are many men with features suggestive of femininity that attract others to them in a 
way that reminds me of a bitch in heat followed by a pack of dogs” (2008: 105), whilst 
Krafft-Ebing thought it “highly probable” that, in environments “where abstinence from 
normal sexual indulgence is enforced”, such as prisons,  there are “single individuals of low 
morals and great sensuality, or actual homosexuals, who seduce the others.  Lust, imitation 
and desire further their purpose” (1965: 391, emphasis added). This early view that an 
“actual homosexual” may act as a potential seducer in prison, and may use “imitation” to 
“further his purpose” – whether in narrow terms of taking the passive “female” role in 
sexual acts and/or more broadly “imitating” a woman in appearance, behaviour etc. – 
continued to find expression in penal, political and public discourse around the “problem” of 
homosexuality in prison for many years to come.  Indeed, whilst the advent of 
psychoanalysis led to the “massive discursive loss” of sexology’s broader gender non-
normative figure of the “invert” (Prosser 1998: 151), the conceptual framework developed 
by sexologists to account for the proliferation of same-sex sexual relations in the prison had 
enduring explanatory power.  Well into the 1960s and 1970s, prison observers, prison 
medical officers and prisoners alike in English prisons distinguished between the prison’s 
“genuine inverts” or “constitutional homosexuals” (or “bitches” in prison vernacular) (e.g. 
Morris and Morris 1963:187), whom they identified by their perceived effeminate gender 
expression and assumed “passive” sexual role, and the prison’s “acquired homosexuals”, 
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who only engaged in (“active”) “homosexual intercourse for want of something better” 
(Krafft-Ebing 1965: 188). 
The “repressed homosexual” of the psychoanalytical school  
In 1905, Freud’s seminal Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality were published in German, 
and soon made their mark in medical circles, 49 but it was not until his work was translated 
into English in the mid-1920s that the psychoanalytical school of thought began to exert an 
influence on popular understandings of “homosexuality” in England (Dickinson 2014: 36, 
note 131). Freud argued that all homosexuality was an acquired phenomenon, and 
specifically referred to the increased prevalence of homosexual activity in same-sex 
environments such as prisons to back up his theory that all homosexuality was acquired 
(Freud 1920/1949:18).  His well-known thesis was that homosexuality in adults was the 
result of an “arrested state” of “normal” sexual development, which was treatable by 
psychoanalysis.50  The “invert” was dismissed as “sexology’s false construction of 
homosexuality” (Prosser 1998:150).  Thus, in what Prosser describes as “his most overtly 
transgender case”, Freud read at the root of his (female assigned, male identifying) subject’s 
narrative of imagined sex change “not transgender but a repressed homosexuality” (150-
151, referencing Freud 1911).   
  
                                                          
49
 In the meantime, Ellis engaged in a lively correspondence with Freud, helped disseminate his work and ideas 
among the English medical profession, and completely revised Sexual Inversion (1915) to address and critique 
psychoanalysis. Ellis also incorporated into this edition the ideas of Magnus Hirshfeld and Iwan Bloch, both of 
whom had been influenced by his work (2008: 67-72).   
50
 Psychotherapy worked on the principle that the therapist would bring repressed emotions and unresolved 
traumas in a person’s sexual development from their subconscious to their conscious mind, including through 
hypnosis, where these new “insights” could then be treated. 
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The criminal justice response to the medical treatment of “homosexual offenders” 
The theory that homosexuality was an acquired phenomenon which could be cured by 
psychiatric treatment, had a profound impact on the criminal justice response to 
“homosexual offenders” in the 1940s, 50s and 60s, until homosexuality was partially 
decriminalised in 1967.  The courts started to order some homosexual offenders to undergo 
hormone therapy in the community as a term of their probation, and on sentencing others 
to prison, promised that they would receive psychiatric treatment.  People who would 
probably identify as transgender today would have been caught up in the courts’ drive to 
“cure” or temper the sex-drive of homosexuals.51  The egregious history of the court’s 
involvement in ordering the “treatment” of homosexual offenders in the community and 
the prison, and the deployment of prison medical power to discipline and control non-
normative sexuality and gender generally in this period is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 6 also discusses the Wolfenden Committee’s firm rejection of the common 
perception that homosexuality was a mental disorder, which could be “cured”, although it 
supported medical treatment which might make “the man more discreet or continent in his 
behaviour” and recommended the introduction of hormone treatment in prisons, for those 
who desired it.  It was a significant historical moment when, in 1973, the American 
Psychiatric Association (“APA”) removed the diagnosis of “homosexuality” from the second 
edition of its internationally influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”).   In 1980, however, “transsexuality” was added. 
                                                          
51
 E.g. In Tommy Dickinson’s Curing Queers: Mental Nurses and their Patients (2014), one of the interviewees 
who agreed to undergo psychiatric treatment for “homosexuality” to avoid a prison sentence, later medically 
and legally reassigned her gender. Confirmed in an email to the author from Tommy Dickinson, dated 8 
January 2016. 
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The Medical Naming and Pathologisation of the “Transsexual”  
Whilst the main focus of medical science and the criminal justice system in this period was 
on the “homosexual”, medical science had separately named the “transsexual” and started 
to develop a medical treatment pathway for their distinctive transformative desire, enabled 
by developments in endocrinology and surgical techniques.  The German sexologist, Magnus 
Hirschfeld first used the term “transsexual” in 1923,52 and carried out the earliest 
documented gender reassignment surgeries in the 1930s, in Berlin’s Institute of Sexology, 
but it is the English medical history that is the focus of this chapter.53    
David Cauldwell, a general medical practitioner, is generally credited with bringing the term 
“transsexual” into English usage in 1949, and for enunciating their “irresistible desire to 
have their sex changed surgically” (1949: 274). He explicitly observed that transsexuals were 
not necessarily homosexual. As Stryker and Whittle have remarked, Cauldwell’s paper was 
an “excessively pathologising, anecdotal account of his experience with one transsexual 
person” and was “riddled with contradictions” (2006: 40), nevertheless, Cauldwell’s 
identification of psychopathia transexualis as an independent sexological category was “an 
important moment in transgender history” (Sharpe 2002:26). 
                                                          
52
 Hirschfeld used the term to distinguish between what he regarded as the most common manifestation of 
“transvestism”, namely “the erotic drive to cross-dress”, and its most extreme form, “psychic transsexualism”, 
which comprised not only “an urge to dress” but also “a desire to live” in the opposite sex (1923).  An earlier 
paper observed that those concerned “are often depressed by the fact that they do not physically belong to 
the desired sex” (1910:33).  Hirschfeld believed that transsexuality was an example of nature’s diversity.   
53
 A rich literature charts the medical history of the “transsexual”; Stryker and Whittle’s (2006) reader provides 
a particularly useful collection.  See also Sharpe’s synopsis in a medico-legal context (2002:17-39) and Prosser’s 
referencing to medical history in exploring the “body narratives of transsexuality” (1998).  For a contrary 
radical feminist reading, which argues that the “transsexual” was constructed by medical science, see 
Raymond (1979) and Jeffreys (2014:14-35). 
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Cauldwell himself was opposed to gender reassignment surgery, but such developments 
were already underway in England.  Michael Dillon, the first person to undergo gender 
reassignment surgery in England, underwent a series of surgeries between 1946 and 1949. 
He is also believed to be the first person to take testosterone, in 1939, not long after it had 
been synthesised and come on the pharmaceutical market (Dillon and Jivaka 2016: 6). 
Dillon’s book Self: A Study in Endocrinology and Ethics (1946) contributed to the “logic of 
treatment” that had started to be advanced in the 1930s and 40s (Rubin 2003:33).  He 
argued that inversion was an innate condition which could not be rectified by 
psychoanalysis: “surely”, he argued, “where the mind cannot be made to fit the body, the 
body should be made to fit, approximately at any rate, to the mind” (1946: 53).  In 1951, 
with Dillon remarkably acting as her surgeon, Roberta Cowell became the first transgender 
woman to undergo gender reassignment surgery in England.54   
By the 1960s, several English people had travelled overseas for surgery, including fashion 
model April Ashley, whose gender reassignment was “outed” by a hostile press in 1961 and 
whose marriage to Arthur Corbett was annulled in Corbett (1970).55  By 1970, gender 
reassignment surgical techniques were becoming more firmly established in England and a 
specialist team offered the procedure out of Charing Cross hospital in London.  Giving 
evidence to the court in Corbett, Dr Randall reported that his team had performed gender 
reassignment surgery on at least 15 people by 1970.  
                                                          
54
The remarkable stories of these transgender pioneers were told in a Channel 4 television documentary, Sex 
Change Spitfire Ace: Secret History (Oct 2015).   
55
 Jan Morris, the travel writer, travelled to the same surgeon in Morocco, in 1970, after British surgeons 
refused to operate on her unless she divorced her wife (Morris 1974/2002).   
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It was not until the late 1960s that Harry Benjamin’s work more firmly entrenched the term 
“transsexual” in both medical and popular discourse in England.  Benjamin (earlier a 
colleague of Hirschfeld at the Institute of Sexology in Berlin) had first referred to 
transsexualism in a paper published in the International Journal of Sexology (1953), but it 
was his book-length consideration of the subject, The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966), 
which popularised the term.  The “transsexualist”, he argued in his earlier paper, “is 
primarily interested in having a conversion-operation performed” (1953: 51). Oestrogen 
treatment was also required, since it must be remembered that “castration produces a 
eunuch and not a woman” (ibid:52). Rejecting psychoanalysis as an effective treatment – 
which to his knowledge had “proved useless” (ibid) – Benjamin proposed that the condition 
required “psychiatric help, reinforced by hormone treatment, and in some cases, by 
surgery” (ibid).  This lay the ground for the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, which were 
first published in 1979, and have since been internationally relied upon as good practice in 
the medical treatment of transgender people, including in the UK (NHS 2017).   
Notwithstanding Benjamin’s influence in the field, the psychoanalytic school of thought 
persisted in its conflation of transvestism and transsexualism with homosexuality well into 
the 1970s, and in its general opposition to gender reassignment surgery.   American 
psychologist, Robert Stoller (who later worked closely with the Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association) developed an influential theory within the psychoanalytic 
school, which carved out a space for the “true” or “primary” transsexual, who was deserving 
of surgical treatment. However, this concept of the “true” transsexual was restricted, inter 
alia, to those who identified themselves as belonging to the other sex/gender from very 
early childhood and whose “gender behaviour” reflected that identification (Stoller 1968: 
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139-40).  This so-called “discovery story of transsexuality” (King 1993:93) privileged a 
particular transgender narrative which many transgender people have since felt a need to 
convey to the medical profession, in order to gain access to medical treatment and legal 
recognition (Prosser 1998: 108; Spade 2003), placing the medical profession in the powerful 
position of gatekeeper.  As discussed later, this gatekeeping role was given legal authority in 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which requires transgender people to obtain a medical 
diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” before they apply for legal recognition. 
The concept of “gender dysphoria”, which was introduced by psychiatrist Norman Fisk in 
1973, supported a much wider group’s access to surgery than before, and focused on 
ascertaining the sexed body in which it was best for the person to live in the future (King 
1993:63). Although it liberalised access to gender reassignment surgery, the concept of 
gender dysphoria produced negative discursive effects, translating the desire to transform 
one’s body into need and disorder (Sharpe 2002:30).  Thus, when the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association (now the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health, “WPATH”) first adopted the concept of gender dysphoria in 1979, it did 
so within its Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders (emphasis added).56  
Meanwhile, the APA included “transsexuality”, then “gender identity disorder”, and now 
“gender dysphoria”, in its internationally influential Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of 
Mental Disorders (respectively DSM 3: 1980; DSM 4: 1994; DSM 5: 2013, emphasis 
added).57 This medical discourse, including its pathologising language of disorder and 
                                                          
56
 In 2011, WPATH replaced the reference to “gender identity disorders” and renamed its standards: Standards 
of Care for Transsexual, Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People (version 7). 
57
 Whilst the APA recently changed its terminology to “gender dysphoria” (DSM 5: 2013), finally bringing the 
DSM in line with WPATH’s Standards of Care it still does so within an overall schema of mental disorders.  This 
is recognised as a tricky issue: on the one hand, it perpetuates a pathologising discourse, but on the other 
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dysphoria, was taken up by the law, in its first construction of the “transsexual”, further 
entrenching its normative power.    
Corbett and the first “Transsexual of Law” 
Although named by medical science in 1949, there was no “transsexual of law” (to borrow 
from Moran 1996) until Corbett v Corbett (1970).  Since the legal status of transsexual 
people who had changed their sexed bodies had not been contemplated by the legislature, 
it was left to a sole judge sitting in the High Court to determine this important question.  
This seminal case established that a “transsexual” person’s legal sex was to be determined 
by particular biological factors at birth, and could never be changed, even if they had 
undergone gender reassignment surgery.   Thus, Corbett established the first medico-legal 
construction of “transsexuality”.   
Corbett concerned the validity of a marriage under English law.  Ms Ashley had taken 
oestrogen hormones since the 1950s and had undergone gender reassignment surgery 
overseas in 1960. Mr Corbett was fully aware of Ms Ashley’s transgender history when he 
married her in 1963, but subsequently petitioned the court for a declaration that the 
marriage was null and void on the basis that Ms Ashely was of the male sex or, alternatively, 
that that the marriage had not been consummated.  It is not necessary to go into the legal 
arguments in any detail here. What is important for the purpose of this thesis, is, first, 
Corbett’s definition of legal sex, and second, the deeper insights the judgment provides into 
law’s first encounter with, and construction of, the “transsexual”.    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hand, it facilitates access to medical treatment for some transgender people, including under private medical 
insurance, see e.g. Spade 2013, and further discussion in Chapter 6.   
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Unlike in Bolton and Park, medical knowledge and opinion was central to the court’s 
deliberations in Corbett, and the court readily accepted the medical understanding of 
transsexuality as a “psychological abnormality” (para 42) or “psychological disorder” (para 
43). It also adopted medicine’s “wrong body” narrative and “discovery story”. For example, 
Ormrod J referred to transsexual people as thinking of themselves “as females imprisoned in 
male bodies, or vice versa” (para 42). Corbett established a biological legal definition of sex, 
based on a congruence of chromosomal, gonadal and genital factors at birth, which 
governed the regulation of sex/gender until the Gender Recognition Act 2004.   Whilst 
medical expert knowledge ostensibly gave an objective, scientific basis for this legal test of 
“true sex” (para 35), the medical opinions presented to the court were actually divided on 
many matters.  In reality, it was Ormrod J, sitting as sole judge on the case, who exercised 
the power of selection between the possible criteria for determining legal sex, and who 
privileged the “truth” of a particular biological past over present psychological and social 
reality, as well as hormonal sex.  Applying this test, he held that Ms Ashley was legally male 
and her marriage was void, as a same-sex marriage. 
Sharpe has argued that, notwithstanding the tripartite biological test of legal sex established 
in Corbett, the judgment “belies a preoccupation with genitalia” (2002:42).  This is evident 
both in the fixation on genitalia in the marriage aspects of the case, but also in Ormrod J’s 
finding that, in the event of any incongruence between the three biological criteria, genitalia 
at birth would prevail (Corbett, para 48). Notably, it is genitalia at birth, not current 
genitalia, which defines legal sex.   And yet, as Sharpe has observed (2002: 41-42), Ormrod J 
appears to bestow some social significance on Ms Ashley’s surgical “sex change”, since he 
refers to Ms Ashley in the male pronoun before gender/ genital reassignment surgery and in 
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the female pronoun afterwards. It seems that the physical embodiment of her 
“psychological gender” renders her socially recognisable as a woman, but Ormrod J did not 
consider it sufficient to actually make her a woman:  “socially … she is living and passing as a 
woman more or less successfully (Corbett, para 47, emphasis added).  This thesis will argue 
in Chapter 4, that, historically, genitalia have also been central to the governance of 
sex/gender in the prison, but that, in deciding where to allocate transgender prisoners 
within the prison estate, the prison administration privileged social recognition of embodied 
sex/gender, based on current genitalia, over Corbett’s legal definition of sex by reference to 
genitalia at birth.   
Beyond the legal test of sex established in Corbett, a close textual analysis of the judgment 
discloses a great deal about law’s first construction of the “transsexual”, and its resonance 
with both historical and contemporary discourse around transgender people. 
Notwithstanding the seemingly objective, medical scientific description of “transsexuality”, 
the historically-charged language of abnormality, sexual deviance, inauthenticity and 
impersonation reverberates through the judgment. Ms Ashley is described as belonging to 
“the society of sexual deviants” (para 37).  Adopting the terminology proffered by the 
medical experts, Ormrod J describes Ms Ashley not only as a “male transsexual”, but as a 
“male homosexual transsexualist” (paras 43 and 44, emphasis added). She is effectively 
regarded not as a heterosexual transgender woman, but as a homosexual man whose body 
has been surgically altered, perpetuating the long-standing historical conflation between 
(homo)sexuality and (trans)gender. This is underscored when Ormrod J opines that “the 
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difference between sexual intercourse” using her surgically constructed vagina “and anal ... 
intercourse is, in my judgment, to be measured in centimetres” (para 49).58  
Ormrod J’s comments about Ms Ashley’s body and gender expression are also highly 
revealing.  Although Ormrod J accepted the medical consensus that Ms Ashley’s body was 
“more like a female than male as a result of very skilful surgery”, he persistently 
underscored the inauthenticity and otherness of her “so-called ‘artificial vagina’” (para 36), 
“pouch” (ibid) and “artificial cavity” (para 37).  This discourse of inauthenticity leads to 
Ormrod J’s legal finding that the respondent was physically incapable of consummating her 
marriage, as intercourse using such an “artificially constructed cavity” could never 
constitute true intercourse (para 49).  Significantly for the purpose of this thesis, the 
apparent inauthenticity of Ms Ashley’s gender presentation as a woman is also used to 
bolster Ormrod’s J primary legal finding that she is legally male. Having determined Ms 
Ashley’s legal sex by reference to his tripartite biological test, he subjected her gender 
expression to his own gaze. At first, he remarked, the “pastiche of femininity was 
convincing” (para 47), but “on closer and longer examination in the witness box it was much 
less so.  The voice, manner, gestures and attitude became increasingly reminiscent of the 
accomplished female impersonator” (ibid, emphasis added).  Ormrod J concluded this 
passage by repeating the “medical consensus” that the “biological sexual constitution is 
fixed at birth”, and “cannot be changed”, and that the respondent’s operation “cannot 
affect her true sex” (ibid). His view that Ms Ashley’s gender presentation was inauthentic 
effectively confirmed his decision to declare that she was not legally a woman.   
                                                          
58
 It will be recalled that homosexuality had only just been decriminalised between consenting adults, in the 
Sexual Offences Act 1967. 
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Ormrod J remarked in Corbett that he was “not concerned to determine the legal sex of the 
respondent at large”, but only for the purpose of marriage (a special relationship “which 
depends on sex and not gender”) (para 48).  However, Corbett’s legal test of sex/gender was 
gradually judicially applied across all fields of English law, and dominated the legal 
regulation of sex/gender for the next 34 years, rendering transgender people “gender 
outlaws” (to borrow from Bornstein 1994/2016).   
Conclusion 
This chapter has charted a brief history of law’s criminalisation and punishment of sexually 
and gender non-conforming people, through to the partial decriminalisation of 
homosexuality in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 and its depathologisation in DSM 1973.  It 
has described how the increasing influence of the psychoanalytical school of thought led to 
the courts’ co-option of medical power in the 1940s onwards, to pursue the “treatment” 
(disciplining) of “homosexual offenders” through hormone and psychiatric treatment. The 
chapter has provided a brief history of medical developments which led to the naming of 
the “transsexual” in British medical science in 1949.  In particular, it introduced sexology’s 
early conceptualisation of the “sexual invert” as a natural human variation, and it discussed 
the lasting explanatory power, within prisons, of sexology’s theory that same-sex sexual 
relations proliferate in prisons due to a lack of heterosexual opportunities, and that 
“congenital inverts” or “constitutional homosexuals” could be distinguished from 
“situational homosexuals” or “acquired homosexuals” on the basis of their perceived 
effeminate gender expression.  It analysed law’s first construction of the “transsexual” in 
Corbett (1970), which reproduced the dominant medical view of transsexual people as 
psychologically abnormal or disordered and in need of medical “sex change” treatment, and 
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adopted a strongly disapproving language of deviance, inauthenticity, artificiality and 
impersonation to depict transgender people’s sexual behaviour, bodies and gender 
expression.  It showed how Corbett’s legal definition of sex placed transgender people 
outside the law.   
In Chapter 3, this thesis will continue law’s story, and consider the way in which later human 
rights-based developments broadened law’s conceptualisation of sex/gender, so as to make 
space for (certain) transgender people, but also reproduced a medicalised, historically 
pathologising model of transgender, in the very moment of reform.  It will examine various 
human rights-based legal developments through to the courts’ first direct encounter with 
the transgender prisoner in 2009.  First, it is important to set out the three theoretical 
pillars, and related literature, which inform and structure the thesis, and to explain the 
theoretical insights they offer to an analysis of the power, and limits, of law and human 
rights to transform the liveability of trans/gendered lives in prison.   
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Chapter 2: Three Theoretical Pillars: Law, Gender, and Risk 
As noted in the Introduction, this thesis adopts a Foucauldian-based power analysis as its 
conceptual framework, as subsequently developed in legal, feminist, queer and transgender 
scholarship, and in prison governance and risk literature.  This chapter outlines the three 
theoretical pillars which underpin the thesis, and inform and shape its analysis of the 
potential transformative effects, and limits, of law and human rights in relation to the lives 
of transgender prisoners.  It draws on three corresponding bodies of literature; first, on 
Foucault, law and rights; second, on the construction, performance and embodiment of 
gender; and third, on prison governance and risk.  Whilst Foucault’s work is not widely 
associated with law or human rights, and he did not specifically deal with gender as distinct 
from sex and sexuality, this chapter will show how his insights into power, discourse and the 
subject provide a valuable theoretical thread between these three seemingly disparate 
fields.   
This chapter has four parts.  The first part outlines Foucault’s core concepts and shows how 
a Foucauldian approach can be applied to law, and can enrich the current analysis, by 
approaching law as a productive power, with normative effects.  The second part expounds 
on this idea.  Drawing on post-Foucauldian legal scholarship, it argues that, whatever 
reading one takes of Foucault’s own position on law and rights, it is now widely accepted 
that law is a powerful discourse in contemporary society, and that human rights have 
considerable political purchase.  The thesis is particularly influenced by Carol Smart’s 
pioneering work, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989), which provides a blueprint for 
deconstructing the discursive power of law.  However, it argues, contra Smart, that law and 
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rights have transformative potential in contemporary society, even if they cannot provide a 
complete solution to social issues, and even if recourse to law and rights may entail costs.  
The third part examines the highly contested terrain around the construction, performance 
and embodiment of gender.  It is particularly inspired by Judith Butler’s innovative work 
(1990/1999; 1993; 2004) on the power of the heteronormative gender order, which renders 
certain gendered lives “culturally intelligible” and others “impossible, illegible, unrealisable, 
unreal and illegitimate” (1990/1999: viii). It builds on important insights from the 
transgender literature on the significance of the materiality of the body (Prosser 1998) and 
the prevalence of “cissexism” and “trans-misogyny” in contemporary society (Serano 2007). 
It also addresses the trans-exclusionary radical feminist view that transgender women’s 
gender is inauthentic and their bodies are risky.  Part four outlines the significance of risk 
discourse in contemporary “risk society” (Beck 1992) and under the continuing conditions of 
the “new penology” first described by Feeley and Simon in 1992. It argues that risk is a 
powerful discourse in prison management, and dominates the discursive terrain on which 
law and human rights must compete in changing the regulation of sex/gender in the prison, 
and improving transgender prisoners’ lives. Drawing predominantly on the governmentality 
approach to risk (Foucault 1991; Ewald 1991; Castel 1991), but also on the cultural approach 
to risk (Douglas 1969; 1969), this part concludes with a preliminary analysis of the prison 
administration’s production of the “risky” transgender prisoner, which paves the way for a 
deeper analysis of the emerging tension between rights and risk in three specific areas, 
namely prison allocation and segregation (Chapter 4), presentation of the self (Chapter 5) 
and access to medical gender reassignment treatment, if desired (Chapter 6). 
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Foucault’s Core Concepts 
This thesis is informed and shaped by Foucault’s core concepts of discourse, truth, power 
and the subject; and his thesis of modern power as a productive, normative power over 
individual lives and bodies (disciplinary power) and the population as a whole (bio-power), 
as later developed in his work on governmentality.   A substantial body of literature exists in 
this field, so only a brief synopsis is provided here, to anchor the Foucauldian analysis, 
before applying it to law.   
Discourse and its production of the subject  
Foucault’s early work on the history of knowledge in the human sciences examined the 
structure of discourse.  It was another decade until he explicitly raised questions of power. 
Understanding law as a discourse is fundamental to this thesis, and warrants explanation, 
since its specific Foucaudian meaning tends to be obscured by its pervasive usage in 
ordinary parlance, and Foucault’s work does not tend to be addressed in legal education. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault examined the epistemic context within 
which certain bodies of knowledge and their associated sets of concepts and statements 
became intelligible and authoritative, and how certain people came to be regarded as the 
authorised knowers and speakers in the particular field. These “discursive formations” 
govern the possibilities for talking seriously about things, and importantly for the purpose of 
this thesis, include the “subject” of the particular discourse – here, the transgender person 
and prisoner.  Foucault did not believe in the existence of pre-existing or pre-discursive 
subjects, which simply became the focus of inquiry and knowledge over time, but rather 
proposed that subjects were themselves defined and produced (“constructed”) through 
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discourse.  This principle can also be applied to law; law does not simply represent subjects, 
but defines and produces them.  Beyond its direct, instrumental effects, which occur 
through legislation and case law, law’s power to include and exclude has powerful 
normative effects, in constructing and perpetuating the boundaries of intelligible sex and 
gender, and, in Butlerian terms, ultimately determining who is humanly thinkable or 
unthinkable (1993: xvii).    
Truth and power 
Foucault argued that discourse generates truth, or more precisely truth-claims, for he did 
not believe in the existence of any singular “truths” waiting to be “discovered” (1980:132).  
On Foucault’s account, discourse becomes powerful not through its claim to speak the truth 
per se, but through society’s acceptance, internalisation and perpetuation of that particular 
version of the truth. Discourses and their accepted truth-claims (which can be equated with 
“norms”) have real effects and structure the possibility of what (or who) gets included and 
excluded, and what gets done or remains undone; “they impose themselves upon social life, 
and produce what it is possible to think, speak and do” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:  9).  This 
idea is indispensable to my thesis, in analysing the power of law’s “truth-claims” over 
society’s understanding of gender and how law affects “what it is possible to think, speak 
and do” in relation to transgender people as prisoners.   
Foucault was particularly interested in how certain discourses or truth-claims came to 
discount or subjugate other discourses and other concepts of truth, and thus enable 
particular exercises of power in society. His portrayal of discourses as multiple and 
“discontinuous practices”, which cross, collide, clash and compete with each other (1981: 
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67), is very useful for this thesis in conceptualising the relationship between human rights 
discourse and risk discourse in regulating transgender prisoners’ lives, and in defining the 
“truth” of the sex and gender order more broadly.  Human rights discourse and prison risk 
discourse, together with powerful medical and pathologising discourses around transgender 
people, set up what is to be argued and fought about; on this contested terrain, “discourse 
is the power which is to be seized” (ibid: 52-53).   
Foucault argued that it was the claim to be a science and to speak the objective, rational 
scientific truth about human behaviour which gave knowledge its discursive power over 
other non-scientific truths, such as morality, religion or belief, in defining what (and who) is 
normal and what (and who) is abnormal (1966), but this thesis will argue that law is also 
high on the hierarchy of knowledge and capable of subjugating other truths, including other 
truths about sex and gender.  As Smart argued in her pioneering monograph, Feminism and 
the Power of Law (1989), Foucault’s ideas can readily be transposed to law, as it has its own 
“discursive formations”, e.g. legal texts, legal methods and procedures, and legal language, 
and makes similar claims to objectivity and rationality as the human sciences, and indeed 
often co-opts them to its cause, fortifying and expanding its power domain.  The very fact 
that “the law” is often spoken of in the singular suggests it has a special, and unified, power. 
Through a number of case studies, Smart demonstrated that law has the ability to impose its 
own definition of events on everyday life, and to not only ignore, but actively negate and 
disqualify women’s experience and knowledge.  This thesis aims to look beneath the surface 
of law, in terms of its legislative rules and judgments, so as to excavate law’s truth claims in 
relation to sex and gender, and specifically its truth claims about transgender people and 
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prisoners, and to consider the extent to which law delegitimises other truths, knowledges 
and experiences. 
Foucault showed how things which we believe today to be self-evident “truths” are in fact 
the cumulative effect of discursive power; that they are contingent on historical moments, 
and are not the inevitable outcome of rational scientific discovery within a grand narrative 
of progressive history.  Although Foucault was interested in the history of sexuality (1979), 
and the history of the prison (1977), he was not particularly interested in law’s part in that 
history, as will be discussed below.  However, law has its own history, its own story to tell.  
As Smart observes, the history of law and rights is often similarly constructed as a “force of 
linear progress, a beacon to lead us out of darkness” (1989:12), but, she warns, it must be 
closely examined and interrogated.    
Smart described her task as “deconstructing the discursive power of law” (1989:5).  She 
sought to expose the way in which law’s discourse causes harm to women, and to debunk 
the widely-held belief that “law is extending rights, rather than creating wrongs” (1989:12). 
Whilst following Smart’s approach to deconstructing the discursive power of law, this thesis 
adopts a more optimistic starting point regarding the positive transformative power of law 
and rights.  
Power as productive and dispersed 
In thinking about law as a form of power, Foucault’s theory on the changing nature of power 
in modernity, developed in the “genealogical” or power-analytics period of his work, is 
indispensable to this thesis. The thesis will draw primarily on Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison (1977), The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Part One (1979), and 
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Foucault’s two lectures on Power/Knowledge (Foucault 1980). These ground-breaking texts 
articulated Foucault’s understanding of power, and its relationship to knowledge and 
discourse, in contexts – the prison and sex/sexuality – which have clear relevance for this 
thesis.   
Foucault propounded the idea that not only does knowledge produce power, but power 
also produces knowledge, which in turn enriches and expands power.  It was this dynamic 
relationship of “power/knowledge” that Foucault sought to investigate; the circular, cyclical 
and cumulative process of “power/knowledge spirals”.  Discourse bound these spirals 
together:   
it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together … discourse can be 
both an instrument and an effect of power .. Discourse transmits and produces 
power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile…   
(1979: 101)   
Similarly, he proposed that truth (which, it will be recalled, is generated through discourse) 
“is linked in a circular relation with systems of power, which produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (1980:33).  He called this dynamic 
relationship between power and truth a “regime of truth” (ibid) or a “ritual of truth” (1977: 
194).   
In propounding his power/knowledge theory, Foucault rejected the classic notion of power, 
which was characterised by the power of the monarch to command, possess, prohibit and 
punish.  He called this “sovereign power” or “juridical power”, using the terms 
interchangeably (Gutting 1994: 100).  Foucault proposed a radically new account of power, 
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which was productive, rather than repressive, and which consolidated knowledge and truth-
claims in its production of reality, including in its construction of the subject, as captured by 
this pivotal quote from Discipline and Punish: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals.  In fact, power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.  
The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production (1977: 194) 
Foucault also rejected the idea of the sovereign state from which all power derives, and 
argued that “power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere” (1989: 93). He was particularly interested in “micro-mechanisms” 
of power, which he described as minute “capillaries” of power (1979:96-7), dispersed to the 
deepest level of being, making people who they are – such that gender non-conforming 
people internalise their categorisation by authoritative sources, e.g. as “deviant”, “criminal”, 
“mentally disordered”, “homosexual” or “transsexual”.    
Foucault stated that a power analysis should not concern itself with centralised state power 
but “on the contrary … should be concerned with power at its extremities   … where it is 
always less legal in character” (ibid).  This idea is critical to this thesis, given that transgender 
prisoners occur at a crux of legal, cultural, medical and security/risk-based categories, 
emanating from different “authoritative” sources, and that these different systems produce 
different rationales for their control, regulation and fair treatment.  In the above quotation, 
however, are the first signs that Foucault, in propounding his theory on the changing nature 
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of power in modernity, was not interested in law, at least in its “sovereign” form.  Yet, 
following Smart, this thesis starts from the premise that law’s power is not only centred in 
the state, and concentrated around its institutions, but that its power is also diffused 
through society through its discursive, norm-producing effects. Law is not simply “law”, in 
terms of legislation and case law, but occupies a special conceptual place in our thinking, 
doing and being.   Indeed, this thesis argues that it is this combination of macro- and micro- 
mechanisms of power, which renders law particularly powerful in the field of sex and 
gender.   
Disciplinary power and bio-power   
In thinking about law as a productive form of power, it is important to understand its 
relationship to Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power and bio-power, which he 
developed, respectively, in the relevant contexts of the prison and sexuality.  A brief 
summary suffices here.  
Discipline and Punish introduces the concept of disciplinary power, which is a “power of 
normalisation” (1977: 297).  Foucault detailed how the sovereign’s power to prohibit and to 
punish through the public spectacle of torture and death came to be replaced, by the mid-
nineteenth century, with “an economy of suspended rights”, achieved through 
imprisonment (ibid: 11). He described this development as part of a new economy of power, 
which sought to discipline or normalise “subjects” into “docile bodies” through various 
disciplinary institutions, including schools, military barracks and prisons (ibid: 308) and 
through various new techniques of power over the body. In the prison, these techniques 
included a strict daily regime and constant surveillance.  Prisoners would learn to adapt 
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their behaviours, so as to be seen to be performing in the manner expected of them.  With 
constant repetition, they would ultimately internalise these “micro-mechanisms of power” 
and regulate themselves, assuring the “automatic functioning of power” (ibid: 201).  Unlike 
the brute instrument of sovereign power wielded over bodies, then, disciplinary power was 
a silent, subtle, insidious mechanism of power which worked on the body through the soul.  
Foucault foresaw that it would ultimately extend beyond the disciplinary institutions and 
pervade all parts of society, bringing about the “universalising reign of the normative” (ibid: 
304).  Foucault did not consider the gendered nature of power, however, or the effects of 
power on gendered bodies in the prison. 
History of Sexuality introduces the concept of bio-power, which involves knowledge of, and 
power over, the population as a whole:   
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate 
dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to 
exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself (1979: 142-3) 
This “power to take charge of life”, Foucault explained, “needs continuous regulatory and 
corrective mechanisms”, so as to distribute subjects “in the domain of value and utility” 
(ibid: 144).  It is a power which “has to qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchize, rather 
than display itself in murderous splendour …. it effects distributions around the norm (ibid: 
144).  Bio-power, like disciplinary power, is a normalising power, but it operates at the level 
of the population as a whole, not on individual souls and bodies.  Its ambit extends to sex, 
gender and sexuality.   Foucault later developed the concept of “governmentality” to explain 
how disciplinary power and bio-power mutually reinforce each other through a wide 
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network of institutions, practices and techniques, which target both individuals and the 
population as a whole.   
Resistance 
Finally, it is important to note that, in History of Sexuality, Foucault added the concept of 
resistance to his account of power: for “where there is power, there is resistance” (1979: 
95). He argued that resistance, like power, is exercised from multiple points and by multiple 
agents, and not just from the administrative centre but also from the margins. He added 
that “this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (ibid).  This 
symbiotic relationship between power and resistance is important for this thesis, in 
explaining how institutional power is already and always altered by resistance against it, and 
how the subject cannot step outside relations of power, but is always formed in and through 
those power relations.  Whilst prison creates less space for resistance, resistance to penal 
power is not extinguished: as Mary Corcoran (2006) has shown, for example, women 
political prisoners in Northern Ireland (1972-1998) demonstrated resistance to penal power 
in a myriad of ways, from ongoing resistance to their internment and classification as 
criminals, to active disengagement with the regime, bodily resistance in terms of “no wash 
strikes” and “dirty protests”, and rights-based litigation alleging sex discrimination. The 
thesis will explore recourse to law and human rights, especially through the courts, as a 
form of prisoner resistance, and reflect on its ability to alter institutional power.   
Post-Foucauldian Legal Scholarship on the Power of Law 
As this section has introduced the core Foucauldian concepts which underpin this thesis, it 
has gradually been linking them to law, in particular by reference to Smart (1989).  Yet, 
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Foucault’s work is not widely connected to law.  He frequently referred to law, but law was 
never one of his explicit objects of inquiry.  Indeed, in History of Sexuality he explicitly called 
upon us “to break free of the theoretical power of law and sovereignty, if we wish to 
analyse power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation” and “to 
construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code” (1979: 85-
86).   Many feminist and queer scholars in the humanities have subsequently regarded law 
as extraneous to their power analyses of sex, sexuality and gender (e.g. Butler).  However, 
this thesis proceeds from the basis that this is a mistake, and that a power analysis which 
neglects law’s normative role in regulating sex, sexuality and gender, is incomplete.   
This section aims to demonstrate that an analysis of law’s power is not futile or 
misconceived, and indeed that Foucault’s rejection of law is not as clear-cut as the above 
quote would suggest.  It discusses different interpretations of Foucault’s view of law – a 
debate which has recently been revived by Golder and Fitzpatrick’s Foucault’s Law (2009) – 
and shows that, whatever interpretation is adopted of Foucault’s own position on law, there 
is a broad consensus among post-Foucauldian legal scholars (perhaps unsurprisingly) that 
law remains a powerful force in contemporary society, and Foucault’s conceptual 
framework is valuable to analyse its power effects.  The author is most persuaded by 
Francois Ewald’s (1991) and Victor Tadros’s reading of Foucault and the law (1998), which 
purports that Foucault’s relevance for legal scholarship is often overlooked, due to a 
common misconception that Foucault used the term “juridical” synonymously with “law”.  
Tadros attributes this misunderstanding to Hunt and Wickham (1994), but it is also evident 
in Smart’s earlier reading of Foucault (1989).  Since Hunt and Wickham’s thesis became the 
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dominant account of Foucault’s position on law, the following passages outline their  
rationale, before turning to Ewald’s and Tadros’s counter-reading. 
On Smart’s reading, Foucault narrated the demise of the law.  He saw law as part of the old 
order, as a negative, repressive form of power, which was gradually being replaced by new 
forms of productive power, both disciplinary and bio-power (1989:8).  She challenged this 
“demise of law” thesis and argued, to the contrary, that law was extending its terrain in 
every direction, including into the private sphere, and that it was increasingly operating as 
mode of disciplinary regulation, incorporating the terms of medicine and the “psy” 
professions to enhance and expand its normative power (as already witnessed, for example, 
in Chapter 1, by law’s co-option of the terms of medicine and psychiatry in its regulation of 
“homosexuals” and “transsexuals”). Smart showed that law’s discourse is powerful and has 
real, exclusionary and damaging effects on women’s lives.  This analysis was developed in 
much greater depth (outside the feminist context) in Hunt and Wickham’s monograph 
Foucault and the Law (1994).   
On Hunt and Wickham’s influential reading, Foucault regarded law purely as an expression 
of sovereign or juridical power.  As part of the old regime, law was gradually being colonised 
by new, productive forms of power, namely disciplinary and bio-power, and would 
ultimately be rendered redundant, or play only a subordinate and marginal role in 
contemporary power relations. There is ample textual evidence to support this 
interpretation (for a detailed review see Hunt and Wickham 1994 and Golder and Fitzpatrick 
2009).  Only a few select quotes are offered by way of illustration here, to shed light on the 
different forms of power that law takes in this thesis.   
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In History of Sexuality, Foucault characterises legislation as “the pure form of power”: 
Power acts by laying down the rule … It speaks and that is the rule.  The pure form of 
power resides in the function of the legislator: and its mode of action with regard to 
sex is of a juridico-discursive character (1979: 83, emphasis added). 
On his account, law’s power is purely and always negative, it is a “law of prohibition” (ibid: 
84), a “sombre law which always says no” (ibid: 72): 
It is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in 
no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits … it is a power whose model 
is essentially juridical, centred on nothing more than the statement of the law and 
the operation of taboos (ibid: 85). 
Finally, Foucault law’s is always backed by violence. Discipline and Punish opens with a 
gruesome description of the sovereign’s power to torture and to condemn to death those 
who transgress the law and, in History of Sexuality, Foucault states that “law cannot help 
but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death …. The law always refers to the sword 
(ibid: 144).  This idea is critical to the thesis, in considering the extent to which law has 
facilitated or legitimised cultural and institutional violence against transgender people and 
transgender prisoners. 
Like Smart, Hunt and Wickham criticised Foucault for this one-dimensional and “inadequate 
conception of law” (1994: 60). They found Foucault’s reductionist account of the law 
“unhelpful” and at times “perverse”, as it neglected “the self-evident truth of the intimate 
connection between modern forms of power and legal mechanism” (1994: 62-3). They 
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called for “a new sociology of law as governance”, which informs the direction taken by this 
thesis, in approaching law’s power as an important element of the governance of 
sex/gender and transgender people’s lives. 
On this influential reading of Foucault’s law, Foucault recounted the rise of disciplinary 
power and bio-power at the expense of law.  Two particular descriptions of law’s decreasing 
power vis à vis disciplinary power in prison, taken from Discipline and Punish, are especially 
important for this thesis in thinking about the power of law and human rights in prison.  
First, is Foucault’s contention that the prison takes over from law, once it has passed its 
sentence on the criminal.   With the introduction of the penal system, he stated, “justice is 
relieved of responsibility” for the penalty as soon as it is imposed, and its implementation is 
taken up by “a whole series of subsidiary authorities”, “none of whom shares the right to 
judge, but who are judges all the same” (1977: 21).  These “judges of normality are present 
everywhere” (Ibid: 304), doctors, psychiatrists, chaplains, “all apparatuses of discipline” 
perpetually imposing the “penality of the norm” (ibid: 183).  The thesis will argue that law 
no longer concedes its power to the disciplines at the prison door, but that its power 
permeates the prison walls.  Prison administrators now not only have a legal duty of care to 
keep prisoners safe from harm (“safeguarding”) but are also coming under increasing 
pressure to absorb prisoners’ human rights.  Furthermore, not only are they monitored by 
HM Prison Inspectorate and IMB, but prison administrators are also held to account by the 
courts, through the power of judicial review, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
The second important insight from Discipline and Punish involves Foucault’s depiction of the 
relationship between the disciplines and constitutional rights (introduced in eighteenth 
century France after the French revolution, e.g. the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
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Citizen, 1789).  Foucault depicts rights as the hand-maiden of disciplinary power, as a 
convenient front for its darker, more sinister workings.  The following well-known passage is 
key: 
Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became in the course of the 
eighteenth century the politically dominant class was masked by the establishment 
of an explicit, coded and formal egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by 
the organisation of a parliamentary representative regime.  But the development 
and generalisation of disciplinary mechanisms constitute the other, dark side of 
processes.  The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights was 
supported by these tiny, every-day, physical  mechanisms, by all those systems of 
micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the 
disciplines *and which+…  provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of 
forces and bodies.  (1977: 222, emphasis added). 
In this passage, Foucault refers to the juridical guarantee of “a system of rights” in the 
plural. Hunt and Wickham note that, in his Power/Knowledge lectures, Foucault heavily 
critiques the “system of right” and “the King’s right” in the singular (1980: 94-95), before 
shifting to speak of “the legitimate rights of sovereignty” in the plural (ibid: 95-6).   They 
contend that this “slippage” from “right” to “rights” has serious consequences (1994: 45; 
see also 63-65), and that, through it, Foucault inexorably ties the modern discourse of legal 
rights (both private rights and human rights) to the King’s right under the old sovereign 
order, where “the essential role of the theory of right… was to fix the legitimacy of power” 
(ibid).  This leads Foucault “to disparage the transformative capacity of rights within modern 
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political systems” (ibid) and to “treat modern discourses and practices of rights as if they 
were nothing more than the repetition of the ‘old’ discourses of ‘right’” (ibid). 
This point is important, and explains the standard reading of Foucault, namely that he saw 
rights as part and parcel of the old order which was being dismantled. In the new order, 
rights merely act as a front for disciplinary power, which is the true locus of power over 
bodies.  This thesis seeks to question whether law and human rights have any real power 
effects in the prison, or only have the effect of masking disciplinary power. In doing so, it 
adopts Smart’s proposal that we should  “think in terms of two parallel mechanisms of 
power, each with its own discourse, the discourse of rights and the discourse of 
normalisation” (1989: 8), and that we should explore the relationship, the interface 
between them, in specific scenarios, bearing in mind that “in some instances we may see a 
coalition, in others a conflict, and we cannot assume a pattern or clear signposts which will 
point us to an inevitable future” (ibid: 19).   
Having considered Foucault’s comments on the demise of law vis ȧ vis disciplinary power, in 
History of Sexuality, Foucault also portrayed bio-power as taking over from law: “another 
consequence of the development of bio-power”, he stated “was the growing importance 
assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law” 
(emphasis added).  Yet, crucially, he adds: 
I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background, or that the institutions 
of justice tend to disappear, rather that the law operates more and more as a norm 
and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of 
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apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on) whose functions are for the most 
part regulatory (1979: 144, emphasis added).  
Thus, Foucault explicitly recognises the continuing power of law, but in a regulatory and 
normative capacity, rather than in its previous, pure, juridical sense.  Despite noting this and 
other discrepancies and contradictions in Foucault’s treatment of law, Hunt and Wickham 
remained committed to their “expulsion thesis” that Foucault effectively expunged law from 
his account of modern power relations.  However, as previously mentioned, the author finds 
the counter-reading of Foucault, proposed by Ewald (1981) and developed more fully by 
Tadros (1998), more persuasive.  
This alternative reading of Foucault purports that Foucault did not use the term “juridical” 
synonymously with “law”.  Whilst Foucault frequently slips between these two terms, 
Tadros credibly argues that his references to the “juridical” describe “an arrangement and a 
representation of power, rather than the law” itself (1988:75, emphasis added), and that 
Foucault did not mean that law in general was on the decline, but only the narrow 
“Austinian” concept of law as “rules backed by sanctions”.   Once the term “juridical” is 
understood correctly, Tadros argues, the nature of modern law becomes an open question, 
and calls for a re-evaluation of the relationship between law and other mechanisms of 
power.  He sees modern law as beginning “to operate in the perspective of the complete 
lives of individuals, rather than just to prevent certain actions”, so that “law … operates in 
accordance with what Foucault calls bio-power” (ibid).   
In feminist legal scholarship, Vanessa Munro has criticised Smart for making the same 
interpretative error as Hunt and Wickham (2001).  According to Munro, distinguishing the 
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legal from the juridical in the manner proposed by Ewald and Tadros, “allows appreciation 
of the continued role of the legal within Foucault’s critical landscape” and that “rather than 
asking his readers to abandon their concern with the operation of law in society, Foucault 
has asked only that they shake off the juridical discourse that tends to frame such 
operations” (2001: 556).  This reading, she concludes, provides a “far more optimistic and 
empowered vision of the future of Foucaultian (sic) legal feminism” than Smart put forward 
(ibid:567), and is most salient to this thesis.  
It should be mentioned, for completeness, that, in Foucault’s Law (2009), Golder and 
Fitzpatrick have proposed a radical re-reading of Foucault.  They claim that Foucault 
developed a far more nuanced and coherent “theory” of law than he is generally credited 
with, which comprises both a “determinate and contained entity” and “a law of possibility, 
contingency and liability” (ibid: 2-3), and that it is in the “uneasy, ambivalent relation of 
these two opposed yet interacting ... legal dimensions”, that Foucault’s law is revealed as “a 
law of possibility … as a law always open to the possibility of it being otherwise” (ibid).  
Reviews of Foucault’s Law, whilst recognising its valuable contribution to reigniting debate 
in the field, are generally sceptical of this interpretation of Foucault, as well as the utility of 
such a theory of law’s “illimitable openness” for analysing law’s power (e.g. Norrie 2009; 
Pottage 2009; Rosenkrantz 2010; Minkkinnen 2011).    
In the final analysis, however, whatever interpretation one takes of Foucault’s own position 
on law, it is now widely accepted that law is a powerful force in contemporary society, and 
operates in multiple ways to regulate our lives, including our sex, gender and sexuality. It 
clearly does so in both a negative, prohibitive manner, and in a productive, disciplinary, 
normative manner.  And, whilst its institutional and instrumental power emanates from the 
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centre of the state, its discursive power permeates through to the micro-level of society, 
and has very real effects in terms of what it is possible to think, speak and do.  Thus, even 
the criminal law, which is closest to the “juridical” in Foucault, not only prohibits and 
punishes certain acts (and correlating “identities”, Foucault 1979), but also regulates lives 
through its symbolic power, its very existence on the statute books.  This was recognised by 
the UN Committee on Human Rights in Toonen v Australia (1994), which held that, even 
though a Tasmanian law prohibiting private sexual relations between men was never 
enforced, the statute acted like a communal chant, which reproduced a powerful normative 
understanding of “homosexual” individuals/acts as criminal, irrespective of its enforcement 
(see Morgan 1994). 
The transformative power of law 
So far, the thesis has accounted for different readings of Foucault and the law, and has 
followed Smart and other scholars in maintaining that law is a powerful discourse, and that 
it is useful to deconstruct its discursive power.  However, it does not agree with Smart’s 
pessimistic prognosis of law’s transformative potential for feminism.  Smart argues that 
engaging with law reinforces law’s power in society and its “androcentric standard” 
(1989:160); that “in accepting law’s terms in order to challenge law”, “feminism always 
concedes too much” and “loses the battle before it has begun” (ibid:5).  She argues that 
feminism should not assume that “law functions to right wrongs”, but should recognise that 
law’s effects are exclusionary and harmful to women.  Feminism, she concludes, should 
therefore “avoid the siren call of law” (ibid: 160), and “resist the temptation that law offers, 
namely the promise of a solution” (ibid: 165).  
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Whilst a recognition of law’s role in producing androcentric standards, as well as 
heteronormative and cis-normative standards, is highly salient to this thesis, the thesis 
rejects Smart’s rather nihilistic denunciation of law.  Many feminist scholars (e.g Sandland 
1995; Munro; Hunter et al 2010) have recognised the merits of the Foucauldian approach 
embodied in Smart’s thesis for deconstructing the discursive power of law, and have applied 
this approach in their scholarship.  Alex Sharpe has specifically applied this approach to 
transgender jurisprudence (2002).  These scholars, however, have firmly rejected Smart’s 
view that feminism should abandon law, as being empty of reform potential. Ralph 
Sandland accepts that Smart is correct to be concerned about the “fetishisation of law” as a 
solution to all problems, but finds Smart’s conclusions absolutist and defeatist.  In his view, 
challenges to law must come from both within and outside the law, since “deconstruction 
which does not subsequently engage with law, leaves law functioning to undermine gains 
made elsewhere” and “unless these challenges are at some stage shifted to the legal arena, 
the power of law will remain fundamentally unchallenged” (1995:47, emphasis in original).   
Foucault’s critique of rights and the wider critique of human rights  
Finally, it is important to address Foucault’s critique of rights.  However, before doing so, 
Foucault’s critique of rights must be situated within the broader, and ever burgeoning, 
literature critiquing human rights.  Philip Alston has recently observed that, in the past 
decade (after previously having been almost invisible in the mainstream social science 
literature) “social scientists have discovered human rights as a fertile and challenging 
subject for inquiry”, and that much of the resulting literature has been of a “deeply critical 
nature” (2013: 2062).   A detailed review of this substantial body of literature is far beyond 
the scope of this thesis, particularly if one accepts the established view that human rights 
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(and their critique) have a deep and rich ancestry, and did not simply emerge in a “big bang” 
in 1977, as Samuel Moyn controversially puts forward in his influential work Human Rights 
in History: The Last Utopia (2010; see also 2017).  Central to Moyn’s argument is that human 
rights only emerged at this time as a replacement utopia, after other political utopias, such 
as socialism, nationalism and communism, had failed (2010: 227).  As with the theory and 
politics of human rights, the historiography of human rights has itself now become a hotly 
contested topic – for a critical engagement with these historiographical debates, and a 
scathing critique of Moyn’s revisionist history of human rights, see Alston 2013.   
Taking a longer view of the history of human rights, only a few core critiques be highlighted 
here.  The universality of human rights, for example, has long been a contested site, as more 
recently revived in the “Asian values” and “African values” debate; critiques made in the 
name of cultural relativism have tended to regard human rights as a form of neo-
imperialism.  The nature and content of human rights has also long been disputed.  A 
particular question which has continued to engage philosophers since the 17th century is 
whether human rights have an existence separate from their legal incarnation in formal 
declarations of rights; this “natural law” theory, propounded by Thomas Hobbes, was 
famously dismissed by Jeremy Bentham as “nonsense upon stilts” (Waldron 1987/2014).   
The French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), which many regard as a 
foundational moment in the history of human rights, was dismissed by Edmund Burke as 
abstract and meaningless, absent social and economic means of implementation (1790), 
whilst Karl Marx derided it as bourgeois ideology, which reduced rights to “the rights of 
egoistic man, of man as a member of bourgeois society, that is to say an individual 
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separated from his community and solely concerned with his self-interest” (1943) (for a 
classic compilation on Bentham, Burke and Marx, see Waldron (ed) 1987/2014).   
Lacroix and Pranchère’s excellent work, Human Rights on Trial: A Genealogy of the Critique 
of Human Rights (2018), provides a concise analysis, or “intellectual map” (ibid: 23), of these 
and other main human rights critiques, from the French Declaration of 1789 onwards, with 
the aim of casting light on contemporary debates and dilemmas around human rights, and 
addressing the prevailing skepticism about human rights in contemporary political thought.   
Reaching an optimistic conclusion about “the richness and robustness of human rights, and 
their democratic and emancipatory potential” (Laborde, back cover), Lacroix and Pranchère 
conclude that, “whatever their potential for perversion and corruption”, the “crucial 
lineages” between the historical struggles of the 18th and 19th century and the struggles for 
emancipation today “continue to imbue human rights with the ‘explosive political force of a 
concrete utopia’” (246).  They take the latter quote from Jürgen Habermas, who 
persuasively locates the “realistic utopia of human rights” in the concept of human dignity 
(2010: 466).    
Lacroix and Pranchère’s (and Habermas’s) optimism contrasts starkly with Costas Douzinas’ 
bleak critique of contemporary human rights theory and practice, in The End of Human 
Rights (2000).  After providing an alternative reading of the historical trajectory between 
classical natural law and contemporary human rights, and engaging with various 
philosophical approaches to human rights, Douzinas argues that the defensive and 
emancipatory role of human rights will come to an end if we do not re-event their utopian 
ideal.  Calling on us to “take stock of the tradition of human rights” (ibid: 7) and to revive a 
critique of their philosophical foundations, he offers a re-conceptualisation of human rights, 
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through the ethics of otherness, which John Morss strongly critiques for being “doomed to 
failure” (2003: 889).  Morss further admonishes Douzinas for taking such a negative 
approach to human rights and justice, and for being a false friend to human rights, at a time 
when human rights are coming under increasing threat, and a positive approach is required 
“in the face of a diversity of enemies” (2003: 889).    
Whilst a lively and engaging debate, it is not necessary to go into detail here about 
competing historical philosophical critiques of human rights, or recent philosophical 
endeavours to ground the modern notion of human rights in theoretical terms (e.g. Sen 
2004 and Beitz 2009) .   Lacroix and Pranchère draw a useful distinction between critiques of 
human rights themselves, and critiques on the use made of human right in contemporary 
democratic societies.  As they persuasively argue, “few political theorists would endorse 
rejection of human rights as such – of the normative and legislative corpus, in other words, 
that forms the basis for the rule of law in democratic states … it is the use made of human 
rights in contemporary democracies” that is disputed and the elevation of human rights “to 
the status of self-standing political ideal” (2: emphasis in the original).  This thesis takes a 
similar starting point.  Whilst philosophical critiques of human rights have their own validity, 
this thesis does not set out to critique the notion of human rights per se.  Rather, accepting 
the privileged place of human rights in contemporary politics and the powerful discourse of 
rights in contemporary society, this thesis seeks to assess the potential, and the risks (both 
pragmatically and, albeit to a lesser extent, politically) of using human rights – here, in the 
concrete scenario of pursuing legal and policy reform through human rights, and pursuing 
litigation in the courts, in the quest for improvements in the everyday lives of transgender 
prisoners.    
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As Lacroix and Pranchère note, contemporary political critique of the use of human rights 
can be categorised into two main strands, the communitarian critique and the radical 
critique. The communitarian critique, whilst it does not question the legitimacy of human 
rights, is concerned with the primacy afforded to them in contemporary democracies, and 
with the egotism and social fragmentation that they see as being caused by an emphasis on 
individual rights claims. The radical critique, with which this thesis more directly engages, is 
“less concerned with social fragmentation” than with “the ideological and disciplinary 
function of a discourse of rights, which they see as turning their back on the promise of 
emancipation” (ibid: 31).   
It is important to note at this juncture that, although radical critics regard liberal and neo-
liberal rights discourse as an impoverished replacement for more radical visions of social 
justice and emancipation, they do not dismiss the use of human rights to ameliorate the 
position of oppressed and marginalised people.  They remain highly alert to the 
unpredictability, the limits and the risks of turning to human rights, however – to the 
“paradox of rights” (Brown 2002).  Many feminist and critical race scholars/activists take this 
critical stance towards human rights, as do many from the newer critical disabilities studies 
and transgender law field.  A particularly good example in the transgender law field, is the 
work of transgender scholar and activist Dean Spade (e.g. 2009 and 2012), discussed in the 
Introduction.  
As should already be clear, this strand of “radical” critique takes a distinctly Foucauldian 
approach.  Broadly, it regards human rights a form of discursive power, which has harmful 
disciplinary effects, and which, whilst appearing attractive on the surface, fails to address 
systemic conditions of oppression.  In the legal sphere, feminist scholarship and critical race 
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scholarship has, for example, critiqued earlier movements for focusing their law reform 
efforts on formal equality and anti-discrimination laws, which prohibit individual acts of 
discrimination on the basis of sex/gender and race, whilst leaving untouched - and indeed 
reinforcing and legitimising - broader historical and contemporary conditions of patriarchy, 
racism and colonialism.59  Further, whilst the symbolic value of human rights for historically 
marginalised and oppressed groups is widely recognised (see, for example, Patricia Williams 
The Alchemy of Rights 1991),60 scholars and activists from this school of thought see the 
desire for recognition and inclusion through human rights, as being in tension with the 
harmful tendency of human rights to consolidate regulative norms around (monolithic) 
identities, e.g. of women qua women, of transgender people qua transgender people (as 
post-structural feminist, queer and anti-racist  critiques of “identity politics” attest).   
Having given a brief overview of the broader context of human rights critique, it is time to 
return to Foucault’s critique of rights.  It will be recalled from the passage quoted from 
Discipline and Punish above, that Foucault described constitutional “systems of rights” as a 
mere “mask” for disciplinary power, including in the prison. For Foucault, appeals to rights 
are fundamentally flawed, both because they fail to acknowledge the real locus of power in 
modern society, and because they reinforce the very sovereign power which they claimed to 
limit and contest.  Recourse to rights discourse therefore places the subject in a “kind of 
blind alley” (Foucault 1980: 108).   
                                                          
59
 There have been attempts to address this well-recognised limitation of the traditional anti-discrimination 
model in both international human rights instruments (such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women), and in domestic laws, for example through state-sanctioned positive 
discrimination and state-based affirmative action programmes for historically oppressed groups.  Another 
example is the Equality Act 2010’s positive “public sector equality duty”, discussed in Chapter 3. 
60
 Williams powerfully argues that “for the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all 
the denied aspects of their humanity; rights imply a respect that places one on the referential range of self and 
others, that elevates one’s status from human body to social being” (1991: 148). 
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Whilst Foucault was clearly dismissive of rights in his genealogical period, however, there is 
a broad consensus that Foucault engaged more extensively with human rights in his later 
work.  Various examples of his mobilisation of the political vocabulary of rights can be found 
in his lectures and interviews from the late 1970s to early 1980s; indeed, he explicitly 
remarked on the importance of “the possibility – and the right – to choose one’s sexuality”, 
and the need for “all abuses of rights” to be eliminated in the prison (Keenan 1987: 29-30).    
As Lacroix and Pranchère point out, some “leftist” critiques of human rights, “forget what 
Michel Foucault himself recognised, particularly if his works are read in the light of his own 
political activism: that campaigns for rights can, by their very unpredictability, be forces for 
emancipation” (2018:234).  They argue that the contradiction which Foucault had earlier 
identified between discipline and law, and which had previously been concealed behind the 
notion of sovereignty, had now come strongly to the fore, and that Foucault saw the way 
forward as moving “in the direction of a new right, one which would be anti-disciplinary, but 
at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty” (ibid, citing Foucault, Lecture 
of 14 January 1976).  Lacroix and Pranchère argue that at the end of his life, Foucault 
“appeared to think that recourse to human rights was indeed moving in this direction” 
(ibid). 
Scholars have reached different conclusions as to what this late engagement with rights 
means for the Foucauldian subject. Eric Paras has equated Foucault’s belated acceptance of 
a “properly agentive” human subject, beyond “power and knowledge”, with a “return to 
rights” (Paras 2006; Golder 2010: 356). Golder agrees that the late Foucauldian subject is 
both “crafted and crafting” (citing Butler 2004) or “acted upon and acting” (ibid: 367), but 
rejects the notion that this represents a radical departure from Foucault’s earlier position, 
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and instead contends that it aligns with his militant anti-humanism, and represents a 
continuation of “his critical engagement with human rights, within and against existing 
human rights, in the name of an unfinished humanity” (ibid: 356) (see Golder 2000 for a 
comprehensive analysis). 
On Golder’s reading, Foucault’s rights have an “illimitable quality”, whereby the “human” of 
human rights is “not determined, but contested”, whereby rights cannot be contained but 
must remain ever “unrestricted”, to allow for different ways of being.  He therefore argues 
that Foucault’s late engagement with human rights is not the “return to the subject”, but 
rather the “undoing” of the subject.  This politics of human rights, Golder argues, rejects 
recourse to an “absolutised human”, and embraces instead “the radical contingency of the 
human and the permeability of its borders” (2010: 373, see also Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 
123-4).  This conceptualisation of the “future of human rights” is certainly compelling in its 
inclusiveness and ethicality.  Even if one is not entirely persuaded by Golder that this theory 
can be found in Foucault, others have, themselves, argued for a similar future for rights. 
William MacNeil, for example, calls for a similar re-theorisation of rights which would make 
rights discourse workable for postmodernity, by recognising the failure of the “rights-
bearing identity”, the “fantasy”, the “nothingness” of the subject supplied by rights 
(1999:134).  For MacNeil, “rights hold out the possibility of a politics which go beyond 
identity by interpolating an identity of non-identity” (ibid: 136).  This ideal of a “politics 
beyond identity politics” shapes much queer thinking (e.g. Butler 2004), and informs its 
tendency to reject recourse to current, identity-based, rights as transformative.  Whilst the 
author looks to a future where there will be an international and domestic right to self-
determination of gender, which is free from medical or state intervention, the thesis will 
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examine whether human rights, in their current format, and in the current socio-political 
context, have transformative potential for the lives of transgender prisoners.   
In contemporary society, as already noted above, it seems to be uncontroversial that human 
rights discourse has considerable power, and, in particular, enables marginalised sectors of 
society to make their voices heard.  As Smart stated some years ago, “to claim that an issue 
is a matter of rights is to give the claim legitimacy” (1989: 143); by couching a claim in terms 
of rights, “it enters into a linguistic currency to which everyone has access” (ibid).  In their 
excellent monograph, Human Rights and the Criminal Justice System, Amatrudo and Blake 
use the transgender prisoners’ rights case of AB (2009) to illustrate their argument that few 
areas of law, other than the law concerned with the human rights of prisoners, have more 
clearly demonstrated “how deeply embedded in the UK the culture of human rights has 
become” since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000 (2015: 136).     
In 1989, whilst Smart felt that rights still had some political purchase and consciousness-
changing potential for feminism, and could help transform women from supplicants into 
self-determining people, she felt that the political climate had led to a “dilemma over rights” 
(1989: 158).  On the one hand, it was difficult to abandon rights discourse, but on the other, 
she thought its efficacy was waning, as rights were increasingly defined as “unjustified and 
selfish prerogatives” (ibid: 158-159).  Over twenty-five years later, the “dilemma over rights” 
(cf. Brown 2000, above, on “suffering rights as paradoxes”) has not been resolved.  Whilst 
human rights and equality discourse has become firmly embedded in contemporary 
political, social and economic life, and rights consciousness has increased to the extent that 
one can comfortably speak of a rights culture in the UK (e.g. Armatrudo and Blake 2015: 
136), the current political climate (as noted in the Introduction) is hostile to “undesirable” 
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and “undeserving” groups such as prisoners, terrorists, migrants and even refugees 
accessing human rights.   Appeals to human rights by prisoners, as a group, have long been 
recognised as problematic.  As Snider remarked in relation to the emergence of the rights-
conscious, woman prisoner, “the very success of rights claims in public arena, the 
constitution of aware, resistance subjects, who no longer know their place, is a central 
component in the virulent and powerful backlash against all progressive movements” 
(2001:356). This tension between the transformative potential of rights, on the one hand, 
and the unpredictability of recourse to rights and potential backlash, will become only too 
evident in this thesis.  
Theory around the Construction, Performativity, and Embodiment 
of Gender  
The second theoretical pillar of this thesis comprises feminist, queer and transgender theory 
on the construction and performativity of gender, and in particular, the way in which these 
theories speak to embodied, lived realities of gender.  So far, the chapter has laid out the 
rationale and conceptual foundations for approaching law not only as a power to lay down 
rules, but also as a productive power, with normative effects “at the level of life itself” 
(Foucault 1979:143). Chapter 1 has already discussed law’s restrictive definition of 
sex/gender, and its harmful exclusion of the “transsexual”, in its analysis of Corbett (1970), 
and, next, Chapter 3 will examine the impact of human rights on law’s re-conceptualisation 
of sex/gender in the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  In order to contextualise the meaning 
and power of law’s changing “truths” regarding sex, gender and the transgender subject, it 
is imperative to situate them in the broader, contested, discursive field.  For, as this thesis 
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will show, conflicting ideas of how to define sex and gender are not simply theoretical, but 
have very real effects on people’s lives.  
Whilst this thesis draws on many important conceptual insights from Foucault’s work, 
gender is not one of them.  However, a rich body of feminist, queer and transgender 
scholarship – much of it grounded in Foucauldian and/or poststructuralist thought – has 
interrogated the categories of sex and gender, contested their etiological foundations and 
cultural boundaries, and contemplated the significance of the material body. The 
problematisation of the transgender figure, or “The Transgender Question” as Namaste 
aptly calls it (2009), has been central to this exercise.   
Despite the elision of gender in his theories of power, Foucault’s core thesis in History of 
Sexuality is critical to the current analysis, and acted as a catalyst for later theorising around 
gender.  Foucault contended that sexuality and sex are not natural, but are constituted 
through “regimes of truth”, which create a “fictitious unity” of anatomy and sexual pleasure 
(1979: 154). He argued that the state constructed and naturalised the concept of 
heterosexuality in order to regulate sex, and to promote the reproductive output of the 
population.  It used discourses of sexuality to entrench the notion of normative, 
oppositional sex categories, and governmentality techniques, such as the official registration 
of births, and the collation of other statistics, to fix these binary, biological sex categories. 
Bodies could either be male or female.  In practice, this process focused on, and reinforced 
the significance of, genitals, erasing intersex and transgender bodies, identities and/or 
experiences.  
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Building on Foucault’s ideas in History of Sexuality, and the poststructuralist project of 
deconstructing taken-for-granted categories, Judith Butler’s iconic book Gender Trouble 
(1990/1999) interrogated traditional feminist assumptions about sex and gender, and the 
heteronormative matrix in which they tend to be situated.  She challenged the central 
premise of second wave feminist scholarship and “praxis” (hooks 1984), which understood 
“sex” as a fixed and incontestable site, manifested in biologically differentiated male and 
female bodies, and understood “gender” (then called “sex roles”) as a separate, socially 
constructed concept, designed and perpetuated by men to keep women in a subordinate 
position.   
By making this conceptual and etiological distinction between sex and gender, feminism was 
able to counter the prevailing, essentialist position that male and female behaviours are 
naturally different, and are determined according to biological sex.  For second-wave 
feminists (unlike Foucault, for whom power was “gender-neutral”), gender was the product 
of patriarchal power relations, which needed to be dismantled. Central to this political 
project was making visible women’s experience of male oppression, including in the 
workplace and family, and in sexual and reproductive matters.  However, second wave 
feminism faltered over its white, Western, middle-class, assumptions about the universal 
“woman” and women’s “universal” experience of oppression (as best exemplified by hooks’ 
1984 critique of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique 1963).  In response to criticisms 
from black and “third world” feminists that their voices and experiences were 
absent/excluded, third wave feminism from the mid-1990s became more alive to 
intersectional issues in women’s experience of oppression, including race, class and 
colonialism, and, most significantly for the purpose of this thesis, sexually and/or gender 
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non-normative women.  This concern found its expression in “queer theory”, a term 
generally attributed to Teresa del Lauritis,61 but most associated with the work of Butler. 
From Butler’s rich and thought-provoking text, Gender Trouble (1990/1999) (and her later 
works Bodies that Matter (1993) and Undoing Gender (2004)) the following discussion is 
only able to distil the main ideas, and canvass the main critiques, that inform and animate 
this thesis in its analysis of the power of law and human rights to regulate whose 
trans/gendered lives are intelligible, legitimate and realisable, and whose are not.   
Un/intelligible genders 
Butler’s concern was that feminism’s formulation of a “stable” and “seamless” category of 
“women”, as the subject of its representational politics, excluded women whose gender 
expression, sexual desires and/or sexual practices did not neatly fit into the 
heteronormative framework.  She believed that feminism was unwittingly contributing to 
the reification of gender into binary norms of “masculine” and “feminine” by working from 
within the existing, “buried”, field of power relations.  Butler argued that feminism’s 
restrictive construction of gender was producing new forms of hierarchy and regimes of 
truth and presenting certain forms of gender expression as “false and derivative”, and 
others as “true and original” (1999: iii).  She sought to uncover the ways in which “the very 
thinking of what is possible in gendered life is foreclosed by certain habitual presumptions” 
                                                          
61
 After organising a conference under the same title, Del Lauritis edited a special issue of differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies on “Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities” (1991),  in which she 
proposed inter alia that lesbian and gay studies could be understood and imagined as a form of resistance to 
cultural homogenisation, and to the construction of heterosexuality as the norm against which all other 
sexualities should be measured, and called for attention to the multiple ways in which race shapes sexual 
subjectivities, so as to “recast or reinvent the terms of our sexualities, to construct another discursive horizon, 
another way of thinking the sexual (iii-iv).  Several years later, she reportedly abandoned the term, on the basis 
that it had had been taken over by the mainstream forces it was intended to resist, see Halperin 2003: 343. 
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and to “open up the field of possibility of gender” for all those who know what it is to live as 
“what is impossible, illegible, unrealizable, unreal and illegitimate” (1999: viii).   
Developing Foucault’s thesis on governmentality, sexuality and sex, Butler examined how 
the regulatory practices that govern gender also govern “culturally intelligible notions of 
identity”, or what she usefully terms “intelligible genders” (1999: 23-24).  “Inasmuch as 
‘identity’ is assured through the stabilising concepts of sex, gender and sexuality”, she 
posits, “the very notion of the person is called into question by the cultural emergence of 
those “incoherent” or “discontinuous” gendered beings who appear to be persons, but who 
fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which people are 
defined”, including those “in which gender does not follow from sex” (1999:24).  In her 
view, “the persistence and proliferation of those genders provide critical opportunities to 
expose the limits and regulatory aims of that domain of intelligibility” (1999:24).   
Butler also argued that the persistence and proliferation of these “unintelligible genders” 
provide subversive potential “to open up … rival and subversive matrices of gender 
disorder” and make “gender trouble” (1999:24).62 The “gender trouble” which Butler 
envisaged is becoming increasingly evident, as more and more gender (including a-gender, 
fluid and non-binary gender) possibilities are becoming visible in contemporary UK society, 
and exposing the myth of the binary gender order.63  The disruptive effects of this challenge 
to the gender order are magnified in the prison.  Transgender prisoners and gender non-
conforming prisoners literally make visible the “non-sense” of the binary sex/gender order; 
                                                          
62
 Others who celebrated the political potential of visible gender transgression include Stone 1991/2006, 
Feinberg 1993, Bornstein 1994/2016 and Stryker 1994. 
63 This proliferation of gender is becoming manifest in contemporary UK society; in 2014, Facebook introduced 
71 gender options for UK users, replacing its previous two (Williams 2014). A recent government (Children’s 
Commission) survey asked teenagers to identify their gender by reference to 24 options (Boult 2016).   
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they trouble the prison administration’s traditional allocation of sexed bodies to the male 
and female prison estate, and cast doubt on the binary gender-normative regimes on which 
it is built, simply by their presence.64 
Becoming gendered  
Butler also advanced the idea that both sex and gender are culturally constructed, which 
challenged the established feminist model of sex (“biologically” fixed) and gender (social 
construct).  In parallel with Foucault’s thesis on sexuality and sex in History of Sexuality, she 
proposed the idea that gender precedes sex, and operates as the discursive/cultural means 
by which sex is made to appear natural, pre-given and irrefutable.  “What if sex were gender 
all along?” she asks: “perhaps this construct called sex is as culturally constructed as gender, 
indeed perhaps it was already gender … with the consequence that the distinction between 
sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all” (1999: 9-10) – an insight which will be 
explored in Chapter 3, when the thesis discusses the collapsing of legal sex into gender 
through the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  Further, through a creative re-working of de 
Beauvoir’s well-known formulation “one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one” 
(1949), Butler proposes that there is no cultural compulsion to become a woman based on 
one’s female anatomical body: “‘woman’ need not be the cultural construction of the 
female body”, nor must ‘man’ be the cultural construction of the male body (1999:152).  If 
sex and gender are distinct, as feminism has claimed, “it does not follow that to be a given 
sex is to become a given gender”, rather, she moots, perhaps gender is free-floating, 
detached from bodies, “something one becomes, but can never be” (ibid).  And, further, if it 
                                                          
64
 Whether or not they conceive of their gender as an act of political subversion of the type proposed by 
Butler.   
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is “a kind of becoming”, it is free “to proliferate beyond the binary limits imposed by the 
apparent binary of sex” (ibid).   
Gender performativity and embodied gender 
In considering how one becomes gendered, Butler proposed the idea that gender is 
performative. There is no “being” or “identity” behind the acts that supposedly "express" 
gender, she argues, rather gender is something anticipated and achieved by the subject in 
and through repetition (“citation”).  The repetition of these acts constitutes, rather than 
expresses, the illusion of a core gender identity.  On this account, naturalised knowledge of 
gender acts as a “pre-emptive and violent circumscription of reality”, and establishes “what 
will or will not be ‘intelligibly human’ and what will or will not be considered to be ‘real’” 
(1999: xxiv-xxv).  For Butler, the transgender figure dramatises this process (ibid: x).  
Whereas the “constructedness” of normative (cis)gender is masked by the veil of 
naturalisation, the transgender figure reveals, indeed explicitly performs, its own 
constructedness, and brings into sharp relief the performativity of (all) gender.  However, as 
the thesis will demonstrate, in the face of transgender’s denaturalisation of gender, law 
seeks to bolster cisgender identity, while simultaneously rendering artificial and unreal the 
lives of transgender people.  
Butler’s theory of gender performativity, which became emblematic of queer theory, met 
with strong criticism in some quarters for trivialising transgender people’s lives and reducing 
their gender to mere performance or “drag”, to be donned and doffed at will.  She was 
charged with overlooking many transgender people’s understanding and experience of their 
gender as inherent and inescapable, and for ignoring the importance of the material body in 
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their sex/gender crossings. Jay Prosser, who was prominent in challenging Butler’s thesis, 
sought to “wrest the transsexual from its queer inscription of transgender” (1998: 56).  
Referring to queer’s sense of its “higher purpose” of subverting the gender order and 
making “gender trouble”, Prosser emphasised that “there are transgender trajectories, in 
particular transsexual trajectories, that aspire to that which this scheme devalues.  Namely 
there are transsexuals who seek very pointedly to be non-performative, to be constative, 
quite simply, to be” (ibid: 32, emphasis in the original).65    
In Bodies that Matter (1993) and the preface to the second edition of Gender Trouble 
(1999)¸ Butler addressed these “misinterpretations” of her gender performativity thesis, and 
stressed that we are all performing, all doing gender.  By emphasising the constructiveness 
of sex and gender through the transgender figure, she stated, she did not mean to imply 
that gender is an artifice or that it can be chosen at will.  Rather, her aim in Gender Trouble 
was to explore how agency might be derived from constructionist accounts of gender, how 
“gender practices” might be preserved “as sites of critical agency”, when gender itself is 
produced through power (1999: ix).  However, as Julia Serano has persuasively argued 
(2007; 2013), this performance-centric view of gender – even when it is said to apply to all 
gender performances – does not sufficiently account for how others perceive and interpret 
gender (2007: 190-193), and the higher stakes of a social constructionist account of gender 
for transgender people.   
 
                                                          
65
 See also Namaste 1996.  For an excellent sociological analysis of the multiple ways in which transgender 
people in the UK experience and identify their gender, see e.g. Hines 2007 and, for a broader international 
collection on transgender identities, e.g. Hines and Stanger 2010. 
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Cis-sexism  
Whilst transgender people’s gender is no less real, no less authentic, than cisgender 
people’s, Serano argues (2007), they still tend to be “read” as inauthentic by our cis-
normative society, and to be placed lower down the “gender hierarchy”.  She draws 
attention to the cisgender “obsession” with “passing” as a double-standard, whereby the 
“gender work” of cisgender people is interpreted as natural and effortless, whilst that of 
transgender people is interpreted as artificial and deliberate (2007: 184-186).  Indeed, as 
she observes, the very term “passing” is problematic as it carries connotations of deception 
and implies that one does not rightfully belong in the gender category.  This thesis therefore 
uses the term being “read” as transgender, to put a focus on what cisgender people do in 
“reading” a person’s gender, rather than shoring up an approximation to cisgender as the 
benchmark for transgender people to attain.   
Serano introduces the useful term “cis-sexism” to describe the pervasive perception of 
transgender people’s gender as inferior to, or less authentic than, those of cisgender people 
(2007: 12).66 She contends that, by dismissing and delegitimising transgender people’s 
gender as “fake”, cisgender people seek to validate their own gender as real, natural and 
legitimate.  A good example can be found in Greer’s influential feminist exposition, The 
Complete Woman (1999).  In a chapter disparagingly entitled “Pantomime Dames”, Greer 
argues that women’s “toleration” of “spurious femaleness” weakens her claim to have a sex 
of her own (1999: 73).   This thesis will show how “cis-sexism” is evident in law – and 
                                                          
66
 Serano distinguishes “cis-sexism” from the broader-based concept of “transphobia”, which refers to fear of, 
aversion to, or discrimination against people whose gender expression and/or behaviour differ from the norm.  
Cis-sexism is more narrowly targeted at transsexual and transgender people, whose gender does not align with 
that assigned to them at birth. 
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underpins both equality legislation and the courts’ construction of transgender people’s/ 
prisoners’ gender. 
Trans-misogyny  
Serano further argues that social stigma and “demonisation” is directed overwhelmingly at 
transgender women, whilst transgender men remain largely invisible (and under-theorised).  
This disparity in attention implies that transgender women are “culturally marked”, not for 
failing to conform to gender norms per se, but because of the specific direction of their 
gender transgression—that is, because of their feminine gender expression and/or female 
gender identities. She characterises this particular marginalisation of transgender women as 
“trans-misogyny” (2012).  One example she gives of trans-misogyny, is the way in which 
transgender women’s motives for transitioning are routinely sexualised by the media. While 
transgender men may face a certain degree of media objectification, she argues, their 
motives for transitioning are not typically sexualised in the same manner. If anything, “those 
who do project ulterior motives onto transgender men” generally presume they transition in 
order to obtain male privilege, rather than for sexual reasons.67  Thus, Serano proposes, the 
presumption that transgender women (but not transgender men) are sexually motivated in 
their transitions “appears to reflect the cultural assumption that a woman’s power and 
worth stems primarily from her ability to be sexualised by others” (ibid).  This thesis will 
show how a presumption of sexual (and other suspect) motivations is evident in media 
reports of transgender women who transition whilst in prison and subsequently transfer to 
the female estate, and casts into doubt their trans/gender authenticity.   
                                                          
67
 This reflects the historical assumption that women took on male identities in order to access male 
employment opportunities, rather than for the “immoral purposes” pursued by men “impersonating women”, 
as noted in Chapter 1. 
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Materiality of the body  
As mentioned earlier, the other aspect of Butler’s thesis which was heavily critiqued in 
transgender scholarship was its failure to recognise the significance of the body in 
trangender people’s sex/gender crossings.  In Second Skins: The Body Narratives of 
Transsexuality (1998), Prosser took up the critical project of reclaiming the centrality of 
“sexed embodiment” for the “transsexual” subject and foregrounded the importance of the 
material body in narratives of transsexual people’s gender crossings, and their desire for a 
“bodily home” (1998: 171-205).  He called for a new “politics of home”, which would 
“analyse the persistence of sexual difference” in the social world, and “the costs to the 
subject of not being clearly locatable in relation to sexual difference”, and “above all, would 
not disavow the value of belonging as the basis for liveable identity” (ibid: 204; see also 
Namaste 2000, 2005 and 2009).68  
Butler responded in Bodies that Matter (1993) to criticisms that she had ignored the 
materiality of the sexed body, and set out to examine why the materiality of sex is so 
forcibly produced, and what bodies matter and why (ibid:ix).  Building on Foucault’s account 
of sex as a “regulatory ideal” (1979), she argues that sex is “not a simple fact or static 
condition of a body, but a process, whereby regulatory norms materialise sex”, or “compel” 
its “materialisation” (1993: xii) “in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual 
imperative” (ibid).  Thus, whilst acknowledging that the body’s fixed matter, its contours and 
movements are material, she calls on us to think of materiality “as the effects of power”: 
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 For a valuable analysis of “transsexual experiences of personal, political and medico-legal embodiment” in 
the UK, see Davy (2011).  
  
112 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
such that there is no way to understand ‘gender’ as a cultural construct imposed 
upon the surface of matter, understood as ‘the body’ or its given sex, rather once sex 
is understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable 
apart from the materialisation of that regulatory norm and sex will be one of the 
norms by which one becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within 
the domain of cultural intelligibility (ibid: xii, emphasis added).   
She recognises, therefore, that bodies are important, as only through assuming a normative 
sex, does a person’s body become culturally intelligible. Meanwhile, the “exclusionary 
matrix by which subjects are formed requires the simultaneous production of a domain of 
abject beings” (1993: xii).  It is through these “abject beings” that the normative domain is 
constituted, reaffirmed, reproduced, fortified: “the construction of the human produces the 
more and the less ‘human’, the ‘inhuman’ and the ‘humanly unthinkable’” (ibid: xvii). She 
includes amongst these “abject beings” those “who do not appear properly gendered”, 
adding that “it is their humanness that comes into question” (xviii), as “their bodies contest 
the norms that govern the intelligibility of sex and gender” (ibid). Thus, she argues, sexed 
bodies do matter, and are fundamental to the cultural intelligibility of gender. 69   
This thesis will show that this is particularly true in the prison, where the norms which 
regulate culturally intelligible sex/gender are materialised in the allocation of bodies to the 
                                                          
69
 In a recent ethnography of facial feminisation surgery (“FFS”), Plemons (2017) argues that the growing 
popularity of FFS among transgender women in the US demonstrates a reconfiguration of the traditional 
medical model of “sex reassignment” which focused on genitalia as the site of “sex change”, to a “social 
recognition” model centered on embodiment of femininity in the face. Interestingly, Plemmer portrays the 
development of these surgical practices as a contemporary materialisation of the performative model of 
gender theorised by Butler.  
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male and female estate and are profoundly challenged by incoherently sexed/gendered 
bodies.  
Butler’s ideas, and those of the other authors cited in this part of the chapter, were 
developed primarily in the cultural and social studies fields, and do not engage substantively 
with law.  However, they provide a vital critical framework for this thesis, in its analysis of 
law’s (and the prison administration’s) production of sex/gender and the transgender 
subject.    
Transgender bodies as risky bodies 
Finally, the concept of “risk” is important to the thesis, in various constructions of 
transgender people’s gender authenticity and bodies being “risky”.   This discourse finds 
particular expression in trans-exclusionary radical feminist literature and is also apparent in 
contemporary media-reporting relating to transgender women’s presence in “women-only” 
spaces, including women’s prisons.  The thesis will also argue that hegemonic ideas of 
transgender women’s bodies as especially risky bodies have informed penal governance. 
Thus, the topic of “risky bodies” provides a bridge between the second and third 
“theoretical pillars” of this thesis, and their respective literatures. 
Janice Raymond’s monograph The Transsexual Empire: The Making of a She-Male (1979) is 
the foundational text in what is now commonly referred to as trans-exclusionary radical 
feminism.  Raymond portrayed transgender women as a threat to the category “women”, 
on the basis that they are, in essence, men pretending to be women. “The male-to-
constructed female transsexual”, Raymond argues, “attempts to possess women in a bodily 
sense, whilst acting out the images into which men have moulded women” (ibid: 99).  
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According to Raymond, transgender women represent a danger to (cisgender)70 women, not 
only by physically taking on the female form and associated “sex roles”, but also by 
“deceitfully” entering or “infiltrating” their spaces.  These two themes coalesce in the 
following highly-charged passage:  
Rape … is a masculinist violation of bodily integrity. All transsexuals rape women's 
bodies by reducing the real female form to an artefact, appropriating this body for 
themselves ... Rape, although it is usually done by force, can also be accomplished by 
deception … Because  transsexuals have lost their physical “members” does not 
mean that they have lost their ability to penetrate women – women’s mind, 
women’s space, women’s sexuality. Transsexuals merely cut off the most obvious 
means of invading women, so that they seem non-invasive. (ibid: 103-4). 
Increasingly, this view of transgender women is regarded as offensive.  Greer, for example, 
has been heavily criticised for making similar derogatory remarks about transgender women 
(e.g. Oppenheim 2016).   Nevertheless, the thesis will argue that this view finds more 
moderate (or sanitised) expression in relation to transgender women’s presence in 
“women-only spaces”, including the prison, both in certain radical feminist circles and in 
general public opinion.    
Sheila Jeffreys’ monograph, Gender Hurts: A Feminist Analysis of the Politics of 
Transgenderism (2014), and various submissions by radical feminist groups to the WESC  
Transgender Inquiry (2015), provide a valuable window on contemporary trans-exclusionary 
radical feminist views objections to transgender women’s access to “women-only” spaces, 
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 Raymond would never use the term “cisgender”, since for her, transgender women are not women, 
obviating any need to describe “real” women as cisgender.   
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including public toilets, changing rooms and prisons.  Following Raymond (1979), Jeffreys’ 
objection to transgender women’s access to women’s spaces is not simply based on the 
premise that transgender women are not “real” women, but rather that, as “men”, they 
intrinsically represent a psychological and physical threat to cisgender women, who she 
presents as especially vulnerable in such spaces.  Illustrating the power of rights discourse in 
contemporary politics, Jeffreys specifically frames this as a rights issue.  She strongly 
criticises the current situation in the UK where “a man’s right to wear make-up and be 
housed with vulnerable women who are incarcerated, trumps the right of those women to 
be protected from violent men” (2014:161).   
Far from being isolated or marginal, the thesis will argue that this radical feminist position 
seems to align with the general public’s response to the presence of transgender women 
(and especially the possibility of transgender women with penises) in women’s prisons, as 
evident in the press reporting of Jessica Winfield case outlined in the Introduction to the 
thesis.71  Drawing on Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt’s analysis of society’s “gender 
panics” around transgender people’s presence in sex/gender-segregated spaces (2014),72 
the thesis will argue that society is more likely to use biology-based criteria, or anatomically-
based criteria (particularly the presence or absence of a penis) to determine a person’s 
sex/gender in such spaces, rather than identity-based criteria, which are commonly used in 
sex/gender-integrated spaces.  It will further argue, that the deep-rooted essentialist belief 
that men are inherently dangerous and women are inherently vulnerable, has led to 
                                                          
71 A highly-charged debate about the presence of transgender women (particularly the possibility of 
transgender women with penises, or cisgender men pretending to be women for nefarious purposes) in 
“women-only spaces”, similarly followed Top Shop’s announcement that its changing rooms will be gender-
neutral, and trans-friendly, e.g. Petter 2017; Brennan 2017; Jones 2017.   
72
 The authors chose not to examine the gender-segregated site of the prison, but they mention prisons in the 
broader context of the paper (2014:39). 
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“greater policing of transgender women’s access to women-only spaces” and, thus, “the 
greater ability of biology-based criteria” or genitalia-based criteria, “to quell gender panics” 
(2014: 40).  Against this broader social context, Chapter 4 will examine how human rights-
based developments (which enable a transgender person/prisoner to obtain legal gender 
recognition without gender reassignment surgery) have clashed with the traditional penal 
governance of gender (which was based on hegemonic notions of risk and on genitalia-
based gender determination).  This issue came before the courts in AB (2009). 
Prison Governance, Risk and the Transgender Prisoner 
The “inexorable logic of risk” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) in society generally, and in the 
prison specifically, is a powerful, established discourse, with which the “new” human rights 
discourse must compete.  In order to assess the power effects of law and human rights on 
transgender prisoners’ lives, it is imperative to have an understanding of this prior discursive 
terrain, as well as some conceptual tools to unpack the prison’s construction and 
governance of transgender prisoners as primarily risky.  Thus, the third theoretical pillar 
which underpins this thesis is scholarship on prison governance and risk. 
In contemporary “risk society” (Beck 1992), and under the continuing conditions of the 
“new penology” identified by Feeley and Simon (1992), risk has become a centripetal force 
in prison governance, pervading prison thinking at every level.   Transgender prisoners, and 
particularly those with “gender-incongruent” bodies,73 deeply trouble the prison’s binary 
sex/gender order and present new and uncertain challenges for prison management.  This 
section provides a conceptual framework for understanding the prison administration’s 
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 I.e. those who have not undergone gender/genital reassignment surgery. 
  
117 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
production and governance of the “risky” and “at risk” transgender prisoner, and paves the 
way for the next chapter, which considers the emergence of the transgender prisoner as 
human rights-bearer.  In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the thesis analyses the emerging tension 
between risk and rights in the construction of the transgender prisoner and the governance 
of trans/gendered lives, in three specific areas (prison allocation, presentation of the self, 
and access to medical treatment, respectively).    
A vast body of sociological and criminological literature exists on risk, but there is little 
literature on the interplay between risk and human rights in prison management.  Murphy 
and oel Whitty have remarked on this gap in the literature (2007), observing that scant 
attention has been paid to human rights in the literature on penal governance and risk, and, 
conversely, that risk is rarely referenced in the legal literature on prisoners’ human rights.  
An important, subsequent exception is Genders’ and Player’s analysis of the intersection 
between risk management, rehabilitation and human rights in the context of offending 
behaviour treatment programmes for prisoners with personality disorders (2014).  Coyle’s 
handbook for prison staff, entitled A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management (2009), 
is also indicative of an increasing recognition of the role of human rights in daily prison 
management (see also Naylor 2016). 
Modernity and the governance of risk 
Perceptions of risk, and responses to risk, have changed over time, and are reflected in 
penality.  The following outlines some key developments which inform this thesis, in its 
general analysis of risk. 
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The modern age, which spanned the period from the late eighteenth-century “Age of 
Enlightenment” to the 1970s, was typified by known and calculable risks, which were 
predictable and controllable.  It was characterised by faith in reason, scientific knowledge 
and the progressive discovery of “universal” truths.  In the modern era, the social enemy 
was the “deviant”, a person who deviated from the norm and brought with them the 
“multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness” (Foucault 1977:300, emphasis added).  As 
outlined in Chapter 1, the “gender deviant” was one such “abnormal” and therefore risky 
figure, who the state and its various apparatus collectively sought to manage and regulate 
through risk discourses and risk-reduction strategies.  This so-called “governmentality 
perspective of risk”, as its name suggests, arose out of Foucault’s work on governmentality 
(Foucault 1991; Ewald 1991; Castel 1991), discussed further below.    
Under the great carceral network envisaged by Foucault (1977), law and discipline would 
flow into one another, reproduce each other, and legitimise each other, so as to ensure “the 
universal reign of the normative” (ibid: 304).  Criminals were therefore understood both as 
“a series of monsters” who had “fallen outside the social pact” (ibid:256) and needed to be 
disciplined, and as “juridical subjects”, who had broken the law and need to be punished 
(ibid).  The “birth of the prison” made “it possible to join the two lines” (ibid) and, through 
the fabrication of the “delinquent”, gave criminal justice a “unitary field of objects, 
authenticated by the sciences” (Ibid).  This enabled it to function on a greater horizon of 
truth (ibid).  Modern penality, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, then, was 
concerned with both punishing prisoners for their past crime, and disciplining them, in order 
to reintegrate them back into society as useful, productive citizens.  As already noted, this 
included disciplining prisoners along normative sex/gender lines.  With growing social and 
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governmental concern about the threat posed by the “dangerous classes”, it was a time of 
great scientific inquiry into what made the criminal (e.g. Lombroso 1887, 1895; Ellis 1901), 
and the prison provided a literally captive pool of subjects for research and experimentation 
(Davie 2005). 74   
Postmodernity and the governance of risk 
The postmodern era is generally considered to have started somewhere between the late 
1980s and the end of the twentieth century.  It is characterised by a growing scepticism 
towards expert knowledge and claims to universal truths, and to the Enlightenment’s “grand 
narrative” of progressive reform.    Postmodernity is also associated with the advent of a 
“politics of difference”, and increasing insecurity around pluralism and diversity, and its 
governance (Rose 2000), which has clear relevance for this thesis.  
In his seminal work, The Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity (1992), Beck painted the 
late- or postmodern “risk society” as a society beset by new types of unpredictable, 
imperceptible, large-scale risks, from global warming to nuclear weaponry, and as a society 
facing increasingly complex risks from rapid industrial and technological development. 
Government and society had started to respond reflexively to these risks.  Uncertainty and 
anxiety was leading to ever-more precautionary measures, aimed at minimising, or ideally 
averting, risk.  This highly risk-aware, risk-adverse climate led to the “defensive risk 
management of everything” (Ericson 2007:17).  Both the risk-society thesis and the 
                                                          
74
 Whilst the work of the Italian criminal anthropologist Lombroso, is most associated with this period, 
Havelock Ellis’s The Criminal (1901) (scorned by the British medical establishment) was so popular with the 
general British public, that it was in its fourth edition by 1910 (Davie 2005: 16).  See generally Davie’s 
fascinating account of the rise of scientific criminology in Britain between 1860 and 1918 (ibid) and Garland 
(1985). The development of criminological theories around sexual and gender “deviance” is well-canvassed 
elsewhere, see in particular, Kunzel 2008: 45-75.  
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governmentality school of risk highlighted this development in government and society’s 
response to risk.  Ewald (a governmentality scholar), in his well-known paper on the 
philosophy of precaution, observed that precautionary logic urges one “to anticipate what 
one does not yet know, to take into account doubtful hypotheses and simple suspicions” 
(2002:288), such that “decisions are therefore not made in a context of certainty, nor even 
available knowledge” but in a context “of doubt, suspicion, premonition, foreboding, 
challenge, mistrust, fear and anxiety” (ibid: 294).  This thesis will argue that this type of 
precautionary logic drives the management of transgender prisoners and the new and 
uncertain risks that they pose to prison administration; that management decisions about 
them are made in a context of “doubt, suspicion … mistrust, fear and anxiety” (ibid). 
The third approach to risk, which is most associated with the work of Mary Douglas (1992), 
emphasises risk as a cultural product, through a focus on lived experiences of risk, and 
emotional responses to risk.  The cultural approach intersects with the risk society and 
governmentality approaches in various ways.  For the purpose of this thesis, it particularly 
contributes to an understanding of the “blame culture” which characterises contemporary 
society.  In her foundational work, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992), Douglas 
identified the rise of new adversarial patterns of blame allocation, which went hand-in-hand 
with society’s increasing concern with risk.   “Under the banner of risk reduction”, Douglas 
wrote, a “new blaming system” has emerged: “whose fault, is the first question? Then, what 
action? Which means: what damages?  what compensation?  what restitution?” (16). 
Preventative action in the blame culture, she argues, translates into ever-more prolific and 
ever-more detailed legislation and policy, in an attempt to prognostically “code” risk.  The 
blame culture also generates an increasing requirement for decision-makers to document 
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the rationale for their decisions, so as to provide a paper trail which will stand up to 
retrospective review.  For, in contemporary society, risks are increasingly subject to 
“hindsight scrutiny” (Carson 1996), and a key test for risk decisions is their defensibility in 
terms of media scrutiny and litigation (Kemshall 2003:12).  With the benefit of these 
insights, this thesis will consider whether recent policies are able to effect fundamental 
change in the governance of transgender prisoners, in terms of fostering respect for, and 
realisation, of their rights, or whether the policies are more likely to generate a greater 
emphasis on preventative action, precautionary logic, and documentation of risk-based 
decisions, so as to minimise the possibility of future “blame”.   
The “New Penology” or “Postmodern Penality” 
In the late eighties and early nineties, some scholars (e.g. Rose 1996, 2000; Garland 1996, 
2001), started to focus on the centrality of risk to emerging forms of government and 
control, and its implications for crime control, whilst others considered how late- or 
postmodern conditions and changes in the nature and reflexive response to risk were 
affecting penal trends (e.g. Simon 1988; Feeley and Simon 1992; Pratt 1995). Feeley and 
Simon’s paper on the “new penology” (1992) really captured the Zeitgeist. Whist it 
examined emerging patterns in US penal rationale and practice, it chimed with UK 
criminologists, who were observing similar developments in penality, as the “language of 
probability and risk” (ibid: 450) took hold.    
The “new penology” described by Feeley and Simon is concerned with containing and 
managing the “dangerous classes”, rather than normalising them, as was the main objective 
of modern penality.  “The task is managerial, not transformative”, they declared, “it seeks to 
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regulate levels of deviance, not to intervene or respond to individual deviants” (ibid: 452, 
emphasis in the original). The new penology, they argued, relies on “variable detention, 
depending upon risk assessment” as its primary method (ibid: 457) and literally removes the 
dangerous classes as a risk to society, by incapacitating them in the prison and “delaying 
their resumption of criminal activity” (ibid: 458).  The effects of this new method might be 
further intensified by a strategy of “selective incapacitation”, they suggested, aimed at 
identifying high-risk offenders and maintaining long-term control over them, whilst 
investing in shorter terms and less intrusive control over lower risk offenders (ibid).  They 
also observed that the expert knowledge and disciplinary practices of modern penality were 
starting to be replaced by actuarial techniques based on statistical risks of reoffending.  
Finally, as the prison became decoupled from its external social objectives, it was beginning 
to measure its success in terms of internal processes and output (ibid: 456-7).  
Building on Feeley and Simon’s observations, Pratt argued (contra Garland 1995) that these 
new penal trends signalled the “arrival of postmodern penality” (2000: 127 and 139).75 
Examining legal and penal responses to the changing construction of high risk offenders, he 
concluded that, in both sentencing decisions and prisoner security classification, it is “not so 
much the gravity of the particular offence”, but “the risk that one is thought to pose to the 
security of the community” which becomes of central concern in “postmodern penality” 
(ibid: 138). Like Feeley and Simon, Pratt also highlighted the rise of a “new managerialism”, 
where prisons focus inwards on their organisational performance (ibid, 139-40). He 
                                                          
75
 Whether this period is described as late-modern, high-modern or postmodern depends on whether these 
developments are regarded as continuous or discontinuous with the conditions of modernity (see generally 
Giddens 1991). Scholars have debated whether the “new penology” described by Feeley and Simon marked a 
genuine watershed, or whether the trends they identified simply comprised an evolution of the risk-based 
thinking which had always defined penology (for a summary, see Kemshall 2003). 
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concluded that, “however fragmented these individual penal developments might be, their 
pragmatic emphasis on risk management”, rather than individually-focused justice, and 
their “emphasis on control and security at the expense of the grand narrative of reform and 
progress” would “seem to represent ways of thinking and acting that are postmodern” 
(ibid).   
The contemporary penal landscape and risk  
Although Feely and Simon’s paper is now 25 years old, the trends it identified continue to 
shape the contemporary penal landscape in England and Wales, albeit actuarial justice has 
not become as prominent as first envisaged (O’Malley 2010 46-47).  Indeed, the last decade 
has witnessed the emergence of a “pre-crime society” (Zedner 2007), whereby pre-emptive, 
precautionary measures are being taken earlier and earlier, to forestall the risk of crime.  
This ranges from ever-expanding CCTV surveillance in public spaces, to the trend toward 
enlarging ‘inchoate’ crime, which capture the planning of criminal activity, as well as the 
attempted or actual commission of the offence. Such precautionary logic towards future 
risks has also been applied in the realm of sentencing.  2005 saw the controversial 
introduction of the “imprisonment for public protection” (“IPP”) sentence, a type of 
indeterminate sentence, primarily designed for those considered to be at high risk of future 
violent or sexual offending.76  The IPP sentence, which is aimed at incapacitating high-risk 
offenders and maintaining long-term control over them, is a prime example of the “selective 
incapacitation” strategy, which Feeley and Simon identified in 1992.  After IPP prisoners 
have served their minimum tariff, they remain in prison until the parole board is satisfied 
that they do not present a “significant risk of serious harm to members of the public” 
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 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.225 (which came into effect in 2005).   
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through the commission of further offences. 77  After the European Court of Human Rights 
held, in 2012, that IPP sentences constitute a form of arbitrary detention, contrary to the 
right to liberty (art 5), if they do not make reasonable provision for prisoners’ 
rehabilitation,78 they were abolished.79 However, some 4,000 prisoners are still serving IPP 
sentences,80 including some transgender prisoners.  Even under the new, extended 
sentences, which have a fixed term tariff, prisoners can be detained for up to eight more 
years, if they are deemed to represent a significant risk of serious harm to the public.  
Whilst prisoners have always had to negotiate the every-day risks of prison life to their 
physical and mental well-being, they are now being responsibilised in much more pervasive, 
far-reaching ways than before.  Under neo-liberalism, prison is no longer simply a matter of 
“serving time”. Crewe argues that the systemic policies and institutional practices of self-
governance have made the pains of imprisonment “tighter”, as well as deeper and heavier, 
in the contemporary English prison (2011). The Incentives and Earned Privileges system 
(“IEP”), as amended in 2013 (PSI 30/2013), is a prime example of the increasing pressure on 
prisoners to self-govern; it requires prisoners to constantly monitor and adapt their own 
behaviour in order to earn and retain “privileges”, such as the right to wear their own 
clothes, receive visits, watch in-cell television and spend money, and prisoners must actively 
“engage” with the prison regime and demonstrate “a commitment” to their rehabilitation 
(PSI 30/2013, paras 4.10 and 4.16), in order to progress (see Khan 2016 for a useful account 
of prisoners’ perceptions of the IEP scheme).  
                                                          
77
 Between 2005 and 2008, IPP sentences were mandatory for a wide range of cases, leaving very little 
discretion to the sentencing judge. This situation was amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008.  For an overview, see Epstein and Mitchell 2009. 
78
 James, Wells and Lee v UK, App Nos 25119/09 57715/09 57877/09 [2012] ECHR 1706. 
79
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.   
80
 Around 6,000 prisoners were sentenced under IPP from their introduction in 2005 to their abolition in 2012. 
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Elaine Genders and Elaine Player argue that the Government’s recent renewed emphasis on 
rehabilitation and its expansion of accredited rehabilitative programmes in prison is driven 
not by a concern to promote the welfare of offenders, but by a broader disciplinary process 
that aims primarily to manage the risks such offenders pose to the public, and therefore still 
manifests itself “as a component of risk management within the new penology” (2014: 
436).81  Pat O’Malley has argued that, whilst not perfect, some risk-based techniques 
provide a platform for a more positive approach to the governance of crime, and points to 
“risk-needs analysis” as “an optimistic alternative use of risk”, that seeks to unite prisoners’ 
needs and crime reduction needs through a focus on their “criminogenic needs” (2010: 45).  
Kelly Hannah-Moffat’s work is particularly useful in this field.   Whilst expressing some 
optimism about the revival of rehabilitation as a central feature of risk-needs management 
and penal control (e.g. 2005), she has argued previously in relation to women’s 
imprisonment and risk assessment, that women’s needs tend to be redefined as risks 
(1999).   
Hannah-Moffat has also argued that the Canadian Corrections Service’s (“CSC”) well-
intentioned, internationally-pioneering, and human rights-inspired reforms towards 
“women-centered prisons” and “gender-responsive” penality have not translated into 
reality, due to a fundamental failure on the part of the prison authorities to consider how 
gender should be operationalised. She contends that, as a result, “conceptualisations of 
gendered risk permeate institutional narratives” (2010: 203), which are based on 
“normative femininities”, and position “non-normative, ‘masculine’ conduct and resistance 
                                                          
81
 Similarly, Garland (2001) has argued that even the welfare strategies under New Labour in the early 2000s 
were driven by concerns about security, and that rehabilitation was primarily a form of control, countenanced 
only it if served crime reduction.   
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to institutional authority” as “risky, rare and abnormal” and “difficult to manage” (ibid).  She 
further argues that the rhetoric of gender-responsiveness has “the capacity to disguise and 
minimise systematic and interpersonal power relations” and that, “as time passes, the ideals 
of penal reformers and the intent of particular policies are abstracted from political, 
material and local interests”, and those “ideals evolve and are modified through the 
processes of institutionalisation” (ibid: 208).  This thesis will build on Hannah-Moffat’s 
important insights to examine the way in which, in practice, transgender prisoners’ needs 
(and rights) tend to be translated into risks, and how, in turn, those risks tend to be 
informed by hegemonic norms about transgender prisoners and their bodies as “risky, rare 
and abnormal” and “difficult to manage”.  It will reflect on whether the similarly well-
intended, internationally-pioneering, and human rights-based policy reforms in relation to 
transgender prisoners in England and Wales are also likely to be diluted as their ideals are 
modified “through the processes of institutionalisation” (ibid). 
The prison administration’s construction of the risky transgender prisoner  
Against this broader background of risk society and the new penology, this section gives an 
overview of the way in which prison administration constructs transgender prisoners as 
risky.  It argues that transgender prisoners present three types of risks to the prison.  First, 
the very existence of transgender prisoners represents a risk to the fundamental sex/gender 
order of the prison.  Second, in common with other prisoners, they pose risks to the 
imperatives on prison administration to maintain security, good order and safeguard all 
prisoners, but they reconfigure these risks in new ways.  Third, they present an 
organisational risk, in terms of formal complaints, potential litigation, coroner’s inquests, 
media coverage, and associated reputational costs.   This type of organisational risk has 
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arguably increased as prison administration has come under increasing pressure to absorb 
human rights, and external scrutiny in the current prison crisis has intensified. 
Different approaches to risk 
In painting the broader backdrop for this thesis, the three main approaches to 
understanding risk, namely the governmentality perspective, the risk society thesis and the 
cultural approach have been highlighted. Each approach has something to contribute, but 
the governmentality perspective of risk ties in particularly well with the overall, 
Foucauldian-based theoretical framework of this thesis.  This is because governmentality 
scholars are primarily interested in the discursive construction of risk, and the power-
knowledge nexus within which risk discourse is constituted and deployed.  That is, they do 
not seek to identify which risks are “real” or “true”, although they do not discount the 
reality of risk.  Further, the governmentality approach rejects the idea of a meta-narrative or 
totalising theory of risk (such as the risk society thesis), and focuses instead on the diverse 
and context-specific ways in which risk is deployed, and its repercussions at the micro-level.  
As O’Malley summarises it, the governmentality approach “looks at specific techniques 
through which subjects are controlled and shaped, and makes clear the costs to our lives of 
being imagined and moulded in such divergent ways” (2010: 14).  This description neatly 
captures the aims of this thesis, as well as its intersection with Butler’s theorising around 
the costs of being culturally unintelligible to the liveability of gendered lives (2004).82  
There is a further important intersection, for this thesis, between the cultural approach to 
risk and sociological literature on the body (e.g. Grosz 1994) and radical feminist literature 
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 She has further developed this theme in more recent work around precarious and liveable life, e.g. 2006 and 
2009.  For a good summary, see McNeilley (2016). 
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mentioned above, relating to the construction of the risky transgender body (e.g. Raymond 
1979, Jeffreys 2014).  As Lupton has remarked, not only are cultural fears and anxieties 
about risk and danger often directed at stigmatised and marginalised groups, or Others, but, 
they also “tend to emerge from and cohere around the body” (1999:124, emphasis added). 
The cultural perspective of risk is therefore important for this thesis, as it helps 
conceptualise the deep-seated emotional responses to transgender people’s bodies as 
being risky, however irrational such responses may be in scientific and statistical terms. It 
also encourages us to think about the extent to which such socio-political “categories of 
suspicion” affect the penal governance of risk (Zedner 2007: 47). 
Beck felt that the governmentality approach to risk inadequately captured the changing 
nature and uncertainty of risk in “risk society”, but he was later at pains to emphasise that 
he did not totally discard the social constructionist approach to risk, but rather argued that 
both approaches should be adopted in order to fully comprehend the complex nature of risk 
in contemporary society (1995:76).  Whilst real risks exist, he stated, they “only exist in 
terms of the knowledge about them.  They can be changed, magnified, dramatised or 
minimised within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social 
definition and construction” (1992:23).  In this regard, then, it is possible to combine a risk 
society perspective with a governmentality approach to risk.  Further, although the risk 
society thesis is most often associated with societal distribution of risk at the macro level83 
and arguably inadequately accounts for the implications of risk for individuals at the micro-
                                                          
83
 According to Beck, risk is a democratising force, which affects all members of society equally.  He has argued 
that “class societies” would gradually transform into more egalitarian “risk societies”.  Others have argued,  
that, to the contrary, social inequalities are likely to be exacerbated by risks in the risk society, because they 
become framed as individual choices rather than structural inequalities, and because of the expectation that 
individuals will negotiate and resolve such risks themselves (Kemshall 2003:13).   
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level (Engel and Strasser 1998), it is indispensable for understanding the broader context in 
which this thesis is situated.  It helps explain the omnipresence of risk consciousness in 
society, the escalation of precautionary logic in responding to new and uncertain risks, and 
the significance of risk management at every level, and in every type of governance, from 
corporates and charities, through to schools, hospitals and prisons.  As Power has remarked, 
we live in an age of “the risk management of everything” (2004).  It is imperative to 
remember that it is within this highly risk-aware, risk-averse climate that policies are set, 
and decisions are made, in relation to transgender prisoners. This is a particularly important 
insight that the concept of the risk society offers to this thesis.   
The risky transgender prisoner 
A fairy substantial body of literature focuses on the legislative and penal management of 
dangerous, high risk offenders, especially sex offenders (e.g Pratt 1995 and 1996; Simon 
1998; Lacombe 2008; Heberton and Seddon 2009).  Transgender prisoners are, however, 
constructed as risky (and also at risk) simply by virtue of being transgender, regardless of 
the particular offence for which they are imprisoned.  They are a risky prisoner population, 
not a risky offender population.  There seems to be less literature in this field, outside 
Liebling’s foundational work on prisoners vulnerable to suicide and self-harm (1995). Thus, 
this thesis, in its analysis of transgender prisoners as a risky (and at risk) prison population, 
is somewhat exploratory in nature. Indeed, the kaleidoscope of risks presented to prison 
administration by transgender prisoners provides an unparalleled opportunity to explore 
the institutional tensions around the intersection between risk management and prisoners’ 
human rights.  As a case study, transgender prisoners might be described as risk par 
excellence.  
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Some of the main ways in which transgender prisoners are produced and managed as both 
risky and at risk, and the tensions that such risk management creates with human rights and 
equality discourse, will be examined in detail in Chapters 4 to 6.  Here, an overview is 
offered of the three main ways in which the transgender prisoner is constructed as risky, to 
anchor the later analysis.   
First, the very existence of transgender prisoners represents a risk to the prison’s binary sex 
and gender order (and also a risk to the broader governmentality of sex and gender).  They 
are, to borrow Grosz’s phrase, “a disorder that threatens all order” (1994: 203).  As Chapter 
4 (prison allocation) will illustrate, as soon as the first “transsexual” people were sent to 
prison, the prison administration did not know how to categorise or respond to them.  In 
1969, Rachel Gosling (who had had gender/ genital reassignment surgery) was first sent to a 
female prison, then, after prison medics decided she was male, was sent to a male prison. 
There, as a culturally unintelligible, and therefore risky, gendered person, she was placed in 
isolation. Later, as explored in Chapter 4, the prison adopted a more pragmatic approach, 
allocating prisoners according to their current genitalia, but those prisoners who were 
perceived to have incongruous bodies, or whose “transsexuality” was otherwise considered 
“obvious”, were still constructed as Other and therefore problematic and risky.  This led to a 
practice of segregating them from the main prison population, and excluding them from 
prison society.  In cultural terms, this epitomises society’s response to them as Other, as a 
risk, polluting the purity of social order.  
Second, in common with other prisoners, transgender prisoners also pose other risks to 
prison management, in terms of security, good order and discipline, and safeguarding.  
However, the situation and needs of transgender prisoners reconfigure these risks in new 
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ways, posing new challenges for prison administration. In Green (2013), for example, the 
provision of gender-affirming clothing, tights, prosthetics and a wig to a transgender woman 
in the male prison estate was translated by prison administration into a whole host of risks.  
These included a security risk that other prisoners might use the wig to disguise themselves 
and escape; the risk that the tights might be used as a ligature, to cause self-harm or harm 
to other prisoners, and even that they might be used to brew “hooch” (alcohol); and the risk 
of the prisoner being given access to the internet to order “out-size” women’s clothing from 
a specialist supplier.  In discussing Green, Chapter 5 (presentation of the self) will argue that 
a highly precautionary approach to risk management is incompatible with transgender 
prisoners’ rights, and undermines the stated aim of prison policy to permit and enable 
transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender.  It will also illustrate how meeting 
transgender prisoners’ needs/rights may be interpreted by other prisoners as special 
treatment, and therefore unfair.  This may unsettle the equilibrium of the prison regime.   
Third and finally, transgender prisoners’ rights themselves represent an organisational risk 
to the prison, in terms of potential litigation, possible coroner’s inquests, negative media 
coverage, and associated financial and reputational costs to the prison.  Noel Whitty refers 
to these organisational risks collectively as “Legal Risk +” (2011), and proposes that prisons 
should be encouraged to think of human rights themselves in terms of organisational risk. 
Although recognising that such an instrumentalist approach to human rights might be 
controversial, he argues that encouraging prisons to absorb human rights into their risk 
management strategies, as a form of organisational risk, may produce reform. This thesis 
will reflect on the potential of Whitty’s argument in relation to the realisation of 
transgender prisoners’ rights.  Notably, Whitty’s paper focuses on the organisational 
  
132 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
(particularly legal and reputational) risks involved where the prison fails to meet prisoners’ 
rights.  However, this thesis will also argue that the risk of “human rights backlash”, where 
the prison realises transgender prisoners’ rights, is relevant in the current political climate.  
As Chapter 6 (medical treatment) illustrates, for example, the public continues to regard 
transgender prisoners as undeserving of gender reassignment surgery on the NHS, and 
undeserving of government-funded legal aid to bring complaints to court.  In the final 
analysis, the very emergence of human rights in this field can be regarded as a risk for prison 
administration, changing not only the way in which things have previously been done, but 
also fundamentally challenging the way in which the sex/gender order and transgender 
prisoners have previously been understood. In this sense, human rights discourse presents a 
risk to the previous power/knowledge terrain. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out the three theoretical “pillars” which structure the thesis, in its 
examination of the transformative potential, and limits, of human rights-based reforms, to 
transform the daily lives of transgender prisoners. It has shown how a Foucauldian-based 
approach links the three field of analysis together.  First, the chapter addressed the way in 
which this thesis will approach the law and human rights not simply as a sovereign power, 
but also as a productive power.  It drew on post-Foucauldian legal scholarship to argue that 
law has powerful norm-producing effects on the way that society thinks, speaks and acts 
about sex/gender and transgender people/prisoners.   It has argued that human rights 
discourse has considerable political purchase and transformative potential in contemporary 
society, but has also warned that recourse to rights may involve a cost.  The second part of 
the chapter drew on feminist, queer and transgender theory on the constitution, 
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performativity and embodiment of gender. Following Butler (2004), it argued that dominant 
scripts of sex/gender have restricted the possibilities of gendered lives, and rendered 
certain trans/gender lives and bodies “culturally unintelligible”, and hence, institutionally 
unintelligible in the prison.  It also addressed the trans-exclusionary radical feminist 
discourse which argues that transgender women’s bodies present a physical and 
psychological risk to cisgender women in “women-only” spaces.   Finally, the third part of 
the chapter introduced the concept of risk as a particular way of envisaging problems and 
formulating techniques of governance to respond to those problems. It argued that, in 
contemporary “risk society” (Beck 1992) and under the continuing conditions of “the new 
penology” (Feeley and Simon 1992), risk logic pervades prison thinking at every level and 
that prisoners’ needs and rights tend to be translated into, and managed, as risk.  
Approaching risk primarily from a governmentality perspective, the chapter argued that 
transgender prisoners represent a fundamental risk to the established sex/gender order of 
the prison.  Against a broader backdrop of the risk society and its associated blame culture, 
it also contended that prisons are likely to adopt a highly precautionary approach towards 
risk-assessment and risk-management in relation to transgender prisoners, and the new, 
complex and uncertain risks that they pose.   
The rest of the thesis will consider how imagining and moulding transgender prisoners in 
terms of risk subjects them to regimes which interrogate their gender authenticity and their 
bodies, and that whilst some of the risks may be real and need to be managed, a highly 
precautionary and defensive approach to risk comes at a high cost in terms of the liveability 
of transgender prisoners’ lives.  This begs the question whether law, and its “new” human 
rights discourse, is capable of counteracting the “inexorable logic of risk” (Ericson and 
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Haggerty 1997) in prison governance, and specifically, whether it has the power to ensure 
that prison policies which promise to respect transgender prisoners’ rights and to meet their 
needs do not become empty rhetoric.   
The next chapter examines the emergence of this “new” human rights discourse in respect 
of transgender prisoners. It traces the developments in both transgender people’s rights 
and prisoners’ rights, which cumulatively led to judicial recognition of the transgender 
prisoner as a human-rights bearer in AB (2009), and subsequently to PSI 2011, the first 
formal prison policy on “the care and management of transsexual prisoners”. 
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Chapter 3: The Emergence and Development of Transgender 
Prisoners’ Human Rights  
 
This chapter shines a spotlight on law and, specifically, the emergence and development of 
human rights in the legal governance of sex/gender and transgender people.  It picks up 
law’s story from Chapter 1, which concluded with an analysis of law’s first direct encounter 
with, and legal construction of, the “transsexual” of medical science, in Corbett (1970).  This 
chapter traces the slow but incremental gains made post-Corbett in law’s recognition of 
transgender people’s human rights and prisoners’ human rights and shows how these 
developments cumulatively ameliorated the formal legal status of transgender prisoners 
and led to their explicit judicial recognition as human rights-bearers in AB (2009).  Building 
on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, the chapter analyses these developments 
both from a traditional legal perspective, i.e. in terms of judicial decisions made and 
legislation enacted, and from a Foucauldian perspective, looking at law as a discourse with 
power/knowledge effects.  Through this two-pronged approach, this chapter seeks to 
highlight both the transformative power and negative discursive effects which recourse to 
human rights has entailed, and continues to entail, in relation to transgender law reform, 
and how this, in turn, has percolated through to transgender prisoners.  
This chapter is divided into five parts.  First, the chapter examines human rights-based shifts 
in the legal conceptualisation of sex/gender, highlighting the significance of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ decision in Goodwin v UK and I v UK [2002] ECHR 28957/95 and 
25680/94 (hereinafter Goodwin),84 which led to the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  Although 
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 Two separate applications were co-joined for the European Court’s consideration. 
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the Gender Recognition Act makes legal space for (some) transgender people, the section 
critiques law’s continued insistence of the “truth” of the gender binary, and its reliance on a 
pathologising discourse of “gender dysphoria”. It also argues that, despite the Gender 
Recognition Act’s ostensible delinking of legal gender recognition from bodies, bodies still 
matter in law.  The second part traces developments in the protection of transgender 
people against discrimination from the European Court of Justice’s decision in P v S and 
Cornwall County Council [1996] IRLR 447, through to the Equality Act 2010. This part argues 
that, underneath the surface of the Equality Act’s progressive provisions, transgender 
people’s gender performance is still not regarded as authentic as, or therefore equal to, 
cisgender people’s, and that transgender bodies (especially women’s bodies) are still 
considered risky.  In part three, two key developments in prisoners’ rights are discussed; 
first, the recognition of prisoners’ right to challenge prison administration decisions through 
judicial review proceedings, and second, the introduction of a policy of NHS-equivalence in 
prisoner healthcare.  The chapter shows how this new healthcare policy, together with the 
Court of Appeal’s ruling in NW Lancashire Health Authority v A, D &G [1999] EWCA Civ 
2022 (“NW Lancashire”), opened the way for prisoners to access gender reassignment 
surgery, but also reproduced transgender people as mentally disordered. Fourth, the 
chapter gives an overview of law’s first direct encounter with a transgender prisoner, in AB 
(2009), both to illustrate the cumulative effects of the substantive and procedural human 
rights-based developments outlined in the chapter, and to provide a window onto law’s first 
construction of the transgender prisoner as a human rights-bearer.  However, it also 
highlights the emerging tension between human rights and risk in the prison’s governance 
of the transgender prisoner.   The fifth and final part provides an introduction to the 
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“transsexual prisoner” as the subject of PSI 2011, the first official prison policy on The Care 
and Management of Transsexual Prisoners. 
The Legal Recognition of Transgender People’s Gender   
Corbett’s restrictive, biological definition of sex85 defined the legal landscape for 
transgender people in England and Wales for over thirty years.  Adopting the position that 
“transsexuality” is a “psychological disorder” curable by “sex change surgery”, it entrenched 
and perpetuated a pathologising, medicalised model of transgender people.  By refusing to 
recognise transgender people’s medically reassigned gender in law, it rendered them 
“gender outlaws” (Bornstein 1994/2016).   
Goodwin and I v UK  
Corbett was finally overturned by the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin (2002). 
Prior to Goodwin, transgender activists had brought a number of complaints to the 
European Court about the legal status of transgender people in the UK,86 but the European 
Court had repeatedly held that the Government’s refusal to alter the register of births or 
issue a new birth certificate to transgender people to reflect their changed sex/gender fell 
within its margin of appreciation, and did not breach the European Convention on Human 
Rights.87 Nevertheless, the European Court repeatedly signalled its concern about the 
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 See Chapter 1. 
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 Rees v UK, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A, no 106; Cossey v UK, judgment of 27 September 1990, 
Series A, no 184; X, Y and Z v UK, judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-11, and 
Sheffield and Horsham v UK, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V. 
87
 Under this general principle of European Convention law, states enjoy a certain amount of discretion in 
giving domestic effect to European Convention rights, subject to the supervision of the European Court.The 
concept was developed through the jurisprudence of the European Court, and is currently pending formal 
recognition in the Preamble to the European Convention (Protocol No.15, Amending the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Strasbourg, 24 November 2013).    
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situation of transgender people in the UK and asked the Government to keep the need for 
appropriate legal measures under review – a request to which it paid scant regard.  In 1999, 
the Government did establish an Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People 
to consider the issue, but this was mere window-dressing; it took no action whatsoever on 
any of the Working Group’s recommendations (Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCA Civ 1140, 
paras 95-69). Whilst Goodwin was awaiting the European Court’s consideration, Bellinger v 
Bellinger (ibid) was progressing through the domestic courts.  This comprised a direct 
challenge to Corbett’s definition of legal sex for marriage purposes.  The Court of Appeal 
lamented the “profoundly unsatisfactory nature of the present position” (ibid, para 109), 
particularly in light of the European Court’s repeated calls for the Government to review the 
law, but concluded that it was for Parliament, not the courts, to reform the law, and that 
this should be done in a comprehensive, rather than a piece-meal fashion.  The House of 
Lords’ judgment, on appeal, was pending when the Goodwin ruling was announced 
(Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21). 
In Goodwin, the European Court finally took the view that “the sands of time have run out” 
for the UK Government (Bellinger v Bellinger (2003), para 21).  It held that “the situation as 
it has evolved no longer falls within the UK’s margin of appreciation” (Goodwin, para 120), 
but comprised a violation of the applicants’ right to marry (article 12) and right to respect 
for private life (article 8) of the European Convention.  In the twenty first century, it 
remarked, “the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an 
intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer sustainable” (para 90).   
For this thesis, the European Court’s interpretation of the right to respect for private life is 
particularly important.  It observed that the “very essence of the Convention is respect for 
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human dignity and human freedom” (para 90) and that, “under Article 8 … in particular, 
where the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each 
individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human 
beings” (ibid, emphasis added).  Emphasising the need for a “dynamic” approach to 
European Convention rights and the “crucial importance” of interpreting and applying the 
Convention in a manner which “renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and 
illusory” (para 74, see also para 92), the European Court held that the right to respect for 
private life includes the right to respect for establishing one’s “sexual identity” (what is now 
more usually termed “gender identity” in the human rights sphere). 88   
As article 8 is not an absolute right, the European Court had to decide first, whether the 
Government’s refusal to legally recognise the applicants’ sex/gender had interfered with 
their private lives, and secondly, whether or not such interference was justified.  On the first 
count, it held that a “serious interference with private life can arise where the state of 
domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal identity” (para 77). The “stress 
and alienation” arising from the disparity between the social and legal position of 
transgender people could not be regarded as “a minor inconvenience”, as the Government 
had suggested, but placed transgender people in an “anomalous position”, which could lead 
to experiences of “vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety” (ibid).  The European Court was 
particularly struck by the fact that the government funded gender reassignment surgery 
                                                          
88
 International and regional human rights bodies, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, now 
refer to “gender identity”.  On 30 June 2016, under a historic resolution entitled “Protection against violence 
and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity”, the UN Human Rights Council mandated 
the appointment of an independent expert on the subject (A/HRC/RES/32/2), building on two earlier 
resolutions on “Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity” in 2011 (A/HRC/RES/17/19) and 2014 
(A/HRC/RES/27/32). The internationally influential “Yogyakarta Principles” on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2006) also adopt this term.  
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through the NHS (see Chapter 6), but that such gender reassignment was not “met with full 
recognition in law”, which appeared “illogical” (para 78).   
As to whether the interferences with the applicants’ private lives were justified, the 
European Court reviewed the Government’s public interest arguments for maintaining the 
status quo.  It did not “underestimate the difficulties posed or the important repercussions” 
which its judgment would entail, not only in the field of birth registration, but also in other 
areas, including the criminal justice system (para 91).  Nevertheless, it found that “society 
may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live 
in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great 
personal cost” (para 91).   
Finding that the Government had unlawfully interfered with the applicants’ right to privacy 
by not legally recognising their medically reassigned sex/gender, the European Court left 
“the appropriate means for achieving recognition of the right”, i.e. the particular mechanics 
and criteria for legal recognition, at the government’s discretion (para 93).   Subsequently, in 
Bellinger v Bellinger (2003), the House of Lords made a formal declaration that UK law was 
incompatible with the European Convention, but determined that it was beyond its judicial 
powers to interpret the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in line with Goodwin, and that 
compliance could only be achieved through legislation.  Adopting the same position as the 
Court of Appeal, the House of Lords felt that it was not clear in which circumstances gender 
reassignment should be recognised for the purposes of marriage, and, in particular, 
questioned whether the “completion of some sort of surgical intervention should be an 
essential prerequisite” (para 41).  These were “deep waters” and the House was “not in a 
position to decide where the demarcation line could sensibly or reasonably be drawn” 
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(paras 42 and 43), nor could it determine what other pre-conditions should be attached to 
legal gender recognition.  Secondly, recognition of gender reassignment for the purpose of 
marriage was “part of a wider problem”, which “should be considered as a whole and not 
dealt with in a piecemeal fashion” (para 45).  Referring to other areas where a distinction is 
drawn between people on the basis of gender, it specifically mentioned “prison regulations” 
(ibid).   
Gender Recognition Act 2004 
In order to bring UK law in compliance with the European Court’s ruling in Goodwin, the 
Government enacted the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  Whilst many now consider the Act 
out-dated (WESC 2016, para 30), and the Government has announced a consultation on its 
reform (Government Equalities Office 2017), at the time, it was internationally ground-
breaking, and represented a major milestone in the recognition of transgender people’s 
rights.  It marked the culmination of a long campaign by transgender advocacy groups to 
achieve legal recognition of transgender people’s gender, and for recognition not to be 
predicated on gender reassignment surgery or sterilisation, as was (and remains)89 common 
in many jurisdictions. The Gender Recognition Act enables transgender people to apply to 
the Gender Recognition Panel (comprising legal and medical members), for legal recognition 
of their gender, if they are medically diagnosed with “gender dysphoria”, have lived in their 
                                                          
89
 On 6 April 2017, the European Court of Human Rights declared that a requirement of infertility in French 
gender recognition law is contrary to article 8 of the European Convention (A.P., Garcon, Nicot v France, App 
Nos 79885/12, 52471/13 et 52596/13). This ruling will affect 22 European states which still make sterilisation a 
pre-condition to legal gender recognition (Council of Europe 2017). The European Court held, however, that it 
was legitimate to require the applicant to provide evidence of the “existence and persistence” of the 
“syndrome of transsexuality”, and for the state to be entitled to order a medical report, as pre-conditions to 
gender recognition.  (Cannoot 2017. Judgment in French.) 
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“acquired gender” for at least two years, and intend to continue to do so until death (s. 2).90  
A successful applicant is issued with a GRC, with the legal effect that “the person’s gender 
becomes for all purposes the acquired gender” (section 9, emphasis added).  
The Gender Recognition Act ostensibly implemented a radically transformative shift in law’s 
regulation of sex/gender, by prioritising gender (psychology) over sex (biology and bodies).   
As Whittle and Turner have argued, through the Gender Recognition Act, “gender identity 
becomes and defines legal sex” (Whittle and Turner 2007: para 1.4, emphasis added).  
Whilst, for Sandland, this shift “from sex to gender as the primary mechanism by which men 
and women are differentiated from each other” is “a distinctly Butlerian approach which has 
been institutionalised and generalised in UK law” (2005: 47), as, under the Gender 
Recognition Act, “gender is the dynamic.  Sex if anything, is the product” (ibid).    
As noted above (see Chapter 2), this legal development was internationally pioneering at 
the time,91 as it did not require a transgender person to undergo any form of bodily 
transformation (whether through hormone treatment or gender reassignment surgery) in 
order to obtain legal recognition of their gender. This led Sandland to conclude that the 
Gender Recognition Act constructs a “radical divide between the public and private” (2005: 
47).  The Act, he argues, is concerned only with a “public politics of the presentational, the 
proper appearance of the gendered body, which trades only on that which is on public 
display.  That which is below the surface, namely the body of the person in question, is 
deemed beyond the sphere of public regulation” and “for the purposes of the 
governmentality of gender, the body, and its biology does not exist” (ibid: 52).   
                                                          
90
 This is the standard route.  Alternative routes also exist, see https://www.gov.uk/apply-gender-recognition-
certificate/overview   (last visited 1 Dec 2017).  
91
 The Irish Gender Recognition Act (2015) is now at the forefront of developments. Like Argentina, Denmark, 
Malta and Colombia, it allows transgender people to self-determine their gender, outside any medical process. 
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Sharpe cautioned at the time that Sandland’s conclusion might be premature (2007: 82). 
Whilst the Gender Recognition Act ostensibly dispenses with the body, she contended, 
there is a disjunction between the Act’s form and substance, which belies the 
transformative potential of the reform moment.  The Gender Recognition Act, she argues, 
remains concerned with anatomically correct bodies, and law continues to construct the 
“truth” around sex in terms of a biological past.  This thesis will argue that, however hard 
law tries, it cannot seem to erase these “truths” in sex-segregated sites such as the prison, 
where anatomically correct bodies, and certain biological features determined at birth, still 
very much matter.   
Bodies still matter 
As Sharpe has highlighted (2007), despite the apparent irrelevance of sexed bodies to the 
Gender Recognition Act’s definition of legal gender, there is clearly an underlying 
expectation that some surgical treatment entailing modification of sexual characteristics will 
take place.  This expectation is woven into the fabric of the Act’s application process.  The 
standard application route requires a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and two medical 
reports, one of which must detail what surgery has taken place or is planned (ss. 3(3) and 
3B(4)).  Where the applicant has not undergone or does not plan to undergo surgery, the 
Guidance Notes states that the medical report must include an explanation for why that is 
the case (HM Courts and Tribunals Service: 2014: 14).  Thus, there is an assumption that 
surgery will take place and an onus on the applicant to explain, or arguably justify, why they 
do not intend to pursue surgery.  The recently added alternative route92  for those who wish 
                                                          
92
 Introduced by virtue of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (the GRA previously required a married 
transgender person to dissolve their marriage before they could obtain a full GRC).   
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to remain in a marriage post-certification requires a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or 
evidence of surgery to change sexual characteristics. Thus, gender reassignment surgery is 
taken in and of itself as evidence of gender dysphoria, the “truth” is written on the person’s 
body, and their authenticity is effectively proved by their willingness to undergo painful, 
complex surgery.   
This interpretation of the Gender Recognition Act is given credence in Carpenter v Secretary 
of State for Justice [2015] EWHC 464 (Admin).  In this case, the applicant challenged, by way 
of judicial review proceedings, the lawfulness of the Act’s requirement to produce evidence 
to the Gender Recognition Panel of surgery undertaken.  The applicant had undergone 
surgery, but did not want to disclose details to the panel.  She argued that since the Act did 
not require a person to undergo surgery in order to obtain a GRC, the Panel’s insistence that 
she produce evidence of her medical history, detailing the surgery she had undergone, 
constituted an unlawful interference with her private life, under article 8 of the European 
Convention. The High Court rejected her application, on the basis that “undergoing or 
intending to undergo surgery” is “overwhelming evidence of the existence now or previously 
of gender dysphoria and of the desire of the applicant to live in the acquired gender until 
death” (para 23, emphasis added).  Where an applicant has undergone surgery, or plans to 
do so, the court held, “that fact is highly relevant, if not central, to his or her application” 
(para 24).  Carpenter therefore underscored the centrality of gender reassignment surgery 
to legal gender recognition, notwithstanding the Gender Recognition Act’s apparent 
eschewal of the body.    
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Past biological “truth” as the unassailable “truth” of gender 
Sharpe has further argued, that despite its ostensible shift from sex to gender, the Gender 
Recognition Act continues to construct a person’s past “biological” sex as the unassailable 
“truth” (2007). She locates this in its amendment to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, to 
provide that non-disclosure that a person was “previously of another gender” is ground for 
nullifying a marriage (2007: 74). Whilst Sharpe situates her analysis in the context of 
marriage (see also 2012),93 this thesis will argue that Corbett’s legally-constructed concept 
of a past biological “truth” continues to have considerable normative power in society’s 
determination of “women-only” spaces, including women’s prisons (as argued by 
Westbrook and Schilt in relation to gender-segregated spaces more broadly, outside the 
prison context (2014)).  
Persistence of binary gender order 
The Gender Recognition Act also demonstrates how, in the very moment of reform, law 
reproduces and entrenches normative arrangements of power in the regulation of gender 
(Foucault 1978).  Despite the significant progress achieved by the Gender Recognition Act in 
enabling (some) transgender people to obtain legal recognition of their gender, the Act has 
been rightfully criticised for reproducing the binary gender order, or what Butler refers to as 
the “reification of gender” (1990:171), as it recognises only two fixed genders (men and 
women), and legitimises only complete and permanent crossings from one gender to the 
                                                          
93
 The legal preoccupation with “correct” bodily anatomy and the past, biological “truth” of sex has also 
manifested itself in a series of criminal convictions for so-called “gender fraud”. Six such cases have been 
reported since 2012, in which the defendants were found to have fraudulently represented themselves as 
male, and therefore failed to obtain valid consent to sexual relations, on the basis that they did not disclose 
their “true” sex (both biological and anatomical) to the women they were intimately involved with. For further 
analysis of these cases, see Sharpe 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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other.94 As discussed in part 5 below, this binary model of gender is faithfully reproduced in 
PSI 2011, although PSI 2016 has since made a radical break from law’s binary 
conceptualisation of gender, and explicitly acknowledges the existence of prisoners with 
fluid and/or non-binary genders, and makes some provision for their needs. 
The Gender Recognition Act exemplifies how law, in regulating gender, is a productive 
power, it has the power to produce – to demarcate, differentiate – the bodies it governs 
(Butler 1993: xii).  That is, law does not merely represent the subject, it produces the 
subject.  This political construction of the subject proceeds with both legitimising and 
exclusionary aims, which are then concealed and naturalised through law (Foucault 1978; 
Butler 1990).  Thus, in granting legal recognition to certain transgender people’s gender, the 
Gender Recognition Act appears transformative, but underneath, it creates “domains of 
exclusion” (Butler 1990).  Like the subject of Butler’s analysis (i.e. the heteronormative 
“woman” represented by traditional feminist politics), the transgender subject “turns out to 
be discursively constituted by the very political system which is supposed to facilitate its 
emancipation” (Butler 1990: 2).  As Sandland has thus observed, the Gender Recognition Act 
“demonstrates the truism that any act of inclusion also excludes” (2005: 45); the Act’s 
requirement for permanence and completeness in a person’s transition from one gender 
category to the other separates the “lifers from the rest” (50). Any gender identity 
“between, above, below, and most significantly beyond a desire for life-long gendered 
conventionality”, Sandland argues, remains not just “unrecognisable” but “unthinkable” 
within the new horizons set by the Gender Recognition Act, leaving “an abyss as deep and 
wide as ever it was, between conformity and deviance, or self and other” (ibid).    
                                                          
94
 Under s.2(1)(c), an applicant must intend to live in the “acquired gender” “until death”, and swear this in a 
statutory declaration.  
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Retention of a medical model of “gender dysphoria” 
Finally, criticism has been levied at the Gender Recognition Act’s insistence on a medical 
diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” as a prerequisite for legal gender recognition (e.g. Cowan 
2005, 76-77: Sandland 2005: 49; Sharpe 2007; WESC 2016: paras 44-45).  In July 2017, the 
Government announced a consultation on the Gender Recognition Act, which will consider 
inter alia de-medicalisation of the process (Government Equalities Office 2017).  The 
consultation has not yet been launched.  The imperative of a gender dysphoria diagnosis has 
a number of implications.  First, it characterises the rights of transgender people as flowing 
from a diagnosis of a mental illness.  Although the NHS specifically states that gender 
dysphoria is not a mental illness (NHS 2017), the diagnosis is associated with pathologising 
understandings of transgender people, and continues to carry negative, stigmatising 
connotations. Indeed, “gender dysphoria” is still categorised as a psychiatric condition in the 
internationally influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V (APA 
2013) and the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases.95    
Second, by making legal recognition of a person’s gender conditional upon a diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria, the Gender Recognition Act retains the medical profession’s power of 
gatekeeping.  The additional requirement that a person must live in their gender for two 
years before applying for a Gender Recognition Certificate also “points to gendered rites of 
passage, issues of passing and the negotiation of medical gatekeepers” (Sharpe 2007:71). 
This thesis will argue that these gatekeeping issues are exacerbated for transgender 
                                                          
95
 The APA has explained its decision not to remove gender dysphoria from DSM  V as a psychiatric condition 
on the basis that it would impede transgender people’s access to medical care, as a diagnosis is required for 
medical insurance purposes in many countries (APA 2013). On the human rights implications, see Green et al 
(2011). In the forthcoming 11th Revision to the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD-11), due 2018, the World Health Organisation has proposed to remove “gender 
dysphoria” from the “Mental and Behavioural Disorders” chapter, and to include “gender incongruence” in a 
new, non-psychiatric chapter, entitled “Certain conditions related to Sexual Health” (WHO 2015).    
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prisoners, both as regards their ability to access a gender specialist and therefore obtain a 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and in demonstrating to the Gender Recognition Panel (and 
clinicians) that they have satisfactorily lived in their gender, given the restrictions of prison 
life (see Chapter 6).  
The Inclusion of Transgender People under Equality Law 
As with gender recognition, advances in transgender people’s protection against 
discrimination were achieved, first, at the European level.  This then prompted domestic 
reform.  The pivotal judgment is P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] IRLR 447 (“P v 
S”), in which the European Court of Justice held that the Equal Treatment Directive’s96 
prohibition of “sex discrimination” encompassed discrimination based on a person’s gender 
reassignment.  The applicant had been dismissed when she informed her employers that 
she had started to medically reassign her gender. Under established English case law (White 
v British Sugar Corporation [1977] IRLR 121), the employment tribunal held that her 
employer was not liable for sex discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, as 
they were able to demonstrate that they would also have dismissed a transgender man in 
these circumstances (the so-called “equal misery principle”). 97 
In an enlightened opinion to the European Court of Justice (P v S [1996] IRLR 447), Advocate 
General Tesauro regarded as “obsolete” the idea that the law should protect a woman who 
has suffered discrimination in comparison with a man, or vice versa, but should deny 
                                                          
96
 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976.  The European Court of Justice oversees the law of the 
European Union, and is based in Luxembourg.  It is different from the European Court of Human Rights, which 
has jurisdiction over the European Convention on Human Rights, and is based in Strasbourg. 
97
 This term originates from Grant v South West Trains Ltd Case C-249/96 [1998] ECR I-621 (1999), in which 
the European Court of Justice held that the train company’s rules, which permitted opposite-sex but not same-
sex partners of employees to receive travel perks, did not discriminate against Ms Grant on the grounds of sex, 
as the rules applied to both female and male employees with same-sex partners. 
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protection to those who are discriminated against because they fall outside the traditional 
man/woman dichotomy (para 17). In his view, it would be a “quibbling formalistic 
interpretation” and “a betrayal of the true essence” of the fundamental right to equality 
(para 20) to maintain that the unfavourable treatment suffered by P was not on grounds of 
sex. The European Court of Justice subsequently concluded that the Equal Treatment 
Directive applied to discrimination arising from gender reassignment, since “such 
discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned” 
(para 21). However, it retained a binary model of gender and the need for a male/female 
comparator, adding that:  
Where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to undergo, or has 
undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably by comparison 
with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong, before undergoing 
gender reassignment (ibid, emphasis added). 
The test was therefore not whether P was discriminated against because she fell outside the 
traditional male/female dyad (as proposed by the Advocate General), but whether P would 
have been dismissed if she remained male and had not undergone gender reassignment 
surgery.  Whilst this test satisfactorily addressed the issue at hand, it was recently applied in 
Green (2013), leading the court to reach the perverse conclusion that a transgender woman 
prisoner housed in a men’s prison had not been discriminated against by being denied the 
same access to female clothing and other items as other female prisoners, since her 
situation should be compared to persons of the sex to which she belonged before gender 
reassignment, i.e. male prisoners (see Chapter 5).   
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The European Court of Justice’s ruling in P v S was subsequently formalised in the Sex 
Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 (now replaced by the Equality Act 
2010, see below),98 which prohibited employment-related discrimination against a person 
on the ground that they “intend to undergo, are in the process of undergoing or have 
undergone gender reassignment”.  A person did not need to be undergoing gender 
reassignment surgery to benefit from their protection, but they did need to be under 
medical supervision.99  This reproduced the medico-legal regulation of transgender, 
established in Corbett (1970).  
Notably, the 1999 Regulations incorporated a series of exemptions into the Sex 
Discrimination Act,100 which limited the law’s protection of transgender people against 
discrimination. The “genuine occupational requirement” exemption exposes the first cracks 
in law’s apparent extension of equal treatment to transgender people.  The exemption 
explicitly applied, for example, to employment involving statutory powers to conduct 
intimate bodily searches,101 employment involving “physical or social contact” within a 
private home, and employment involving the provision of personal services to “vulnerable 
individuals” (undefined). This exemption perpetuates the idea that transgender people’s 
gender is inauthentic and that close physical and social contact with them is risky and 
potentially harmful, particularly for “vulnerable individuals” (for a detailed critique, see 
Whittle 2002: 120-130).  Understanding this background is essential to the later analysis 
                                                          
98
 It was first applied domestically in the UK by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Chessington World of 
Adventures v Reed [1997] IRLR 556. 
99
 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s.82 (as amended). 
100
 Sections 7 and 19. 
101
 In A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 21, however, the House of Lords held that the 
Chief Constable’s rejection of a transgender woman’s application to become a police constable was 
discriminatory under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, on the basis that she should be treated as female for the 
purpose of statutory duties which require that searches are conducted by a constable of the “same sex” as the 
person searched.   
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that transgender women prisoners (in particular) have consistently been constructed as a 
risk to “vulnerable” cisgender women prisoners, in the close and confined space of the 
prison (see Chapter 4). 
The broadening of law’s protections against discrimination  
It was not until 2008 that transgender people became legally protected against 
discrimination beyond the employment sphere.  Amongst other things, the Sex 
Discrimination (Amendment of Legislation) Regulations 2008 prohibited discrimination in 
the provision of services, including public services.  This is highly significant for this thesis, as 
it was not until 2008 that it became unlawful for the prison authorities to discriminate 
against transgender prisoners.    
Only two years later, the Equality Act 2010 consolidated and expanded all previous anti-
discrimination laws into a single equality act.  Under the Equality Act, “gender 
reassignment” is included as a self-standing protected characteristic, separately from “sex”, 
for the first time.  As well as prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination, the Equality Act 
prohibits harassment and victimisation against transgender people, and against people 
perceived to be transgender.  This additional protection against “discrimination by 
perception” is important, but does not protect gender-fluid, non-binary or other gender 
non-conforming people against discrimination, unless they are perceived to be 
“transsexual” (WESC 2016, paras 95-100).  
Whilst the Equality Act retains the gender binary (apart from scope for discrimination by 
perception), it no longer requires transgender people to be under medical supervision to 
benefit from its protections.  This is a momentous legal development, with both 
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instrumental and symbolic effects. According to its Explanatory Notes, the Equality Act 
regards gender reassignment as a “personal and social process rather than a medical 
process” (para 43).  Once a person starts living in their gender, they can benefit from its 
protections. Thus, the Equality Act abandoned the medico-legal model of transgender 
people which has dominated law’s construction of transgender people since Corbett (1970) 
and has shaped equality law since the 1999 Regulations first incorporated discrimination 
based on “gender reassignment” into the Sex Discrimination Act.  The thesis will show that 
this development has been transformative for prison policy. 
Unfortunately, however, the Equality Act is couched in medical language, using the terms of 
reassigning “sex”, changing “physiological or other attributes of sex” and “transsexual” 
(section 7), which all imply that medical gender reassignment is required, notwithstanding 
the Explanatory Notes’ assurances to the contrary.  As WESC has remarked, this “outdated 
and confusing” language has given rise to an “apparently widespread misapprehension that 
the Act only provides protection to those trans people whose transition involves medical 
‘gender reassignment’ treatment” (2016, paras 92-93).  It also found this misapprehension 
to be apparent in the prison system and recommended that the language should be 
amended to clearly reflect the legal position (ibid: para 108).    
Biology and normative gender performance still matter  
Despite the advances in the protection afforded to transgender people by the Equality Act, 
law’s historical reluctance to recognise the authenticity of transgender people’s gender, and 
its tendency to revert to the “truth” of biological sex, resurfaces in its accompanying 
Explanatory Notes and the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Codes of Practice.  This 
is troubling.  The Equality Act continues to allow employers to exclude transgender people 
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from applying for a job if they can demonstrate that the requirement to be cisgender is 
genuine, proportionate and in pursuit of a legitimate aim (schedule 9). The Explanatory 
Notes give as an example of a permitted “genuine occupational requirement”, the case of “a 
counsellor working with victims of rape” who “might have to be a woman and not a 
transsexual person, even if she has a Gender Recognition Certificate, in order to avoid 
causing them further distress” (para 789, emphasis added). This comment implies that a 
transgender woman is not a woman, even if she is legally certified as one, and perpetuates 
the belief that transgender women represent a source of distress for cisgender women who 
have experienced sexual violence. It constructs transgender women as men, and 
indiscriminately associates them with male violence.  This viewpoint is clearly evident in 
historical and contemporary responses to transgender women prisoners who are allocated 
to the female prison estate.   
Finally, the Explanatory Notes and Codes of Practice imply a “passing privilege” in relation to 
transgender people’s access to the Equality Act’s protections.  This has been heavily 
criticised (see e.g. WESC 2016: paras 110-132). The Explanatory Notes state, for example, 
that a transgender man who has decided not to have surgery because he “successfully 
passes as a man” will be protected by the Act (para 23).  Meanwhile, service providers are 
advised that, in providing separate sex or single sex services, they should be aware that 
“where a transgender person is visually and for all practical purposes indistinguishable from 
a non-transgender person of that gender, they should normally be treated according to their 
acquired gender” (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010: para 13).  These guidelines 
imply that the Act privileges transgender people who can be read as cisgender over those 
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who, because of their non-normative gender presentation or likelihood of being read as 
transgender, perhaps have greater need of its protection (WESC 2016: para 114).   
Despite these various drawbacks, the Equality Act proved pivotal in finally securing an 
official prison policy on transgender prisoners, by virtue of its new public sector equality 
duty. Traditionally, anti-discrimination law has entailed only negative obligations on the 
state, i.e. the requirement not to discriminate.  Legislative developments in the UK have 
since placed a positive “equality duty” on public authorities to eliminate discrimination in 
the fields of race (2001), disability (2006) and gender (2007).  The Equality Act’s single 
“public sector equality duty” specifically extends to gender reassignment (s.149). Since both 
state-run prisons and prisons contracted to the private sector comprise “public authorities” 
within the terms of the Equality Act (schedule 19), they are bound by this new duty.   
Broadly, the three limbs of the public sector equality duty, as applied to the current context, 
are to “consider taking steps”: (1) to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment 
against transgender prisoners; (2) to advance equality of opportunity between transgender 
and cisgender prisoners; and (3) to foster good relations between transgender and 
cisgender prisoners (s.149(1)).  The second duty is given further legislative content, and 
requires prison authorities to consider taking steps “to meet the needs” of transgender 
prisoners, where these are different from the needs of cisgender prisoners (s. 149(3)).  The 
voluntary sector organisations interviewed for the purpose of this project all shared the 
view that it was this new public sector equality duty (even if it is not a strongly worded duty, 
see Fredman 2011 for a detailed analysis of the public sector equality duty), that finally 
compelled NOMS to introduce its first official policy on transgender prisoners.  This is borne 
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out by the timing of PSI 2011, which came into effect on 14 March 2011, only three weeks 
before the public sector equality duty came into force on 5 April 2011.   
Advances in Prisoners’ Rights  
Having discussed legal human rights developments in relation to transgender people, the 
next section now considers two crucial developments in the prisoners’ rights field, namely, 
their right to access the courts and to challenge decisions of the prison administration 
through judicial review proceedings, and their right to NHS-equivalent healthcare, both of 
which have been important for transgender prisoners.  
Access to the courts  
From the early twentieth century, prisoners could complain internally about their treatment 
to the governor and/or lodge a complaint with the prison’s board of visitors or visiting 
committee, but it was not until the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 that prisoners were 
entitled to bring legal action against the prison.  Even then, the Prison Commission 
established itself as gatekeeper, considering itself “free to decide on the merits of each case 
as to whether or not a prisoner should be allowed to initiate legal proceedings or seek legal 
advice” (Fox 1952:220).  In the rare instance that a prisoner was given permission to pursue 
a legal complaint about their treatment, the courts tended to adopt a “hands-off” approach.  
Indeed, many judges openly questioned the role of the courts in overseeing the prison 
administration.  Examples are abundant. In Arbon v Anderson [1943] KB 252, for example, 
the court held that a prisoner had no right of remedy against the Secretary of State for a 
breach of the Prison Rules, since, as Goddard LJ stated (at 255), “it would be fatal to all 
discipline in prisons if governors and warders had to perform their duty always with the fear 
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of an action before their eyes if they in any way deviated from the rules”. In Becker v Home 
Office *1972+ 2 ALL ER 676, Lord Diplock similarly declared (at 685) that “if the courts were 
to entertain actions by disgruntled prisoners, the governor’s life would be made intolerable” 
and “the discipline of the prison would be undermined”.102  By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, however, the tide started to turn.  As in the field of transgender rights, a European 
Court of Human Rights decision was central to domestic legal reform.   
In Golder v UK [1975] 1 EHRR 524, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed for the 
first time that the right of access to the courts guaranteed in article 6 of the European 
Convention applies to prisoners and held that the UK Government had breached the 
Convention by denying a prisoner access to a lawyer, and therefore access to the courts.  It 
took another decade for the European Court’s decision in Golder v UK to be firmly 
established in domestic law. The break-through came in ex parte St Germain [1979] 1 All ER 
701, when the courts first spoke of their role as “the ultimate custodians of the liberties of 
the subject, whatever his status” (at 716).  As Quinn has observed, “if this was not ‘hands 
on’, it at least heralded that the courts were prepared to touch prisoners’ rights with their 
fingertips” (1999: 3).  Later cases gave further shape and definition to prisoners’ right to 
access the courts, and removed various barriers placed in their way by the prison 
administration.   In Raymond v Honey [1983] AC 1 and ex parte Anderson [1984] QB 778, 
prisoners’ unfettered right to the courts was finally realised.  Raymond v Honey also 
established the fundamental tenet in the prisoners’ rights field that “a convicted prisoner 
retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication” (at 
10), i.e. by virtue of legislation or imprisonment.  These developments gave prisoners a 
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 On the prisoners’ rights movement in this era, see Jacobs 1980; and for an interesting personal account of 
early prison management responses to prisoners’ rights and prisoners’ legal representatives, see Quinn 1999. 
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formal channel to challenge prison decisions, which was external to, and independent of, 
the prison system, and which – unlike internal complaints procedures and complaints to the 
Prison and Probations Ombudsman (established in 1994) – results in legally binding 
judgments.   
As for the role of the courts in judicial review proceedings, this is to scrutinise the impugned 
decision of the prison administration and to determine whether it is either ultra vires (i.e. 
without legal basis/ beyond official powers) or so unreasonable or irrational that no 
reasonable administrator could have made it, pursuant to the common law test of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness.103 Notably, a breach of prison policy in the form of a Prison 
Service Order or Prison Service Instruction104 is not legally actionable per se, but may 
contribute to a finding of Wednesbury unreasonableness (see Owen and MacDonald 2015: 
26-28).  Whilst prisoner resistance to prison power inevitably has to take place within the 
system and on its terms (and could therefore be challenged in Foucauldian terms as an 
illusory power), this thesis will argue that the transformative potential of prisoners’ right to 
access the courts should not be underestimated.   
Schone has argued that the early 1990s marked the “beginning of the end” of prisoners’ 
rights (2001: 74).  However, the Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force in 2000, 
gave new momentum to prisoner litigation.  Previously, prisoners were only entitled to raise 
a breach of European Convention rights in the domestic courts insofar as it went to the issue 
of lawfulness of the prison’s decision or action under the common law test of Wednesbury 
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 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
104
 PSOs, issued until 31 July 2009, are long-term mandatory instructions. They have no expiry date and remain 
in force until cancelled or replaced.  PSIs lay down various rules, regulations and guidelines by 
which prisons are run, and have an expiry date. 
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reasonableness. Only once they had exhausted all domestic remedies could prisoners take a 
human rights-based case before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This 
was a long, expensive and arduous route, which, for prisoners, was particularly prohibitive. 
By incorporating the European Convention into domestic law, the Human Rights Act 
empowers prisoners to claim directly before the English courts that their European 
Convention rights have been breached. Such a claim is additional to prisoners’ right to 
challenge prison administration decisions on traditional Wednesbury grounds, fortifying 
their legal armoury against the prison.  This dual legal approach was taken, for example, in 
AB (2009). 
NHS-equivalent healthcare 
In addition to judicial recognition of prisoners’ right to access the courts, the Government’s 
announcement in 1994 of its new policy of “NHS-equivalent healthcare” for prisoners (HM 
Prison Service 1994), was a fundamental development in the prisoners’ rights field, if not a 
human right per se.  As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, prisoner healthcare at the 
time was provided by the Prison Medical Service (“PMS”), which was staffed and run 
completely separately from the NHS.  Sustained critique of the second class healthcare 
offered to prisoners by the PMS culminated in the HM Prisons Inspectorate’s damning 1996 
report Patients or Prisoners: A New Strategy for Healthcare in Prisons (1996), and set in 
motion the integration of the PMS and NHS, which was completed in 2013.105 In 1999, a 
joint Prison Service and NHS document on the Future Organisation of Prison Health Care 
declared that the purpose of prison healthcare was “to give prisoners access to the same 
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 In 2003, the budget for prison healthcare transferred to the NHS, in 2006, prison health services in publicly-
funded prisons were transferred, and in 2013, prison healthcare in privately-run prisons was also brought 
under NHS commissioning. 
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quality and range of health care services as the general public receive from the NHS” (HM 
Prison Service/ NHS 1999).106   
The reason that this cannot be described as a human right as such, is because the principle 
of equivalence between prisoner and community healthcare is laid down in various 
international human rights resolutions and instruments, including the influential United 
Nations’ Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990, principle 9) and Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules 2015, rule 24), but it is not 
incorporated in any human rights treaties.  It therefore does not constitute a legally binding 
human right which can be raised by a prisoner against the state.107  In other words, it is 
“soft-law”.   Nevertheless, lack of access to NHS-equivalent healthcare can be challenged by 
a prisoner, on the basis that it breaches prison policy, and is therefore Wednesbury 
unreasonable, which is why it is included here as a development in the prisoners’ rights 
field.   
As discussed further in Chapter 6, this policy development paved the way for transgender 
prisoners to access medical gender reassignment treatment on an equivalent basis with 
transgender people in the outside community, after the Court of Appeal ruled, in NW 
Lancashire (1999), that gender reassignment treatment falls within the remit of the NHS.   
Whilst this ruling was to be welcomed, NW Lancashire had one major downside, in that the 
very success of the case was built on the “the common ground that “transsexualism is an 
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 See Ginn 2012, and Birmingham et al 2006, for useful synopses of the developments, and a discussion of 
ethics and the principle of equivalence in prison medicine.   
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 For a comprehensive review of the nature and scope of the right to health of prisoners in international law, 
see Lines 2008.  Interestingly, it was not until 2006, that the European Prison Rules specifically referred to the 
prison authorities’ obligation to safeguard the health of all prisoners (rule 39), however, the need for prison 
medical services to be organised in close relationship with the general public health administration (rule 40), 
has been part of the European Prison Rules since they were originally adopted in 1987 (rule 26). 
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illness in the nature of a mental disorder” (para 3).  Thus, NW Lancashire entrenched a 
pathologising discourse of gender dysphoria, in the same moment that it secured important 
legal advances in terms of transgender people’s access to gender reassignment 
treatment.108   However, it cannot be claimed that this development had anything to do 
with human rights.  The court curtly dismissed the applicant’s attempts to refer to European 
Convention and European Union jurisprudence, and to invoke their rights to respect for 
private life, equality, and freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment.  It felt this 
approach was “misguided” and had “no sensible connection to the issues in the case” (per 
Lord Justice Buxton, at paras 19-21).  Whilst the court stated that it would take seriously any 
breach of European Convention rights in its consideration of Wednesbury rationality (the 
Human Rights Act 1998 had not yet entered into force), it criticised the applicant’s 
“unfocused recourse” to European Convention jurisprudence, as “positively unhelpful, 
cluttering up *the court’s+ consideration of adequate and more precise domestic principles 
and authorities governing the issues at play” (per Lord Justice Auld, at 14).   
The court’s approach in NW Lancashire can be contrasted to the post-Human Rights Act 
case of AB, ten years later in 2009.  In AB, the right to respect for private life, under article 8 
of the European Convention, lay at the very heart of the court’s finding that the prison 
authorities had unlawfully interfered with a transgender prisoner’s private life by refusing to 
transfer her to the female estate, where she could be considered for gender reassignment 
surgery, and over-shadowed the court’s separate finding of Wednesbury unreasonableness.   
                                                          
108
 On the internationally-recognised problem of the need to rely on a mental health model of gender 
dysphoria in order to access medical treatment and/or insurance coverage, see Spade 2003 and Butler 2004: 
75-101. 
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Law’s Construction of the Transgender Prisoner as a Human Rights-
Bearer 
So far, this chapter has shown how legal recognition of transgender people’s human rights 
has gathered pace over the last twenty years, leading to important advances in gender 
recognition, protection against discrimination, and access to gender reassignment 
treatment on the NHS.  Meanwhile, judicial recognition of prisoners’ rights has been pivotal 
in enabling prisoners to challenge their treatment through the courts, and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 has enhanced their access to European Convention rights.  The chapter has shown, 
however, that these significant legal achievements, both legislative and judicial, have come 
at a price; how law has entrenched and perpetuated a medical model of transgender 
people; how in making space for certain transgender people, law has excluded others; and 
how law has repeatedly reinforced the gender binary.  The chapter has also argued that, 
whilst law has ostensibly eschewed any need for transgender people to “normalise” their 
bodies in order to benefit from its recognition and protections, law’s preoccupation with a 
past “biological” truth of sex, anatomically “correct” bodies, and normative gender 
presentation still bubbles underneath its transformative surface. Even the most 
contemporary and progressive piece of legislation, the Equality Act 2010, uses the 
medicalised terminology of “transsexualism”, even though its protections are not based on 
a medical model, and reproduces the Victorian notion that transgender people’s gender is 
artifice, and that their bodies are risky to “vulnerable” others in confined spaces.    
This section now turns to examine the judgment in AB (2009). Transgender prisoners did not 
become the specific, knowable subject of English law until this case; that is, just as there was 
no “transsexual of the law” until Corbett (1970), there was no “transgender prisoner of the 
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law” until AB.  Whilst some transgender prisoners had previously commenced legal action 
against the prison authorities and prison administration, their cases were settled out of 
court.109  Thus, the detailed facts of their complaints and the terms of the settlements did 
not reach the public domain.   
AB involved a petition for judicial review by a transgender woman who had started to 
reassign her gender, both socially and medically, whilst serving a long-term prison sentence 
in a men’s prison.  She had been medically diagnosed with gender dysphoria and had 
started to take feminising hormones in 2003, and was referred to the Gender Identity Clinic 
at Charing Cross in 2004.  After living for the requisite two-year period as a woman in the 
male estate, AB had obtained a GRC, legally recognising her as a woman.  She wished to 
transfer to a women’s prison, and also to be considered for gender reassignment surgery, 
which the Gender Identity Clinic would not contemplate unless she had first lived in a 
women’s prison, which the prison authorities refused to contemplate unless she had gender 
reassignment surgery in the male estate.  At the eleventh hour, it conceded that it could 
transfer her to the female estate, but argued that she would need to be segregated on a 
long-term, perhaps indefinite basis, and the costs would be prohibitive.   
The specific implications of AB in relation to transgender prisoners’ prison allocation and 
access to gender reassignment surgery are examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 6 
respectively.  For current purposes, AB usefully illustrates the cumulative effects of the 
procedural and substantive legal developments discussed in this chapter, which enabled AB 
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 E.g. A six-figure settlement was reached with a transgender woman prisoner raped in HMP Peterborough, a 
men’s prison, in the late 1990s (Interview with Press for Change, 26 October 2015, see Chapter 4); and legal 
action was commenced, in 1990s, by six transgender prisoners wanting access to gender reassignment surgery 
(see Chapter 6).  
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to bring her case before the courts, and resulted in the courts’ first affirmation of 
transgender prisoners as human rights-bearers.  
Procedurally, AB benefitted from the (by now) well-established right of prisoners to bring 
judicial review proceedings against decisions of the prison administration, naming both the 
Secretary of State and the Governor of HMP Manchester as defendants to the proceedings.  
The Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention into UK law, 
enabled her to challenge the prison authorities’ decision not only on the traditional 
common law ground of Wednesbury unreasonableness, but also on the ground that the 
decision breached her rights to private life and equality under articles 8 and 14 of the 
European Convention.   
Substantively, there was no question over AB’s right to be considered for gender 
reassignment surgery, since, by this time, the policy of NHS-equivalent prisoner healthcare 
had long been established, and the courts had affirmed in NW Lancashire (1999) that 
gender reassignment surgery falls within the responsibility of the NHS.  Further, the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 had enabled her to obtain a GRC as a woman, whilst she was in prison.  
Indeed, the court in AB remarked that the Gender Recognition Act “marks an important 
milestone in the recognition of transgender rights” (para 30).   
Drawing on European Convention jurisprudence in relation to the right to respect for private 
life (article 8), including Goodwin (2002), the court in AB noted that whilst AB did not have a 
right to gender reassignment surgery per se, the decision to retain her in the male prison 
estate effectively barred her from qualifying for surgery, which, it concluded, “interferes 
with her personal autonomy in a manner which goes beyond that which imprisonment is 
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intended to do” (para 49).  This is an important re-articulation of the general principle 
expressed in Raymond v Honey (1983) that a prisoner retains all rights except those taken 
away “by necessary implication”.  Although the court observed that the Secretary of State 
has “significant latitude” in balancing the “often competing interests of criminal justice, 
protection of the public, the prison estate, resources and the well-being and discipline of all 
prisoners” (para 77), and stated that it would not “interfere lightly” in the exercise of this 
discretion (para 83), it did not defer to the prison authorities’ decision in this particular case.  
“Where issues go so close to the identity of a prisoner as here”, and are “so intimately 
concerned with her personal autonomy”, the court stated, “the deployment of resources as 
a justification for the infringement of such rights must be clear and weighty in order to be 
proportionate.  Here they are neither” (para 77).   It held that that the decision was an 
unlawful interference with AB’s private life under article 8 of the European Convention, as 
well as being Wednesbury irrational, and ordered the prison authorities to transfer AB to a 
women’s prison forthwith. 
AB was a landmark judgment in many ways, and not only because it achieved the outcome 
sought by AB.  Its primary construction of AB, a transgender prisoner, as a human rights-
bearer has enormous legal and symbolic significance.  If it had been so-minded, the court 
could have confined itself to an administrative law finding, and dismissed AB’s human rights 
arguments, as the Court of Appeal did in NW Lancashire. This legal finding would have led 
to the same result for AB.  However, the analysis of AB’s right to private life lies at the heart 
of its judgment, so much so, that (as mentioned in the Introduction), Armatrudo and Blake 
single out the case of AB to illustrate “how deeply embedded in the UK the culture of 
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human rights has become” since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000 (2015: 
136).     
Despite these many positive aspects of the case, a closer analysis reveals three particularly 
harmful, regressive aspects of the court’s judgment, in terms of its general construction of 
the transgender prisoner.  First, the court accepted the Secretary of State’s contention that 
a transgender prisoner’s “physical characteristics” might have “implications” for the “proper 
running or discipline of the prison estate” (para 31), and held that the prison authorities 
may have regard to those physical characteristics (here, a penis) where they have a “bearing 
on their responsibilities for prisons and other prisoners” (para 32, emphasis added).  This 
reproduces the idea that transgender prisoners’ bodies (or at least penises) matter, and can 
even trump their legal gender, in the specific context of the prison.  It suggests that they 
may disrupt the prison’s order, and may be risky in relation to other prisoners.  Second, 
although the court refers to AB in the female pronoun throughout its judgment, it 
reproduces a nature/artifice distinction in relation to her gender performance, remarking 
that “in physical terms, the claimant presents convincingly as a woman” and “even within a 
male prison, she dresses and passes herself off as a woman” (para 4, emphasis added).  This 
description is tinged with law’s historical discourse of impersonation, deception and fraud.  
Third, in considering whether AB had been discriminated against, the court stated that, 
“while it is true that the claimant was not treated in a manner equivalent to a biological 
woman, it is difficult to characterise the treatment as discriminatory since the claimant was 
treated as a woman but in a pre-operative condition” (para 80, emphasis added).  Indeed, 
although this was AB’s desired outcome, it was AB’s ability to qualify for genital surgery 
which the court characterized as the “full” realisation of her gender” (para 64), not her GRC. 
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In conclusion, an analysis of AB shows that, on the one hand, the court delivers a 
progressive judgment which recognises and upholds the human rights of transgender 
prisoners, and results in a positive outcome for AB.  On the other hand, its underlying 
discourse reproduces and further entrenches hegemonic norms.   
The “Transsexual Prisoner” of PSI 2011  
This chapter concludes with a broad analysis of the “transsexual prisoner” of England and 
Wales’ first official prison policy on transgender prisoners.    The detailed content of PSI 
2011 on The Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners, and the way in which its 
provisions have unfolded in practice and altered the organisational and conceptual terrain 
of the prison, will be examined in subsequent chapters, in specific contexts.  This section 
takes only a “bird’s-eye” view, by way of introduction.  
First, it is important to note, given the policy’s human rights-based origins, that the language 
of rights is not employed in its title, or its Executive Summary. Instead, the title and policy is 
couched in terms of “care” and “management”.  Whilst PSI 2011 does contain an appendix 
which refers to the human rights-based legislation and case-law in the field, rights are not 
mentioned anywhere the body of the policy.  
As for the “transsexual” prisoner who is the subject of the policy, s/he is defined as 
“someone who lives or proposes to live in the gender opposite to the one assigned at birth” 
(para 1.1).  Thus PSI 2011 reproduces law’s binary model of gender; it excludes from its 
scope prisoners with non-binary and/or fluid genders, whilst including, and providing for the 
“care” of, those who conform to the binary gender order.  Further, whilst the term 
“transsexual” was undoubtedly adopted in order to maintain consistency with the 
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terminology used in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and Equality Act 2010, it reproduces, 
in the first-ever prison policy on the treatment of transgender prisoners, the historical 
inference that the policy applies only to “transsexual” people pursuing medical gender 
reassignment.  This misleading nomenclature undermines the policy’s broader, non-
medicalised definition of a “transsexual prisoner”, and its specific statement that this 
includes transgender prisoners who “may or may not have been diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria” (para 1.1).  Further, right from the start, PSI 2011 presents transgender prisoners 
as a risk in prison management terms.  The Executive Summary states not only that PSI 2011 
“clearly sets out how prisons can comply with the law” (para 1.4), but adds “in a way that is 
safe for the transsexual prisoner and others” (emphasis added).  On the surface, this simply 
reflects the prison administration’s overarching, common law duty to safeguard all 
prisoners, but at a deeper, discursive level, it immediately produces the “transsexual 
prisoner” as a risky figure, whose safety, and the safety of “others”, needs to be secured.   
Having briefly considered the “transsexual prisoner” of PSI 2011, the following outlines PSI 
2011’s three sections, which map onto the three topics discussed in the remainder of the 
thesis. “Medical treatment” is the first area addressed by the policy, which arguably 
reinforces the primacy of a medical model of “transsexuality”.  This section reaffirms the 
policy of NHS-equivalence in prisoner healthcare (para 2.2).  It then usefully specifies what 
this means in relation to transgender prisoners’ access to medical treatment.  This topic is 
addressed in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.   
The next section is named “prisoners living in their acquired gender role”.  Interestingly, PSI 
2011’s use of the expression “acquired gender role” does not have its origins in law – the 
Gender Recognition Act simply refers to people living in their “acquired gender”.  From a 
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Butlerian perspective of gender, this language is not problematic, since everyone’s gender is 
acquired and everyone’s gender is performative.  In ordinary parlance, however, cisgender 
people do not tend to speak of their own gender as a “role”, thus, arguably, the terminology 
reproduces a nature/artifice distinction.  This is explored further in Chapter 5.  Whilst 
explicitly invoking the Equality Act’s relevance to the treatment of transgender prisoners, 
PSI 2011 also repeats, word for word, its problematic language (para 3.1.), again, giving the 
false impression that the policy protects only those “transsexual prisoners” who are 
undergoing or have undergone a medical “process” of reassigning their “sex”.  In fact, the 
section makes it mandatory for prison administrators to permit prisoners to live in their 
gender if “they consider themselves transsexual” (PSI 2011: para 3.2, emphasis added).  This 
progressive provision includes allowing prisoners to “dress in clothes appropriate to their 
acquired gender and adopting gender-appropriate names and modes of address” (para 
3.3.), whichever part of the prison estate they are housed in.  However, “self-definition” still 
requires a person to identify with, or submit to, the narrow definition of “transsexual” 
stipulated in PSI 2011.  Despite these limitations, the provision is ground-breaking as it 
ostensibly removes the power of professional gatekeeping over transgender prisoners’ right 
to live and dress in their gender.  How this provision plays out in practice, however, is 
explored in Chapter 5.  
The final section on “location within the estate” states that “in most cases prisoners must be 
located according to their gender as recognised under UK law” (para 4.2).  The policy 
specifies that “this is a legal issue rather than an anatomical one, and under no 
circumstances should a physical search or examination be conducted for this purpose” (para 
4.5).  Thus, it formally adheres to the Gender Recognition Act’s eschewal of the body in its 
  
169 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
regulation of gender.  PSI 2011 further provides that a transgender prisoner with a GRC 
cannot be refused location within the appropriate estate, unless their security profile is such 
that a cisgender prisoner with the same security profile would also be refused location (para 
4.3).110 It therefore requires transgender prisoners’ risk to be assessed no differently from 
cisgender prisoners.   Conversely, PSI 2011 provides that transgender prisoners who have 
not obtained a GRC must be treated for prison placement purposes according to the gender 
assigned to them at birth, although it recognises that some people “will be sufficiently 
advanced in the gender reassignment process that it may be appropriate to place them in 
the estate of their acquired gender, even if the law does not yet recognise they are of their 
acquired gender” (Annex D, para D.10).  Where there are “issues to be resolved”, a “multi-
disciplinary risk assessment” must be completed “to determine how best to manage a 
transsexual prisoner’s location” (para 4.2).  Thus, risk is ruled out as a unique feature in 
relation to transgender prisoners with GRC, but not for those who do not have a GRC, i.e. 
whose gender has not been medically and legally certified, and who are therefore 
constructed as potentially risky.  This topic is explored further in Chapter 4. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown how the formal situation of transgender prisoners has benefitted 
from various human rights-based legal developments over the years, culminating in 2011 in 
the Prison Service’s first official policy on the Care and Management of Transsexual 
Prisoners.  Yet, it has also demonstrated that recourse to law, and human rights, comes at a 
price, whether it is pursued in legislation, policy, or the courts.  However progressive on the 
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 It appears that this situation would only arise where a woman presents such a high security risk she cannot 
be housed securely in the female estate and has to be held in a Close Supervision Centre, an extreme form of 
custody, which is only available in the male estate.  See Chapter 4. 
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surface, law reform in this area has repeatedly reproduced and reinforced the “truth” of the 
gender binary and excluded those who do not wish to commit to life-long gender 
convention.  It has shored up a medical model of transgenderism, requiring transgender 
people to submit to a pathologising diagnosis of gender dysphoria, in order to access both 
legal recognition and NHS medical treatment.  Whilst the Gender Recognition Act ostensibly 
makes bodies redundant to legal gender, law’s preoccupation with the biological “truth” of 
the past and “correct” anatomy continually resurfaces, and transgender bodies continue to 
be regarded as risky, both to the binary gender order, and to cisgender people.  The 
language of impersonation, artifice and deception, which was evident in law’s first 
construction of the “transsexual” in Corbett (1970), continues to reverberate in 
contemporary legal discourse.   This chapter has shown how many of these themes were 
reproduced in law’s first construction of the transgender prisoner in AB (2009).  Despite 
being a landmark case in the transgender prisoners’ rights field, it perpetuated the view that 
transgender prisoners’ gender is inauthentic, and reasserted the significance of bodies and 
biology in the prison’s governance of gender.    
The following three chapters will now examine, in detail, the extent to which these human 
rights-based legal developments, and the “new” discourse of human rights in relation to 
transgender prisoners have affected (or have the potential to affect) the prison 
administration’s construction and governance of transgender prisoners as primarily risky.  
The chapters will consider both the transformative potential, and the limits, of recourse to 
human rights in relation to improving transgender prisoners’ lives, in terms of allocation 
within the prison estate (Chapter 4), ability to express gender through clothing, hair etc. 
(Chapter 5) and access to medical treatment (Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 4: Prison Allocation and Segregation, and the Costs 
of Imagining Transgender Prisoners as Risky 
 
This chapter examines the effects of law and recent human rights-based developments on 
the allocation of transgender prisoners to the male or female estate.  Prison allocation is 
examined first, because it is the first decision that has to be made when a transgender 
person is sent to prison, and also because it is the most fundamental decision, with both 
practical and symbolic effects on transgender prisoners’ lives. Indeed, whether a 
transgender prisoner is allocated to a gender-appropriate prison goes to the very heart of 
whether their gender is recognised as legitimate by the prison authorities.  This chapter also 
analyses the common practice of separating transgender prisoners from the main prison 
population, ostensibly for their own protection.  Whilst recent public, parliamentary and 
policy focus has been on the appropriate allocation of transgender prisoners to either the 
male or female estate, little attention has been paid to the circumstances of their housing 
within the particular prison they are allocated to, e.g. segregation or a vulnerable prisoners’ 
unit.  This is an extremely important issue, and a discussion of prison allocation is not 
complete without it.   
This chapter argues that risk continues to be the primary lens through which transgender 
prisoners and their housing is viewed, and that the prison administration’s construction of 
them as both at risk and risky has considerable costs to their lives.  Whilst prison policy now 
requires prisons to allocate transgender prisoners according to their legal gender (i.e. to 
accept a GRC as determining gender, regardless of bodily status), the chapter argues that 
bodies, and particularly genitalia, still matter in prison.  It argues that the construction of 
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transgender bodies as both at risk and risky continues to manifest itself in their routine 
separation from the main prison population. This practice subjects them to punitive 
segregation conditions or other regimes of “less eligibility” and excludes them, perpetuating 
the view that they are risky to the good order of the prison, and prison society.  The chapter 
argues that it is in the women’s prison estate that transgender prisoners’ rights have most 
struggled to take root.  It explores the biological or cultural essentialism seemingly at play, 
and examines a particularly acute suspicion around the trans/gender authenticity and 
motives of transgender women who transition whilst in prison, compared with those who 
have lived in their gender prior to imprisonment.    
This chapter is divided into six parts. After a brief introduction to the origins of the sex-
segregated prison estate in England and Wales, the first part shows how the prison’s 
regulation of trans/gender developed separately from law’s, and privileged transgender 
prisoners’ genitalia upon entry to prison, rather than their genitalia at birth (Corbett (1970)).  
Part two traces the emergence and evolution of official risk discourse around transgender 
prisoners’ allocation, and the perceived need for their protective segregation.  Through an 
in-depth analysis of the High Court judgment in AB (2009), part three explores the 
construction of transgender women prisoners’ bodies as especially risky when placed in the 
female estate and addresses the parallel construction of transgender men’s bodies as being 
at risk in the male estate.  The fourth part considers the established practice of separating 
transgender prisoners from the main prison population as a risk management technique and 
reflects on its practical and symbolic effects on transgender prisoners’ lives and on the 
prison’s governance of gender.  The fifth part analyses attempts to balance rights and risk 
management in recent prison policy, and the creation of a new divide, in PSI 2011, between 
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those with a GRC (no longer risky) and those without a GRC (still risky).  The sixth and final 
part discusses the limits of human rights in this field, through an analysis of R (on the 
application of Hunnisett) v the Governor of HMP Frankland [2017] EWHC 72 (“Hunnisett”) 
and an out-of-court settlement reached in XT (2017).  These cases provide evidence of the 
continuing use, and harmful effects of segregating transgender prisoners as a risk 
management solution, rather than addressing transphobia in the main prison population.  
The Sex-Segregated Prison Estate and Genitalia-Based Allocation 
Today, it is taken for granted that the English and Welsh prison estate is divided into men’s 
and women’s prisons, although, as mentioned in Chapter 1, women and men were initially 
housed together in prison.111  Current prison rules stipulate that female prisoners should 
“normally” be kept separate from male prisoners (Prison Rules 1999: Rule 12(1)), although 
the Secretary of State retains discretion to depart from the general rule.  The Prison Rules 
do not define who is to be regarded as “female” or “male” for these purposes.   
The segregation of male and female prisoners can be traced back to the Gaol Act 1823, 
which was enacted after prison reformists, such as Elizabeth Fry, campaigned for separate 
housing and a separate regime for women to meet their perceived gender-specific 
rehabilitative needs (1827a, 1827b).  Sex-segregation also assisted the prison administration 
in its efforts to tackle widespread sexual abuse, corruption and prostitution of women in 
                                                          
111
 In England and Wales, HMP Peterborough, which is privately-run, is the only dual, purpose-built prison for 
men and women, but they are kept separate at all times. In 1986, a Howard League report on Women in the 
Penal System proposed that women’s prisons should take male prisoners to fill spare capacity, to prevent the 
closure of under-utilised women’s prisons, and to avoid women being imprisoned far from home.  The report 
proposed that male and female prisoners would have separate living quarters, but would share opportunities 
for work, education, training and leisure, at the discretion of the governor (Howard League 1986). A similar 
proposal was considered, but rejected, recently, for Wales, as the lack of prison capacity in Wales means that 
many Welsh prisoners are housed in England (House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee: 2015, para 30).   
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mixed-sex prisons (Zedner 1998: 297).  Whilst the original intent behind sex-segregation was 
benevolent, it is well-established in the literature that, in practice, penal power was soon 
deployed to discipline women according to prevailing class and gender norms (see e.g. from 
the UK literature: Smart 1977; Carlen 1983; Dobash, Dobash and Gutteridge 1986; Bosworth 
2000; Carlen and Worrell 2004; Corcoran 2010; from the US literature: Estelle 1977; 
Freedman 1981 and Rafter 1985; from the Canadian literature: Hannah-Moffat 2001).  
Whist these past “regimes of femininity” (Carlen 1983) have been heavily critiqued, it 
continues to be widely believed, at both the international112 and UK113 level, that a different 
approach is required towards women’s offending and imprisonment than men’s, and that 
sex-segregation is necessary to this end.   However, Hannah-Moffat has argued that even 
the most progressive, contemporary, human rights-based approaches to women’s 
imprisonment (like the Correctional Services of Canada’s (“CSC”) “women-centered” prisons 
and “gender-responsive” regimes) tend to be based on “normative femininities”, which 
reproduce gender non-normative or more “masculine” women as risky (2010; as discussed 
earlier, in Chapter 2).   
Literature on men’s prisons has similarly shown how relations of power and violence in the 
hyper-masculinised environment of the male prison relegate prisoners who are perceived to  
be “effeminate” to the bottom of the hierarchy, where they are vulnerable to sexual and 
other abuse (see e.g. regarding the English and Welsh prison system: Sim 1994; Newburn 
and Stanko 1994; Carrabine and Longhurst 1998; Bosworth and Carrabine 2011; Jewkes 
2005; and Philipps 2012; and regarding the US prison system: Sabo, Kupers and London 
                                                          
112
 See e.g. the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Female Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for 
Female Offenders, known as the Bangkok Rules, A/RES/65/229 (adopted Dec 2010). 
113
 See e.g. the Corston Report (Home Office 2007) and follow-up (House of Commons Justice Committee 
2013); and the White Paper on Prison Safety and Reform (Home Office 2016, para 28). 
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(eds) 2001).  It is only recently that the effects of sex-segregation, and gender-normative 
prison regimes and prison societies, on transgender, gender non-normative and intersex 
prisoners specifically have become a matter of international and domestic concern, as 
discussed earlier in the thesis (see Introduction and Chapter 3).  
It is important to note at this juncture that the allocation of prisoners within the prison 
estate was always – and remains today – the responsibility of the prison authorities, not the 
courts.  Thus, when Tara Hudson unsuccessfully appealed against her 12-week sentence for 
assault (which she was serving in HMP Bristol, a men’s prison), Bristol Crown Court 
recommended that the Prison Service reconsider where she serve her sentence, and invited 
“sensitive consideration” of the issue, but stated that it was for the Prison Service, and not 
the court, to decide (Morris 2015).  Similarly, when Vikki Thompson’s solicitor asked the 
judge to send her to HMP New Hall, a women’s prison, the court stated that this was 
outside its purview (BBC News 2015).   
Traditionally, a person’s sex was determined as part of the routine medical examination on 
their reception to prison and, in practice, was based on genitalia.  Thus, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Bolton and Park were examined and declared male by the prison doctor on their 
arrest in 1871 for the offence of “personating a woman”, and placed in a men’s prison 
pending trial. Fear of the imminent medical examination prompted Bill Chapman, who was 
charged in 1835 for a public order offence unrelated to his gender expression, to declare his 
“true sex” as a woman to the arresting officer, before this “truth” would otherwise be 
revealed (Jackson 2014).  After “transsexualism” was named by the English medical 
profession in 1949, and hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery started to 
become available in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 1), prison doctors were faced with 
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the new problem of classifying transgender people’s hormonally and/or surgically altered 
bodies as male or female and allocating them appropriately within the sex-segregated 
prison estate.   
In the absence of existing research, the following history of English prison allocation 
practices is collated from a wide range of sources.  It cannot claim to be a definitive history.  
Nor do the patterns identified from sporadic reporting of prison administrators’ responses 
to individual transgender prisoners necessarily represent widespread prison practice at the 
time.  Nevertheless, these reports provide valuable insights into early prison practice and 
prison discourse around transgender bodies.   
The first reported case in the press (at least as identified by the author) relates to Rachael 
Gosling, who came before the courts in 1969 for soliciting (Evening News Reporter 1969).  
She had lived as a woman for some years, had undergone three gender reassignment 
surgeries overseas and, according to her lawyer, “had all the physical attributes of a 
woman” (ibid).  Although she was originally remanded to HMP Holloway, a women’s prison, 
she was subsequently transferred to HMP Brixton, a men’s prison, after prison doctors 
examined her and declared her male.  There, she was placed in isolation.  The courts 
criticised the Home Office’s decision to transfer her to the male estate, but since there was 
no law or policy governing the sex/gender of transgender people at the time, penal/medical 
power prevailed in determining the “truth” of her sex/gender.   Indeed, the prison doctors’ 
insistence that she remained male, despite gender reassignment surgery, reflected the 
widespread view of the medical profession at the time, as demonstrated, one year later, in 
the medical evidence given to the court in Corbett (1970) (see Chapter 1).   
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Interestingly, despite the ruling in Corbett that a person’s legal sex is fixed at birth, and can 
never be changed, even by gender reassignment surgery, all the cases identified after 
Gosling’s indicate that prison allocation decisions were based on genitalia at the time of 
imprisonment, with the result that transgender people who had undergone genital 
reassignment surgery were placed in a gender-appropriate prison.  Prison administrators 
seemingly ignored the legal test for sex laid down in Corbett, presumably because classifying 
a person’s sex/gender according to their genitalia at birth did not make sense in prison, it 
did not translate.  Thus, the prison set itself apart from law, made its own rules, and 
consolidated its own power over the location of transgender prisoners within the prison 
estate.  This status quo was not legally challenged until AB (2009).   
Meanwhile, two cases from the 1980s provide some insights into the effects of the prison 
authorities’ genitalia-based allocation practice on transgender prisoners.  In 1980, the press 
widely reported the case of Linda Gold, a West End nightclub hostess sentenced to 18 
months’ in prison for theft (Veitch 1980; LAGNA 1980; Smith 1980).  Gold had lived as a 
woman, and been prescribed oestrogen by a private doctor, for five years before her 
imprisonment.  She had developed breasts as a result, but because she had not had genital 
reassignment surgery, she was sent to HMP Wormwood Scrubs, a men’s prison.  There, 
prison doctors withdrew her hormone treatment, which led her secondary sex 
characteristics to revert.  As discussed further in Chapter 6, this medical decision literally 
disciplined her body back into line with the prison’s sex/gender order and the male prison to 
which she had been allocated.  Press reports, which were sympathetic to Gold’s plight, 
focused on the cruelty of withdrawing her hormones, as did the National Council of Civil 
Liberties (now Liberty), which took up her case.  Her allocation to the male estate appears to 
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have been regarded as unproblematic.  Although the public’s response clearly indicated that 
she should be treated as female within the male estate, and that it was wrong for the prison 
“to punish her twice by trying to make a man of her” (LAGNA 1980), public opinion 
seemingly concurred with the prison medics’ and prison administrators’ view that Gold was 
not fully or truly female until she had had genital reassignment surgery, and was rightfully 
housed in the male estate.   
Several years later, R v Tan and Others *1983+ 2 All ER 12 (“R v Tan”) came before the Court 
of Appeal.  This case involved Gloria Greaves, a transgender woman who had undergone 
hormone treatment and also (unlike Gold) gender reassignment surgery.  She and her co-
defendants had been convicted of various gender-specific criminal offences relating to 
prostitution, which depended on the court classifying Greaves as a man.  Applying Corbett, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the appellants’ convictions and sentences on the basis 
that Greaves was legally male, and remained so, notwithstanding surgery.   Interestingly, 
however, it was reported that Greaves was released on bail from a women’s prison pending 
her appeal (Pace 1983:317, note 7).  That is, notwithstanding the court’s finding that she 
was legally male for the purposes of criminal law, she was treated as a woman for prison 
allocation purposes, due to her current genital status. Her legal sex was irrelevant in the 
prison, it was her current, anatomically sexed body which mattered. 
References to transgender men’s prison allocation are scarce.  In a collection of prisoner 
narratives from HMP Holloway, a women’s prison, one prisoner expresses concern about 
the treatment of a transgender man, Marc Santo, who was locked up on his own within the 
psychiatric unit at the prison (Padel and Stevenson 1988: 82).  After his death there, in 1985, 
the coroner’s verdict was “accidental death due to lack of care” (ibid: 73).   Since genital 
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surgery (phalloplasty) for transgender men was more complicated and risk-laden than for 
transgender women, and the results often unsatisfactory, it was rarely undertaken in this 
period (see e.g. Rubin 2006: 496) and transgender men would have been allocated to the 
female estate.  
In the absence of any official prison statements or policies in this era, sporadic press reports 
indicate that prison practice continued to be based on genital status on reception to prison 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, for example, Stephanie Booth, who had genital 
reassignment surgery in 1983, served a 12-week sentence for video-licensing offences in 
HMP Askham Grange, a women’s prison (Meierhans 2015).  In the 1990s, two transgender 
men were kept in conditions amounting to solitary confinement for seven and eleven years, 
respectively, in HMP Holloway.  One of them decided to live as a woman, in order to return 
to the main estate, as he could no longer bear the solitude (Interview with Press for Change, 
26 October 2015).  In 1995, the press reported the case of Joanne Wray, who had lived as a 
woman for 12 years, had developed breasts through hormone treatment, and was awaiting 
genital reassignment surgery when she was imprisoned: “and that was the deciding factor.  
Because she still had a penis, she was a man and was sent to Hull *men’s] prison” (Mills 
1995).   
In purely practical terms, this genitalia-based test established clear boundaries between, 
and thus easy categorisation of, male and female bodies: “fully” reassigned bodies could be 
slotted into the existing sex-segregated prison order, whereas “ambiguous” bodies could 
not.  As discussed in Chapter 2, such incongruous bodies were not only “culturally 
unintelligible” (Butler 1994), but also represented a risk to the governmentality of sex/ 
gender in prison, since they departed so far from the norm.  To borrow Grosz’s phrase, they 
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were a “disorder which threatens all order” (1994: 2003).   Further, given the dominance of 
the medical model of “transsexuality”, a person’s willingness to undergo gender 
reassignment surgery seemingly proved their (trans)gender authenticity and rendered them 
deserving of social gender recognition, and also institutional gender recognition by the 
prison administration; the “truth” of a person’s sex/gender was effectively carved into their 
body, and was beyond question.   Regardless of their genitalia, however, transgender bodies 
– particularly transgender women’s bodies – were still regarded as at risk and risky bodies, 
when placed in close proximity to other prisoners’ bodies, and this often led to their 
segregation (as discussed below).   
Emergence and Evolution of Risk Discourse around Transgender 
Prisoners 
It was not until the mid-1990s that official prison discourse started to emerge regarding the 
allocation of transgender prisoners.  This seems to have been prompted by public concern 
over the widely-publicised cases of six prisoners who had started to socially and medically 
reassign their gender in the early 1990s, whilst serving long-term sentences in various men’s 
prisons (e.g. Evening Mail Reporter 1999).  The public seems to have been sympathetic 
towards the provision of hormone treatment to prisoners, such as Linda Gold (mentioned 
above), who had started to medically reassign her gender before their imprisonment (whose 
(trans)gender authenticity was therefore seemingly not in doubt).  However, the prospect of 
prisoners being allowed to transition whilst in prison, and particularly the possibility of them 
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having gender reassignment surgery whilst in prison, and potentially transferring to the 
opposite part of the prison estate, proved (and continues to prove) highly controversial.114   
The first official statement to emanate from the Prison Service regarding the allocation of 
transgender prisoners appears to have been made in May 1994, when the Director General 
replied to several parliamentary questions raised by Alex Carlile MP, in relation to Kelly 
Denise Richards, a transgender woman who had socially reassigned her gender, and had 
started hormone therapy, whilst in HMP Parkhurst men’s prison.  Carlile was sympathetic to 
Richard’s position, and was notably the first MP to advocate for transgender people’s 
rights.115  The Director General’s reply adopts the medical term “transsexual”, as was 
prevalent at the time, and is important to cite in full:   
“Any transsexual is likely to have difficulties in adjusting to prison life, and it is more 
often than not necessary to segregate in a vulnerable prisoner unit or prison 
healthcare centre those whose transsexuality is obvious.  We prefer to treat each 
case individually and the principal criteria [sic] is the most obvious physical 
characteristics of the person concerned and their ability to integrate with other 
inmates.  A male-to-female transsexual who has undergone surgery and hormone 
treatment would therefore be more appropriately allocated to a female 
establishment.  Conversely, a transsexual who has not undergone any form of 
treatment would be unlikely to be accepted by fellow inmates in an establishment 
for the gender of their choice” (Hansard, HC Deb 18 May 1994, vol 243, c460W).  
                                                          
114
 See further Chapter 6. 
115
 In 1995/6, Carlile unsuccessfully introduced a Private Members Bill, on behalf of the transgender advocacy 
group Press for Change, to allow transgender people to change their birth certificates (for a vivid, first-hand 
account of the House of Common’s debate on the Bill, see Burns 1996). 
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The Director General’s response offers a number of valuable insights into prison allocation 
practice itself, as well as its underlying rationale.  At this time, the prison authorities did not 
officially operate a blanket policy, but treated each case individually, having regard to the 
person’s “most obvious physical characteristics” and “their ability to integrate with other 
prisoners” in a gender-appropriate prison.   From the context, it is clear that the reference 
to a person’s “most obvious” physical characteristics is to their genitalia, as the given 
example is that a “male-to-female transsexual who has undergone surgery and hormone 
treatment” would be “more appropriately” allocated to the female estate.  A prisoner’s 
“ability to integrate with other prisoners” is also clearly linked to their medical and bodily 
status, as the passage states that “a transsexual who has not undergone any form of 
treatment would be unlikely to be accepted by fellow inmates” in a gender-appropriate 
prison (emphasis added).  Furthermore, if their “transsexuality is obvious” (i.e. whether due 
to their bodily status and/or gender performance), they are likely to be segregated, either in 
a vulnerable prisoners’ unit (which characterises them as at risk) or a healthcare centre 
(which produces them as ill, see below). 
Whilst the Prison Service statement appears to be concerned with the difficulties 
transgender prisoners may experience in being accepted by fellow prisoners, subsequent 
developments show that prison practice was driven as much, if not more so, by the 
construction of transgender prisoners as risky, rather than vulnerable and at risk.  This 
became evident in the report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual 
People (“IWG”) (Home Office 2000).  The IWG was set up in 1999 to report to the 
Government on “the need for appropriate legal measures to address the problems 
experienced by transsexual people” (ibid).  It was established in response to the European 
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Court of Human Rights’ repeated criticisms of the UK Government for failing to keep the 
legal status of transgender people under review.116  The report noted that the Prison Service 
was in the process of drawing up guidelines for dealing with “transsexual prisoners” (para 
2.74 - those which eventually became PSI 2011).  Its description of current prison allocation 
practice (para 2.75) closely corresponds to the Director General’s 1994 statement to 
Parliament, cited above. Importantly, however, the report adds a new observation to the 
mix, namely that “there may be problems in placing a male-to-female transsexual person in 
a female establishment, where she may not be accepted by other prisoners, many of whom 
may have suffered violent or sexual abuse from men” (ibid, emphasis added).  That is, the 
presence of a transgender woman (specifically) is characterised as a problem, and by 
implication a threat or risk, to other (cisgender) women in the female estate. The 
emergence of this “new” risk discourse is highly significant, and seems to be based on a 
biological or cultural essentialist view which produces transgender women as men, and 
indiscriminately associates them with masculine violence and sexual abuse, and produces 
cisgender women as inherently and especially vulnerable in the “women-only” space of the 
prison.    
This matter was explicitly put to the test before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in 
Kavanagh and Canadian Human Rights Commission v Attorney General of Canada (2001 
CanLII 8496 (CHRT)) (“Kavanagh”). Although this ruling is Canadian (and, as a 
Commonwealth authority, persuasive, but not legally binding, on the English courts), it is 
                                                          
116
 E.g. Rees (1986), para 47; Cossey (1990), para 17; Sheffield v Horsham (1998), para 45.
 
The IWG’s 
comprehensive report was left to gather dust, and no action was taken on any of its recommendations, much 
to the ECtHR’s ire (Goodwin (2002), para 92).  In 2002, following Goodwin, the IWG was reconvened, with a 
mandate to “re-examine the implications of granting full legal status to transsexual people in their acquired 
gender; and to make recommendations" (Home Office 2002), eventually leading to the GRA 2004. 
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invaluable for the current analysis.  It considers – within a human rights framework, and 
some eight years before a similar legal challenge was launched in England – a comparable 
practice and rationale to that voiced by the English prison authorities at the time.   The case 
concerned Synthia Kavanagh, who had lived as a woman for many years, was on hormone 
treatment, and had received conditional approval for gender reassignment surgery shortly 
before her conviction in 1989.  CSC policy stated that “unless sex reassignment surgery has 
been completed, male inmates shall be held in male institutions”.  On this basis, she was 
allocated to a men’s prison (Kavanagh, para 29). Since CSC’s policy also prohibited prisoners 
from accessing gender reassignment surgery during their incarceration, Kavanagh was 
effectively trapped in the male estate, where she “was regularly beaten, sexually assaulted 
and ridiculed” and spent long periods in protective custody and administrative segregation 
(paras 129 and 131). In conjunction with the Human Rights Commission, she challenged the 
lawfulness of CSC’s policy, on the basis that it discriminated against transgender prisoners 
on the basis of their sex under the Canadian Human Rights Act 1985.   
Legally, the case succeeded; the Human Rights Tribunal declared CSC’s allocation policy 
discriminatory on the grounds of sex,117 as it failed to recognise “the special vulnerability of 
the pre-operative transsexual inmate population” and “the differential effect that housing 
inmates in accordance with their anatomy has on transsexual inmates” (para 166).  
However, the Tribunal only ordered CSC to revise its policy so as to individually assess the 
best type of housing for “pre-operative transsexuals” within the male prison system, and to 
                                                          
117
 In fact, the Tribunal held that it was discriminatory on both sex and disability grounds – the claimant argued 
that “gender identity disorder” is a mental illness, and hence a disability.  Due to space constraints, this part of 
the case is not analysed here (cf. discussion of NW Lancashire (1999) in Chapters 3 and 6), nor is the Tribunal’s 
separate, important finding that CSC’s policy of refusing access to gender reassignment surgery to prisoners 
was discriminatory.   
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take steps to ensure their safety (ibid) and house them in a manner which did not incur 
“undue hardship” to them within the male prison estate (para 192).118 Their exclusion from 
the female estate, it held, was justified, on the basis argued by CSC, namely that “the 
placement of pre-operative male-to-female transsexuals in female prisons would present a 
great risk of harm to the female inmates, many of whom have histories of having been 
sexually abused” (para 106, emphasis added).  CSC therefore expressly raised the spectre of 
risk of harm to “female inmates”, and not simply risk of non-acceptance by those prisoners.  
It presented this risk as two-fold, comprising a risk of sexual harm, and a risk of 
psychological harm to “female inmates”, when placed in close proximity with anatomically 
male bodies, as expounded below.     
First, CSC argued in Kavanagh that “pre-operative” transgender women posed a sexual risk 
to cisgender women, as hormone therapy did not guarantee that they “would not have 
erectile capacity” (para 101).  Some prisoners “who were not truly transsexual”, it argued, 
might also seek to be placed in women’s prisons “for sexual purposes” (para 102) or to 
sexually “prey” on women (para 101).  Whilst taking into account these arguments, the 
Human Rights Tribunal expressed particular concern about the second limb of CSC’s 
argument, namely the potential psychological impact on cisgender women prisoners.  The 
Tribunal remarked that the “unique context created by the carceral setting” (para 157) 
meant that “female inmates *would+ be asked to live, for extended periods of time, in very 
close quarters, with a person who is anatomically of the opposite sex” and that “leaving 
would not be an option” should the situation become “intolerable” (ibid).   This echoes the 
                                                          
118
 The Tribunal specifically ruled out the creation of “a dedicated facility for pre-operative transsexuals in 
transition” due to the small number of such prisoners and related logistics, distance from friends and family 
and possible “ghettoisation” (pars 162 and 163).   
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trajectory of English sex discrimination law, which (as discussed in Chapter 3) has historically 
re-produced the idea that transgender bodies are potentially intolerable and risky to 
cisgender people in close, personal spaces, such as private homes, and has given cisgender 
people the right to exclude them from employment in such spaces.  The Tribunal rejected 
the Human Rights Commission’s argument that CSC’s policy gave legitimacy to the 
prejudicial attitudes of others, and that any fear and ignorance could be addressed through 
education. This was “overly simplistic”, it felt, since female inmates’ views were based not 
simply on “ignorance”, but on “painful life experience”, and “psychological damage” 
inflicted on them “as a consequence of the physical, psychological and sexual abuse they 
have suffered at the hands of men” (para 158).   
As cogently argued by Allison Smith, the judgment in Kavanagh effectively endorses a 
“hierarchy of rights” (2014: 152), whereby the needs of cisgender women are ranked above 
the needs of transgender women, on the basis that the former are authentic, “real” women, 
whereas the latter are not.  Whilst the Tribunal recognises that “pre-operative transsexual” 
women are discriminated against, it does not consider them to be discriminated against as 
women.  This is cis-sexism in action (Serano 2007, see Chapter 2).  Indeed, the Tribunal’s 
judgment effectively reproduces them as men and, as Smith argues, indiscriminately 
associates transgender women with a penis with male violence and “defines them by their 
anatomy and all that is associated with this anatomy” (2014: 159).   
Meanwhile, the English and Welsh prison authorities’ genitalia-based allocation policy, 
which was based on the same rationale as CSC policy, escaped legal scrutiny, and appears to 
have been unaffected by the changes brought about by the Gender Recognition Act 2004, 
until the situation was finally challenged by way of judicial review in AB (2009).  The 
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following analysis of AB argues that, like CSC, the English prison authorities constructed 
transgender women who had not had genital surgery as risky because of their anatomy 
(penis) and related associations of male violence, but also seem to have considered certain 
transgender women to be inherently risky, regardless of their genital status, based on 
biological or cultural essentialism.     
Transgender Women’s Especially Risky Bodies 
Although similar factually to Kavanagh, it will be recalled from Chapter 3 that AB had 
obtained legal recognition of her gender through a GRC, whereas Ms Kavanagh had not (and 
in Canada legally could not without gender reassignment surgery).119  AB was serving an 
automatic “two strikes” life sentence, imposed in 2003, for attempted rape of a female 
stranger, shortly after she had served a prison sentence for manslaughter of her male 
partner.  During this second prison sentence, she had socially transitioned and lived as a 
woman for over two years in the male estate, before obtaining a GRC.  Despite her legal 
status as a woman, the prison authorities refused to transfer her to the female estate.  This 
meant that she could not be considered for her desired gender reassignment surgery, as the 
gender identity clinic insisted she first spend a further two years living as a woman in a 
women’s prison.  The high bar set by gender identity clinicians for meeting the “real life” 
requirement whilst in prison is discussed further in Chapter 6.  It is sufficient to recall here 
that the prison authorities would only contemplate AB having surgery in the male estate, 
before she could be transferred to the female estate, which would have enabled them to 
                                                          
119
 It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that gender reassignment surgery is not a formal prerequisite for legal 
recognition under the UK’s Gender Recognition Act.  By contrast, Alberta’s provincial legislation made gender 
reassignment surgery a prerequisite for legal gender recognition.  This requirement was later declared 
unconstitutional, CF v Alberta (Vital Statistics), 2014 ABQB 237.    
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maintain their established genitalia-based allocation policy.  Despite the Gender Recognition 
Act’s progressive de-coupling of gender and genitals, it was seemingly AB’s penis which still 
defined her as a man for prison allocation purposes and rendered her risky. Like Kavanagh, 
AB was in a “Catch 22 situation”.  As she succinctly explained to the court: “the prison 
service ... will not consider me female until I have my penis removed ... notwithstanding my 
gender recognition certificate.  Yet they resist moving me to the female estate which would 
enable the surgery to be arranged” (AB (2009), para 8).   
Although AB successfully invoked both common law and human rights arguments to 
challenge the prison authorities’ decision, the judgment is driven by human rights discourse, 
with the right to respect for private life (article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights) at its core. The following analysis develops the preliminary review of AB in 
Chapter 3.   
Shifting the rationale from risk to resources 
The AB case started out in a similar vein to Kavanagh in terms of the prison authorities’ 
rationale for refusing to transfer her to the female estate.  Earlier in the proceedings, the 
prison authorities had argued that the claimant’s risk profile “was such that it would not be 
safe or appropriate to accommodate her in a female prison” (para 16, emphasis added).  Its 
reasoning is not given in the judgment, but cited pre-trial correspondence implies there was 
some discussion about AB’s sexual functionality and the sexual threat she posed to 
cisgender women, as her solicitors argued that her conviction for attempted rape had not 
been based “on an ability to sustain an erection” and “appears to have been more inspired 
by feelings of frustration and jealousy than sexual desire” (para 24).  However, the prison 
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authorities revised its rationale for keeping AB in the male estate at the eleventh hour (para 
16).  
Under their last-minute submissions, the prison authorities accepted in principle that AB 
could be housed in the female estate, but argued that, for her safety, she would need to be 
held in long-term segregation, which would have serious detrimental effects on her well-
being (para 60).  Thus, ostensibly, it was primarily for AB’s well-being that she should not be 
transferred, not for the protection of others – still a regular refrain in the prison 
administration’s governance of transgender prisoners. Nevertheless, Michael Spurr, Chief 
Operating Officer of NOMS acknowledged that whilst "the main issue that has been 
addressed in terms of risk is the Claimant’s risk to herself, NOMS must also bear in mind the 
risk she poses to other prisoners” (para 24).  At this point, the prison authorities’ rationale 
starts to reveal the underlying construction of AB as both a sexual and psychological threat 
to cisgender women, as in Kavanagh. 
Spurr described the risk AB posed to other women prisoners as “a significant risk, and a very 
unusual one”, requiring long-term segregation (para 21).  The need for such segregation was 
based on “the specifics of her offending history”, “the lack of guarantees that her surgery 
will definitely proceed” and “concerns over how the female population would react to her 
generally, and also specifically if they become aware of her index offence” (para 22).  
Indeed, he concluded that there was “no guarantee that the Claimant, either pre- or post-
operatively, would ever be suitable for integration into the general female prison 
population” (ibid, emphasis added).   These comments go to the crux of the matter.  
Although the prison authorities were concerned about AB’s genital status, their concerns 
seemingly went beyond this: even if she had gender reassignment surgery, she was still 
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potentially risky. Since cisgender women who have committed sexual and/or violent 
offences against women are housed in the female estate, AB’s offending history (attempted 
rape of a woman) does not appear to have driven the prison authorities’ decision.   Rather, 
the “very unusual” risk that AB was perceived to present to cisgender women seems to have 
been due to her being a transgender woman with such an offending history.  
In a prison system governed by genitalia-based sex-segregation – and also shaped by risk 
society’s highly precautionary approach to risk and blame (see Chapter 2) – the prison 
authorities seemed to need a “guarantee” that surgery would proceed. Yet, the risk that AB 
presented for prison management was seemingly so uncertain, so unknowable, that even 
this level of assurance was not enough; it could not “guarantee” that AB would ever be 
suitable for integration.   Long-term segregation was the only way the prison authorities 
could foresee managing such an immeasurable risk, as this would literally prevent her from 
being in close physical proximity to other prisoners, and thus contain any risks to and from 
her (containment of risk being one of the main objectives of the “new penology”, also 
discussed in Chapter 2).   
Since the prison authorities conceded at the last minute that AB could be moved to the 
female estate, but opposed her transfer on the basis that she would require long-term 
segregation and a special regime at “very considerable cost” (para 23), the court concluded 
that the prison authorities’ core justification for retaining AB in the male estate was 
“primarily a resource consideration” (para 58).  Thus, the court thus avoided a close review 
of the prison authorities’ initial risk-based arguments for retaining AB in the male estate and 
focused instead on their resource-based arguments.  It is impossible to know what 
significance to attach to the prison authorities’ (or the court’s) manoeuvre, and whether it 
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was precisely to circumvent this thorny issue.  Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of AB 
(below) provides useful insights into the prison authorities’ construction of the transgender 
woman prisoner as both at risk and risky.  It also demonstrates the truism that recourse to 
law and human rights is always a wager, and that even a positive outcome for the particular 
litigant may entail broader, negative discursive effects.  
Genitalia may trump legally-certified gender under the GRA 
Section 9 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 provides that once a GRC is issued, “the 
person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender”.  Despite its apparent 
clarity, the court felt that the precise scope of section 9 was unclear and gave rise to 
difficulties “in cases such as this, where a person with acquired gender still retains 
physiological aspects of the former gender – in this case male genitalia” (para 31).  It agreed 
in principle with the Secretary of State’s contention that section 9 did not require the Prison 
Service “to disregard all the consequences of the claimant’s physiology, nor the implications 
which they might have for the proper running or discipline of the prison estate”.  It 
acknowledged, however, that “this is undoubtedly a difficult line to draw, since if it were 
taken too far, it could undermine the purpose of [section 9] to provide comprehensive 
recognition of acquired gender” (para 31).  The court concluded that the prison authorities 
may have regard to a transgender prisoner’s physical characteristics, but only “to the limited 
extent that they have a bearing on their responsibilities for prisons and other prisoners” 
(para 32, emphasis added).  The claimant was not to be regarded “as anything other than a 
woman except to the extent strictly necessitated by the specific relevance of [her] pre-
operative physical state to the functioning of the prison” (para 31, emphasis added).   This 
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effectively gave the prison authorities a “get-out clause”, as the court left open the 
circumstances in which this exception might apply.  
The court’s finding that a transgender woman prisoner with a GRC might lawfully, albeit 
exceptionally, be treated as “something other than a woman” for the purpose of prison 
allocation, is extremely troubling, both instrumentally and discursively.  In “pure” law terms, 
the judgment carves out a potential exception to the Gender Recognition Act’s 
comprehensive recognition of legally-certified gender.  This resurrects the significance of 
genitals in defining who is a woman or man, notwithstanding their legally-certified gender, 
for prison allocation purposes.   It concedes that law’s new “truth” – that gender does not 
depend on genitals – does not necessarily translate in the prison.  It also leaves pre-existing 
power relations intact, yielding ultimate power over the determination of a prisoner’s 
gender to the prison authorities.   
Normatively, the subtext of the judgment reproduces the idea that it is gender reassignment 
surgery which makes AB a woman, not her GRC.  Thus, even though the court respects AB’s 
gender in its use of female pronouns throughout the judgment, right from the start, it 
describes her as a “pre-operative transgender woman” (para 1, emphasis added), who 
“presents convincingly as a woman” (para 4, emphasis added), and “dresses and passes 
herself off as a woman” (ibid, emphasis added).  This has echoes of Corbett, giving the 
impression that she is not an authentic woman, despite the fact that the Gender 
Recognition Panel, another judicial body, has legally certified her as a woman.   
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The centrality of gender reassignment surgery to the right to private life 
This medical model of transgender people, and the centrality of gender reassignment 
surgery to the full realisation of gender, underpins the remainder of the judgment.  After 
reviewing the implications of section 9 of the Gender Recognition Act for the prison’s 
governance of trans/gender, the court considered whether the prison authorities had 
unlawfully interfered with AB’s private life under article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  Citing Goodwin (2002) and various other authorities, the court first 
established that the right to respect for private life has been “widely drawn” and entails 
respect for the “personal autonomy” and “personal sphere of each individual” (para 39). 
AB’s argument that the prison authorities had unlawfully interfered with her private life had 
two aspects.  First, she argued that the refusal to transfer her, as a legally certified woman, 
to the female estate unlawfully interfered with her right to live as a woman per se.  The 
prison authorities rejected this argument, stating that she was recognised and treated as a 
woman in the male estate, and that further adjustments could be made if necessary (paras 
45 and 46).  Unfortunately, the court side-stepped this crucial question and focused instead 
on the second limb of AB’s argument, namely that the prison authorities’ refusal to transfer 
her to the female estate prevented her from ever being assessed for gender reassignment 
surgery.  This specific interference with AB’s private life, it felt, was “a significant and 
personal one”, which “goes to the heart of her identity” (para 53).  Thus, crucially, it was her 
inability to progress towards gender reassignment surgery – or what the court later 
revealingly referred to as “realisation in full of her gender” (para 64, emphasis added) – that 
formed the plank of the court’s finding that there had been an interference with her private 
life, not the non-recognition of her (legally certified) gender per se, nor the fact that she was 
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compelled to live in the male estate, an environment which, as her solicitors argued, is 
“constructed and tailored for men” (para 45).  This is telling; the legacy of the medical 
model of transgender people seems to have resulted in the court giving more legal weight 
to the interference with her medical gender reassignment, than with the interference with 
AB’s daily life as a woman, per se.  
It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that, pursuant to article 8(2) of the European Convention, 
the right to respect for private life is not absolute, but may lawfully be interfered with, if the 
interference pursues a legitimate aim, is in accordance with the law, and is proportionate to 
that aim.  The court accepted that the Secretary of State’s considerations might serve a 
legitimate aim in terms of “economic” and (interestingly) “prevention of disorder” 
objectives, but held that the interference with AB’s private life was disproportionate to 
those aims. “When issues go so close to the identity of a prisoner as here” and are “so 
intimately concerned with her personal autonomy” (referring to the possibility of gendered 
embodiment through gender reassignment surgery), the court stated, “the deployment of 
resources as a justification for the infringement of such rights must be clear and weighty in 
order to be proportionate.  Here they are neither” (para 77). 
It also held that the Secretary of State’s decision was unlawful on common law Wednesbury 
grounds (irrationality in administrative decision-making) as it had failed to take into account 
a number of relevant factors in its cost calculations; for example, it had not considered the 
risks and costs entailed if AB remained indefinitely in the male estate.  Increasing frustration 
might lead to greater risk of self-harm and harm to others, and, in turn, this might require 
her to be held in more stringent segregation conditions than on the vulnerable prisoners’ 
unit where she was currently housed.  This would involve comparable costs to long-term 
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segregation in the female estate, yet, those costs had not been taken into account (para 60).  
This, the court concluded, was a “significant” omission (ibid) and made the risk assessment 
“somewhat one-sided” (para 76).  Finally, there was no evidence that AB’s segregation in 
the female estate would need to be as long-term as the Secretary of State had assumed in 
its calculations (para 74); the clinicians had spoken of weeks or, at most, two months being 
sufficient (para 69-70), and, if a special regime were put in place, as proposed, the risks of 
segregation to the claimant’s mental health would be mitigated (para 75).  Thus, the court 
did not simply defer to the prison authorities’ decision-making, but closely scrutinised its 
arguments and costings, and exposed them as a fallacy.   
AB further argued that she had been discriminated against in relation to her private life on 
the basis of sex (cf. Kavanagh), by being refused a transfer to the female estate.  Whilst the 
court did not determine this claim in full,120 it makes several observations about the right to 
equality, which further reinforce the perception that AB is not fully a woman until she has 
gender/genital reassignment surgery.  “While it is true that the claimant was not treated in 
a manner equivalent to a biological woman”, the court stated, “it is difficult to characterise 
the treatment as discriminatory since the claimant was treated as a woman but in a pre-
operative condition” (para 80, emphasis added).  Thus, the court (and various witnesses) 
continue to apply a biological test for sex, repeatedly contrasting AB’s status with that of a 
“biological female prisoner”, “a biological female offender” and a “biological woman” (e.g. 
paras 11, 27, 32 59, 77, 80).  This demonstrates the enduring power of Corbett’s medico-
legal definition of “biological” sex, despite the Gender Recognition Act’s entry in the field.  It 
also exposes the emergence of fracture-lines within “the law”, which undermine the 
                                                          
120
 It did not fully consider this claim, since it had already found an unlawful interference in her private life per 
se.  This is common practice in ECtHR jurisprudence.   Notably, the Equality Act 2010 was not yet in force. 
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authoritative power of law’s new “truth-claim” that gender does not depend on genitals.  
For, as discussed in Chapter 2, society’s tendency to speak of “the law” in the singular shows 
law’s power to present itself as a cohesive, singular, authoritative discourse, when the 
reality is often quite different (as here).   
In sum, AB was a landmark judgment, in that it recognised transgender prisoners’ human 
rights, and resulted in a positive outcome for AB, who was subsequently transferred to a 
women’s prison.  It rejected the historically entrenched argument that AB was uniquely risky 
because of her transgender history.   The judgment also led to important changes to the 
(then draft) PSI 2011, as discussed below.  Francesca Cooney, formerly of the Prison Reform 
Trust, remarked that “the impetus to get it [PSI 2011] finalised, finished, and out was the 
legal action, the AB case.  NOMS has a long tradition of sorting out its policies when it has 
been to court …  it is a real motivator … it definitely made a difference because they couldn’t 
really hide behind it” (Interview, 17 Nov 2015).    
Despite these important “sovereign” effects, however, the judgment also entails negative, 
discursive effects.  It entrenches hegemonic norms around “true” gender, perpetuating the 
view that a transgender prisoner’s gender is not fully realised unless and until they have 
gender reassignment surgery, and that, in some circumstances, legally-certified gender may 
not be enough when it comes to the right to access “women-only spaces” like women’s 
prisons.  It also implied that, as a “pre-operative transgender woman”, AB was not worthy of 
equal treatment with a “biological” woman.  This view continues to animate public 
discussion around transgender women’s access to the female prison estate, as will be 
discussed below. 
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Transgender men: bodies at risk  
It is important to note that there have been examples of transgender men challenging 
allocation decisions, even though they have not reached the courts.   An interview with the 
Prisoners’ Advice Service (“PAS”) (Interview, 13 April 2016) identified a parallel 2008/2009 
case to AB’s, in which a transgender man was allocated to HMP Holloway (a women’s 
prison), after being arrested at the airport for drug importation.  Whilst there, he obtained a 
GRC legally recognising him as a man and contacted PAS to help secure his transfer to the 
male estate.  According to PAS, he presented “fully as a man”121 and was on testosterone 
hormones but had not had genital surgery.  HMP Pentonville (a men’s prison) was not 
prepared to take him due to concerns over his physical security.  After having genital 
reassignment surgery whilst in HMP Holloway,122 he was finally transferred.  PAS resolved 
the situation at governor-to-governor level, without recourse to judicial review, by arguing 
that it was discriminatory under the Equality Act 2010 not to transfer him.  Effectively, it was 
his genital surgery that finally secured his recognition and equal treatment as a man by the 
prison authorities, although his security classification also came into account.   A fellow 
prisoner at HMP Holloway, interviewed whilst on day-release to a voluntary sector 
organisation, described how this particular man “really had to fight to move to the male 
estate.  He absolutely wanted to move.  He really had to battle; he fought and fought to 
move across.  He was allowed only once he was eligible for open conditions because … they 
                                                          
121
 This description is mentioned, as it provides a parallel with the court’s discussion of AB’s gender expression 
being “convincing” and shows that gender performance matters to how people generally think and talk about 
this field. 
122
 It is interesting that this man was able to have gender reassignment surgery whilst housed in a women’s 
prison, but that the gender identity clinic required AB to live in a women’s prison before she could be 
considered for surgery.  This differential approach to transgender men and women, in terms of meeting the 
“real life test”, is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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felt he would be safer, because there are many instances of FtM particularly, but also 
MtF,123 being raped in the male estate” (interview with Joanne Roberts, 26 July 2014).  
It would seem from these two interviews (no sources document the prison perspective), 
that concerns about sexual harm to the transgender prisoner from other prisoners 
dominated, and outweighed both his housing preference and his legally-certified gender.  It 
was only once his gender was fully embodied through phalloplasty (surgical construction of 
a penis), that the prison authorities considered him less susceptible to harm, and his right to 
be recognised as a man and housed in the male estate was finally realised.   
Whilst both these cases – one with the intervention of the courts (AB) and one at the 
intervention of a voluntary sector organisation (PAS) – ultimately resulted in a positive 
outcome for the individuals concerned, they demonstrate the historically entrenched 
significance of the medical model of gender reassignment, and hence genitalia, in prison 
allocation decisions. They show how the divide which already existed between the prison 
administration’s and law’s governance of trans/gender remained after the Gender 
Recognition Act entered the field.  Indeed, perhaps human rights law’s most material effects 
in this field are witnessed in AB by the prison authorities’ and courts’ conceptual 
contortions, and the invention of legal lacunae in the Gender Recognition Act, to effectively 
retain the prison’s right (albeit in “exceptional” circumstances) to govern gender separately 
from the law, and to allocate prisoners according to genitalia, as had always been the case 
in the past.  And yet, despite providing them with a future “get-out” clause, the court in AB 
did not take the easy way out by giving the prison authorities the benefit of this potential 
legal exception in AB’s case, but ordered her transfer to the female estate.   
                                                          
123
 These terms are used to mean female-to-male and male-to-female transgender people (see Glossary).  
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Two years later, PSI 2011 closed the legal loophole left open by the dictum in AB, and finally 
brought official prison allocation policy in line with the GRA.  For the first time since Corbett, 
penal and legal governance of trans/gender converged in this field.  Before turning to PSI 
2011’s (and PSI 2016’s) effects in this field, however, it is important to integrate into the 
analysis some discussion of the long-standing practice of separating transgender prisoners 
from the main prison population as a risk management technique, for, as demonstrated in 
AB, a complete picture only emerges if allocation and segregation decisions are considered 
in tandem.  
Segregation of Transgender Prisoners as a Risk Management 
Technique  
In 1994, as cited above, the Prison Service’s very first official statement regarding the 
placement of transgender prisoners remarked that “it is more often than not necessary to 
segregate in a vulnerable prisoner unit or prison healthcare centre those whose 
transsexuality is obvious”.  (Hansard, HC Deb 18 May 1994, vol 243 c460W, emphasis 
added).  As evidenced by various examples given in this chapter, and indeed throughout this 
thesis, separating transgender prisoners from the main prison population is still routine, 
particularly transgender women.124  Indeed, in 2015, the Ministry of Justice stated that “the 
usual practice is for [transgender prisoners] to be held in a supportive environment away 
                                                          
124 The research established that transgender men are usually housed in the main prison population in 
women’s prisons, and rarely housed in men’s prisons.  Transgender women are usually housed separately in 
men’s prisons.  Those allocated or transferred to the women’s estate are likely to be housed separately 
initially, and then integrated into the main population.  Numerous examples given in this thesis evidence this 
practice and, due to space constraints, are not repeated here. 
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from the main regime of the prison and protected from risk of harm from other prisoners” 
(2015: para 9, emphasis).   
It is important to note that various housing scenarios are often (especially historically) 
referred to loosely as “segregation”, including within official prison discourse.  This tends to 
blur the distinctions between them, and hinders precise analysis of historical prison policy 
and practice.  Official prison discourse now uses the term “segregation” more precisely, only 
when formal segregation is mean, but new confusion is caused by the rebranding of 
“segregation units” as “care and separation units”. Whilst the language has changed 
(arguably itself an effect of human rights discourse in the field, as discussed below), the 
official rationale remains the same, namely that housing transgender prisoners separately 
from the main prison population is necessary to protect them from harm from other 
prisoners.   
There are three types of separate housing within the English and Welsh prison estate, which 
transgender prisoners may be placed in.   Each has different practical and symbolic effects.  
Briefly, a formal segregation unit (or “care and separation unit”) is intended as a short-term 
facility to punish those who have breached prison rules by removing them from association 
with other prisoners, or for housing prisoners separately from the main estate on a short-
term basis for reasons of safety, good order or discipline (called “GOOD”).  According to the 
PPO, “prisoners will generally spend most of the time alone in their cell, leaving only to 
shower, use the telephone and exercise for a short period” (PPO 2015).  Further, “many 
prisoners in segregation units do not have access to a radio or television or any meaningful 
activity, regardless of the reason for their segregation”, (HM Prison Inspectorate 2016: 25, 
emphasis added).  As will be demonstrated in the cases of Hunnisett and XY below, the 
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punitive conditions of the segregation unit therefore apply even to vulnerable prisoners 
sent there for protection; thus, formally segregating transgender prisoners effectively 
punishes them for being transgender, and disturbing the good order or discipline of the 
prison.   
Transgender women prisoners in men’s prisons are most frequently housed on a vulnerable 
prisoner unit (“VPU”), which is a dedicated long-term facility for those considered too 
vulnerable to be safely housed in the main prison population.  However, this may depend on 
the particular security category of the prison they are sent to.  The VPU entails a more 
confined and intensely supervised space than in the main prison population, and greatly 
limits a prisoner’s access to association, recreation, education and prison employment.125  
Lack of purposeful activity is currently a problem across the entire prison estate but is 
particularly pronounced on VPUs (Owen and MacDonald 2015: 5.05; 5.46-5.57; HMIP 2014-
2015: 50).  Further, placement of a transgender prisoner on a VPU, whilst ostensibly 
intended to protect them from harm from other prisoners, may actually expose them to 
harm, for example, prison management expressed reservations about transferring Vikki 
Thompson to the VPU, as it housed a number of sex offenders, but later acceded to her 
request to move there, after she complained of transphobic harassment on the main wing 
(West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s Court 2017).   Placement on a VPU effectively produces 
transgender prisoners as “less eligible”, yet, notably, media reports, fuelled by the Prison 
Officers Association, portray transgender prisoners as having “special treatment” and 
“cushy privileges” on VPUs, such as single cells and private washing and laundry facilities 
                                                          
125
 Lack of a prison job means no prison salary, greatly limiting the prisoner’s opportunity to purchase items 
from the prison canteen (shop) or catalogue.  This may impact on a transgender prisoner’s ability to buy 
gender affirming-items, such as clothing, makeup etc. See Chapter 5. 
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(Daubney 2014), and suggest that an increasing number of prisoners are claiming to be 
transgender as a “soft option for prison life” (Leake 2014).   
The final option for separate housing is “healthcare”.  In the past, transgender prisoners 
were regularly pathologised and placed in hospital wings or psychiatric units on a long-term 
basis, like Marc Sancto, mentioned earlier, or placed in healthcare due to lack of alternative 
options. In a 1995 BBC 2 television documentary, Taking Liberties, Joanne Wray recounted 
how, after being subjected to attempted rape and repeated sexual harassment during her 
year’s imprisonment in HMP Hull, a men’s prison, she was eventually transferred to the 
hospital wing for her own safety, which she found “a distressing place” (Mills 1995).   Today, 
perhaps due to the gradual de-pathologisation of transgender people, placement in a 
psychiatric unit or in healthcare does not seem to be routine.  In 2015, for example, prison 
management considered the option of the healthcare wing for Vikki Thompson, but were 
concerned about the lack of privacy, the nature of prisoners currently in healthcare, and, 
above all, the fact that she “was not ill” (West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s Court 2017).  
One month earlier, however, transgender prisoner Tara Hudson was placed on the Brunel 
Unit in HMP Bristol (a men’s prison), a small segregated unit for prisoners with complex 
mental and physical needs, of which she had neither (Curtis 2015).  She was locked in her 
cell for 23 hours a day, surrounded by men who “taunted and mocked her” and, at times, 
felt suicidal (ibid).  When she was transferred to a women’s prison, she was again placed in a 
segregated unit, alongside some of the prison’s most dangerous prisoners (ibid).   
It seems to be taken for granted, internationally, that transgender prisoners will be at risk of 
harm in the general prison population.  There is certainly evidence that such risk is real, e.g., 
in the UK, the Ministry of Justice reached a six-figure settlement in the 1990s with a 
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transgender woman raped by another prisoner in HMP Peterborough, a men’s prison, on 
the ground that the Prison Service had neglected its duty of care towards her (Interview 
with Press for Change, 26 October 2015).126   Yet, it also seems to be taken-for-granted that 
the risk to them can be managed (or contained) through separating them from the main 
regime, but there is evidence that this does not protect them from harm from prisoners, 
either, or from self-harm and suicide. This pre-emptive risk framework militates against the 
equal treatment of transgender prisoners and is exclusionary.   
In 2013, the Israeli Supreme Court reduced a transgender man’s prison sentence, compared 
with his co-accused, to reflect the fact that, under Israeli prison policy, he would serve his 
entire sentence in solitary confinement and that the conditions of his imprisonment would 
be much harsher than for his cisgender co-defendants (Judgment of the Supreme Court (in 
Hebrew),127 Criminal Appeals Nos. 5833/12; 6207/12; 6227/12; Gross 2013; Winer 2013). 
Whilst ground-breaking its interpretation of the constitutional right to equality, the 
Supreme Court’s judgment did not actually interrogate the solitary confinement policy itself, 
but seemingly regarded it as an obvious solution to keeping transgender prisoners safe from 
harm (see Yona 2016).128  Yet, even the reduced nine month sentence it imposed would 
                                                          
126
 The seminal US Supreme Court judgment in Farmer v Brennan (1994), 511 US concerned a transgender 
woman who had been beaten and raped by her cell-mate two weeks after being placed in the general 
population of a men’s prison. In the Canadian case of Kavanagh (2000), the applicant testified that she was 
“regularly beaten, sexually assaulted and ridiculed” in the main estate of the men’s prison, and that during an 
earlier prison sentence, she had been raped by nine men (para 129).  New Zealand’s Department of 
Corrections policy recently came under scrutiny, after a transgender woman was allegedly raped after she was 
moved to the mainstream men’s prison, having been housed separately during the earlier stages of her 
transition (Fisher 2015). 
127
 Informal translation into English kindly provided for the author by Maya Barr (copy on file with the author). 
128
 Arkles has argued that this bare equation of segregation with safety has similarly escaped question, 
challenge or critique in the US (2009). Constitutional challenges to the “administrative segregation” of 
transgender prisoners on the “equal protection” ground have consistently failed, on the basis that segregation 
is rationally linked to the legitimate aim of ensuring the safety of the transgender prisoner and other prisoners, 
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have been extremely harmful to the prisoner’s mental health.129 The decision effectively 
legitimises a policy which casts transgender prisoners as so far outside the realms of cultural 
and institutional intelligibility, and hence as so risky, that solitary confinement is the only 
option.   It characterises transgender prisoners as the problem, rather than transphobia in 
the main prison population.   
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has similarly drawn attention to this 
dilemma, and warned that whilst transgender women, especially, “are said to be at greater 
risk if placed within the general prison population in men’s prisons”, solitary confinement 
and administrative segregation of transgender prisoners is harmful and may constitute 
inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to the international prohibition on torture 
(2001: para 23).  Indeed, there is well-established jurisprudence that long-term segregation 
in conditions of solitary confinement can amount to inhuman and degrading treatment 
under article 3 of the European Convention (incorporated into UK domestic law through the 
Human Rights Act 1998) depending on its length, conditions and effects on the prisoner.  As 
yet, no case has specifically determined the situation of a transgender prisoner held in long-
term segregation.  However, in an analogous case, the European Court of Human Rights 
held in X v Turkey (App No. 24626/09, judgment 9 October 2012), that the Turkish prison 
authorities had breached article 3 of the European Convention by placing a gay man in 
solitary confinement for 13 months, ostensibly for his own protection.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and maintaining the security of the prison (ibid:550-551, discussing Estate of DiMarco v Wyoming Department 
of Corrections 300 F.Supp 2d 1183 (2004)).   
129
 In fact, he was later pardoned (e-mail to the author from Aeyal Gross, 12 Feb 2014). 
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This was a landmark judgment, but it must be noted that the conditions in which X was held 
were extreme.  During his 13-month period of segregation, X was only allowed out of his 
small, poorly lit and rat-infested cell once a month for the purpose of his lawyer’s visits.  His 
mental and physical health suffered greatly.  The prison authorities argued that his 
segregation was necessary for his own protection, and that it was the prisoner himself who 
had asked to be moved, following harassment from other prisoners.  As the European Court 
observed, however, the prisoner’s request was to share a cell with another gay prisoner, not 
to be placed in long-term isolation.  It held that the “extreme” and “exceptional” conditions 
in which he was held constituted inhuman and degrading treatment under article 3 of the 
European Convention, both separately, and in conjunction with article 14 (protection from 
discrimination), on the basis that the Turkish authorities had discriminated against the 
applicant due to his sexual orientation.  The main reason for his solitary confinement, it 
found, had been his sexual orientation, rather than his protection.130  X v Turkey provides 
judicial authority for transgender prisoners to similarly challenge long-term solitary 
confinement under article 3 on its own, and in conjunction with article 14, particularly now 
that the European Court has expressly interpreted article 14 of the European Convention to 
encompass discrimination on the grounds of “gender identity”, Identoba v Georgia (App no. 
73235/12, judgment 12 May 2015).131  
                                                          
130
 As previously noted, since the European Convention’s right to equality is not a free-standing right, but can 
only be brought in conjunction with another Convention right, the European Court’s established practice is to 
decline to make a determination regarding the discrimination complaint, if it has already found a violation of 
the primary impugned article of the Convention.  Its separate finding in X v Turkey that there was 
discrimination in X’s detention conditions, due to his sexual orientation, broke new ground, and represents a 
significant development in the European Court’s jurisprudence on gay and lesbian rights.  See Johnson 2012.  
131 It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that the Equality Act 2010 also provides domestic protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of “gender reassignment” as a free-standing right.   
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In the UK context, the WESC stated in its report on Transgender Equality that: “there is a 
clear risk of harm (including violence, sexual assault, self-harming and suicide) where trans 
[sic] prisoners are not located in a prison or other setting appropriate to their 
acquired/affirmed gender”, but “neither is it fair or appropriate for them to end up in 
solitary confinement solely as a result of their trans status” (2016, para 320).   According to 
the Minister of Justice, however, “prisoners in England are never subject to solitary 
confinement”, although they may be placed in long-term segregation, subject to strict 
procedural requirements132 (Minister of State for Justice 2012).   
In practice, whilst prisoners in England and Wales may never be formally subject to solitary 
confinement, the line between solitary confinement and segregation may be a fine one.  
Some prisoners in segregation are locked in their cells for 23 ½ hours a day, with only half an 
hour in a caged exercise yard (alone) to break the day (HM Inspector of Prisons 2015: 37).  
Indeed, this constitutes solitary confinement under the internationally influential (but not 
legally binding) UN Nelson Mandela Rules (A/RES/70/175) (previously the UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners) (rule 44).133  Several recent court cases (not 
involving transgender prisoners) have specifically tested whether long-term segregation in 
English prisons and young offenders’ institutes might amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment under article 3, but with no success.134  In R (on the application of Joanne 
                                                          
132 Under current Prison Rules (Rule 45), amended after the Supreme Court ruling in R (on the application of 
Bourgass and another) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54, segregation for up to 42 days is 
permitted with governor approval (subject to regular reviews).  Thereafter, Secretary of State authorisation is 
required. 
133
 Solitary confinement is defined in the Nelson Mandela Rules as “the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours 
or more a day without meaningful human contact”. 
134
 The courts have, however, ruled that failures to follow segregation rules breach administrative law, e.g. R 
(on the application of “AB” a child, by his litigation friend v Secretary of State for Justice and Youth Justice 
Board [2017] EWHC 1694 (Admin), Bourgass and Dennehey.   
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Dennehey) v Secretary of State for Justice and Sodexo Ltd [2016] EWHC 1219 (Admin), for 
example, the court stated (citing Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2016] AC 429)135 that an 
extremely high threshold has to be met for long-term segregation to amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment under article 3 of the European Convention, and held that Dennehey’s 
two years in segregation had not met this threshold, and was far from “total solitary 
confinement” since she had been allowed domestic visits and access to a library and gym, 
and had worked as a prison orderly (Dennehey, at para 41). 136 This chapter will shortly 
discuss two very recent (2017) cases, in which transgender prisoners were placed in long-
term segregation in English prisons, but first, PSI 2011’s and PSI 2016’s formal provisions in 
relation to allocation and segregation will be examined.  
Balancing Rights and Risk in PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 
So far, this chapter has analysed historical, genitalia-based prison allocation practice, and 
has unpacked the effects of the prison authorities’ construction of transgender prisoners as 
both at risk and risky.  It has reflected on the practice of segregating and separating 
transgender prisoners from the main prison population as a risk management technique, 
and argued that, whilst ostensibly for their own protection, it has exclusionary and harmful 
effects.  This section examines official allocation policy, which was finally laid down in PSI 
2011, two years after judgment was handed down in AB, and was recently revised in PSI 
                                                          
135
 The court described Shahid’s segregation period (11 months, followed by a further 45 months) as 
“exceptional”, but still held that the length and conditions of segregation did not amount to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.   
136 Applying Shahid, the court held that long-term segregation can also comprise an interference with private 
life, under article 8 of the European Convention, but concluded that Dennehey’s segregation was justified as it 
was lawful and proportionate to the extremely high security risk she posed (she had made specific plans to 
harm prison staff and escape).   
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2016.  It analyses the attempt to align human rights-based developments with prisons’ risk 
management imperatives.   
Prisoners with a GRC: officially no longer risky 
Referring to the Prison Rules, PSI 2011 provides that “in most cases, prisoners must be 
located according to their gender as recognised under UK law” (para 4.2).  Thus, if they hold 
a GRC when they are sent to prison, they must be located to a gender-appropriate prison.  If 
they acquire a GRC whilst in prison, they should again, “in most cases, be transferred to the 
estate of their acquired gender” (Annex D, para D.5.).  PSI 2011 therefore formally aligns 
recognition of a person’s gender for prison allocation purposes with law’s recognition of 
their gender under the GRA.  Legal gender, and its underlying respect for transgender 
people’s right to respect for private life, is now what officially counts, not genitalia, a 
particular “biological” past, or offending history …. “in most cases”.   Whilst this phrase 
suggests that discretion is being let in through the backdoor (as the court implied was legally 
possible in AB), the exception is, in fact, extremely narrowly, and clearly, defined.   
PSI 2011 provides that a transgender woman with a GRC “may be refused location in the 
female estate only on security grounds” (para 4.3),137 and then, only where “it can be 
demonstrated that other women with the same security profile would also be held in the 
male estate” (ibid).  This, it states, is likely to arise only in a “few very rare cases” (Annex D, 
para D.8).  Whilst PSI 2011 does not give any examples, it seems this could only arise if a 
woman’s risk profile is so exceptionally high that she needs to be housed in a Close 
Supervision Unit, as there are three such units in the male estate, but none in the female 
                                                          
137
 A transgender man with a GRC “may not be refused location in the male estate… because there are no 
security grounds that can prevent location in the male estate” (para 4.4).    
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estate.138  PSI 2011 adds, crucially, and by explicit reference to AB, that “there are some 
women who are guilty of violent crimes against other women [who] are still managed safely 
in the female estate”, and that any “transsexual woman with a GRC who poses similar risks 
should be managed in a similar way in the female estate” (Annex D, para D.7).   
This provision is highly significant, as it requires transgender women with a GRC to be 
treated the same as cisgender women in terms of risk assessment.  It recognises them, 
through their GRC, as authentic women, as equal to cisgender women, and as no more risky 
than cisgender women.  It therefore rejects both the broader narrative that transgender 
women inherently represent a risk to cisgender women which justifies their exclusion from 
the female estate, and the more specific narrative that transgender women who have 
“male” genitalia and/or a history of violence against women are too risky to be placed in the 
female estate.  Indeed, PSI 2011 emphasises that a person’s gender “is a legal issue rather 
than an anatomical one” (para 4.6) and adds that “under no circumstances should a physical 
search or examination be conducted for this purpose” (ibid).  This officially draws to a close 
historical reliance on current anatomy, especially genitalia, to determine gender for prison 
allocation purposes, and represents a new alignment between the legal and penal 
regulation of gender. 
This development is progressive in terms of transgender prisoners’ human rights but is not 
without its critics.  Jeffreys has heavily criticised PSI 2011’s requirement that a transgender 
woman’s risk profile be considered on the same basis as a cisgender woman’s (2014). 
Whereas Smith (2014) criticised the Kavanagh judgment for subordinating transgender 
                                                          
138
 This research has not identified any cases in which a cisgender woman has ever been held in the male 
estate.  Notably, the construction of risk is highly gendered across the prison estate, and the same risk levels 
are not applied uniformly in women’s and men’s prisons (see e.g. Corcoran 2006). 
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women’s rights to cisgender women’s rights, Jeffreys criticises the AB judgment and PSI 
2011 for the opposite stance. She depicts AB as a “clear clash of rights ... in which a man’s 
right to wear make-up and be housed with vulnerable women who are incarcerated trumps 
the right of those women to be protected from violent men” (159) and argues that the very 
“notion of human rights is trivialised thereby” (ibid).  For Jeffreys, “it is a serious setback for 
the journey to women’s equality when states protect gender in their legislation and 
proclaim that men’s rights to personate women are ‘human rights’” (161).  This 
“subordinates the rights of women, persons of the female sex, to dignity, security and 
privacy, to the rights of (mostly) men who choose to act out a ‘gender identity’, a state of 
mind.” (161).    
Various submissions to the recent WESC inquiry into Transgender Equality have similarly 
framed the issue as a clash of rights between transgender women’s right to be recognised 
as women, and cisgender women’s rights to safe, female-only spaces and services (e.g. 
Jeffreys 2015; Radical Feminist Legal Support Network 2015, Campaign to End Rape 2015, 
Women Analysing Policy on Women (“WAPW”) 2015, Scottish Women against Pornography 
2015 and Women and Girls Equality Network 2015).  WAPW’s submission states that 
“prisons must take action to ensure the safety and well-being of transgender people serving 
a custodial sentence”, this “cannot be at the expense of women prisoners, who are already 
an extremely vulnerable group” (2015, para 7.3.4.). There is a clearly a perceived tension 
here, in meeting the rights or needs of all women.   Although presented, politically, by 
feminist groups as a clash of rights (which is arguably evidence, in itself, of the perceived 
power of rights discourse in contemporary society), this general line of argument continues 
to have considerable traction with the general public, particularly in relation to transgender 
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prisoners who transition in the male prison estate and request a transfer to the female 
estate.   Suspicions around this group’s trans/gender authenticity and motives seem 
particularly hard to shake.  Accepting the authenticity of prisoners whose gender is not 
legally certified by a GRC also seems to be problematic for prison management.  The next 
section argues that this again translates into a risk management issue, eclipsing transgender 
prisoners’ rights and needs. 
Prisoners without a GRC: still risky 
PSI 2011’s clear, strictly-drawn provisions apply only to prisoners with a GRC.  It leaves the 
allocation of a transgender person without a GRC at the discretion of the prison authorities, 
and creates a new divide between those who have, and those who do not have, a GRC 
(another example of reform excluding as it includes).  Although PSI 2011 makes it 
mandatory for prison management to hold a case conference if a prisoner requests a 
transfer to the estate opposite to their legal gender (para 4.5), in practice, this provision was 
largely ignored, as evident in Tara Hudson’s, Vikki Thompson’s and Jenny Swift’s cases.  
Prisons simply interpreted the new allocation policy under PSI 2011 as a black-and-white 
test of “GRC or no GRC”.   
Arguably, PSI 2011 – whether by design or default – allowed previous power relations to 
prevail.  It did not place a duty on prisons to inform transgender prisoners of their right to 
request a transfer to a gender-appropriate prison, nor did it provide any time-frames or 
deadlines for case conferences to be convened, where requested.  Transgender prisoners 
did not have the right to be present, represented or even kept informed of developments, 
leaving them powerless, and prisons unaccountable (except in retrospect, as at the inquest 
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into Vikki Thompson’s death, where the jury was critical of the co-ordination of the 
supposed “multi-disciplinary” case management meetings, and the absence of key staff, 
West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s Court (2017)).  PSI 2011 also gave wide discretion to 
prison management in deciding whether or not to transfer a prisoner between estates. 
Whilst flexibility is important, this discretion seems to have been regarded as a licence for 
prison management to govern trans/gender in the same way as before, subject only to the 
new caveat that prisoners with a GRC must be allocated to a gender-appropriate prison.  
Indeed, one firm of solicitors prepared a legal challenge to the lawfulness of PSI 2011, on 
the basis that its provisions regarding the allocation of prisoners without a GRC gave rise to 
“an unacceptable risk of unlawful decision-making”, contrary to administrative law, but their 
client’s case settled before the proposed judicial review application was filed (Ryan 2016). 
A review of the case conference criteria (PSI 2011, Annex D, para D.13), reveals that, in 
contrast to prisoners with a GRC, PSI 2011 continues to construct transgender prisoners 
without a GRC as risky.  The biggest risk seems to be that their gender is not authentic, as it 
is not medically or legally certified.  The first criterion which should be considered in the 
allocation decision, for example, is whether the person would meet the conditions for 
obtaining a GRC, including a gender dysphoria diagnosis.  The advice of the gender specialist 
and supervising psychiatrist should also be taken into account.  Medico-juridical authority 
over (trans)gender authenticity is therefore retained, and privileged over self-determination 
of gender.  Furthermore, whilst security issues may only be considered in exceptional 
circumstances in relation to transgender women prisoners with a GRC under PSI 2011 (and 
then only if a cisgender woman prisoner would be treated the same way), the risk to/from 
transgender prisoners without a GRC must be considered as part of the allocation decision.  
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This implies that they are risky for prison management purposes because they do not have a 
GRC confirming their (trans)gender authenticity.   
PSI 2011 notes that not every transgender person will wish to be housed according to their 
self-identified gender. Whilst this is no doubt true, the example given is that “female-to-
male transsexual people with vaginas may feel that they will be very vulnerable if placed in 
the estate of their acquired gender” (D.13, emphasis added).  There is no correlating 
recognition of the possibility that transgender women (with or without penises) might feel 
vulnerable, and may therefore not wish to be housed, in a women’s prison.  As in Kavanagh 
(2001), the equation of vagina with vulnerability (and penis with threat) is unproblematically 
assumed.  This double-standard of risk is revealing of the deeply entrenched cultural coding 
of transgender women as aggressors and predators, and transgender men as vulnerable and 
at risk, reflecting an essentialist position (rejected by feminism) that certain gender 
behaviours stem from male or female “biological” sex.  Whilst the reference to “female- to-
male transsexual people with vaginas” has been removed in the revised version of the 
policy, PSI 2016 still states that transgender women may wish to remain in the male estate 
due to “the geographical location of the prison or familiarity with the male estate” (para 
4.13), whilst transgender men may wish to remain in the female estate, due to “fear of 
location within a male establishment” (para 4.14). These may well amount to reasonable 
assumptions based on known facts, such as known risk differentials between the female and 
male estate.  However, applying a governmentality approach to risk, as a discourse, it is 
necessary to consider the cost to transgender prisoners’ daily lives of constantly “being 
imagined and moulded”, and hence managed, as risky (O’Malley 2010:14).  
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PSI 2016 promises that NOMS will now take a “more flexible approach” (para 2.4) to prison 
allocation, noting that not all transgender people will have obtained legal recognition via a 
GRC, as it is a “costly and lengthy process” and “not a necessity of day-to-day living” (para 
2.4).  For transgender prisoners “who can demonstrate consistent evidence of living in the 
gender they identify with” (para 2.4), the absence of a GRC “does not automatically 
prevent” them from being located in a gender-appropriate prison (para 2.5).  Nevertheless, 
“exceptional circumstances” must apply (para 6.1).  This is not a self-determination test, and 
PSI 2016 emphasises that prisoners must be made aware that there is “no obligation for the 
prison authorities to locate them according to the gender they identify with” (para 4.9, 
emphasis added).  
PSI 2016 greatly strengthens the procedural aspects of PSI 2011, providing clear procedures 
and time-lines to ensure early decision-making regarding allocation, with prisoner 
involvement.139  A transgender prisoner without a GRC who wishes to be allocated to a 
gender-appropriate prison, must provide “consistent evidence of living in the gender they 
identify with” (para 4.8).  Under Annex A, “full evidence” is still linked to a GRC, or an 
application for a GRC.  “Strong evidence” comprises healthcare evidence”, such as advice 
from a general practitioner or gender identity clinic, hormone treatment, a diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria and gender reassignment surgery, and/or “actual life evidence”, such as 
change of name and appearance, consistent use of gendered spaces, and day-to-day living, 
such as bank cards.  This evidence must be considered alongside “all known risk factors” 
(para 5.17).  
                                                          
139
 E.g. transgender case boards must be held at latest three days after the prisoner arrives at prison, and 
ideally beforehand (para 5), and transgender prisoners must be provided with an opportunity to participate or 
to make their views known to the board (paras 4.5, 4.6, 5.4, 5.7, 5.20). 
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PSI 2016 does not specify the risk factors that may appropriately be considered, but where a 
prisoner presents “a significant level of complexity and/or risk of harm”, a centrally-
managed, “complex case” board must consider the case, rather than a local case board 
(para 5.19).  This board is to be “chaired by the deputy director of custody for the women’s 
estate” (ibid), which, again, implies and perpetuates the view that “complex” and “risk of 
harm” issues are most likely to arise in respect of transgender women wishing to be housed 
in the women’s estate.  Notably, the independent reviewers state in their report (Ministry of 
Justice 2016) that they “have seen no evidence that being transgender is, in itself, linked to 
risk”, and emphasise that risk assessments “must be free from assumptions or stereotyping” 
(ibid, para 6).  Yet they also note that, in decisions to transfer serving prisoners between 
male and female prisons (or vice-versa), it will be necessary to factor in “the impact on, and 
risks to” other prisoners, “especially, for instance, in the women’s estate, where many 
prisoners will have been the victims of domestic violence or sexual abuse and may continue 
to be exceptionally vulnerable” (ibid, para 5, emphasis added).  Thus, it is clear that the 
vulnerability of cisgender women prisoners remains a major concern, and that transgender 
women who wish to transfer to the female estate continue to be constructed as risky 
behind the scenes, even though this is not officially recognised in PSI 2016.  Arguably, 
however much tighter the procedures are in PSI 2016, without a genuine commitment to 
allocating prisoners according to “consistent evidence” of their lived gender (i.e. not simply 
in “exceptional circumstances”), these developments are unlikely to have real power effects 
on this highly contested, discursive terrain, and hence on prison’s management of 
transgender prisoners without GRCs.   
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Segregation  
Finally, reflecting international concerns (albeit without specifically referencing international 
human rights standards in the field, e.g. articles 3 and 8 ECHR), PSI 2011 cautions strongly 
against long-term segregation, stating that “particular care should be taken where the 
prisoner is likely to be put into long-term segregation as the effects of long-term segregation 
may have serious mental health consequences on the prisoner” (Annex D, para D.14).  It 
also stipulates that “transsexual prisoners should be viewed as an ‘at-risk’ group in terms of 
suicide and self-harm” and should therefore not be placed in long-term segregation except 
in “exceptional circumstances” (Annex B, para B.9).140 Such decisions must be made “very 
carefully” and must be “supported by legal advice” (Annex D, D.14).   PSI 2016 strengthens 
the prison authorities’ stance, although its language is still conciliatory.  It states that “it is 
not advisable to use Care and Separation as a method of managing risks to transgender 
prisoners from other prisoners” and that “in these circumstances, where possible, the 
establishment should seek to manage the prisoner in an appropriate supportive 
environment away from the main regime of the prison” (para 6.34, emphasis added).  
“Where it is necessary to locate a transgender prisoner in a Care and Separation Unit”, 
however, a referral “must be made” to a centrally managed Transgender Case Board within 
seven days of the decision (6.35).  Thus, whilst not ruling out long-term segregation, PSI 
2016 establishes additional procedural requirements, and relocates power over long-term 
segregation to a central body.  Only time will tell whether this additional procedural 
safeguard will make any difference on the ground.   
                                                          
140
 Here, it cross-refers to PSO 1700 on Segregation, which advises against the segregation of prisoners at risk 
of suicide and self-harm wherever possible.   
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The Limits of Human Rights  
The final section of this chapter reflects on the limited power of law and its human rights 
discourse to effect instrumental and normative change in this field, and the limited power of 
the courts to provide a remedy, when prison establishments do segregate transgender 
prisoners on a long-term basis.  The research indicates that there are two fields in which PSI 
2011, and now PSI 2016, do not appear to have shifted the discursive terrain, first in relation 
to the use of segregation as a default position, and second in relation to the motives and 
trans/gender authenticity of transgender women who transition whilst in the male estate, 
and are subsequently transferred to the female estate. 
Segregation as a default position 
Whilst PSI 2011 (and now PSI 2016) strongly caution against long-term segregation of 
transgender prisoners, it seems to still be used as a “default position” (Ryan 2016b), with 
highly punitive, exclusionary and harmful effects.  In July 2017, the Ministry of Justice paid 
an undisclosed amount of compensation, and made an apology, in settlement of a legal case 
brought by a transgender woman housed in long-term segregation in a men’s prison 
between May 2014 and July 2015 (Bhatt Murphy 2017b). According to Bhatt Murphy’s press 
announcement (ibid), “XT” had lived as a woman for many years prior to her imprisonment, 
in 2013, for the offence of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition.  Contrary to PSI 
2011, no case conference was held regarding her prison allocation or her management.  
Initially, she was locked in her cell for 23 hours per day, with one hour’s exercise.  The cell 
was dirty, covered in graffiti, and had no internal electricity (and hence no radio or 
television).  She was not given sufficient access to gender-affirming items for nine months. 
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She was subjected to abuse from other prisoners, including sexually explicit abuse and 
threats, and felt “scared, debased and persecuted because of who she was”.  She described 
feeling “despairing and suicidal at times” (Fae 2017c). Despite repeated requests to move to 
the female estate, and even after she obtained a GRC legally certifying her as a woman in 
April 2015, the prison refused to transfer her and she was only moved, in July 2015, after 
her solicitors intervened (Bhatt Murphy 2017b).   
The legal proceedings, brought by Bhatt Murphy on behalf of XT in May 2016, alleged 
misfeasance, negligence, breaches of the Equality Act 2010 and violations of articles 3, 8 and 
14 of the European Convention.  It is unfortunate for the purpose of this analysis (although 
not for XT), that this case did not proceed to a court hearing, as it might have set an 
important precedent regarding the long-term segregation of transgender prisoners in such 
severe conditions as being contrary to human rights and equality guarantees, where such 
segregation is simply due to a prisoner being transgender.  By settling the case, the Ministry 
of Justice avoided such a precedent being established.  Whilst law, including human rights- 
and equality-based arguments, led to a successful outcome for XT in retrospective terms, via 
compensation and an apology, it did not prevent her from suffering 14 months in extremely 
harsh conditions in segregation.  It is hard to know if the settlement will have any future 
effects on prison practice towards transgender prisoners.  Adopting Whitty’s suggestion that 
human rights might be conceived of as an organisational risk to the prison (2011), there was 
little “Legal Risk +” to the prison in this case, other than a compensation payment (of an 
undisclosed amount).  As the prison is not named, it has not suffered any reputational 
damage, and, apart from Gay Star News (Fae 2017c), the case does not appear to have been 
reported in the press.  Lack of press coverage further suggests that there is little public 
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concern about the conditions in which transgender prisoners are held, when they are 
ostensibly segregated for their own protection.  Perhaps this is regarded as an inevitable, 
inescapable consequence of being transgender in prison (cf. the Israeli case above), since 
transgender prisoners are continually reproduced, through various governmental strategies, 
as both at risk and risky.  
An earlier case in 2017 bolsters this argument. In February 2017, a transgender prisoner, 
Hunnisett, was denied leave by the High Court to pursue a judicial review of HMP 
Frankland’s decision to retain her in “indefinite isolation” in segregation, rather than 
transfer her to the VP wing.  
Somewhat unusually for this stage of proceedings,141 the court published a computer-
generated transcript of its oral decision regarding the application, Hunnissett.142  This is 
highly informative for the purposes of this chapter.   
Hunnissett was imprisoned for life in 2012 for the murder of a man whom she accused of 
being a paedophile.  Since October 2015, she has identified as a woman (ibid, para 3).  Due 
to threats to her safety, she could not be safely housed on an ordinary wing.  Prison 
management refused to relocate her to the VP wing, due to her statements about, and 
threats against paedophiles, since many of the prisoners on the VP wing had been convicted 
of such offences. Consequently, she was placed in segregation, on a restricted regime, which 
meant that she could not access church, work and education in the same way as other 
prisoners, including those on the VP wing.  She described to the court how desperate her 
                                                          
141
 The court offered Hunnissett a transcript, covered by legal aid. Hunnissett’s first name is not given. 
142
 An earlier court had refused leave to pursue judicial review proceedings “on the papers” (Hunnisett, 
para 1). Hunnissett appeared in person (via video-link) in the renewed proceedings. 
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situation was, and how she had attempted suicide (para 13).  Hunnissett argued that placing 
her in long-term segregation breached article 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment) in 
conjunction with article 14 (non-discrimination) of the European Convention and/or that it 
breached article 8 (private life).  She also argued that it discriminated against her on the 
grounds of gender reassignment, contrary to the Equality Act 2010.  She was now housed in 
the prison hospital, where she had some freedom, but she was still limited in what she could 
do; she was able to work three hours a day as a hospital cleaner, but still did not have access 
to church and education (para 13).   
Whilst she initially sought an order for the prison to transfer her to the VP wing, Hunnissett 
accepted, during the hearing, that it was unlikely that she could be relocated to the VP wing 
due to her repeated threats towards paedophiles (ibid, para 6).  Her complaint, as she now 
put it to the court, related to the “whole of her treatment in prison” (para 12).  In effect, she 
stated, the prison was “obliging her to run the risk”, if she wanted access to the full regime, 
“of being subject to threats from other prisoners who were unfamiliar with transgender 
people”, and of those threats being carried out (ibid).  The court determined that the 
prison’s refusal to transfer her to the VP wing was lawful, whether one looked at article 3 or 
article 8 of the European Convention (para 18).  Regarding article 8, the interference with 
her private life was justified, as it was a proportionate response to the need to protect other 
prisoners’ right to life (ibid).  Thus, this was specifically recognised by the courts as an issue 
of competing rights. Nor could the court see from the papers that she had been 
discriminated against for being transgender; “it is a fact that she is transgender. It is a fact 
that, as a result of that, she may suffer a greater risk from other people than she otherwise 
should, or otherwise would, if not transgender” (para 21).  Whilst it was “an obligation of 
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the prison to protect her so far as it can from such risks”, there was no arguable case which 
could be determined by judicial review (para 19).  The court was not, “as part of its duties, 
required to manage prisons”, but only to review whether those decisions which had been 
made were lawful (para 18).  She could pursue a separate claim for compensation if she had 
suffered injury, or seek an order requiring the prison service to behave in a different way 
towards her (para 22), but her application “as it stands” was for leave to pursue a judicial 
review of the prison’s refusal to transfer her to the VP wing.  There was no realistic prospect 
of success in this claim, so the application had to be dismissed (para 23). 
This case shows how human rights and equality arguments can only go so far if there is no 
suitable housing within the prison estate for a transgender prisoner with a risk profile such 
as Hunnissett’s. She was placed in an impossible legal situation, with no obvious solution, 
other than compensation after the event.   Whilst is easy to focus on the difficulty of placing 
Hunnisett on a VP wing, given her history of violence towards paedophiles, it is highly 
troubling that prison management felt it could not keep her safe in the main prison 
population, due to other prisoners’ hostility towards transgender prisoners, and felt that it 
had no other option.   It is equally troubling that some elements of the press trivialised both 
her obvious distress at her situation and her recourse to human rights; the Mirror, for 
example, ran the headline “Jailed killer who chopped off own TESTICLES in DIY transgender 
op claims her rights are being violated” (Bazaara 2017).  
In his 2015 Annual Report, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons spoke of the “upsurge of violence” 
in the main male estate in recent years and drew attention to the number of prisoners 
requesting to move into VPUs and even “self-segregating” by deliberately breaching prison 
rules (HMIP 2015-16: 8), and the exponential increase in self-harm and suicide among 
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prisoners in general.   In the light of the current pressures on prison governance to manage 
risk in these conditions, and with ever-diminishing resources, it is not difficult to see that 
segregating or separating transgender prisoners is operationally more manageable than 
placing them in the main prison population.  But it must be asked at what cost:  this policy 
has not been shown to protect transgender prisoners from harm, despite protection being 
its official justification – as a risk management tool, it is not effective.   Beyond its 
ineffectiveness as a harm-reduction strategy, removing transgender prisoners from the 
main estate entails a broader social cost, by reinforcing, rather than challenging, the 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of transgender prisoners, and effectively legitimising 
ignorance, prejudice and transphobia in the main estate. 
Continuing suspicions of trans/gender authenticity 
The other area in which the “new” human rights discourse of PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 seems 
to have made very little inroad, is in shifting the long-standing cultural construction that 
transgender women represent a threat to cisgender women in the “women only” space of 
the prison.   Press reports in 2017 suggest that the prison authorities have started to 
transfer more transgender women into female estate, and therefore that PSI 2016 has had a 
“sovereign” effect on prison governance.  However, public opinion does not seem to have 
changed, nor the opinion of certain “inside sources” feeding stories to the press. 
On the one hand, those who have clearly lived in their gender before imprisonment, 
particularly those whose offences were relatively minor and/or not directed at women, 
appear to be regarded sympathetically, e.g. Tara Hudson, Vikki Thompson and Jenny Swift. 
Their authenticity is effectively proved by their lives prior to prison, and, in the public’s eye, 
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they appear deserving of respect for their gender, regardless of their legal or genital status.  
On the other hand, legal certification of gender through a GRC does not seem to assuage the 
deep-rooted fear that transgender women who have reassigned their gender whilst in 
prison (particularly, but not exclusively, those who have previously committed sexual and/or 
violent crimes against women) are suspicious and should not be housed in the female 
estate.  This perceived threat seems to be greater if they have not had genital surgery, and 
still have a penis.  One of the independent reviewers observed in a seminar that many of the 
prison staff they had interviewed for the purpose of the review of PSI 2011 had expressed 
concern about the risk of “sexual functionality” and “functional penises”, not simply in 
terms of risk of non-consensual sex, but also in terms of consensual sex, as sex is deemed to 
be illegal in prison,143 and they were worried about a prisoner getting pregnant “on their 
watch” (author’s contemporaneous notes of Jay Stewart, Garden Court Chambers 2016).  
PSI 2016 notes that “being transgender is independent of sexual orientation. Transgender 
people may identify as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual or may not identify with 
conventional sexual orientation labels” (para 1.1, note 1).  However, press reports 
perpetuate the view that a transgender woman who has sexual relations with another 
woman is not a genuine woman, and should be housed in the male estate. This seems to be 
rooted in a strong heteronormative assumption that that an “authentic” transgender 
woman would be sexually attracted to men, not women.144  For example, in 2011, the 
Mirror reported that “Craig Bowman, who calls himself Emma” and who “is still thought to 
have male sex organs” has been “allowed to mix with women” in HMP New Hall (a women’s 
                                                          
143
 On the basis that it is regarded as sex in public, rather than in private.  See Howard League for Penal Reform 
Sex in Prison research (2015). 
144
 This might also be traced back to the sexologists’ construction of the homosexual as a “sexual invert”, see 
Chapter 1 (Ellis and Symonds 1987). 
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prison) and is having a close relationship with another prisoner (Dorman 2011). Concerns 
had consequently been raised as to her suitability for that prison; a prison source was cited 
as saying that “Bowman is causing staff concern.  He *sic] is still a long way from having a 
complete sex change ...  Staff believe he [sic] can still function as a man and that is quite 
scary in a prison full of female inmates. Bowman should not be in here” (ibid).  Quite why 
she was “scary” when she had been imprisoned for a drugs-related offence, and was in a 
consensual relationship with another prisoner, is not clear.  However, the fact that she had 
not had gender reassignment surgery and was engaging in a consensual relationship with a 
woman, seems to have meant to prison insiders that she was a man.   
In April 2017, the press reported that five transgender women had been transferred to HMP 
New Hall, four of whom had not “fully physically transitioned”, and that apparently both 
prisoners and staff were “fearful” and feel “threatened” (Hamilton 2017).  Although none of 
the transgender women prisoners had actually “misbehaved”, the prison source stated, 
there are “a lot of vulnerable women in there” (ibid).  Then, in September 2017, the press 
took up Jessica Winfield’s case again.  In March 2017, when she was first transferred to the 
female estate after obtaining a GRC, and gender reassignment surgery, the press – from the 
Sun to the Telegraph – disavowed her (legal) gender, by referring to her male name and 
using male pronouns to describe her.  BBC Radio 4’s PM correspondent mis-gendered her 11 
times, in a report lasting a mere one and a half minutes (Shaw 2017), and like most other 
reports, highlighted the fact that her transfer “has obviously provoked some alarm and 
distress among prisoners who are going to be sharing that prison with him [sic+” (Shaw 
2017).    In September, the press revealed the (highly personal) fact that her gender 
reassignment surgery had in fact only been partial, that she still had a penis, and that she 
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had been placed in segregation “for making sexual advances on women” (O’Donoghue 
2017; Doran 2017; see Eleftheriou-Smith 2017, refuting this was the reason for her 
segregation).  The “authenticity” of transgender women’s gender therefore remains under 
constant surveillance and scrutiny, and they are seemingly never free from others’ 
suspicions about their (sexual) motives.    
Finally, on 31 October 2017, MP David Davies housed a House of Commons meeting on 
“Transgender Law Concerns” (Davies 2017), which inter alia expressed concerns about the 
number of sex offenders currently reassigning their gender whilst in prison and the potential 
impact on the female estate. “Segregation on the basis of gender identity cannot be an 
acceptable substitute for sex-segregation if we are to uphold the human rights of women 
prisoners and protect them from harm”, one speaker stated (Green 2017).  The Daily 
Express ran a piece on the meeting, under the headline “Stay in jail until you have sex-op, 
sex offenders told” (Tominey 2017).  Thus, whilst the prison authorities are seemingly 
following the policy laid down in PSI 2011 and PSI 2016, the widespread suspicion of 
transgender women who transition whilst in prison remains very much evident.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how, historically prison governance of trans/gender was based on 
genitalia.  It argued that transgender prisoners, particularly those with “incongruent” 
bodies, represented a risk to the governmentality of sex/gender, although the official 
justification for their routine segregation was that this would protect them from harm.  This 
chapter traced the emergence and evolution of a particular risk discourse concerning the 
placement of transgender women in the female estate. It showed how these concerns 
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appear to be driven by cultural or biological essentialism, which codes transgender women 
as male, sexually predatory, and potentially violent, and codes cisgender women as 
vulnerable and in need of protection from such “men”.   It discussed AB’s resolution of this 
tension, and portrayed it as a landmark decision, both because it recognised transgender 
prisoners’ rights and because it rejected the prison authorities’ risk- and resource-based 
justifications for retaining AB in the male estate and ordered her transfer to the female 
estate.  However, it also argued that the judgment in AB had broader, detrimental effects, 
as it carved out a potential exception to the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and reproduced 
regressive discourses around bodies, biology, and risk.  It seemed from AB that, however 
law has defined (Corbett (1970)) and redefined gender (Gender Recognition Act 2004), the 
old “truth” simply returns, and bodies, especially genitalia, still matter in prison.  This old 
“truth” was even conceded by the courts in AB.  
The chapter went on to show how PSI 2011 formally aligned penal and legal governance of 
transgender prisoners’ gender for the first time, and officially laid to rest previous prison 
discourse that transgender women (particularly those who have male genitalia and/or a 
history of violent offending against women) pose a unique risk to other women prisoners, 
which risk cannot be managed in the female estate. However, it argued that PSI 2011 
resulted in a new divide, differentiating between transgender prisoners with a GRC (not 
risky) and those without a GRC (risky), and therefore, like many human rights-based 
developments, excluded as it included.  It remains to be seen whether PSI 2016’s promise of 
“a more flexible approach” to prisoners without a GRC will be any more transformative.  
Even if prison administration becomes more flexible in its allocation practice, it seems that 
the “old” truth is likely to re-emerge in the segregation and separation of transgender 
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prisoners, as a risk-management technique, despite its harmful sovereign and discursive 
effects on transgender prisoners’ lives. 
The chapter also argued that there appears to be increasing social acceptance of the 
trans/gender authenticity of prisoners who have consistently lived as a woman before their 
imprisonment (regardless of their legal or genital status), and that they are considered 
“deserving” of gender recognition.  However, the media’s response to Jessica Winfield’s 
transfer to the female estate in March 2017 indicates that whilst law and prison policy may 
attempt to redraw the gender lines in prison, a deep suspicion of trans/gender authenticity 
and motives remains in relation to those transgender women who transition whilst in 
prison.  Under the powerful legacy of the medicalisation of transgender people, it would 
seem that such suspicions are only assuaged when the “truth” is carved into a transgender 
woman prisoner’s body through genital reassignment surgery and, further, lacking a penis, 
she is no longer regarded as risky to cisgender women.  However, the public response to 
Jessica Winfield’s transfer to the female estate, when it was initially assumed that she had 
had complete genital reassignment surgery (and not only orchidectomy), suggests that 
transgender women with a history of violent or sexual offending against women cannot 
escape their cultural coding as male, predatory and risky to “vulnerable” (cisgender) women 
in the women’s estate.   
In conclusion, it is in sex/gender-segregated spaces that human rights discourse around 
trans/gender seems to meet its limits.  Whilst human rights discourse can lead to law and 
policy reform, society seems to be struggling to move beyond the deeply-entrenched 
historical equation of genitalia with gender, and to leave behind the traditional cultural 
coding of men-penis-risk and women-vagina-vulnerability, and the heteronormative 
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framework which dictates that a transgender woman is not really a woman if she engages in 
sexual relationships with other women.  The chapter has shown how progressing 
transgender prisoners’ rights to gender recognition in prison allocation decisions has given 
rise to a political counter-discourse about the rights of “those of the female sex” (i.e. 
cisgender women) to safety and privacy in the sex-segregated space of the women’s prison. 
Whilst contemporary society may be undergoing a “gender revolution”, and official prison 
policy is at the forefront of change, it seems that the strict demarcation of gender, divided 
by a “flesh border” (Halberstam 1998: 164) and the “truth” of a certain biological past, 
remains stronger than law’s new “truth” of gender at the very visceral site of the prison.   
The next chapter, Chapter 5, turns to consider the disciplining of gender through prison 
dress, and specifically considers the effects of recent human rights and equality discourse in 
improving transgender prisoners’ access to clothing and other items to present their gender, 
particularly when they are allocated to a prison which does not correspond to their gender. 
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Chapter 5:  Law and Transgender Prisoners’ Difficulties in 
Presenting their Gender in Prison  
 
This chapter examines the effects of law and human rights on transgender prisoners’ ability 
to present their gender through clothing, hair, cosmetics and other gender-affirming items 
(collectively referred to in this chapter as “prison dress”).145 Whilst often trivialised in the 
press, this chapter argues that the enforcement of gender norms through prison dress is 
harmful for transgender prisoners’ personal autonomy, dignity, health and well-being, and 
that failures on the part of prison management to enable and support transgender prisoners 
to live and dress in their gender deeply affect the liveability of their lives.  The chapter 
follows on from Chapter 4’s discussion of prison allocation, as differences still exist between 
the male and female estate in terms of prison uniform and other prison dress regulations, 
which impact on (all) prisoners’ self-expression.  The chapter argues that prison dress in 
English and Welsh prisons is disciplined and controlled in much more subtle, pervasive ways 
than in the past, when prison uniform was mandatory for all prisoners.  
This chapter examines recent human rights- and equality-based developments in prison 
policy (PSI 2011 and PSI 2016), which now require prisons to permit transgender prisoners 
to live and dress in their gender, whichever prison they are allocated to. Through an in-
depth analysis of the second transgender prisoner case to reach the English High Court, 
Green (2013), the chapter argues that this progressive policy is undermined, in practice, by 
the prison administration’s highly precautionary approach to the perceived risks of 
                                                          
145
 This chapter uses the term prison dress broadly, to include clothing (whether prison uniform or permitted 
personal clothing), shoes, hair, including beards and moustaches, and makeup. 
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providing transgender prisoners with access to gender-affirming items, and an over-reliance 
on its security exemption.  Through Green, this chapter also reflects on whether the policy 
effectively sets prisoners up to fail, since the court continues to produce Ms Green’s gender 
performance as inauthentic, artificial and imitative, despite acknowledging that she has “no 
access to female attire of the kind needed” (para 56).  It also unhelpfully perpetuates the 
view that permitting and enabling transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender is a 
“privilege”, rather than a right.   
This chapter is divided into five parts.  The first part discusses the significance of gender 
expression to (transgender) prisoners’ presentation of the self, by reference to a broader 
literature in this field.  The second part presents a brief history of the legal and penal 
regulation of prison dress in England and Wales, to contextualise the way in which, 
historically, prison dress has been used to discipline and normalise prisoners according to 
gender-based norms. It concludes with the contemporary rules and disciplinary techniques 
over prison dress through the Incentives and Earned Privileges (“IEP”) scheme.  The third 
part examines evolving prison management responses, in the 1990s, to transgender women 
transitioning whilst in men’s prisons. The fourth part considers the transformative potential 
of human rights and equality-based legal developments in relation to transgender prisoners’ 
ability to present their gender, as reflected in PSI 2011.  In the fifth and final part, the impact 
of PSI 2011 is examined, primarily through an analysis of Green, as well as the potential 
effects of PSI 2016’s internationally ground-breaking requirement that prison administrators 
permit and enable prisoners with non-binary and fluid genders to live and dress in their 
gender, in addition to transgender prisoners in a more narrow sense.  
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The Significance of Gender Expression in Prison 
Dress and hair have long been an important way of expressing individuality, as well as 
religious-, cultural-, class- and gender-belonging (or non-belonging/ subversion).  
Surprisingly, little literature or case law specifically examines prison regulations and 
restrictions on prisoners’ freedom to express their gender through their clothing and hair 
(see, however, Ash’s broader history of prison dress 2010), although there is a growing body 
of case law, internationally, in which prisoners have successfully challenged prison rules, on 
the grounds that they unduly restrict their freedom to express their religion.146  Arkles’ 
intersectional analysis of the enforcement of racialised gender norms through the 
regulation of prison dress in the US (2012) is an important exception, and discusses the 
effects on transgender prisoners, as well as other groups. 147 The regulation of prison dress 
in England and Wales has developed very differently from the US, however, and (at least in 
contemporary times) is not so “violently enforced” (ibid: 866).  Nevertheless, prison dress 
continues to be disciplined in more subtle, insidious ways in England and Wales, through the 
IEP.    
It has long been recognised in the classic sociology of the prison literature that prisons strip 
people of their previous bases of self-identification, and that this has profound effects on 
the psyche. Indeed, Gresham Sykes argues that the “destruction of the psyche” in the 
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 In a recent US case, Holt v Hobbs, 135.S.Ct 835 (2015) (prohibition of beard, Muslim prisoner), for example, 
the US Supreme Court held that prison officials had not proved that the restriction on the prisoner’s exercise 
of religion was in pursuance of a compelling governmental interest, and the least restrictive means of meeting 
that interest, indeed they had offered no evidence that a short beard presented security risks or could serve as 
a hiding place for contraband, as they had initially argued.   
147
 Arkles discusses how contemporary offences under various US state prison regulations include wearing 
dreadlocks or Afros, possessing nail varnish in a men’s prison and wearing boxers in a women’s prison, and 
how these are severely punished, including through solitary confinement (ibid, 861). He also describes how, in 
recent years, Native men, transgender women, and other people in men’s prisons with long hair have had 
their heads forcibly shaved (ibid).   
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modern prison is “no less fearful than the bodily suffering inflicted in prison in the past” 
(1958: 64). Amongst prisoners’ shared “pains of imprisonment”, he lists the loss of material 
possessions, which, in modern Western society, “are such a large part of the individual’s 
conception of himself that to be stripped of them is to be attacked at the deepest layers of 
personality” (ibid, 69).  Prison may meet the prisoner’s basic material needs, but the 
prisoner “wants – or needs, if you will – not just the necessities of life, but also the 
amenities: cigarettes and liquor as well as calories, interesting foods as well as sheer bulk, 
individual clothing as well as adequate clothing,” for “what is the value”, Sykes asks, “of a 
suit of clothing which is also a convict’s uniform with a stripe and stencilled number?” (ibid, 
67, emphasis added).  Erving Goffman similarly describes the process that occurs when an 
individual transitions from the outside community to the “total institution” of the prison as 
a “mortification of the self” (1961: 24); a prisoner not only experiences a profound attack on 
their internal, private sense of self, but also loses their “identity kit” for the management of 
their “personal front”, which means that they cannot present their usual external image to 
others, and are “dis-identified” (ibid, 31).  This stripping of the prisoner’s usual appearance, 
and the equipment and services by which they maintain it, such as clothing, cosmetics and 
shaving equipment, has a deep psychological effect, and results in the prisoner’s “personal 
defacement” (ibid, 29).     
This early (US) literature on the sociology of the prison considers the pains of imprisonment 
on prisoners’ gendered self, but does so within an androcentric and heteronormative 
framework.  Gender non-conforming prisoners are only discussed in relation to sexual 
behaviour in prisons (e.g. Clemmer 1940; Sykes 1958: 70-72). This is also true of the earliest 
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sociological studies of the English prison, e.g. Morris and Morris 1963.148 Sykes theorises 
that the male prisoner’s image of himself may be endangered by the fact that he is “shut off 
from the world of women, which by its very polarity gives the male world much of its 
meaning” (ibid, 72).  According to Sykes, “like most men, the inmate must search for his 
identity not simply within himself but also in the picture of himself which he finds reflected 
in the eyes of others” (ibid).  Since a “significant half of his audience is denied him”, the 
inmate’s self-image is in danger of becoming a “partial identity”, as “the prisoner’s looking-
glass … is only that portion of the prisoner’s personality which is recognised or appreciated 
by men” (ibid). This relational nature of masculinity seems to have continued relevance 
today.  In a recent study of three men’s prisons in England, Coretta Philipps (2012) found 
that whilst some prisoners felt an “acute need” to present a public image of themselves 
which was as close as possible to their image “on the outside”, others took a “pragmatic” or 
“fatalistic view” to prison dress, stating that “in the absence of women or other important 
figures”, there was no need to impress anyone (2012: 51-2).  
In the only published empirical research to date on transgender prisoners’ gender identities 
(a US, Californian study),149 Jenness and Fenstermaker found that being recognised as a 
woman by male prisoners was of utmost importance to transgender women housed in 
                                                          
148
  In this early sociological study of HMP Pentonville, a men’s prison, Morris and Morris found that the sexua l 
behaviours of prisoners corresponded closely to Clemmer’s schema, and identified around twenty-five to 
thirty “passive homosexuals” or “genuine inverts” who were given women’s names, and were “invariably 
called ‘she’ by the staff and prisoners alike” (1963:187).  These prisoners “behaved in a feminine way, walking 
seductively, rouging their lips and growing their fingernails to considerable length” (ibid).  The authors did not 
discuss the prison administration’s response.   
149
 The study was originally commissioned by the California Department of Corrections, to help it determine 
where, as a matter of policy, it would be best to house transgender women prisoners, and was based on 315 
interviews with transgender women housed in 27 different men’s prisons in California (Jenness et al 2009: 
Sexton et al 2010; Jenness 2010).  Jenness and Fenstermaker later went back to the interview material to try to 
make sense of their unexpected finding that the majority of transgender women stated a preference to remain 
in the male estate, notwithstanding the increased risk of violence to them (2014).   
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men’s prisons (2014). The authors found this lent a particular, situated significance to 
transgender women’s desire to express their femininity, and to be recognised as “the real 
deal”, which was firmly based on binary gender norms, and traditional ideas of womanhood 
in terms of being deferential to men, and acting “like a lady” to garner their respect, and 
being grateful for their chivalry and protection.  However, the research did not explore the 
significance of clothes, hair etc. to the women’s gender presentation, or the prison 
administration’s regulation of their prison dress.150    
Within the UK literature on women’s prisons, there is only limited discussion of the 
disciplining of women’s appearance and resistance thereto.151  Carlen has usefully identified 
the way in which women prisoners were “imprisoned within and without femininity” (1983: 
103).  In her study of Cornton Vale women’s prison, Scotland, she notes the paradox 
whereby prison administrators promoted traditional female accomplishments such as 
baking and sewing, whilst simultaneously denying women “most of the sartorial and 
cosmetic props to femininity” (ibid, 104).  They were supplied with “ill-fitting” and 
“unflattering” wrap-over dresses and prison-issues shoes,152and were allowed access to only 
three cosmetic items.  Razors, hair removal products and tweezers were not permitted.  
                                                          
150
 The author assumes, from the lack of discussion of this issue, that the Californian prison system leaves little 
scope for agency in relation to prisoners’ appearance, and that transgender prisoners are required to wear 
standard prison uniform.  It is unfortunate that the authors did not describe the prison regime in which the 
transgender women were situated, to contextualise their findings for an international readership.  For an 
excellent comparison of the conditions of the general prison population and “KG6”, a special unit for 
transgender and gay inmates, in LA County’s Men’s Central Jail, see Dolovich 2013.  Dolovich describes how 
prisoners in KG6 are issued with a distinctive pale blue uniform, which distinguishes them from the general 
prison population (who wear dark blue). This stigmatises them and leads to harassment from prison staff and 
prisoners when they have to walk through the main prison population. However, some prisoners reportedly 
found this is a small price to pay for allocation to the KG6, and its more humane environment (ibid).   
151
 Such resistance that has been identified in the scholarly literature on women prisoners (e.g. Bosworth 
1999), relates to enhancing their femininity, e.g. through adapting prison dress to make it more shapely, rather 
than resisting feminine norms.   
152
 Unlike their counterparts in England and Wales at the time (see below), women were still required to wear 
prison uniform in Scottish prisons. 
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Carlen astutely remarks that, in this way, the women’s “femininity was engaged, played 
upon, and then denied” (ibid, 108).  This provides a useful lens through which to view the 
way in which PSI 2011 effectively sets up some transgender prisoners to fail.  Promised by 
PSI 2011 that they may live and dress in accordance with their gender, they are then denied 
many of the means to do so, on security grounds.   
Earlier (e.g. Sim 1994) and more contemporary UK research discusses the significance of 
masculine gender performance in terms of prisoners’ survival within the hyper-masculinised 
men’s prison estate. “Conspicuous consumption” of designer clothing and branded trainers 
is a particular marker of masculinity and status, for those prisoners allowed to wear their 
own clothing (e.g. Jewkes 2005: 57; Crewe 2009: 277; Phillips 2012: 51-52). Jewkes argues 
that survival depends not only on the prisoner’s ability to construct a public identity which 
allows them to fit in with the dominant, hyper-masculine culture, but also on their ability 
simultaneously to maintain and nurture a private, interior, and usually “non-macho”, sense 
of self (2005).  This reiterates Goffman’s foundational dramaturgical conceptualisation of 
the “front-stage” and “back-stage” self (1956).  Although the literature does not consider 
this particular implication, the dual aspect of negotiating both a public and private identity 
would have particular significance for transgender prisoners who decide to “do risk” (see 
Nygren et al 2017) by not living in accordance with their self-identified gender in prison.  For 
example, although Senathooran Kanagasingham was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and 
had started to medically reassign her gender before she was imprisoned, she decided to live 
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as a man, and stopped taking hormones, when she was sent to HMP Belmarsh, a men’s 
prison, fearing harassment from other prisoners.  She died in custody (PPO 2015a).153 
Notwithstanding their significant contributions to the prisons literature, these studies have 
tended to take the subject of “women in prison” and “men in prison” as fixed, rather than 
fluid and contested sites.  Their gender analyses have also tended to focus on femininity in 
women’s prisons, and masculinity in men’s prisons.  Contemporary studies on the 
“gendered pains of imprisonment”, whilst extremely valuable (e.g. Liebling 2009; Crewe 
2011; Hulley and Wright 2017) have similarly focused on, and compared, the gendered pains 
of women in women’s prisons and men in men’s prisons, without unpacking those terms to 
consider the impact of the prison’s binary gender order on transgender and gender non-
normative prisoners, and the different type of gendered pain experienced by them.  As Julia 
Oparah has argued, the cumulative effect of the literature on gender in prisons has been 
unwittingly to further reinforce the “rigid gender binary that violates gender non-
conforming individuals” (2012: 242).  As queer criminology takes root, this gap in the 
literature will hopefully start to close.   
A Brief History of the Gender-normative Regulation of Prison Dress 
Having introduced some specific ideas around the significance of gender expression in 
prison, this section demonstrates that there is a long history of prisoners’ appearance being 
disciplined in a binary, gender-normative manner in English and Welsh prisons.  It also 
                                                          
153
 When the author attended part of this inquest on 18 and 19 February 2015, one of the lawyers, upon asking 
what her interest in the case was, apologised that she had wasted her time, as the inquest was not about a 
transgender prisoner.  It seems that because the prison had sent the prisoner to a gender identity clinic, where 
she had refused to engage (note that a prison officer was present, for security reasons), and had herself 
decided to live as a man, and to stop taking her hormones, in prison, her transgender history was not relevant 
to the inquest.  To the author, however, this seemed like “the elephant in the room”. 
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discusses the multiple and shifting justifications for regulating prison dress. This background 
is imperative for understanding the significance of the policy changes instigated by PSI 2011 
and PSI 2016, and their actual and potential effects on the governance of gender through 
prison dress.  
Subject to limiting abuse, and sketching the broad parameters in the field, law has always 
left the day-to-day regulation of prison clothing and haircuts to the prison administration.  
In 1865, Parliament ushered in sweeping, nationwide prison reforms through the Prisons 
Act 1865, and established the first Prison Rules. Whilst the first national penitentiary, 
Millbank, had already introduced its own prison uniform (Millbank Penitentiary Act 1816), 
the Prisons Act made prison uniform mandatory nationwide, for all convicted prisoners 
(Schedule 1, Regulation 23).  Originally arising out of a benevolent concern of prison 
reformists to clothe prisoners cleanly and adequately (Howard 1777:31), prison uniform also 
fulfilled the utilitarian goal of preventing escape, and the disciplinary aim of distinguishing 
between different categories of prisoners, which reflected the preoccupation of penal 
reformists of this era with the identification and categorisation of the criminal class (Ash 
2010:30).154   
Disciplining gender through prison uniform 
Prison uniform was soon used to humiliate and punish the bodies of prisoners, both 
physically, through the deliberate use of coarse material and ill-fitting clothing, and 
                                                          
154
 E.g. to distinguish between remand and sentenced prisoners and/or between different types of offenders 
and/or to denote the level of their cooperation with the regime. 
  
238 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
psychologically, through the use of stigmatising uniforms,155 such as the jester-like “party-
coloured dress”.156 Parliament, wishing to curtail the humiliating and punitive use of such 
uniforms, intervened by legislating that party-coloured dress could only be used for serious 
felons, and other prisoners should be dressed in plain attire (Gaol Act 1823)  Whilst uniform 
styles varied from prison to prison, the iconic “broad arrow” cloth was commonly used for 
making both men’s and women’s uniforms from the 1850s until its official abolition in 1921 
and subsequent slow phasing out (Ash 2010:40; 22-23; 49-50; 63). The broad arrow, 
stamped on items ranging from wine to sheep, literally marked prisoners’ bodies as 
property of the Crown.  Hobhouse reported to the Prison System Enquiry Committee in 
1922 that the prison authorities denied that prison uniform was “intended or designed as a 
garb of shame”, but “crudely cut, untidy, ill-fitting and sprinkled with broad arrows, it 
emphatically gives that impression” (1922: 131).   
Throughout, the overall style of prison uniform was both class- and gender-based, as 
described in depth in Ash’s history of prison dress (2010).  In the Victorian era, for example, 
women were clothed in simple dresses, aprons and caps akin to those worn for domestic 
servitude (Mayhew and Binny 1862; Ash 2010:43) and men in the garb of manual labourers 
(Ash 2010:40).  Women at this time were considered doubly deviant, having breached both 
the law and their “natural” gender role by committing crime.  Consequently, they were 
disciplined much more harshly than men, including in relation to their appearance. There 
was a contradiction here – similar to that referred to earlier, in Carlen’s study of Cornton 
                                                          
155
The Millbank Penitentiary Act 1816 states that “every convict … shall be clothed with a coarse and uniform 
apparel, with any distinguishing marks which may be deemed useful to facilitate discovery in case of escape” 
(para XXVI). 
156
 This was comprised of alternate panels of differently coloured cloth, often black and white (and hence 
sometimes dubbed the “magpie outfit”), sometimes blue and yellow (Ash 2010:33).    
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Vale Prison, 1983 – between the prison administrations’ desire to punish women by taking 
away their femininity, and to discipline and normalise them back in line with feminine 
gender norms.  Indeed, the prison authorities in the Victorian era “considered the vanity of 
women a sin that led to crime”, and “this ‘universal weakness’ was to be stamped out”, 
through shaving or close-cropping their hair and prohibiting any adornments or refinements 
in their dress and make-up (Dobash, Dobash and Gutteridge 1986: 81).  Prison reformist 
Elizabeth Fry also advocated this approach: “ear-rings, curled hair, and all sorts of finery and 
superfluity of dress, in tried female prisoners, must be absolutely forbidden” (1827: 61).  
She also called for the cutting of convicted female felons’ hair as “a certain yet harmless 
punishment”, believing “humiliation of spirit” in such women was indispensable to their 
“improvement and reformation” (ibid).  Such close haircuts not only branded them as 
criminals, but also deprived them symbolically of their femininity and sexuality.157   
Disciplining gender through hair  
As with excessively stigmatising prison uniforms, Parliament intervened to limit the punitive 
use of enforced haircuts, particularly in relation to women. The Prison Act 1865 (Schedule 1, 
s.29), stipulated that haircuts for both men and women were only permitted for health and 
cleanliness reasons (i.e. “vermin” and “dirt”) and that additionally, women’s express consent 
had to be obtained.  Men’s hair, meanwhile, was not to be “cut closer than may be 
necessary for purposes of health and cleanliness” (ibid).  In debating whether visiting 
justices should have the power to sanction hair-cutting of female prisoners under the Act, 
Mundy,  MP, opined that “female prisoners were sometimes so disorderly” that “the threat 
                                                          
157
 There is a long history of head-shaving to punish and humiliate women, particularly for adultery or for 
sexual liaisons with the enemy in wartime; it is widely recognised that loss of hair, symbolically, is a loss of 
sexuality (see e.g. Bevoor 2009).   
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of cutting off their hair might be usefully held over them in terrorem” (Hansard, HC Deb 9 
June 1865, Vol 179, cc1328-35). Briscoe, MP, vehemently objected, as this “was the most 
cruel and severe punishment that could be inflicted on a woman” (ibid).   
The special significance which hair was assumed to have for women, compared with men, is 
reflected in prison rules right up to 1999, all of which require a woman’s express consent 
before her hair may be cut, but allow a man’s hair to be cut for “neatness” or “good 
appearance” (e.g. 1949 Prison Rules, Rule 95; 1964 Prison Rules, Rule 26).  This differential 
treatment of men and women prisoners in relation to hair seems to have been generally 
regarded as natural and unproblematic. When the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was enacted,  
Kilroy-Silk, MP, asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why he was not 
considering the elimination of sex discrimination in prison by amending the Prison Rules so 
that men’s hair, as well as women’s hair, would not be cut without their consent. The Home 
Secretary’s unsatisfactory, evasive response was that “the present provision, which takes 
account of the consideration of safety at work, appears to be operating reasonably” (HC Deb 
21, April 1975, vol 890, cc255-6W).158  The 1999 Prison Rules finally brought parity in this 
field (Rule 28(3)), and the 2007 Prison Rules also extended the consent-requirement to 
facial hair (Rule 25(5)).  Thus, in the English and Welsh prison estate, no prisoner’s cranial or 
facial hair may now be cut without their express consent. 
Differential treatment of women also took root in terms of prison uniform.  After its phasing 
out in the 1920s and 1930s, the iconic broad arrow cloth was replaced with “everyday” 
                                                          
158
 Notably, prison administrators were careful not to infringe on prisoners’ religious freedom at this time. In 
practice, male prisoners who were baptised as Sikh were exempted from haircuts (HC Deb, 6 February 1981, 
vol 998, cc233-4W) and prison governors were described in the early 1980s as generally having “a tolerant 
approach to long hair, including Rastafarian styles” (HL Deb 24 July 1981 vol 423 cc541-2WA).   
  
241 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
materials, reflecting the idea that normalising prison clothing would aid prisoners’ 
rehabilitation and their return to life outside the prison walls.  This led to the abolition of 
prison uniform in women’s prisons in 1971 (Ash 2010: 113).  Prison uniform was not 
discontinued in the male estate until 1991, and even then, it continued to be used in high-
security men’s prisons.  In 2013, however, prison uniform was re-introduced in the male 
estate, as discussed below. 
Resistance to gender norms in the women’s prison estate 
Interestingly, soon after the abolition of women’s uniform in 1971, concern emerged 
amongst prison administrators about women prisoners dressing in a “masculine” manner.  
This resistance to gender norms was regarded as a threat both to the good order of the 
prison, and to other prisoners.  Reflecting a continuing conflation of gender and sexuality, 
masculine gender performance was also associated with lesbianism.   Although seemingly 
not referenced in the literature on women’s prisons, the LAGNA archives reveal a flurry of 
reports in the local and national press regarding the 1973 Prison Officers’ Association 
conference, at which prison officers expressed consternation at “lesbians” being able to 
purchase male clothing with their £33 annual clothing allowance (available for those serving 
sentences of six months or more).  In proposing a motion to prohibit such use of public 
funds (which was unanimously passed), Kendall, Governor of HMP Styal, a women’s prison, 
stated that “the fact that a woman is allowed to wear civilian clothing is good for her 
morale, but in practice this is now giving cause for great concern, because lesbians wish to 
wear male clothing.”  (Guardian Reporter 1973). There was a danger that lesbian subculture, 
a faction which was “disruptive and anti-authority”, would take over the prison.  “To allow 
them to masquerade blatantly as men”, Kendall argued (with echoes of historical discourse 
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around “men personating women”), “strengthens their influence over other vulnerable 
personalities” (ibid). Her concern was that “many normal, well-balanced women” were 
being “forced to live in an environment they find embarrassing and repulsive” (ibid), and 
that the Home Office was effectively giving its seal of approval to “transvestitism by 
delinquent lesbians” (Nottingham Guardian Journal Reporter 1973).  Others prison officers 
felt that, whilst instructions were always stating “that what happened outside prisons 
should be allowed to happen inside, someone must draw the line” (Sandrock 1973, under 
the headline “State cash buys men’s clothes for lesbians”).  The issue resurfaced in 1980, 
when prison officers expressed disappointment that the May Report159 had not addressed 
the problem of “aggressive lesbians”160 disrupting prison life, and made known their view 
that women prisoners “should be made to dress in women’s clothes” (Sandell 1980, under 
the headline “gang terror of jail girls in men’s clothing”). The Home Office reply was that “in 
an age of unisex clothes it would be difficult to lay down hard and fast rules” (ibid).   
Contemporary disciplining of prisoners through prison dress 
As noted, by 1991, neither the women’s or men’s prison estates had compulsory uniform, 
with the exception of high security men’s prisons. Prison-issue clothing was, however, 
available for those who needed it, or wished to wear it.  The 2007 Prison Rules provide that 
prisoners may be allowed to wear their own clothing at the discretion of the prison 
governor, subject to the maintenance of good order and safe and secure custody (Rule 
21(1)), and further  stipulate that if a prisoner is not permitted to wear his or her own 
clothing under Rule 21(1), “he or she shall be provided with clothing adequate for warmth 
                                                          
159
 The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the United Kingdom Prison Service, 1979. 
160
 Cf Freedman (1996) on the construction of the “aggressive” prison lesbian in the US. 
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and maintenance of good health, and, in so far as is practicable, of a kind that is generally 
worn by persons of his or her age and gender outside prison” (Rule 21(3), emphasis added). 
This is the first time that the appropriateness of the clothing for a person’s gender is 
mentioned in any Prison Rules, and indeed the first time that the Prison Rules have reflected 
the long-established belief and practice of the prison authorities that prison dress should be 
normalised along the lines of that worn by the outside community.  Whilst this provision 
might prevent misuse of prison dress to humiliate or ridicule prisoners,161 arguably it also 
encourages the enforcement of gender-normative prison dress (subject to PSI 2011’s and 
PSI 2016’s provision for transgender prisoners).   
In 2013, Chris Grayling, Secretary for Justice, introduced various new measures to “toughen 
up” prisons and to further incentivise good behaviour under the IEP scheme, one of which 
was the reintroduction of prison uniform in the male estate, more than 20 years after its 
general abolition.  PSI 30/2013 on Incentives and Earned Privileges now makes prison 
uniform mandatory in men’s prisons for all prisoners convicted of criminal offences162 in the 
first two weeks of imprisonment (so-called “entry-level”). The uniform usually comprises 
grey tracksuit bottoms, grey sweatshirt, T-shirt, underwear and socks.  This represents a 
return to previous thinking that prisoners need to be “put in their place” when they enter 
prison – the uniform strips them of their previous identity, and brands them as a new 
                                                          
161
 Whilst this research has not revealed any examples of such misuse in the history of UK prison dress, Joe 
Arpaio, a sheriff in Phoenix, Arizona, USA infamously introduced pink underwear and pink uniforms in men’s 
prisons. In a wrongful death suit relating to a prisoner forced into the pink uniform, Wagner v Maricopa 
County, No. 10-15501 D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00819- EHC, the 9
th
 US Circuit Court of Appeals observed, as an aside, 
that the policy was potentially unconstitutional, since “unexplained and undefended, the dress-out in pink 
appears to be punishment without legal justification” (ibid, 3).  It stated that it was fair to infer that the 
selection of pink as the underwear color was “meant to symbolise a loss of masculine identity and power, to 
shame and stigmatize the male prisoners as feminine” (ibid, 12).  
162
 As opposed to those on remand and those convicted of civil offences.  
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inmate. After the initial two-week “entry level” period, prisoners may earn the opportunity 
to wear their own clothes, on “standard level”, by demonstrating commitment towards 
their rehabilitation, engaging in purposeful activity, behaving well and helping other 
prisoners and staff members, and having “due regard for personal hygiene and health 
(including appearance, neatness and suitability of clothing)” (ibid, Annex B, Part A 
(Behavioural Expectations), emphasis added).  Prisoners demoted to “basic level” (below 
“entry level”) for bad behaviour or lack of engagement with the regime are also required to 
wear uniform, which visually marks them out as non-compliant.  This is reminiscent of the 
historical use of different prison uniform, to distinguish between different levels of co-
operation with the regime.   
This two-tier system of some prisoners wearing uniform, and others wearing their own 
clothes, is a new model of sartorial control.   It places disciplinary power firmly in prison 
officers’ hands both to bestow and to withdraw the privilege of wearing one’s own clothing 
and to assess its “neatness” and “suitability”.  Crewe has argued that the “all-encompassing 
and invasive power” of the prison works “like an invisible harness on the self”, demanding 
“self-regulation of all aspects of conduct, addressing both the psyche and the body”, and 
that it gives renewed authority to Foucault’s concept of governmentality (2011: 522).  
Indeed, the changes introduced by the 2013 IEP scheme mean that prisoners’ daily 
appearance is under constant scrutiny, and arguably operate as a much “deeper” and 
“tighter” mode of discipline (Crewe 2009 and 2011) than if all prisoners were required to 
wear uniform at all times.163  Further restrictions, which apply to both the male and female 
                                                          
163
 Crewe has argued that contemporary penal practices and policies give rise to new pains of imprisonment, 
including the pains of self-government, which in turn generates a “tightness”, whereby prisoners experience 
feelings of tension and anxiety “generated by uncertainty, and the sense of not knowing which way to move, 
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estate, limit prisoners’ choice in personal clothing.  Now, clothes, makeup, toiletries etc. 
may only be purchased through the prison canteen (shop) or from the prison catalogue, and 
must be bought with the prisoner’s earnings from prison work or their personal allowance, 
which is also linked to the IEP scheme.  Friends and relatives are no longer allowed to send 
or bring in items of clothing, on the basis that this could undermine the purpose of the 
scheme (para 10.4), although an initial or subsequent parcel of clothes may be permitted, at 
the discretion of the governor.   
Although the 2013 IEP scheme reintroduced prison uniform in the male estate, this change 
of policy was not extended to women’s prisons. There is no publicly-available 
documentation on the rationale behind the differential treatment.  In a reply to the author’s 
request for information, NOMS’ Equality, Rights and Decency Group stated that the decision 
not to reintroduce uniform in women’s prisons maintained “a policy which had long been in 
place”, reflecting “the understanding that the impact of imprisonment can be different for 
men and women”, and that “the policy in respect of women’s clothing was designed to 
avoid exposing women to a particular vulnerability which was considered likely to arise if 
they were required to wear prison clothing and which would result in the experience 
impacting more severely on them” (NOMS, email to the author, dated 4 December 2014). 
This reproduces the historical belief that women are more affected by limitations on their 
appearance than men. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for fear of getting things wrong” (2011: 522).  Note also that routine IEP reviews now only require one 
member of prison staff, rather than two (para 1.9), rendering the individual officer’s interpretative power even 
more significant. 
 
  
246 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
It is important to understand this background, in order to place PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 in 
their broader context.  It also helps explain emerging complaints from cisgender men 
prisoners that transgender women prisoners are being given “special” treatment and 
“privileges” as they are permitted to wear their own clothes in the male estate (see below). 
Behind Closed Doors and Out of Sight: First Accounts of Prison 
Responses to Transgender Women in the Male Estate 
So far, this chapter has provided a brief history of the way in which prison dress and haircuts 
have been used to discipline prisoners along gender-normative lines.  It has shown how 
binary gender norms have been repeatedly reproduced through prison dress regulations 
and prison practice in England and Wales, and how women continue to be constructed as 
more vulnerable to restrictions on their appearance than men. This next section traces the 
first accounts of prison management responses to “transsexual” prisoners, in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.   
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from early, isolated cases, other than the fact that 
some transgender prisoners were apparently given a degree of leeway to express their 
gender in some prisons, at the governor’s discretion. For example, in a 1968 newspaper 
article entitled “But this Jail ‘Bird’ is a Man”, a prisoner at HMP Dartmoor, a men’s prison, 
stated that he “saw a queer walking about with rouge on ‘her’ face”, and that “some of 
them even have bras and knickers made up in the tailor’s shop”.  He also remarked that one 
prisoner “had a sex change inside.  He was turning into a woman. We called him Rachel” 
(LAGNA 1968).  In 1980, in a corruption trial against a prison officer, one of the witnesses 
stole the headlines when it was reported that “he wears a pinafore in jail, carries a handbag 
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and is known as Mary”. The prisoner reportedly described herself as “a transsexual, not a 
homosexual” (Daily Telegraph Reporter 1980).   
By the late 1990s, more details start to emerge of the case-by-case arrangements made by 
the prison administration with a number of transgender women who had started to 
transition whilst in men’s prisons.  The first accounts are of Jane Pilley.  Housed at HMP 
Gartree in the mid-1990s, she was reportedly allowed to wear women’s clothing whilst 
locked in her cell at night and had “signed a pledge” to wear “men’s clothes”, apart from 
underwear, during the day (English 1999).  In 2006, in a case concerning a transgender 
patient at a high security psychiatric hospital, it was stated that earlier, whilst at HMP 
Altcourse, DB was “permitted to dress as a woman whilst in her cell” but only “to wear 
gender neutral clothing in public areas”, R (on the application of DB) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and Ashworth Hospital Authority (“DB”) [2006] EWHC 659 
(Admin), para 3.  In 2009, in HMP Manchester, AB was permitted to dress as a woman, but 
could only wear the “most feminine” items of clothing, “blouses and skirts etc.”, within her 
own cell (AB (2009), para 5). And in 2013, in HMP Frankland, Kimberley Green was allowed 
to wear “female clothing and make-up” on the residential wing, but, in other parts of the 
prison, only  female underwear, a bra, female trousers and unisex clothing on the “Girl 
Gear” list (sic) and “minimal make-up” (Green (2013), para 46).  “Overtly female clothing” 
was not permitted outside the residential wing, on the grounds that it enhanced the risk of 
assault or sexual violence to her (ibid). The court added that she might also be subject to 
ridicule: “of course the other prisoners should not act like that, but… one has to be realistic” 
(ibid). 
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These cases suggest a gradual relaxation of local prison practice in comparable security male 
prisons between 1999 and 2009, but, in Goffmanesque terms, still required the prisoners to 
present a suitable “front-stage” self and to limit their real, “back-stage” self to the private 
confines of their cell, where they were unable to seek or receive reflection of their gender in 
the eyes of others (1956).  As explicitly noted in Green, these restrictions appear to have 
been justified by prison management as measures to protect transgender women prisoners 
from risk of sexual and physical harm from other prisoners. Like segregation (Chapter 4), 
however, the risks to the transgender prisoner are contained by containing the transgender 
prisoner herself.  This produces the transgender prisoner as both at risk and risky.  Kept out 
of sight, literally behind cell doors (or, in the case of underwear, beneath an external façade 
of gender-normativity), transgender prisoners’ gender performance is produced as a risk to 
the established, binary gender order of prison society.  These early restrictions on 
transgender prisoners’ gender performance imply a clear public/private distinction, 
whereby the right to respect for private life (article 8 of the ECHR) is interpreted minimally, 
as a toleration of gender autonomy behind closed doors, rather than a genuine respect for 
personal autonomy.  PSI 2011 represented (at least on paper) a major development in this 
regard.    
PSI 2011’s Requirement for Prisons to Permit Transgender Prisoners 
to Live and Dress in their Gender 
By the time PSI 2011 was introduced in March 2011, it was already well-established that 
restrictions on transgender people’s gender expression through dress comprised an 
interference with the right to private life, pursuant to a European Court of Human Rights’ 
ruling, Kara v UK (1998) 27 EHRR CD 272.  Whilst Kara was an employment case, the English 
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courts have subsequently applied article 8 in an institutional context,  under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. In both R (ex parte E) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2001] EWHC Admin 
108 and DB (2006), they held that interferences in the private lives of transgender patients 
detained in a high security hospital (one was allowed to dress as a woman only in her room, 
the other was also allowed to wear gender-neutral clothing in public areas) were justified 
under article 8(2), due to the special therapeutic and security concerns of the institution.  
The courts implied that these special concerns distinguished them institutionally from 
prisons (for a brief summary, see Curtice and Sandford 2009).   
Reflecting both transgender prisoners’ right to respect for their private life, in terms of dress 
(art 8 ECHR), and their right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of “gender 
reassignment” under the Equality Act 2010, PSI 2011 makes it mandatory for prison 
administrators to permit transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender, whichever 
part of the prison estate they are housed in (PSI 2011, section 3 and Annex B).  This was a 
major development, it was the first time there had been any official policy in this field, and it 
was the first time that the prison authorities’ governance of trans/gender through prison 
dress was explicitly informed by human rights, rather than as a case-by-case discretionary 
concession.   
Furthermore, PSI 2011 provides that prisoners “who consider themselves transsexual” and 
who “wish to begin gender reassignment” must be permitted to “live permanently in their 
acquired gender” (para 3.2, emphasis added) and “to dress in clothes appropriate to their 
acquired gender” (para 3.3).  This ground-breaking self-definition model reflects the broad 
definition of transgender people protected by the Equality Act, and means that transgender 
prisoners need neither a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, nor legal certification of 
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their gender via a GRC, to benefit from PSI 2011’s provisions.164  However, the law’s gender 
binary is maintained, as they must still identity with, or submit to, PSI 2011’s definition of a 
“transsexual”, as a person who lives or proposes to live “in the gender opposite to the one 
assigned at birth” (para 1.1) on a permanent basis (para 3.2).  Only permanent, binary 
gender crossings are contemplated, and considered deserving. The policy further implies 
that conventional, normative gender expression is expected afterwards; prisons must allow 
transgender prisoners to dress in clothes “appropriate” to their “acquired gender” (para 3.3) 
and to purchase “gender-appropriate clothing” from mail order catalogues (Annex B.2).  
Meanwhile, a statement that make-up may be used both by transgender men and women 
prisoners to “present more convincingly” in their “acquired gender” (Annex B.7) reproduces 
historical and contemporary legal discourse, that transgender people’s gender expression is 
not real or authentic, but artificial and imitative of cisgender people’s.  
Whilst providing for transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender, PSI 2011 leaves 
numerous pockets of discretion around what is “appropriate”, “decent”, “necessary” and 
“vital” in terms of a person’s gender presentation.  It would probably be difficult to define 
these terms in a policy document, but the subjective interpretation of these terms leaves 
scope for misuse/abuse of disciplinary power.  For example, PSI 2011 provides that make-up 
which is “vital to presenting in the acquired gender, such as foundation to cover beard 
growth” may not be restricted through the IEP scheme, but that “non-vital” makeup is a 
privilege, capable of being withdrawn as a disciplinary measure (PSI 2011, Annex B, para 
B.7).  In 2015, the PPO investigated a complaint from a transgender prisoner who had been 
downgraded an IEP level for wearing lipstick (PPO 2015c). Under her local transgender 
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 This can be contrasted with PSI 2011’s allocation policy, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, relies primarily on 
the prisoner’s legal gender, namely whether they possess a GRC. 
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“compact” (an individualised agreement between prisoner and prison), she was expected to 
wear “minimum makeup” at all times.  The prison officer who disciplined her interpreted PSI 
2011 to mean that she could only wear foundation.  The prisoner complained that 
downgrading her IEP level was contrary to PSI 2011, as lipstick was “vital” to her gender 
presentation and pointed out the irony that the prison had allowed her to purchase lipstick. 
The PPO upheld her complaint and recommended that make-up should be in line with 
guidelines for female prisons, which do not place any restrictions on the type of makeup 
which may be worn, but only the quantity, such that “excessive amounts” of makeup are 
not allowed.  (PPO 2015).   On the other hand, this type of decision-making apparently 
troubles many prison officers in their day-to-day dealings with transgender prisoners.  In an 
informal conversation which the author had with an equalities officer at a men’s prison 
(2014), she observed that prison officers were too concerned about potential complaints 
and legal action to act without seeking higher authority in this regard.  They had approached 
her about speaking to a transgender prisoner about decency levels, as she had started 
wearing short skirts and her G-string was showing.  Thus, the very introduction of PSI 2011 
and the potential risk of complaints and litigation appear to have changed power relations 
in some prisons and may act as a pre-emptory brake on the exercise of disciplinary power at 
the prison officer level.   
Finally, the most problematic provision, in terms of its potential to thwart the realisation of 
transgender prisoners’ right to live and dress in their gender, is arguably PSI 2011’s security 
exemption, which states that gender-affirming items may be restricted in “exceptional 
circumstances” (PSI 2011, Annex B, para B.5), where it can be demonstrated that they 
present a security risk which cannot be reasonably mitigated (para B.6).  PSI 2011 even 
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warns prison administrators that any decision to restrict items could be subject to judicial 
review and must therefore be backed by “detailed and reasonable justifications” (para B.6.) 
– another example of pre-emptive action being required, to avoid risk of later blame/ legal 
liability (cf. long term segregation). 
Green (2013): Security Trumps Prisoners’ Rights 
It was this security exemption which came under judicial scrutiny in Green (2013), the 
second transgender prisoner case to be determined by the High Court.  The case concerned 
Kimberley Green, who was housed in HMP Frankland, a high security men’s prison.165 In 
2011, Green had expressed the desire to be treated as a transgender prisoner, and to live 
and dress as a woman.  She complained that the prison had denied her access to a range of 
gender-affirming items, including larger-size women’s clothing, tights, “intimate prostheses” 
(breasts and vagina) and a wig.  The prison governor argued that restricting access to these 
items was justified under PSI 2011, as each presented security risks which could not 
reasonably be mitigated (para B.6).  The legal issues before the court were whether the 
prison had acted in an unlawful manner (i.e. such that it decisions were Wednesbury 
unreasonable)166 by placing barriers in the way of the claimant living in her gender, contrary 
to PSI 2011 and/or whether it had discriminated against her on the grounds of gender 
reassignment, contrary to the Equality Act 2010.  The court held that the prison’s refusal to 
provide Green with all the items was justified on security grounds, and therefore lawful on 
both legal counts.   
                                                          
165
 The court notes that HMP Frankland housed five other transgender prisoners at the time (Green, para 22).   
166
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Wednesbury test is an administrative law test, which considers whether a 
decision is so unreasonable or irrational that no other public body would have made the decision.  Whilst a 
claimant cannot bring a direct complaint for breach of PSI 2011, since it is a policy and not a legal document, 
breach of such a written policy goes to the reasonableness of the decision. 
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The Green case usefully captures the tension between PSI 2011’s new mandate that prisons 
must permit transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender, and the prison 
administration’s long-established power to control prison dress along gender-normative 
lines.  Green demonstrates how easily the policy can be stripped of its transformative 
potential, and the previous status quo reasserted.  In making this overall argument, the 
analysis addresses three important aspects of the judgment; first, the court’s deference to 
the prison administration’s risk-based decisions, despite its serious concerns about the 
outcome for Green, personally, and for the future viability of PSI 2011; second, the court’s 
construction of Green as a “man seeking to become a woman” who was not (yet) entitled to 
equal treatment with cisgender women prisoners; and third, its observations that Green 
was actually advantaged in terms of her prison dress and lifestyle, compared to cisgender 
men in the same prison.   
Deference to prison administration’s risk-based decisions 
The judgment in Green starts by recognising that the “desire of a human being to change 
their gender is of profound import” (para 2) but continues that it is “at all times … critical to 
remember the context” and the “serious security considerations” involved, for “what may 
happen in everyday life without too much difficulty, when translated to a prison suddenly 
poses truly difficult issues” (ibid).  This opening remark sets the tone for the rest of the 
judgment. 
The court (comprising Justice Richardson, sitting as a sole judge) deferred to all of the prison 
administration’s decisions. It had no trouble finding that the prohibition of prosthetics and 
tights fell “entirely” within the security exception (para 47).  The court accepted the prison’s 
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argument that allowing the prosthetics would give rise to a “profound” risk of the prisoner 
concealing items for escape or for other illegitimate reasons “in intimate parts of the body” 
(ibid). Providing the items and maintaining security would demand more rigorous and 
invasive searches, which would affect the dignity of transgender prisoners, and should be 
avoided (para 28).  Whilst the governor also argued that providing the prisoner with 
prosthetic breasts and vaginas would heighten the risk of sexual abuse and assault to Green 
by other prisoners (para 28), unfortunately the judge did not address this important issue.  It 
also accepted that tights might be used to “provide a ligature, climbing aid and/or as a sieve 
for brewing alcohol” (an interesting and somewhat superfluous addition, since socks – 
which are in general circulation – are regularly used for this purpose), and, since tights could 
easily be concealed, it would be impossible to monitor their use (para 28).  
However, the court found the prohibition of larger-size women’s clothing and a wig more 
taxing.  The governor maintained that it was impossible to provide Green with access to 
“out-size” clothes, as the only suitable specialist supplier had only an on-line catalogue, and 
prisoners were not permitted to go on-line for security reasons.  The court was willing to 
accept that preventing access to the website was an “entirely proportionate stand at 
present” and therefore “legitimate at present” but warned that “a longer-term solution has 
to be found or the policy (and it appears a very enlightened and good policy) will simply 
become a pious list of worthy hopes with no practical application” (para 58, emphasis 
added).   
The question of the wig was what had caused the court the “greatest concern” and was the 
area where it had “wrestled the most with what is right” (para 50).  Observing that “the 
outward appearance of an individual is such a core feature of a person’s being”, the court 
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felt that denying a transgender prisoner hair when “transitioning from one sex to the other 
is a fundamental denial of what is being legitimately allowed by PSI 07/2011” (para 48).  Yet, 
ultimately, providing a wig in the prison context was “simply providing a hostage to fortune” 
(para 48), since a wig could be used by other prisoners to disguise themselves and facilitate 
escape, thus it deferred to the prison administration’s decision.167   
Some of the security risks raised by the prison administration to justify limiting access to the 
items appear more weighty than others;168some arguably might be described as risk 
possibilities rather than risk probabilities; some might be mitigated relatively easily, but the 
court deferred to the prison administration’s assessment of each risk, and its claim that the 
risk could not reasonably be mitigated.  
Despite its findings, on numerous occasions, the court emphasised that “a more purposeful 
solution” needed to be searched for in relation to larger clothing and wigs, and that more 
work needed to be done to see if the security risks may be mitigated (paras 50 and 61).169 
The judgment is unusually tenuous, and the court is clearly conflicted in upholding what PSI 
2011 seeks to achieve in terms of transgender prisoners’ rights, and deferring to prison 
                                                          
167
 Security issues are frequently raised as a justification for regulation of natural hair in other jurisdictions, on 
the basis that dreadlocks and long beards, for example, could be used to conceal contraband, and they have 
also been raised in relation to head-coverings (see Arkles 2012 for a good overview of US regulations and 
practice). Arkles mentions that wigs are allowed for medical reasons in some US state prisons, but that this 
argument has not been successful in terms of a wig being medically required to alleviate transgender 
prisoners’ gender dysphoria.  
168
 Other high-security prisons have seemingly managed to mitigate the risks in providing wigs to transgender 
prisoners.  In 2013, it was reported in the press that Emma Page “wore a blonde wig and was allowed to dress 
in skirts and blouses in the male Category A jail HMP Wakefield” (Slack 2013).  This issue must also arise where 
prisoners request a wig for medical reasons, e.g. hair loss due to alopecia, or due to chemotherapy or 
radiotherapy treatment for cancer (indeed, for transgender prisoners diagnosed with gender dysphoria, access 
to a wig might be similarly pursued on medical grounds). 
169
 HMP Frankland reportedly allows transgender prisoners to wear wigs, after a relaxation of rules post-Green 
(Johnson 2017, IMB HMP Frankland 2017, para 5.4).  From an informal conversation with a doctoral student 
who has visited the prison (6 Dec 2017), the author understands that transgender prisoners are also allowed to 
wear wigs in HMP Littlehey. 
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management’s power/knowledge in assessing and managing risk.  It even remarks that 
refusing access to larger-size clothing and a wig results is a “fundamental denial” of what is 
permitted by PSI 2011 (para 48), and expresses concern that, although the governor had 
made “all sorts of worthy principled statements” to the court, “the simple fact is that 
*Green+ has no access to female attire of the kind needed” (para 56).  Yet, it concludes that 
there is “no question of the Governor compelling her to live as a man” (para 43), and nor 
has Green been prevented from living as a woman (para 60), though, “as was inelegantly, 
but perhaps accurately, described in the course of argument”, she “is being expected to look 
like a bald drag artiste” (para 48).  The court implicitly recognises that Green is left in an 
untenable position, that it is humiliating and in effect, punitive.  Indeed, Green is visibly 
marked with stigma (Goffman 1963).   
Undermining the right to equality 
The second aspect of the judgment which bears scrutiny is the way in which it undermines 
Green’s right to express her gender as a woman, and the troubling legal precedent it sets 
under the Equality Act 2010.  Under the Equality Act, it must be established that the person 
was treated less favourably than “others” because of their gender reassignment. It is widely 
accepted that the Equality Act retains the need for an actual or hypothetical “comparator” 
(a person whose circumstances are the same or similar to the claimant’s, but who does not 
have the same protected characteristic as the claimant) against whom the claimant’s 
treatment can be compared (Equality and Human Rights Commission:  Employment 
Statutory Code of Practice; Epstein and Masters 2011).170 In some cases, the identification of 
                                                          
170
 With the exception of discrimination arising from disability, which does not require a comparator (Equality 
Act 2010, s.15). 
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a suitable comparator will be clear-cut.  For example, it is well established that where a 
person is dismissed from their employment because they are undergoing gender 
reassignment, the comparator would be a person who is not undergoing gender 
reassignment (P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR 1-2143). Relying on a 
precedent from a very different context (i.e. the point at which a transgender woman 
should be entitled to access the women’s toilets at her workplace, during her transition, 
Croft v Royal Mail Group PLC (2003) EWCA (Civ) 1045), the court in Green rather perversely 
concluded that “the only possible comparator” is a male prisoner who is not undergoing 
gender reassignment (para 66); indeed, it added, it is “almost impossible to see how a 
female prisoner can be regarded as the appropriate comparator” (para 68).  The rationale 
behind the court’s finding is worth citing in full. According to the court, Green is: 
“a man seeking to become a woman – but he is still of the male gender and a male 
prisoner.  He is in a male prison and until there is a Gender Recognition Certificate, 
he remains a man.  A woman prisoner cannot conceivably be the comparator as the 
woman prisoner has … already achieved what the claimant wishes.  Male to female 
transsexuals are not automatically entitled to the same treatment as women – until 
they become women” (para 69). 
The court therefore characterised Green’s gender as a “becoming” (not a “being”) and 
states that she does not becomes a woman, and therefore deserving of equal treatment 
with cisgender women, until she obtains a GRC, and is legally female. In the meantime, “he 
[sic+ is still of the male gender and a male prisoner” (ibid).   
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It will be recalled that the Equality Act’s protections against discrimination on grounds of 
gender reassignment apply regardless of legal gender (and medical supervision), and that 
this, in turn, is reflected in PSI 2011’s self-definition test, whereby prisoners “who consider 
themselves transsexual” must be permitted to live and dress in their gender (para 3.2).  
Indeed, PSI 2011 clearly envisages that the comparator should be a cisgender woman 
prisoner, as it provides that prisons “should obtain from an equivalent opposite gender 
prison a set of guidelines for what clothing and makeup is acceptable” and notes that “such 
guidelines can often be adopted almost entirely for transsexual prisoners” (Annex B, para 
B.1).  The PPO has also recently remarked that most of the complaints it has received from 
transgender women prisoners about restrictions placed on their gender expression, are 
based on security considerations, which “could have been resolved more effectively by 
learning from the female estate and considering what a female prison would do in the 
circumstances” (PPO 2017a).  Thus, the court’s decision to compare Green’s position to a 
male prisoner not undergoing gender reassignment clearly conflicts with both the Equality 
Act and PSI 2011.  Beyond that, it has deeply negative discursive effects, in refusing to 
recognise Green’s identity as a woman, and insisting that she is a man, until she obtains a 
GRC.  The paradox is that the court even observes that because of its judgment, she might 
struggle to satisfy the “real life test” required to obtain legal recognition of her gender 
under the Gender Recognition Act. 
  
  
259 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
Perpetuating the myth that transgender prisoners are advantaged in dress and lifestyle  
Aside from its legal questionability,171 the discursive effects of the Green judgment are 
extremely troubling, as they reassert transgender prisoners’ rights as privileges, and 
reproduce cisgender people’s gender performance as natural, and transgender people’s as 
artificial.   PSI 2011 specifically states (in Annex B, para B.4) that “allowing male to female 
transsexual prisoners to wear their own clothes” is “necessary to ensure that such prisoners 
can live in the gender role that they identify with”, and that, where transgender women are 
housed in a men’s prison, “it may be helpful to explain this to other prisoners who are 
required to wear prison uniform” (ibid).172  Thus, PSI 2011 specifically contemplates the 
possibility that other prisoners may feel the situation is unfair.  Despite PSI 2011’s explicit 
provisions, the court in Green perpetuates the view that transgender prisoners are indeed 
privileged; it concludes that Green has not been treated less favourably than other prisoners 
in the male estate, “indeed the reverse” (para 70, emphasis added), since:   
“a male prisoner (who wishes to remain male as most do) does not need to express 
his gender identity in any purposeful way.  He does so innately through the male 
clothes he wears and certainly does so via prison clothing.  Transsexual prisoners are 
treated differently (and wish to be so) and as such have a number of advantages in 
terms of clothing and lifestyle not available to the remainder of the male population 
absent privileges” (para 69, emphasis added),  
                                                          
171
 In the author’s informal conversations with a number of solicitors and barristers with experience of advising 
transgender prisoners, they have also expressed concern about the court’s interpretation of the Equality Act in 
Green.  One barrister noted that legal aid is unlikely to be available to another prisoner wanting to bring a 
similar case, which limits the possibility of another court overturning the “bad” precedent set in Green.   
172
 This issue does not arise in women’s prisons in the same way, as it will be recalled that women prisoners 
are not required to wear prison uniform.   
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This passage reveals the fundamental problem that transgender prisoners face in a 
cisgender society which cannot see cisgender people’s gender as performative (only 
transgender people’s) (Serano 2007). The cisgender male prisoner is able to express his 
normative masculine gender not “innately”, as the above quote states, but because the 
prison clothing is designed with him in mind, and he does not need to express his gender in 
any “purposeful way” because the clothes he is provided with do that for him.  The 
cisgender male prisoner’s gender expression is perceived as natural, normal, and so innate 
that the advantage his cis-genderism confers is invisible.  Conversely, and ironically, the 
transgender prisoner is seen as being the one who is at an advantage “in terms of clothing 
and lifestyle” (ibid).     
Problems with prisoners asserting their rights 
In addition to the detailed insights into penal governance of trans/gender offered by the 
Green case, other research sources indicate that whilst PSI 2011 has made a significant 
contribution by establishing formal policy in this area, the level of commitment of prison 
administrators to realising transgender prisoners’ right to express their gender varies greatly 
from prison to prison, and from governor to governor. Some reports suggest that PSI 2011 
has effected some small but positive instrumental changes in men’s prisons which are 
known to house a number of transgender prisoners on a long-term basis, for example, HMP 
Littlehey’s Equalities Team reportedly set up a pop-up shop for its six transgender inmates, 
to enable them to purchase women’s clothing and order items from a catalogue (Panther 
2016), and the Independent Monitoring Board for HMP Isle of Wight recommended that “a 
qualified hairdresser should attend one day a week to cater for the growing number in the 
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transgender population”, estimated to be around 11 (2015, para 5.1(c)), although it is not 
clear whether this has been implemented.  
Reports suggest that transgender prisoners on remand or on short-term sentences in men’s 
prisons do not fare well (even though both remanded and convicted prisoners are covered 
by PSI 2011’s provisions on prison dress), particularly those housed in prisons which have 
limited experience of dealing with transgender prisoners, and which do not have established 
systems in place to respond to their needs, and rights, appropriately and quickly.  Prisons 
may seriously underestimate the importance of gender-appropriate dress for transgender 
prisoners’ health and well-being.  Jenny Swift allegedly refused to wear male prison uniform, 
and entered HMP Doncaster naked, demonstrating the ultimate resistance to the prison’s 
power (Halliday 2017).  Whilst on remand, she took her own life.  On reception to HMP 
Bristol, a men’s prison, Tara Hudson was offered the men’s prison uniform – a T shirt, 
tracksuit bottoms and boxer shorts – and “instead of wearing them, I didn’t take off my own 
clothes for the whole week I was in HMP Bristol” (Curtis 2015). The PPO investigation into 
Vikki Thompson’s death reported that her access to women’s clothing and make-up was 
limited, as she did not have a prison job (and therefore the ability to earn and purchase 
items from the catalogue) and had to rely on her partner to bring in clothes and money, 
which he failed to do  (PPO 2017b).  The inquest heard that she was offered a uniform from 
a nearby women’s prison, but that she refused, and instead adapted the men’s prison 
uniform, by cropping the prison jumper to show her midriff and rolling the trousers low on 
her hips (author’s contemporaneous notes of inquest West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s 
Court 2017), and padding out her bra with socks (PPO 2017b, para 69).  Although staff 
recognised that she needed “to establish herself as a woman in a male prison”, and 
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supported her in various other ways, they were concerned about the negative attention she 
was receiving from other prisoners, and the fact that cutting and altering prison-issue 
clothing is also a disciplinary infraction.  When spoken to by a prison officer, she agreed to 
comply with the compact she had signed (PPO 2017b, para 73).  Having been remanded into 
custody on 27 October 2015, she did not receive the makeup she had ordered until 10 
November, and was still waiting for her partner to bring in her clothes when she took her 
life on 12 November 2015.     
The PPO observed in its Learning Lessons Bulletin (2017a) that lack of access to clothing, 
make-up, hair-dye and other gender-affirming items has been the greatest source of 
complaints from transgender prisoners.  Press for Change reported a similar concentration 
of complaints in its correspondence with transgender prisoners (interview with the author, 
26 October, 2015), and referred to the usefulness of PSI 2011 as leverage in its follow-up 
with prison governors.  These early indications suggest that perhaps the biggest potential 
change in power relations effected by PSI 2011 is the fact that it sets an official policy and 
formal benchmark against which prisons can be inspected by the IMB and HMP 
Inspectorate, and upon which transgender prisoners (or their advocates) can found a 
complaint to the governor, IMP and HMP Inspectorate, PPO and courts.   
However, this approach has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, if prison 
administrators are repeatedly held to account then prison administration might strategically 
respond to their PSI 2011-based obligations as an organisational risk to be managed (Whitty 
2011). This may be particularly true in prisons which house a number of long-term 
transgender prisoners, both from a prison management perspective, and because such 
prisoners have more time and incentive to pursue complaints and have more collective 
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“bargaining power”. On the other hand, asserting rights is risky, and often comes at a high 
personal cost, particularly for prisoners whose daily lives are governed by the very people 
they are complaining about.  History shows that prisoners who assert their rights, and make 
formal complaints, are highly likely to be constituted by prison management as a vexatious 
group. This is likely to not only negatively affect their personal situation in prison, but also to 
reduce public sympathy for the situation of transgender prisoners in general (see for 
example Snider 2003 on this experience in relation to women prisoners’ recourse to rights).  
Indeed, Sarah Jane Baker, a transgender woman prisoner currently housed at HMP Isle of 
Wight, remarks that “any attempts to force prisons to acknowledge their legal 
responsibilities are seen as acts of manipulation and strongly resisted” (2017:18), whilst the 
Mail Online’s headline on Green’s case trivialises both her need for a wig, and her recourse 
to the courts, particularly at the taxpayer’s expense: “Transgender killer who tortured and 
killed his wife gets legal aid for his right to wear a WIG [sic] in prison, after complaining that 
he [sic] looks like a ‘bald drag artiste’” (Doughty 2013). 
The other issue is that whilst there is some merit in Whitty’s “human rights as organisational 
risk” thesis (2011), the evidence to date indicates that it is highly unlikely that PSI 2011 and 
PSI 2016, and complaints and litigation by individual prisoners, can effect change at a 
deeper, discursive level, without prisons having a genuine, ethical commitment to 
transgender prisoners’ rights and well-being, and a genuine commitment to supporting 
gender diversity within the prison.  The very fact that transgender prisoners’ access to 
gender-affirming items is translated into a risk issue, reveals the overwhelming logic of risk 
in the prison and the judgment in Green shows the power of security and risk discourse to 
subjugate the discourse of law and rights in this field.   
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Given the institutional and normative problems in implementing PSI 2011 on the ground, 
and the court’s complete deference to the prison administration in Green, PSI 2016’s 
internationally ground-breaking provisions to provide for a wider group to access to gender 
expression, only five years after PSI 2011’s introduction, may ultimately do little more than 
widen the gap between rhetoric and reality.  For prisoners who identify as non-binary, 
gender fluid or transvestite, PSI 2016 states that prison administration must seek agreement 
with them (again “subject to risk, security or operational assessments”) to express 
themselves according to “the gender with which they identify” or “as gender-neutral” (para 
6.19).  It advises that a “fair approach” to facilitating gender presentation would include 
“not being unduly restrictive” and emphasises that there must be “genuine and weighty 
operational and/or security reasons” to refuse access to particular items, or to refuse a 
prisoner “to present in different genders intermittently” (ibid).  These strengthened 
provisions seemingly respond to evidence of previous over-reliance on the security 
exemption to restrict and control transgender prisoners’ gender presentation.  PSI 2016 also 
established a Transgender Advisory Board, to address concerns of prisoners with regard to 
access to facilities in order to support their gender expression, and to consider the wider 
policy of provision of a gender-neutral prison uniform (12.1).173  Beyond PSI 2016’s 
translatability in instrumental terms, however, at  a time when many prisons are suffering 
from extreme staff shortages, are stretched to the limit in maintaining a humane daily 
                                                          
173
 This policy board is chaired by the Deputy Director for Equalities in HM Prisons and Probation Service 
(formerly NOMS) and has two external members from transgender advocacy charities on its board.  It has met 
several times already but has not issued any public documents for review (e-mail to the author from George 
Barrow, Vulnerable Officers Team, 30 Oct 2017).  It is not yet clear how the TAB will inter-relate with the PPO 
in relation to complaints about access to gender-affirming prison dress, but hopefully, as with segregation 
decisions, this centralised body will be able to advance the situation, and rights of transgender prisoners, and 
ensure consistency of approach across the prison estate.   
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regime and safety and good order across the estate, this chapter has raised the more 
fundamental question of whether human rights and equality discourse in relation to 
prisoners’ right to present their gender has the power to alter the pre-existing discursive 
terrain, which constitutes transgender prisoners’ gender performance as inauthentic, and 
their access to gender- affirming items as risky – or arguably uses security and risk-based 
justifications as a pretext to retain its control over the gender order, and equilibrium of the 
prison, in the face of PSI 2011’s (and now PSI 2016’s broader) self-determination test. 
Conclusion   
This chapter has argued that, historically, prison dress has been used to discipline and 
normalise prisoners along binary, normative gender lines, and that despite the apparent 
liberalisation of penal regulation in this field, changes introduced to the IEP scheme in 2013 
have led to prisoners’ appearance being controlled in much more subtle, pervasive ways 
than before. The chapter also showed that the changes to the IEP scheme have reinstated 
differences between the male and female prison estate, and that these are based on the 
normative assumption that women are more affected by restrictions on their appearance 
than men.   
It then argued that PSI 2011, and now PSI 2016, have potentially profound implications for 
the possibilities and liveability of trans/gendered lives in prison in relation to an aspect of 
their lives that is likely to hold considerable import, but tends to be trivialised in our 
cisgender society.  By providing that access to gender-affirming clothing and other items 
must be made available to those who self-define as “transsexual”, PSI 2011 unsettled the 
established medico-legal authority over trans/gender, but kept the gender order intact, by 
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requiring complete, permanent binary gender-crossings.  Indeed, PSI 2016 is even more 
cutting-edge in the history of penal gender regulation, as it extends this right to prisoners 
who have “a more fluid or a neutral approach to their gender (including individuals who 
identify as non-binary, gender fluid and/or transvestite)” (PSI 2016, para 3.3).174 Now, all 
“transgender prisoners”, in this much broader sense, must be “permitted” and positively 
“enabled” and “supported” to express “the gender they identify with (or neutral gender)”.   
The chapter identified an emerging fault-line between the prison administration’s new 
mandatory human rights and equality-based duty to permit transgender prisoners to live 
and dress in their gender, and its long-established duty to maintain security, good order and 
discipline, and to safeguard all prisoners.  It drew on the judgment in Green to illustrate 
that, in contemporary risk society, and in a prison system driven by the “inexorable logic of 
risk” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997), even a requirement to allow transgender prisoners to 
dress in accordance with their gender is translated into a risk, rather than a rights discourse. 
The chapter further argued that, despite the prison administration’s multiple security-based 
explanations for restricting transgender prisoners’ access to gender-affirming items, its 
highly precautionary response appears to be driven by a much more fundamental 
conceptualisation of transgender prisoners’ gender as risky to the established gender order, 
and to the equilibrium of the prison, or perhaps is simply a pretext for something which the 
prison does not fully believe in, and therefore does not wish to accommodate.  The chapter 
further argued that judicial discourse in Green reproduces and perpetuates negative 
discourses about transgender prisoners, characterising their gender as artificial and 
                                                          
174
 Use of the term “transvestite” seems to be at odds with PSI 2016’s general approach to adopting more 
current, non-medicalised and non-pathologising terminology in prison policy. It is not clear why this term was 
adopted, instead of the less problematic term “cross-dressers”, for example.   
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performative, and contrasting it with cisgender prisoners’ gender, which it portrays as 
natural and non-performative. It also reinforces the view, internally within the prison, and 
to the outside world, that PSI 2011 gives transgender prisoners’ “advantages in clothing and 
lifestyle” that are not available to cisgender prisoners.  Thus, the chapter has argued, 
recourse to law, rights and the courts not only resulted in a negative outcome for Green, but 
also has much broader regressive, discursive effects.  
Having discussed the use of prison dress to discipline gender along normative lines, the next 
chapter, Chapter 6, turns to consider the powerful legacy of the medicalisation of 
transgender prisoners, and historical and contemporary barriers to transgender prisoners’ 
access to gender reassignment treatment. 
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Chapter 6:  The Legacy of Medicalisation and Barriers to 
Gender Reassignment Treatment for Transgender Prisoners 
 
This chapter examines the legacy of the medicalisation of “transsexuality” (see Chapters 1 
and 3) in the conception, treatment and control of transgender prisoners.  It argues that 
past and present barriers to transgender prisoners’ access to medical gender reassignment 
treatment not only have serious consequences for their health, but also impact on other 
aspects of their lives in prison, particularly prison allocation.  The thesis has argued that in 
prison, transgender bodies, and particularly “incongruous” transgender bodies, are 
problematic; defying normative categorisation, they represent a risk to the established 
order and regulation of gender.  This chapter shows how, in the past, legal, medical and 
penal power converged in the disciplining, punishment and control of gender- and sexually- 
non-normative people as part of the governmentality of sex/gender.  It argues that, despite 
the medical model of “transsexuality”, prison medical power was used to discipline and 
punish the first “transsexual” prisoners, rather than to treat them for their “transsexuality”, 
and situates this in a continuum of power over gender non-normative prisoners. This 
chapter then explores the effects of law, and human rights, in ameliorating access to 
medical gender reassignment treatment for those transgender prisoners who desire it, 
whilst critically engaging with the negative aspects of litigation, advocacy, and legal and 
policy reform. 
Transgender prisoners now have a right to NHS-equivalent gender reassignment treatment, 
including diagnosis, counselling, hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery,175 
                                                          
175
 It is common for gender reassignment surgery to be referred to in the singular, and to be intended to mean 
genital reassignment surgery.  However, a range of gender reassignment surgeries exists.  See Glossary.    
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but access is beset by resource constraints and structural equality issues in the general 
provision of transgender healthcare and prisoner healthcare.  Beyond this, the chapter 
argues that the realisation of transgender prisoners’ rights to access gender reassignment 
treatment is hindered by three main factors: first, by a widespread public perception that 
they are “less eligible” or undeserving of expensive surgery on the NHS, second, by a deep-
seated disbelief of the authenticity and motives of those who first express themselves as 
transgender whilst in prison (compared to those “deserving” prisoners who transitioned 
before prison), and third, by concerns that permitting transgender women housed in the 
male estate (in particular) to access gender reassignment treatment is risky, as it will lead to 
legal recognition of their gender,176 and hence to their right to transfer to the female estate, 
with all the related perceived risks examined in Chapter 4.  From an organisational risk 
perspective (Whitty 2011), the chapter argues that these concerns translate into a risk of 
public and political backlash, amid a resurgence of penal popularism, and a climate of fear 
around transgender women’s bodies in “women-only spaces” (see Introduction).   
This chapter overlaps with Chapter 4, which explored the centrality of genitalia, and hence 
genital reassignment surgery, to transgender prisoners’ allocation within the prison estate, 
as challenged in AB (2009), and the shift to the centrality of legal gender recognition, which 
still requires a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and the expectation that surgery will 
follow (see Chapter 3). The chapter also dovetails with Chapter 5, as gendered embodiment 
is not only important to some transgender people’s health and well-being in terms of finding 
their “bodily home” (Prosser 1998) but is also important to some people in terms of being 
                                                          
176
 It will be recalled that, under the Gender Recognition Act, a medical diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” and 
two years living in one’s gender is required, before an application may be made for a GRC.  
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“socially recognisable” in their gender and/or for feeling safe177  (which is likely to be 
particularly true in the prison).  However, for those transgender people who do not wish to 
medically transition, or to submit themselves to a pathologising medical diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, legal gender recognition and hence the right178 to be housed in a gender-
appropriate prison is proscribed. Thus, the legacy of medicalisation has particularly enduring 
power in the prison.        
This chapter is divided into six parts.  The first part examines the way in which, historically, 
legal and medical power were used to enforce sexuality and gender norms on prisoners. 
Against this backdrop, the second part discusses the inhumane use of prison medical power, 
in the early 1980s, to discipline and punish “transsexual” prisoners with incongruous bodies 
by withdrawing hormone treatment, and the role of a human rights organisation in bringing 
public attention and sympathy to the issue. The third part charts developments in 
transgender prisoners’ right to access gender reassignment treatment through the 
introduction, in 1994, of a policy of “NHS-equivalence” in prisoner healthcare, and the ruling 
in NW Lancashire (1999) that gender reassignment surgery is covered by the NHS. It 
examines further prisoner litigation in this field, culminating in the human-rights infused 
judgment in AB (2009).  This part also considers the costs of progress, including the 
claimant’s reliance on the argument that “transsexuality” is a mental disorder in NW 
Lancashire, and the court’s perpetuation in AB of the notion that “full” realisation of gender 
is achieved through gender reassignment surgery, not through a GRC.  The fourth part 
                                                          
177
 Plemons has recently examined the growing demand for facial feminisation surgery in the US, as social 
recognition is becoming more important to many transgender people in their daily lives and social interactions, 
and genital reassignment surgery less so (2017). Facial feminisation and masculinisation surgery is not 
available on the NHS in the UK, and has to be privately funded, as in the US.   
178
 Although, as discussed in Chapter 4, PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 contain a discretion for transgender prisoners to 
be allocated to a gender-appropriate prison, even if they do not a GRC. 
  
271 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
examines the transformative potential of PSI 2011’s and PSI 2016’s specific provisions on 
transgender prisoners’ access to medical gender reassignment treatment.   The fifth part 
reflects on the limits of rights rhetoric in this field.  It considers the effects of more subtle 
gatekeeping powers in relation to transgender prisoners’ access to diagnosis, medical 
treatment, and genital reassignment surgery – which paradoxically, still acts as the ultimate 
litmus test of a transgender prisoner’s authenticity in the eyes of the general public, despite 
the widespread objection to such surgery being provided in prison.  In this regard, power 
relations are much more complex than in the previous two chapters, as the 
power/knowledge of specialist gender identity clinics is intertwined with that of primary 
healthcare services in prison, prison administration, and law.  The sixth and final part asks 
whether prison may be the final frontier against the crumbling gender binary. 
In the absence of previous research,179 this chapter draws on a broader literature, and a 
wide range of primary sources, to inform its historical and contemporary analysis.   
Disciplining Gender and Sexuality through Prison Medicine: An 
Historical Overview 
This part starts by outlining the origins of prison medicine and discipline, and then turns to 
examine the specific use of prison medical power to enforce normative gender and sexuality 
                                                          
179 Further historical research would be useful, along the lines of that undertaken by Dickinson, who explores 
patients’ experiences of psychiatric treatment for “homosexuality” and “transvestism” carried out in UK 
“mental” institutions between 1935-74 (2014).  Most of his participants were voluntary out-patients, but one 
undertook treatment after a close scrape with the law, and another as a formal term of their probation, after 
being convicted of a “homosexual offence”.  The field would also greatly benefit from empirical research into 
the contemporary medico-legal-penal governance of primary and secondary healthcare for transgender 
prisoners in England and Wales, incorporating prisoners’ experiences, c.f.  Jaffer et al’s review of transgender 
healthcare in New York City’s correctional system (2015) and Brown’s analysis of transgender inmates’ 
correspondence to a voluntary sector organisation, regarding their problems accessing appropriate healthcare 
(2014, and also Brown and McDuffie 2009).  
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on prisoners, with a particular focus on women and “homosexual offenders”.  This 
background provides important context for understanding the sheer extent of medical 
power in disciplining, punishing and controlling prisoners’ minds and bodies.  Understanding 
the history, and growing controversy, surrounding hormone treatment for “homosexual 
offenders” and other “sex offenders” from the 1940s through to the 1970s arguably also 
helps explain the Prison Medical Service’s refusal to prescribe hormones to the first 
“transsexual” people to be sent to prison, resulting in the return of their secondary sexual 
characteristics.  
The origins of prison medicine and discipline 
The legislature has been involved in prison healthcare since the late 18th century, when 
concerns about prisoners’ health and the rampant spread of disease (“gaol fever”) led to the 
Health of Prisoners Act 1774 (14 Geo III C.59) and an act restricting jail fees.  The Health of 
Prisoners Act provided for improved prison conditions, including cleanliness and ventilation 
of cells, regular healthcare through the appointment of a prison doctor, and the 
containment of disease through the provision of separate sick rooms, all to be overseen by 
justices of the peace.  Prisons were required to paint and display the Act on a board, so that 
prisoners were aware of its provisions. “By those acts”, the prison reformist John Howard 
rather melodramatically proclaimed in his classic work The State of The Prisons in England 
and Wales (Howard 1777), “the tear was wiped from many an eye, and the legislature had 
for them the blessing of many that were ready to perish” (Howard 1777:2).   
Both Foucault (1977), who considered the topic more broadly, across different institutional 
settings, and Ignatieff (1978), who specifically examined the English penitentiary from 1750-
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1850, challenged the then dominant view that institutional medicine had evolved as a 
“benevolent set of practices and benign programmes”, and instead regarded healthcare, 
medical examinations and cell inspections as part of the wider imposition of discipline on 
the confined (Sim 1990: 5).  Whilst Foucault argued that law conceded its power to the 
disciplines at the prison door, Ignatieff argued that the English magistracy was so heavily 
invested in the principle of “less eligibility”180 that when the prison reformist, George 
Onesiphorus Paul, wanted to improve hygiene in Gloucestershire’s jails in the late 18th 
century following an outbreak of gaol fever, he first had to persuade his fellow magistrates 
that sanitary improvements would not reduce the pains of incarceration, or compromise the 
deterrent value of punishment (Ignatieff 1978: 100-102).  Paul’s solution was to convince 
the magistrates that “hygienic rituals could be made to serve punitive functions” (ibid).  
Thus, medical rituals carried out on admission to the penitentiary – having one’s head 
shaved, being stripped naked, bathed, and examined by a doctor, and then dressed in 
institutional clothing – were endowed with “a latent but explicit purpose of humiliating 
prisoners” (1978: 100-102).181  These admission procedures brought home to offenders “the 
state’s power to subject every outward feature of their identity to control” (ibid), whilst the 
daily clean-ups and hygienic inspections were intended “not only to guard against disease” 
but also “to express the state’s power to order every feature of the institutional 
environment” (ibid). Foucault’s portrayal of the disciplinary purpose of medical power was 
somewhat different from Ignatieff’s.  For Foucault, the routine medical examination was a 
                                                          
180 It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that this principle (which applied to everything from food, to prison 
conditions, to healthcare, and access to the courts) reflected the widespread view that prisoners should not 
live in better conditions than on the outside, and continued to inform penal policy well into the 20
th
 century.   
181
 See also the discussion of Sykes and Goffman’s respective theories on the “destruction of the psyche” and 
the “mortification of the self” in Chapter 5. 
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route to power/knowledge.  This “slender” technique lay “at the heart of the procedures of 
discipline”, for, in it, “a whole domain of knowledge, a whole type of power is to be found”, 
and the “normalising gaze” made it “possible to qualify, to classify, and to punish” 
(1977:184-5).   
It is important to note at this juncture that, in England, the Prison Medical Service was an 
entirely separate entity from the NHS, and prison doctors and nurses were paid by, and part 
of, the Prison Service.  This situation allowed medical power to accumulate and consolidate 
in prison, and shielded it from the public gaze.  In Medical Power in Prisons: The Prison 
Medical Service in England 1774-1989 (1990), Sim developed the insights of Foucault and 
Ignatieff, and their rejection of the evolutionary model of medical benevolence, in the 
specific context of England’s Prison Medical Service, from its genesis in 1774 through to 
1989.  Sim’s work provides a crucial historical and critical plank for this chapter.  He argues 
that prison medical workers were not only concerned with maintaining discipline and order 
within the prison, but were also informed and influenced in their work by broader penal 
ideologies of the time, particularly the discipline of “less eligibility” (which, as argued below, 
is still evident in penal populism today, despite a policy of NHS-equivalence in prison 
medical treatment).  Sim also gives an important account of the various violent and coercive 
medical practices used to discipline and control prisoners’ bodies and minds, including 
practices directed at women and “homosexual offenders” as gender- and sexually-“deviant” 
prisoners.  These particular insights are important, for whilst Foucault’s theory on the 
governmentality of sex and sexuality (1978) (as extended by Butler to gender (1999)) helps 
explain the part played by both law and prison medicine in punishing, pathologising and 
attempting to normalise these particularly “risky” categories of prisoners in the interests of 
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governmentality, neither Foucault nor Ignatieff specifically considered the disciplining of 
sex, sexuality or gender in their studies of prison medical power.  
The pathologisation and medical disciplining of women prisoners  
Before turning to the medico-legal disciplining of “homosexual offenders”, it is important to 
note that women prisoners, as a class, were constituted as having breached both the law 
and gender norms by engaging in crime.  Building on earlier scholarship on women’s 
imprisonment in England (e.g. Smart 1976, Carlen 1983, Dobash, Dobash and Gutteridge 
1986), Sim contends that penal power was deployed to “reshape the very spirit of the 
criminal woman back to the role for which she was seen to be biologically and sociologically 
suited – that of wife and mother” (1990: 130) and that, crucially, prison medical power was 
also deployed to this end.  Women prisoners were disciplined and “normalised” into the 
feminine ideal, he argues, not only through moral instruction and domestic science 
education, but also through psychiatric treatment, straight-jackets and psychotropic drugs, 
which were used to break resistance and subdue the spirit (ibid: 129-176; see also Genders 
and Player 1987).  As women prisoners who dressed in “men’s” clothing and/or cut their 
hair short were constructed by prison management in the 1970s as aggressive, disruptive 
and anti-authoritarian (see Chapter 5), it can safely be assumed that prison medicine would 
have been particularly heavily deployed in the discipline and control of such non-normative, 
“masculine”, women, and that this might have included people who would identify as 
transgender men in today’s terms.  So strong was the construction of women prisoners as 
inherently pathological, that HMP Holloway, the first prison specifically designed for 
women, was finally re-opened in 1983, having been re-built as a “medically-orientated 
establishment with the comprehensive, versatile, and secure hospital as its central feature”, 
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on the matter-of-fact basis that “most women and girls in custody require some form of 
medical, psychiatric or remedial treatment” (Home Office 1969: 61-62; see further Sim 
1990: 164-167 and Smart 1976).   
The consolidation of legal and medical power in the medical disciplining of “homosexual 
offenders”  
By contrast, the male prison population was not, as a whole, pathologised.  However, men 
convicted of “homosexual offences” were pathologised, and medico-legal power was 
specifically directed at disciplining and controlling their sexuality.  The medical disciplining of 
“homosexual offenders” provides particularly important context for this chapter, as men 
who cross-dressed or were perceived to be “effeminate” were disproportionately arrested 
and imprisoned for homosexual offences, particularly “importuning” (Schofield 1965: 12-
14), and, inevitably, this would have included some people who would identify as 
transgender women in today’s terms.  Further, “transsexualism” was not yet widely 
recognised within the legal and medical professions as distinct from homosexuality (see 
Chapter 1). Thus, whilst legal, penal and medical governance of homosexual and 
transgender prisoners later diverged, at this historical moment, they followed the same 
trajectory.   
Following an extension of its powers over the terms of probation in the Criminal Justice Act 
1948, the courts started to place homosexual offenders on community-based sentences, on 
the condition that they complete a course of psychiatric or hormone treatment as a term of 
their probation (on the effects of the Criminal Justice Act generally, see Sim 1990: 77-78).  
This practice came to widespread public attention in 2013, through the posthumous royal 
pardon granted to Alan Turing, the Enigma code-breaker, in relation to his 1952 conviction 
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for “gross indecency” for engaging in private, consensual sexual activity with another adult 
man. Like many other men convicted of homosexual offences at the time, Turing agreed to 
submit to hormone injections as part of his parole, in order to avoid imprisonment 
(Swinford 2013).182 He reportedly developed breasts and became depressed.  Although the 
coroner recorded an open verdict, many consider that his death was suicide (e.g. Cook et al 
2007: 166). 
In addition to ordering psychiatric or hormone treatment as part of a community-based 
sentence, the courts tried to extend the arm of the law into the penal domain by making 
directions that “homosexual offenders” should receive psychiatric treatment in prison.  This 
exercise of judicial power proved controversial, not because of the court’s intention that 
men should be treated for their “homosexuality” (for which there was widespread support 
at the time),183 but because of the court’s lack of medical expertise and inability to 
guarantee that men would receive the psychiatric treatment proposed.  The Wolfenden 
Committee was in favour of such treatment, although it firmly rejected the prevailing view 
that homosexuality was a mental “disease” or “illness” (Home Office 1957: 13-15 and 66; 
see generally, Moran 1996). Indeed, it found little medical evidence that treatment could 
result in a change in direction of sexual preference but remarked that simply “making the 
man more discreet or continent in his behaviour, without attempting any other change in 
                                                          
182
  In January 2017, so-called “Turing’s law” – an amendment to the Policing and Crime Act 2017 – extended 
posthumous pardons to all men convicted of homosexual offences which are no longer on the statute books. 
183 Including within the prison authorities, e.g. the 1953 Report of the Commissioners of Prisons stated that 
the main “medical objectives” in this field were to determine “whether in any case psychiatric treatment was 
desired or practicable” and “to watch for evidence that any prisoner of latent homosexual tendencies was 
becoming involved” (139).   
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his nature” was “not to be despised as an objective, for if it is successful such treatment will 
reduce the number of homosexual offences and offenders” (ibid: 66-67).   
Nevertheless, the Committee expressed serious concerns that the courts, on sentencing 
men convicted of homosexual offences, “sometimes intimated to an offender that he would 
receive medical treatment for his condition in prison”, and “in some cases, the courts even 
suggest that the offender is being sent to prison for this purpose” (Home Office 1957: 61-
62), given the limited resources of the PMS,184 and the small prospect of success (ibid).    
It seems that some men were themselves hopeful of treatment, whilst others who were 
offered treatment resisted, by being uncooperative, or rejected treatment outright 
(Hansard, HC Deb 3 December 1953, vol 521, cc1295-9).  The 1953 Report of the 
Commissioners of Prisons notes that efforts had been made that year to interview “all 
homosexuals who were potential cases for psychological assessment or treatment”, but 
who had previously refused the opportunity, but “so far, no prisoner was found who 
appeared to have a genuine desire for such treatment” (139).   
There is little material on the precise nature of psychiatric treatment for “homosexual 
offenders” in prison.  Dr. William Calder, Principle Medical Officer at Brixton Prison, declined 
to discuss the specifics in his 1957 lecture to psychiatrists (1957).  There is evidence, 
however, that treatment was not always restricted to “talking therapy”. In 1974, Professor 
Alexander Leitch, a visiting psychologist at HMP Shepton Mallet, reported in the Prison 
Medical Journal how he had used aversion therapy in the case of two homosexual sexual 
                                                          
184
 The Committee noted that the Prison Medical Service was understaffed, few prison doctors had psychiatric 
training, and few were able to call upon psychiatric consultants from the NHS, given that the PMS and the NHS 
were not integrated and there was a national shortage of psychiatrists. 
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offenders, by presenting “provocative pictures of males” and applying a painful electric 
shock “whilst at the same time remarking that homosexual activities were disgusting, 
loathsome, and led to corruption of the young and later to conflicts with society and the 
law” (1974: 26).185 
The introduction of hormone treatment in prison 
Although hormone treatment, as well as psychiatric treatment, was used to treat 
homosexual offenders in the community, the Wolfenden Report observed that, in 1957, it 
was banned in prison. The “reluctance of the authorities to permit the indiscriminate 
administration of oestrogens for this purpose”, it stated, “is understandable”, and “certainly 
there can be no question of departing from the general law that the consent of a patient 
must be given before medical treatment is administered” (Home Office 1957: 71).  However, 
“if a prisoner himself clearly wishes to undergo oestrogen treatment, which may indeed 
have a beneficial effect, we think it wrong that he should not be afforded the opportunity” 
(ibid).  The following year, in 1958, the Committee’s recommendation was implemented, 
and oestrogen treatment was made available in “suitable cases”, subject to Home Secretary 
approval and the prisoner’s informed, written consent (Hansard, HL Deb 12 May 1965, vol 
266, cc 71-172).  The paper trail then goes cold for a decade, when reports emerged of 
hormones being used to treat “sexual offenders” more broadly.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several visiting psychotherapists working in prisons, Dr. 
Field and Dr. White at HMP Wormwood Scrubs, Dr. Fitzgerald at HMP Dartmoor, and Dr. 
                                                          
185
 Dickinson recounts the horrifically debasing experiences of aversion therapy on men who either voluntarily, 
or by order of the court, attended psychiatric hospitals as out-patients for homosexuality and/or 
“transvestism”/ cross-dressing (2014).  However, the author has not found any specific accounts of aversion 
therapy used on cross-dressing or “transvestism” in prison. 
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Leitch at HMP Shepton Mallet, published a series of reports in the Prison Medical Journal on 
the experimental use of hormones in the treatment of sexual offenders in prison.  Dr. White 
reported that of the 40 men he had treated with oestradial implants186 in Wormwood 
Scrubs, most had been convicted of offences against children, but “homosexuals were also 
involved” (Daily Telegraph Reporter 1968), whilst Dr. Fitzgerald reported that oestradial 
implants given to 28 prisoners at Exeter and Dartmoor were mainly directed at “pederasts”, 
although “exceptionally” he agreed to prescribe hormones to a male prostitute, who had 
not been convicted of any sexual offences (1974: 17).  As the Prison Medical Journal was a 
confidential, in-house publication, circulated only to Prison Medical Service staff,187 it took 
some time before the details of these experimental treatments on prisoners, and their 
serious side effects (see below), reached the public domain.   
A Sunday Times article in 1978 seems to have been key to bringing public attention to the 
issue, under the headline “Worries Growing over Anti-Sex Drugs in Prisons” (Harriman 
1978).  The reporter explained that he had obtained copies of the restricted Prison Medical 
Journal articles mentioned above (ibid).  Before then, the public had only been fed positive 
news.  In 1969, for example, a Home Office white paper, entitled People in Prison (England 
and Wales), described the “use of hormone therapy as an adjunct to psychotherapy” in the 
treatment of “abnormal sexual offenders” as “an area in which pioneering work is being 
done in the Prison Medical Service” (1969: 35), whilst a senior doctor in the Prison Medical 
Service, who was closely involved in the Wormwood Scrubs experiment, reported that the 
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 These were small pellets, inserted under the skin, which provided a slow release of oestrogen over a six-
month period.  Tablets and 3-monthly injections were also used.   
187
 Even though the editor of the Prison Medical Journal called for “the powers that be” to make it publicly 
available (Hansard, HC Debates 4 Dec 1979, vol 975, c100W), its circulation remained restricted to PMS staff.   
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drugs were increasingly being used in other prisons, and commented that “this is no longer 
an experiment.  We regard this as positive treatment” (Daily Telegraph Reporter 1968).   
Serious side-effects, litigation and public controversy  
Although the Wolfenden Committee had been assured by various medical experts that 
oestrogen treatment was safely being used in outside practice (Home Office 1957:71-72), it 
soon became clear that the use of oestrogens and later anti-androgens (which block the 
production of testosterone) had serious side effects.  These ranged from nausea and sharp 
pains in the chest, stomach and testes (Harriman 1978), to blood clots and the development 
of breasts (“gynaecomastia”). These side effects were reported in the Prison Medical Journal 
articles mentioned above.  Dr. Fitzgerald stated, for example, that  oestradiol implants 
involved the “inevitable complication of gynaecomastia,” which “almost invariably reaches a 
state demanding surgery within twelve months of starting treatment” (1974:18-19). He did 
not regard this side-effect as problematic, however, and lamented the difficulty in obtaining 
mastectomies for such prisoners on the NHS, and in finding surgeons willing to undertake 
the operation (ibid).  He remarked that many did not agree with the treatment on ethical 
grounds, but, in his view, they did not fully understand the context (ibid). Most of the 
mastectomies reportedly took place at HMP Grendon Underwood, and some took place at a 
small surgery in Devon (Smith 1978).    
The need for surgical removal of hormonally-induced breasts in at least 10% of oestradiol 
implant cases became increasingly controversial and, in 1977, the National Association for 
Mental Health (“MIND”) announced that it was suing the Department of Health and Social 
Security for alleged negligence in the treatment of a patient, William Pale, at Broadmoor 
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secure hospital.  MIND argued that Pale had not given valid consent to such implants, as he 
was not made fully aware of the possible risks and side-effects (General Practitioner 
Reporter 1977). Pale had been one of 12 patients at Broadmoor to take part in an 
“apparently experimental” treatment programme with sex offenders, in 1971 (ibid), which 
resulted in him having to have one breast surgically removed and left him with extensive 
scarring and pains in the chest (ibid).  Two other patients also had to have breasts removed 
(ibid). Although a hearing date was set, the case had to be postponed shortly beforehand, as 
“British psychiatrists were hesitant to testify against their colleagues at Broadmoor” (ibid). 
The case does not appear to have proceeded and may have been settled out of court.  
However, it brought to the fore concerns about the side effects and the validity of consent, 
in scenarios where patients/ prisoners might consent to experimental treatment in the hope 
of early release (Berry 1978).  Together with the leaked details of the treatments being 
conducted in prison (Harriman 1978), Pale’s case led to calls for oestrogen implants to be 
banned in secure hospitals and prisons (Smith 1978).  Against the backdrop of this legal 
action, and the attendant negative publicity, it would appear that, by the late 1970s, the use 
of hormone treatment for sexual offenders was either officially banned or otherwise ceased 
in prisons.   
The reasons for relaying this historical background in considerable detail are threefold.  
First, it helps contextualise the sheer extent of legal and medical power to discipline 
prisoners’ bodies.  Second, due to the historical conflation of gender and sexuality, the 
medical disciplining of homosexual offenders in particular, but also of women perceived to 
depart most from the “feminine” norm, would inevitably have encompassed some prisoners 
who would describe themselves as transgender in contemporary terms.  Third, this 
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background may help explain early prison medical responses to prisoners who identified as 
“transsexual” on reception to prison.  These prisoners represented a new and uncertain 
challenge for the Prison Medical Service, and a new risk, particularly given public outcry and 
litigation over its previous use, and serious side effects, of oestrogen treatment on 
“homosexual offenders”. 
Medical Power in the Disciplining and Punishment of “Transsexual” 
Prisoners  
From the late 1960s, it is evident that transgender men and women were being sent to 
prison, some of whom had been on hormone treatment and/or had undertaken gender 
reassignment surgery prior to imprisonment,188 and some of whom hoped to have such 
treatment.  In 1969, for example, The Guardian reported (under the headline “Chance of Sex 
Change in Prison”) that a judge had recommended that the prison authorities “provide 
every facility for the medical requirements” of two transgender men, whom he had 
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for obtaining a diamond ring by deception (Guardian 
Reporter 1969).  The men (described as wearing men’s suits, with open necked shirts and 
short cropped hair) had reportedly committed the offences as a “short cut” to a new life: 
unable to obtain employment in traditional “men’s work”, they had turned to crime to try to 
fund gender reassignment surgery at Guys Hospital in London (ibid).  There are no reports of 
what treatment, if any, they received in prison.  Indeed, the Prison Medical Journal contains 
no references whatsoever to the medical treatment (if any) offered to transgender 
prisoners in its entire period of publication from 1965-1982. Apart from a brief reference, in 
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 E.g. Racheal Gosling (1969), whose case is discussed in Chapter 4.  Unfortunately, there is no reference to 
the medical care she received in prison. 
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article about HMP Grendon’s “F wing”, that one inmate had a diagnosis of “sexual identity 
crises” (Wool 1978: 47), both the presence and medical treatment of transgender prisoners 
goes unmarked.   
In 1968, Professor William Symmers, a specialist in the treatment of “transsexuality” at 
Charing Cross hospital (who later gave medical evidence to the court in Corbett (1970)) 
published an article about two transgender patients who had died from breast cancer five 
years after having had regular oestrogen implants overseas (1968).  Symmers’ paper is said 
to have caused concern among prison doctors using such oestrogen implants to reduce sex 
drive in male sexual offenders (Harriman 1978).  Unfortunately, even though other types of 
hormone treatments were being developed and were being safely prescribed to 
transgender people in the outside community, Symmers’ paper, and the controversy which 
later ensued around the side effects of oestrogen implants on sex offenders, seems to have 
contributed to a broader anxiety, and a heightened precautionary approach, to the use of 
any hormones in prison, including in the treatment of transgender prisoners.  A less 
generous interpretation might be to regard prison medical responses to transgender 
prisoners as a continuum of prison medical power in disciplining non-normative gender and 
sexuality.  Absent any published research in relation to the historical medical treatment of 
transgender prisoners, both interpretations are plausible, and may have co-existed.   
In 1980, several newspapers reported the case of Linda Gold, a West End nightclub hostess 
sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for theft.   Press reports of this case, from the 
LAGNA archives, provide the first insights into the Prison Medical Service’s specific response 
to “transsexual” prisoners.  According to various reports (Veitch 1980; Smith 1980: LAGNA 
1980), Gold had lived as a woman for five years before she was sent to prison, and had been 
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prescribed oestrogen on the NHS throughout that period.  As she had not had gender 
reassignment surgery, she was treated by the prison authorities as a man and sent to HMP 
Wormwood Scrubs (see Chapter 4 on the centrality of genitalia to prison allocation 
decisions at this time). The prison doctor and the principal medical officer refused to 
continue her previous prescription, as there were “no clinical indications for prescribing 
oestrogens for this man [sic+” nor, in the latter’s medical opinion, was it “necessary to 
prescribe any treatment” at all for Gold (Veitch 1980).  Her skin started to roughen, her 
body and facial hair return, and her breasts shrink, and she became severely depressed 
(ibid).   
The National Council for Civil Liberties (“NCCL”, now “Liberty”) took up Linda Gold’s case, 
and petitioned both the Governor and Prison Department to allow her access to hormone 
treatment, describing it as “pointlessly cruel to force her to reacquire male secondary 
characteristics” (Veitch 1980).  The Governor was not willing to intervene in the principal 
medical officer’s decision, however, and the Prison Department took a similar stance.  A 
Home Office spokesperson remarked that Gold “does not suffer from any of the medical 
conditions for which female hormones are clinically indicated” and there were “special 
hazards” in the use of female sex hormones (ibid).  Indeed, it continued, no prison medical 
officer at the time would prescribe hormonal treatment, as the possible side effects 
rendered it a “hazardous treatment for any prisoner” (ibid).   Another article cited the Home 
Office spokesperson as saying that “it is a general clinical judgment that this treatment is 
hazardous and prison doctors will not give it” (Smith 1980).  This official statement from the 
Home Office supports the author’s hypothesis that hormone treatment may have been 
banned in prisons and secure hospitals, after growing concerns about the experiments in 
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prison (Harriman 1978) and the MIND/ William Pale litigation in 1979.   The harmful 
withdrawal effects from pre-existing (NHS-prescribed) hormone treatment did not seem to 
feature in the Home Office decision, however.  Prison medical power was separate from the 
NHS, and absolute.  
The NCCL’s arguments that the Prison Department was being “cruel” and “doubly 
punishing” Gold by denying her proper treatment appear to be the first appearance of, and 
recourse to, human rights discourse in relation to the treatment of transgender prisoners. 
The language used by NCCL recalls the prohibition of “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment” in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, article 5), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1977, article 7), and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (article 3).  It also echoes the fundamental principle of 
prisoners’ rights, confirmed by the English courts in Raymond v Honey (1983), that 
imprisonment should entail only loss of liberty and not additional punishment.189   
The outcome in Linda Gold’s individual case is not clear,190 but the case illustrates the 
effectiveness of an outside, human-rights based pressure group in bringing the situation of 
                                                          
189
Although this issue has yet not come before the UN Human Rights Committee or European Court of Human 
Rights, an application is currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights, under the article 3 
prohibition of “inhuman and degrading treatment”. It concerns the denial of hormone treatment to a 
transgender woman whilst held in custody in Russia, Bogdanova v. Russia (Application No. 63378/13).  See the 
third party intervention by Transgender Europe et al (2015). A substantial body of US case-law also exists in 
this field, under the (broadly comparable) eighth amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment.  
In 2015, the US Justice Department took the highly unusual step of intervening on behalf of Ashley Diamond, a 
transgender prisoner, in a federal lawsuit filed against Georgia correctional officials.  Through a Statement of 
Interest (Diamond v Owers et al., case 5.15.CV.00050.doc 29), the Justice Department advised the court that 
proscriptive “freeze-frame” policies were “facially unconstitutional” under the eighth amendment prohibition 
on “cruel and unusual punishment”, “as they do not provide for individual assessment and treatment” (p.2). 
Another important case is Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2011), in which the Seventh Circuit 
struck down a Wisconsin state statute that prohibited the Department of Corrections from providing hormone 
therapy or gender reassignment surgery to any transgender prisoners.  
190
 Unfortunately, searches at the Liberty Archives at the Hull History Centre, University of Hull, did not reveal 
any further documentation regarding Ms Gold’s case (probably because it “would have been covered by legal 
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transgender prisoners to public attention, and persuading the press and public of the 
legitimacy of their cause, through human rights rhetoric.  The general tone of press 
coverage is sympathetic and respectful of Gold’s gender.  One newspaper report described 
it as “less than constructive to deny Linda Gold the medically approved treatment [she 
received] before she went to gaol”, as this would “lessen her chances of coping with society 
when she gets out of the gaol”, and, moreover, would “punish her twice by trying to make a 
man of her” (Smith 1980).  The latter statement captures in a nutshell the sheer extent of 
prison medical power to punish Gold for failing to conform to societal gender expectations, 
and to literally discipline her body back to her birth-assigned gender (so as to “make a man 
of her”), to reinstate the binary order of the prison, and render her less risky.   
Hormone treatment de novo for transgender prisoners  
Linda Gold’s case involved withdrawal of hormone treatment, which she had been medically 
prescribed before she was imprisoned. By the 1990s, there is evidence that the Prison 
Medical Service had made hormone treatment available for such prisoners, although there 
was sometimes a harmful delay in the (re-)commencement of treatment in prison (Whittle 
and Stephens 2001). The research has not identified any prison statements, or other 
sources, which pinpoint precisely when this change in practice occurred.  However, in the 
late 1990s, press reports emerged of six prisoners who had started to medically reassign 
their gender whilst serving long-term prison sentences in men’s prisons, and who had 
commenced legal action against the Home Office for access to gender reassignment surgery. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
privilege and never formed part of the archives”, e-mail to the author from Verity Minniti, Hull History Centre, 
21 Feb 2015), nor regarding NCCL’s broader advocacy for policy reform in this area.    
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The issue of prisoners commencing medical gender reassignment treatment in prison (“de 
novo”) raised new problems, and potentially risks, for prison management.  
HM Prisons Inspectorate reports of the prisons which housed these six particular 
transgender prisoners are silent as to their presence.191 However, press reports indicate that 
John/Jane Pilley192 (HMP Gartree) had been on hormones since 1992 (Evening Mail Reporter 
1999; Burrell 1999) and that Kelley Denise Richards (HMP Parkhurst) had received Androcur 
(an anti-androgen or testosterone blocker) since 1993 (Burrell 1999; Ford 2006).193 Pilley 
argued that, having had long-term hormone treatment which had feminised her body and 
given her breasts, the prison’s refusal to complete her bodily transformation through 
gender reassignment surgery was unfair, as it left her “in the limbo of being part-man and 
part-woman” (Burrell 1999).  Like Linda Gold’s case, Pilley’s case highlights the sheer extent 
of prison medical power over transgender prisoners’ bodies; their power to provide, 
withhold and withdraw medical treatment. 
Whilst the prison authorities/ Prison Medical Service were prepared to provide these 
transgender prisoners with hormone treatment de novo, they refused to provide gender 
reassignment surgery.  An article in the Independent gives some possible insights into the 
prison authorities’ rationale.  According to a Prison Service spokesperson, the “general 
approach is that the prisoner should wait for release, as it is not really a suitable 
environment to take such an irrevocable decision”, although she noted that “problems arise 
                                                          
191
 Review of archived HM Prisons Inspectorate reports for Gartree (1990, 1993, 1996, 2001), kindly 
undertaken for the purposes of the author’s study by the library staff at the Prison Service College Library (e-
mail to the author, dated 1 July 2015).   
192
 Both first names are referred to, as Pilley later returned to living as a man (see below). 
193
 Other prisoners pursuing legal action against the Home Office for gender reassignment surgery, as reported 
widely in the press, included Tai Pilley (HMP Channings Wood), Matthew Richardson (HMP Gartree) and Philip 
Taplin (HMP Gartree).  The latters’ male names are used here, as their female names were not reported.  
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with prisoners serving a long sentence” (Burrell 1999).  Russell Reid, a consultant 
psychiatrist at the NHS Charing Cross Gender Identity Clinic stated that prison life made it 
very difficult, although not impossible, for inmates to satisfy the necessary criteria before 
they could be given such a life-changing operation, as they “must adjust successfully and live 
and work in their female role for two years before they can be considered for surgery” 
(ibid).  Similar concerns about whether prison can provide a satisfactory “real life test” for 
the purposes of qualification for gender reassignment surgery are expressed by gender 
identity clinicians today (see below).  Concerns about general reaction to the public 
expenditure involved may well have come into play as well, although not officially voiced.  
For whilst hormone treatment is relatively inexpensive, gender reassignment surgery cost 
around £10,000 at the time, under the NHS (Daily Mail Reporter 2000).  
The Significance of NHS-Equivalent Medical Treatment for 
Transgender Prisoners 
The Prison Service only changed its stance when it became legally untenable, after the 
North West Lancashire case (1999).  At this stage, the Prison Service’s head of healthcare 
reportedly instructed the Treasury Solicitors representing the Prison Service to desist from 
contesting the case (Burrell 1999).  It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that, in 1994, the 
Prison Service introduced a policy of NHS-equivalence in prisoner healthcare (HM Prison 
Service 1994).  This policy was a significant milestone and responded to repeated criticisms 
of the second-rate healthcare provided by the Prison Medical Service, and also reflected the 
international principle of equivalence between prisoner and community healthcare laid 
down in various international human rights resolutions and instruments.  The second 
important development, and the turning point for Pilley and the other transgender 
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prisoners who had been pursuing legal cases to access gender reassignment surgery, was 
the ruling in NW Lancashire that “gender dysphoria” is a medical condition eligible for 
treatment, including gender reassignment treatment, under the NHS (unreported, Queen’s 
Bench Division, 21 December 1998).   
The Queen’s Bench decision in NW Lancashire was upheld on 29 July 1999 by the Court of 
Appeal.194  The Court of Appeal held that regional health authorities were not obliged to 
fund gender reassignment surgery in every case, i.e. that there was not a right to gender 
reassignment surgery per se, but they were required to give proper consideration to an 
individual’s need for treatment, and could not operate a blanket policy – whether on paper 
in practice – of refusing funding for gender reassignment surgery.  Such a blanket policy was 
irrational and unlawful under the common law principle of Wednesday unreasonableness.  
It followed, under the policy of “NHS-equivalence” in prisoner healthcare, that transgender 
prisoners were also entitled to be considered for gender reassignment surgery on an 
individual basis.  Thus, when the Prison Service announced that Pilley would be granted 
permission for gender reassignment surgery, it specifically cited its obligation to give 
prisoners the same access to medical care as other members of the public (Burrell 1999; 
English 1999).  It formally reiterated its commitment to equivalence between prison 
healthcare and NHS community healthcare in the House of Commons.  In a response to a 
written question on the Home Office’s policy “in respect of requests by serving prisoners for 
                                                          
194
 There is evidence that a number of other cases had been settled out of court previously, regarding other 
regional health authorities’ policies of refusing funding for gender reassignment surgery; it was reported in the 
British Medical Journal’s news section in 1996 that a transgender person had been granted leave for judicial 
review against Gloucestershire Health Authority’s refusal to pay for gender reassignment surgery (Dyer 1996), 
and, reporting on the NW Lancashire decision, the BBC quoted the claimants’ solicitors as saying that they had 
“successfully settled a number of previous cases”, but this is “the first time the issue has been fully considered 
by the court” (BBC News 1998). 
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access to NHS sex change operations”, Boateng, Minister of State for the Home Office, 
replied: 
Gender dysphoria is a recognised medical condition for which treatment, including 
gender reassignment surgery, is available on the NHS. The Prison Service aims to 
provide prisoners with access to the same range and quality of health services as the 
general public receives from the NHS. A prisoner who had been receiving treatment 
for gender dysphoria under the supervision of an NHS specialist would normally be 
permitted to have gender reassignment surgery on the recommendation of that 
specialist (Hansard, Written Answers, 28 Nov 2000, Col 485W-596W). 
NHS guidelines subsequently published in 2000 gave further substance to the NHS 
transgender treatment pathway.  They provided that transgender patients should be 
treated according to the international protocols laid down by the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association (now WPATH), and that, accordingly, after 
assessment and a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, patients should be provided with 
psychiatric counselling and prescribed hormones.  Gender reassignment surgery should be 
provided for those “carefully selected” people “who reach the surgical stage” after living for 
at least two years in their gender (Annex A to NHS 2000).   
Perpetuation of pathological model of transgender  
Whilst recourse to the courts in NW Lancashire had a positive outcome in providing a legal 
basis for transgender people, and transgender prisoners, to access gender reassignment 
treatment, such progress came at a price. In order to achieve this legal outcome, the 
claimants had to argue that gender dysphoria was a mental illness under the Mental Health 
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Act 1983, and was therefore eligible for treatment under the NHS.  Indeed, the very success 
of the case was built on the “common ground that transsexualism is an illness in the nature 
of a mental disorder” (NW Lancashire (1999): 3). The judgment therefore perpetuated the 
discourse that gender dysphoria is a mental illness in the same moment that it secured 
important legal advances for transgender people, so it cannot be regarded as an entirely 
unequivocal success. Indeed, it is a good example of Butler’s observation that transgender 
people who wish to access medical treatment (and/or legal gender recognition) are placed a 
bind and must be agree to be “undone” in order to “do” themselves (2004: 100). That is, 
they must subject themselves to the existing regulatory apparatus, its conditions and its 
labels (here a mental illness label), in order to exercise their right to personal autonomy.    
Political and public backlash against gender reassignment surgery for prisoners 
Aside from the negative discursive effects of NW Lancashire, the Prison Service’s 
recognition of transgender prisoners’ right to access gender reassignment surgery at tax 
payers’ expense was highly controversial and generated considerable political and public 
backlash.  It was (and continues to be) clearly difficult to affect a shift in the public’s 
perception of prisoners as “less eligible”, as less deserving, of NHS medical treatment than 
law-abiding citizens.195 The view that gender reassignment surgery is a lifestyle choice, 
rather than a genuine medical need, also persisted (and continues to persist) despite the 
NW Lancashire ruling.  These opinions clashed with the Prison Service’s insistence on 
transgender prisoners’ right to NHS-equivalent healthcare, and with the views of advocates 
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 In a review of prison healthcare in England, Ginn remarks that “any successful health initiative runs the risk 
of being seen as too good for prisoners, who are portrayed as undeserving” (2012:2). 
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for transgender people’s rights, as evident from the widespread press coverage of Jane 
Pilley’s and Kelley Denise Richards’ gender reassignment surgeries in 1999 and 2000.     
In March 1999, Pilley became the first prisoner to be granted permission to undergo gender 
reassignment surgery on the NHS.  Her surgery was due to take place in April 1999 (Burrell 
1999; English 1999; Evening Mail Reporter 1999).196 She was then transferred to HMP 
Holloway, a women’s prison (Jenkins and Kay 2006).  In announcing that her surgery would 
go ahead, the Prison Service stated that it was under an obligation to give prisoners the 
same access to medical care as other members of the public (Burrell 1999).  Barrister and 
former Liberal Democrat MP, Alex Carlile, who had campaigned for transgender rights in 
parliament (see Chapter 4), remarked that the decision “was an important step towards 
giving transsexuals proper liberties” (ibid).  Press for Change, the transgender advocacy 
group, also took a human rights stance on the issue, stating that prisoners “are supposed to 
lose their liberty, but they should not be further punished by the removal of treatment for a 
recognised medical condition from which they are suffering” (ibid).   
Other press reports took a different view of transgender prisoners’ access to gender 
reassignment surgery. The Daily Mail reported that Kelley Denise Richard’s gender 
reassignment surgery, which took place in September 2000, had apparently “infuriated 
prison officers, who condemned it as an outrageous waste of NHS money” (Daily Mail 
Reporter 2000). Duncan Keys, assistant secretary of the Prison Officers’ Association, was 
quoted as saying that “prisoners are in prison to be rehabilitated, not to have their sexual 
fantasies accommodated” (ibid).  Keys contrasted this with the “worthy causes clamouring 
                                                          
196
 One press article reports that her surgery entailed an “orchiectomy”, i.e. removal of the testicles, not full 
penectomy and vaginoplasty (Burrell 1999). 
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every day for health treatment, people who have genuine health problems, but who have to 
wait years” (ibid).    The Victims of Crime Trust stated that “the country should hang its head 
in shame” after Richards, a “convicted armed robber”, had the operation (Times Reporter 
2000).  Richards had reportedly committed the crime to try and fund sex change surgery 
(Daily Mail Reporter 2000). 
In an exclusive interview with The Independent, Chief Inspector of Prisons, Sir David 
Ramsbotham, stated that transgender prisoners risked serious health problems if they were 
denied treatment and should be given the same access to surgery as members of the public 
(Goodchild 2000). His views were “greeted with outrage” by the Conservative Home Affairs 
spokesman, who described sex changes for prisoners “as a complete waste of public 
money” and complained that it meant that “resources for thousands of law-abiding people 
who genuinely need operations would be sacrificed” (ibid).  Ramsbotham recognised the 
problems involved but insisted that “if delay to treatment is going to cause damage to 
health, then I don’t think being in prison should be allowed to be the cause of delay” (ibid).    
By 2007, 12 prisoners in total had reportedly completed gender reassignment surgery 
(Williams 2006).  Unusually, Pilley underwent a reversal of the surgery in 2006 (Ford 2006).  
Reversal of gender reassignment is rare, but as Pilley was the first prisoner to undergo 
gender reassignment surgery, this development further fanned the flames of public 
perception that surgery for prisoners was an inappropriate use of tax payers’ money. A 
representative of the Taxpayer’s Alliance is quoted as saying that “it beggars belief that the 
Government can find money for two sex-change operations for a prisoner when life-saving 
medical treatments for honest taxpayers are deemed too expensive” (Daily Mail Reporter 
2006).  The Prison Service refused to comment (ibid). 
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Further, human rights-based, prisoner litigation 
So far, this part has shown how, by the 2000s, prisoners had a firm legal basis on which to 
seek access to NHS-funded counselling, hormone treatment and gender reassignment 
surgery for the treatment of (the mental disorder) “gender dysphoria”.  The Court of Appeal 
in NW Lancashire had not felt it necessary or desirous to draw on human rights in this field, 
given that the Human Rights Act 1998 had not yet entered into force, and there were 
“adequate and more precise domestic principles and authorities governing the issues at 
play” (per Lord Justice Auld, at 14).  However, two cases brought by transgender prisoners 
after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000, demonstrate how direct reliance 
on European Convention rights before the UK courts helped further advance transgender 
prisoners’ access to medical treatment.   
In 2007, Clive197 Watson, a prisoner at HMP Dovegate (a men’s prison), commenced judicial 
review proceedings against the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the prison, 
regarding their refusal to provide her with medical gender reassignment treatment, despite 
the fact that she had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria (Scotney 2007; Dolan 2007).  
Watson was serving a four-year sentence for driving offences and over 70 burglaries, which 
she said she had committed to fund the purchase of hormones on the internet, and to save 
up for gender reassignment surgery (Dolan 2007; Telegraph Reporter 2005).  According to 
press reports, Watson claimed that the Prison Service had breached its own guidelines on 
NHS-equivalence in prisoner healthcare (and was therefore Wednesbury unreasonable). 
Additionally, she argued that it had unlawfully, and discriminatorily, interfered with her right 
to respect for her private life (articles 8 and 14), under the European Convention on Human 
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 Watson’s change of first name is not reported in the media, hence the .  
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Rights, by not referring her to the Primary Care Trust for specialist treatment, and for not 
providing her with private sessions with a psychologist to discuss her gender issues, as 
would be available to transgender people in the outside community (Uttoxeter Post 
Reporter 2007).  The prison authorities’ legal response, and underlying rationale, is not 
clear.  It is possible that prison management felt she should wait until her release, given her 
relatively short sentence, and the views expressed by the Prison Service in relation to 
Pilley’s case. 
The judge held that Watson’s complaints were actionable and gave her permission to take 
her case to a full judicial review hearing before the High Court, but the case was settled out 
of court.198 Nevertheless, the fact that her case settled shows the power of impending 
litigation, and arguably the additional contribution of human rights-based arguments, to 
effect change.  On the other hand, it illustrates continuing public and political backlash 
against transgender prisoners being granted access to public funding, whether in terms of 
legal aid or medical treatment, as exemplified by newspaper headlines such as the Daily 
Mails’ “Prisoner sues over his ‘human right’ to have sex change” (Dolan 2007) and Sunday 
Mercury’s: “Jailbird sues prison for not freeing him to have sex change: AND YOU’RE 
PAYING” (sic) (Scotney 2007).  Opposition MPs also criticised the case.  “It’s nobody’s fault 
but his own that he [sic] is in prison and there is no grounds whatsoever for expecting the 
prison service to facilitate sex changes”, Ann Widdecombe, Conservative MP, commented 
(ibid), perpetuating a discourse of “less eligibility” in relation to transgender prisoners’ 
healthcare.  
                                                          
198
Inquiries of the solicitors’ firm and barrister who represented her, to establish more clearly the fact of the 
case, and when the case was settled (to the extent such details were not covered by client privilege), were not 
fruitful.  Emails dated 18 May 2015, 29 April 2015 and 30 Sept 2014 on file with the author.  
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The case of AB has already been discussed at some length in previous chapters.  What is 
noteworthy for the purpose of this chapter is that AB successfully argued that the prison 
authorities’ refusal to transfer her to a women’s prison, which barred her from progressing 
towards gender reassignment surgery, was both Wednesbury unreasonable at common law 
and comprised an unlawful interference with her right to respect for her private life under 
article 8 ECHR.  Compared to the bench in NW Lancashire, ten years earlier, the court was 
highly receptive to the human rights-based arguments canvassed before it, particularly the 
right to respect for private life, which, by this time, had been interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights to encompass transgender people’s right to personal autonomy, 
Goodwin (2002).  Indeed, as Amatrudo and William-Blake have commented (2015: 136), “it 
is difficult to envisage how, even now, except by relying on the right to private life in article 
8 ECHR, a prisoner who wished to undergo gender reassignment surgery could have 
achieved the result achieved by the claimant, AB, in R (on the application of AB) v Secretary 
of State for Justice (2009)”. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4, that the prison authorities did not (apparently) object to 
AB having gender reassignment surgery per se, but would only contemplate her having 
surgery whilst she was in the male estate, as they considered it too risky to transfer her to 
the female estate without surgery.  The prison authorities’ stance conflicted with the gender 
identity clinic, which required her additionally to have sufficient “real life experience” as a 
woman in a women’s prison before it would consider her suitability for surgery.  The risk for 
the gender identity clinic was presumably that the decision might turn out to be wrong, as 
had happened in Pilley’s case – although interestingly, the author’s research revealed that 
the gender identity clinic permitted a transgender man to have gender reassignment 
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surgery, including a phalloplasty (surgical creation of a penis), in 2008/9, whilst housed in a 
women’s prison, before transferring to the male estate (interviews with PAS, 13 April 2016, 
and Joanne Roberts 26 July 2015). 
Drawing on NW Lancashire, the court noted that AB did not have a right to surgery per se, 
but held that the decision to retain her in the male prison estate effectively barred her from 
ever being considered for gender reassignment surgery, which, following Raymond v Honey 
(1983), “interferes with her personal autonomy in a manner which goes beyond that which 
imprisonment is intended to do” (para 49).  This specific interference with AB’s personal 
autonomy went “to the heart of her identity” (para 53) and to “realisation in full of her 
gender” (para 64, emphasis added).  The court was not so concerned with the prison 
authorities’ refusal to recognise her as a woman per se, as per her GRC.  It is true that AB 
herself wanted gender reassignment surgery, nevertheless, it is significant that the medical 
model of transgender people took precedence in the court’s determination of the issues, 
over and above the legal model prescribed by the Gender Recognition Act, and that, for the 
court, gender reassignment surgery represented the realisation in full of her gender, not  
legal recognition.   
The Medical Implications of PSI 2011 for Transgender Prisoners 
Several years after AB (2009), PSI 2011 came into force.  Interestingly, PSI 2011 starts with 
“Medical Treatment” as its first topic, arguably reflecting this on-going tendency to think 
about transgender people primarily through a medical lens.  Technically, PSI 2011 does not 
further advance transgender prisoners’ right of access to gender-affirming medical 
treatment per se.  Yet, its significance should not be overlooked, both symbolically, as an 
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official policy commitment to NHS-equivalence in transgender prisoner medical treatment, 
and practically, in terms of the specific, detailed obligations it places on prison primary 
healthcare and prison management.  It also makes prison policy on transgender medical 
transparent, and provides an official benchmark against which prisons can be measured, 
and potentially held legally accountable through judicial review.199  
Furthermore, PSI 2011’s provisions are firmly anchored in human rights rubric, making 
explicit the link between prisoners’ rights and the accountability of prison power in this 
field.    The section on “Medical Treatment” even commences with the statement that “a 
convicted prisoner retains all civil rights that are not taken away expressly or by necessary 
implication” (para 2.1), which is taken verbatim from Lord Wilberforce’s famous dictum in 
the seminal prisoners’ rights case of Raymond v Honey (1983).200 The core, mandatory 
provision of PSI 2011 (retained in PSI 2016) on medical treatment, which reflects the human 
rights-based principle of equivalence between prisoner and community healthcare, follows: 
prisons must provide prisoners who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria 
with the same quality of care (including counselling, pre-operative and post-
operative care and continued access to hormone treatment) that they would expect 
to receive from the NHS if they had not been sent to prison (para 2.1).  
Thus, medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria is the access point for the PSI 2011’s provisions 
on medical treatment. Detailed guidance on medical treatment available under the NHS, 
                                                          
199
 It will be recalled that breach of a PSI is not legally actionable per se, but that there is an expectation that 
prison policies will be followed, which will be taken into account in any judicial review of the prison’s actions 
under the common law test of Wednesbury unreasonableness or irrationality.  
200
 Interestingly, this opening sentence was deleted from PSI 2016. 
  
300 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
and reference to the prevailing international and domestic professional standards of care, is 
usefully set out in Annex A to PSI 2011.  
The main provisions of PSI 2011 specifically provide that, for prisoners who have 
commenced medical treatment for gender dysphoria before reception into prison, such 
treatment should normally be continued until the prisoner’s gender specialist has been 
consulted on the appropriate way to manage the prisoner’s treatment (para 2.4). This 
addresses the situation which used to arise in the 1990s and early 2000s, where a prisoner’s 
hormone treatment would usually be suspended pending the gender specialist’s advice 
(Whittle and Stephens 2001).  PSI 2011 also makes it mandatory for the prison healthcare 
team to inform the relevant NHS commissioning authority of any prisoner’s request to begin 
medical treatment for gender dysphoria (para 2.6), and for the prison doctor to refer all 
applications for medical gender reassignment treatment to a consultant specialising in 
gender dysphoria (para 2.8).  These provisions are clearly intended to limit the prison’s 
gatekeeping powers, evident in Watson’s case (above).  
Furthermore, PSI 2011 makes provision for prisoners to access private health services, if 
there are “sound and demonstrable clinical reasons for allowing access” and “evidence that 
this will improve the health of the individual”, rather than such access being based on the 
“uniformed personal choice” of the prisoner (para 2.3).201 Aside from the problematic, 
patronising tone of this small phrase (which is retained in PSI 2016, and acts as a reminder 
of the uneven power relations in prison), the interpretation of this important provision may 
not be straightforward.  Medical opinion remains divided on the clinical necessity and 
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 In Canada, Synthia Kavanagh was ultimately given permission to privately fund her gender reassignment 
surgery, and was then transferred to the female estate (on Kavanagh (2001) generally, see Chapter 4).   
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effectiveness of certain procedures, particularly which side they fall on the clinical/ cosmetic 
divide.  AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162 (Admin), for example, 
challenged an NHS commissioning body’s refusal to commission breast augmentation for a 
transgender woman, who was disappointed with the limited effects of hormone treatment, 
and felt it hindered her feminisation.  Whilst observing that it is “inapt” to describe the 
surgery as “cosmetic” in this context, the court concluded that there was no general medical 
consensus as to the clinical effectiveness of breast augmentation surgery for gender 
dysphoria, and therefore that the Primary Care Trust’s decision to categorise it as a 
cosmetic, non-core procedure for funding purposes was not Wednesbury irrational, 
particularly in light of its limited resources and budgetary obligations.202   
Prison management’s gatekeeping power over transgender prisoners’ access to private 
treatment may also limit the potential of this provision.  During a House of Commons 
debate on transgender prisoners in December 2015, Cat Smith MP read out a letter she had 
received from a transgender prisoner housed in a men’s prison, who had been refused 
continuing access to hormone treatment, and to the final stages of gender reassignment 
surgery, which she had privately arranged before she was sent to prison (Hansard HC Deb 15 
Dec 215, Vol 603, Col 1526-7).  Smith reported that the prisoner had obtained a county 
court judgment in her favour, on 29 October 2015, which stated that the Ministry of Justice 
has responsibility for providing access to private medication and private treatment outside 
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 Courts in the US are divided on the question of whether gender reassignment surgery itself is a “medically 
necessary” treatment for transgender people, and therefore whether its denial to prisoners contravenes the 
eighth amendment Constitutional prohibition of “cruel or unusual treatment”.  In 2014, the Massachussets 
Federal Appeals Court overruled two lower court rulings that gender reassignment surgery was a medically 
necessary treatment and held instead that it comprises one of two suitable treatment regimes available to the 
prison authorities, the other being hormone treatment alone, Michelle Kosilek v Spencer (12-2194 16 Dec 
2014). 
  
302 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
prison, although the final decision rested with the prison governor, following a multi-
disciplinary meeting.  As of 10 December 2015, that meeting had yet to be facilitated (ibid).   
This case illustrates the extent of prison power to deny prisoners’ access to medical 
treatment, whether NHS or privately funded.  It also suggests that sometimes, prison 
management concerns may not simply be about public backlash towards public spending on 
gender reassignment surgery but may be more about loss of power over the governance of 
gender in prison, and loss of control over individual prisoners’ gender reassignment.  It also 
indicates that there is much more at stake in this field than institutional or structural 
problems in realising transgender prisoners’ rights, and that rights rhetoric may have limited 
power to change the discursive terrain, in which transgender prisoners are primarily 
constructed as a risk to good order and discipline in the prison, and a risk to the gender 
order itself. 
The Limits of Rights Rhetoric: Remaining Barriers, Remaining Risks 
and Regressive Discourse  
Although PSI 2016 substantially revises other areas of PSI 2011, it makes no substantive 
changes to the policy’s provisions on medical treatment.  Indeed, the sovereign effects of 
human rights-based developments in the field of transgender prisoner healthcare may well 
have reached their zenith in AB (2009) and PSI 2011.  Transgender prisoners are promised 
NHS-equivalent medical treatment for “gender dysphoria”, the continuation of pre-existing 
hormone treatment, and for those already diagnosed, or newly diagnosed in prison, referral 
to gender identity clinics for gender reassignment treatment.  There is also scope for access 
to private medical treatment.  On paper then, transgender prisoners in England and Wales 
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are in a strong, and perhaps internationally-envied, position.  Unfortunately, despite the 
official rights rhetoric, numerous barriers remain; not only structural barriers, but broader 
socio-cultural barriers, particularly around the trans/gender authenticity of those who first 
express themselves as transgender in prison.   
Human rights rhetoric seems to have had most impact in relation to transgender prisoners 
who are already living in their gender, and/or on hormones, when they are sent to prison.  
Withdrawal of pre-existing hormone treatment appears to be widely regarded as unfair, 
cruel and inhuman, as illustrated by the press coverage of Linda Gold’s case, and more 
recently, Jenny Swift’s case.  As mentioned in the Introduction, Swift had been taking non-
prescription hormone replacement treatment, purchased over the internet, when she was 
sent to HMP Doncaster, a men’s prison, on remand in November 2016.  The author 
understands from a prison doctor that it would not be ethical to prescribe hormones 
without a previous prescription, or specialist advice.203  She took her life on 30 December.  
At the recent inquest into her death (December 2017, the verdict was death by 
misadventure), two fellow inmates told the court that she had struggled without her 
medication for five weeks, and days before her death said she was “starting to turn back 
into a man” (Halliday 2017b).  Shortly before she died, she had been informed that she 
would be receiving hormones on 3 January 2017 (ibid).  However, it is not clear to what 
extent this sympathetic response is consciously grounded in rights, rather than, perhaps, in 
an underlying ethical belief that such prisoners are authentic and therefore “deserving” of 
humane treatment.  The same can be said of the sympathetic response to Tara Hudson and 
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 Informal conversation with a prison doctor at the inquest into Vikki Thompson’s death (16 May 2017). 
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Vikki Thompson, who were allocated to men’s prisons, despite having lived as women for 
many years before they were sent to prison.   
In respect of prisoners who commence gender reassignment in prison, particularly those on 
long-term sentences for violent and/or sexual offences against women, human rights 
rhetoric seems, conversely, to have resulted in considerable public backlash.  Not only has 
there been a resurgence of the popularist rhetoric of “less eligibility” in relation to prisoners 
in general (see Sim 2009: 71-96), but this particular category of prisoners are regarded as 
particularly “undeserving” of publicly-funded medical treatment (and legal aid), due to their 
violent crimes.  Beyond this rhetoric of less eligibility, there appears to be a culturally 
immutable perception that this particular group of prisoners are suspect, both in terms of 
their (trans)gender authenticity, and in terms of their motives for transitioning.  It is likely 
that these deep-seated cultural or emotional responses to (trans)gender authenticity  and 
risk also inform some prison management responses to transgender prisoners who first 
express a desire to medically transition whilst in prison, and – whether consciously or not – 
contribute to the institutional barriers placed in their way.  
Structural and institutional barriers to transgender healthcare 
Transgender people in the outside community face many structural hurdles to accessing 
specialist gender services and treatment.  Numerous reports have highlighted problems 
with NHS transgender healthcare over the years (e.g. Combes, Turner and Whittle 2008; 
Equality and Human Rights Commission 2011; WESC 2016). It is outside the scope of this 
  
305 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
chapter to engage in a detailed review,204 but it is important to have a feel for the main 
issues, as they also affect transgender prisoners’ access to specialist gender services and 
provide a structural and financial limit to whatever is promised in PSI 2011 and PSI 2016.    
One major concern has been the long waiting times for a first appointment with a gender 
identity clinic (this is often one year to eighteen months after a GP’s referral) and for gender 
reassignment surgery.  Another has been the “NHS postcode lottery”, whereby differences 
in regional commissioning policies resulted in uneven access to specialist gender services 
across the country (leading to the NW Lancashire case, above).  The “postcode lottery” has 
now been addressed.  In 2013, NHS England became sole commissioner for specialist gender 
identity services in England, replacing the 152 Primary Care Trusts and 10 Specialist 
Commissioning Groups which previously shared responsibility for commissioning in this 
area.  It has a legal duty to ensure equitable access to treatment.205 In relation to long 
waiting times, in July 2017, NHS England launched a public consultation on its proposals to 
reform the provision of medical gender reassignment treatment, including the introduction 
of an 18 week referral-to-treatment standard along the entire transgender pathway (NHS 
2017).206 Whilst an additional £4.4 million was invested in “genital reconstruction services” 
in 2015/16, NHS England has acknowledge that, in practice, it might take some time for 
waiting times to come down, due to increasing demand (ibid). Referrals have been 
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 The WESC report on Transgender Equality provides a good synopsis of the current position (2016: 
Chapter 5). 
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 In the absence of a service specification in this field, NHS England issued an Interim Protocol in November 
2013. 
206
 After a national procurement process, the plan is that all newly NHS-commissioned gender identity services 
will “begin regular, consistent national reporting in 2018 so that there is absolute transparency about waiting 
times” (NHS England 2017).   
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increasing by an average 25–30 per cent per year across all gender identity clinics (WESC 
2016: 189).  
It is clear that these issues have also affected transgender prisoners’ access to specialist 
treatment. For example, prior to NHS England becoming sole commissioner of gender 
identity services in April 2013, regional differences in funding policies meant that Billie 
Evans, a transgender prisoner who had started to live as a woman in October 2011 at HMP 
Full Sutton (a men’s prison) was informed that the local Primary Care Trust did not fund 
gender reassignment treatment (PPO 2014: para 44).  She became increasingly frustrated 
about the slow progress in her transition and committed suicide in March 2012 (ibid). In 
another case, a prisoner at HMP Dovegate (a men’s prison) recounted that she had waited 
several years for each appointment with the gender identity clinic, and missed her third 
appointment, after being strip-searched and placed in a holding cell for two hours waiting 
for prison transport which did not materialise (Baker 2017: 81-82). 
In other cases, it appears that deliberate obstructions have been placed in the way of 
transgender prisoners accessing specialist gender services.  The Bent Bars Project reported 
to the WESC that one transgender prisoner was led to believe that the prison had been 
trying to make contact with a gender identity clinic, but on contacting the clinic after her 
release, she discovered that no contact had been made (Bent Bars Project 2015; WESC 
2016: para 306).  
According to Sarah Jane Baker, a transgender prisoner at HMP Elmley (a men’s prison), the 
consultant at the gender identity clinic made it clear to her that even a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria (yet alone treatment) would not be possible until she had lived as a woman 
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outside prison (2017: 94). After four appointments at the clinic did not result in a diagnosis, 
she took the decision to castrate herself (ibid: 92-95).  At least three other prisoners have 
castrated themselves in the English and Welsh prison estate, due to frustrations over delays 
and denials of treatment,207and Jenny Swift hanged herself after five weeks without 
hormone therapy. Whilst it is impossible to assess the clinical judgment made in Baker’s 
case, it is a stark reminder of the despair, frustration and powerlessness that transgender 
prisoners may feel when treatment is denied or delayed.208 
Is prison life real enough for the “real life test”?  
The biggest remaining obstacle to transgender prisoners accessing genital reassignment 
surgery appears to be the question of whether they can satisfactorily meet the so-called 
“real life experience” or “real life test”, which is a pre-condition of surgery.209  From the 
author’s telephone conversation with James Barrett (13 Oct 2015), lead clinician at Charing 
Cross gender identity clinic and president of the British Association of Gender Identity 
Specialists, it seems that under the current practice and leadership of gender identity clinics, 
transgender prisoners will only be granted full genital reassignment surgery in highly 
exceptional cases (for example, for prisoners on whole-life tariffs, for whom prison is their 
life).  However, press reports indicate that some transgender prisoners may be given partial 
genital surgery, such as Jessica Winfield, who reportedly underwent an oridechtomy 
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 Hunnisett (discussed below); Watson (discussed above); Amber McDonald (Daubney 2014); an anonymous 
prisoner, who corresponded with Cat Smith MP, described how she had injected bleach into her testicles and 
then tried to cut off her scrotum, after being denied hormone treatment, which she had been on prior to 
imprisonment (McLelland 2015). 
208
 See further Brown’s US-based research on the increased risks of auto-castration and suicide amongst 
transgender prisoners following abrupt withdrawal of hormone treatment or lack of initiation of hormone 
therapy when medically necessary (2010). 
209
 Under the Interim Procotol, the expected period is “typically” 12 to 24 months (2013: 20).  
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(surgical castration) in March 2017 (Joseph 2017). In Transsexual and 
Other Disorders of Gender Identity: A Practical Guide to Management (2006), Barrett 
remarked that, aside from the institutional barriers to prisoners completing the real life test, 
“a major problem is the extent to which any sort of valid ‘real life experience’ can be 
conducted in a prison.” (ibid: 14). Whilst prisons are often thought to be “places where 
difference is not well tolerated”, those serving longer sentences often develop the ability to 
get on with disparate others, or else spend a lot of time alone (ibid).  Furthermore, prisoners 
who start to transition in prison are likely to be placed with more tolerant prisoners, which, 
he remarked, protects them from the “unbridled opinion of others” and does not offer a 
real-life experience (ibid).   He expressed similar views in the telephone conversation with 
the author.  Whilst some cases were successful, there was a concern that sometimes things 
might “unravel on the outside” (13 Oct 2015).  
WPATH’s Standards of Care state that the rationale for the “real life experience” is: 
based on expert clinical consensus that this experience provides ample opportunity for 
patients to experience and socially adjust in their desired gender role, before undergoing 
irreversible surgery ... Changing gender role can have profound personal and social 
consequences, and the decision to do so should include an awareness of what the familial, 
interpersonal, educational, vocational, economic, and legal challenges are likely to be, so 
that people can function successfully in their gender role.  The recommended duration of 12 
months allows for a range of different life experiences and events that may occur 
throughout the year (e.g., family events, holidays, vacations, season-specific work or school 
experiences).  
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Significantly, the latest version of the WPATH Standards of Care (2011) includes a new 
section on transgender people living in institutional environments, which specifically states 
that “all elements of assessment and treatment described in the Standards of Care can be 
provided to people living in institutions” (p.67).  Neither NHS England’s Interim Protocol 
(2013) nor its new, draft Service Specifications (2017), however, refer to the situation of 
people living in institutional environments, e.g. prisons and secure hospitals.  
The question of whether the real-life test can satisfactorily be met in prison has not squarely 
come before the English courts, but it has arisen indirectly in AB, and directly in Canadian 
and US jurisprudence, in each case within a human rights/constitutional framework.  These 
cases show how, in addition to – and interwoven with – clinical concerns about the risk of 
carrying out gender reassignment surgery on prisoners who have no “real life” experience in 
the outside community, prison management is driven by concerns about the risk of placing 
transgender women prisoners (specifically) in the female estate, whether pending or after 
genital surgery. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about whether the real-life test 
is effectively being used as a pretext, as a final frontier against “the crumbling gender 
binary”, as Judge Thompson fervently argued in Kosilek II (see below), and as a way of 
keeping transgender women out of the female estate.   
Prison as the Final Frontier? 
In AB (2009), it will be recalled that AB had completed two years of living as a woman in a 
men’s prison, but the gender identity clinic required her to live for a further two years as a 
woman in a women’s prison, before they would consider her suitability for gender 
reassignment surgery.  In effect, the gender identity clinic required her to complete a four 
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year “real life test” rather than the standard two-year test. As both parties agreed that this 
was an appropriate requirement (para 7), the issue itself was not legally contentious.  It was 
accepted that her experience of living as a woman in the male estate was not “real” enough 
for clinical purpose – although it had been “real” enough for her to obtain legal recognition 
of her gender from the Gender Recognition Panel, a judicial body, comprising both medical 
and legal members.  This placed AB in the same stalemate as Synthia Kavanagh (Canada) 
and Michelle Kosilek (US), who were not allowed to transfer to the female estate unless 
they had gender reassignment surgery, but were not permitted to have surgery whilst in the 
male estate. 
Medical opinion remains strongly divided over whether a prisoner can meet the real-life 
criteria for gender reassignment surgery, internationally.  On the one hand, one medical 
expert interestingly testified before the Human Rights Tribunal in the Canadian case of 
Kavanagh (2002) that “the prison environment can, in some ways, provide an even better 
real-life experience than the outside community, “as prisoners are under much closer 
observation in prison, and thus in a better position to be assessed, and being accepted by 
other inmates is, in many ways, the hardest test” (para 51).   
However, the Human Rights Tribunal in Kavanagh concurred with the medical experts 
called by Correctional Services Canada (“CSC”) that a transgender woman living in a men’s 
prison would not be able to fulfil the real-life experience.  It accepted the CSC’s medical 
experts’ view that, “the artificial environment of the male prison” can “distort the 
experience of the individual in such a way as to render the real life experience an unreliable 
test of an individual’s resolve *and+ capacity to function in the preferred gender” (para 
57).   In addition to concerns about the “reality” of the experience, given the controlled 
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nature of the prison environment and the highly regulated setting in which prisoners 
interact with each other, the Tribunal interestingly endorsed the heteronormative opinion 
of CSC’s medical experts that the “availability of homosexual relations in the carceral 
setting” provides “pre-operative transsexual inmates with a level of acceptance that they 
would not experience in the community at large” (para 57) and that “this positive 
reinforcement may provide the inmate with a distorted perception of their ability to live 
successfully as a member of the opposite sex” (ibid), whereas, in the female estate, “they 
might find they do not fit in” (ibid). This completely contradicts Kavanagh’s own evidence 
that she had been repeatedly subjected to rapes, assaults and discrimination in the male 
prison.   
In Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.Supp.2d 190, 232 (D.Mass.2012), the US District Court of 
Massachusetts held that it was a violation of the constitutional prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual punishment” for Kosilek to be denied gender reassignment surgery, and that the 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) had engaged in a pattern of “pretence, pretext and 
prevarication” to deny her such treatment, after she had met all the criteria, including the 
real-life experience.  It attributed the DOC’s position to public and political pressure (ibid: 
202). It rejected the view that a real-life experience could never be replicated in prison, on 
the basis that this did not take into account Kosilek's particular situation nor, more 
generally, the different realities of transgender prisoners, since “for someone like Kosilek, 
who is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, prison is, and always will 
be, *her+ real life” (ibid: 231).  Although the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld 
the District Court’s landmark decision, in a highly unusual move, it then reconvened, en 
banc, and reversed its own decision.    
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In its en banc decision of 16 December 2014 (No 12-2194), the Court of Appeals held that 
the DOC’s non-surgical treatment of Kosilek’s gender dysphoria (comprising hormone 
treatment, laser hair removal and permitting her to dress as a woman) did not demonstrate 
wanton disregard for her medical needs, but was one of two recognised medical routes for 
the treatment of gender dysphoria, and, most significantly, was “a measured response to 
the valid security concerns identified by the DOC” (ibid: 70, emphasis added).  These 
included the risk that if she had surgery, she would probably be transferred to the female 
estate, where, inter alia, it might be easier for her to escape due to the less secure 
perimeter (even though she had not attempted escape in her 22 years of imprisonment), 
she might not be accepted by other women due to the fact she had murdered her wife, and 
she might be at risk of harm from other women (ibid: 104-105). There was also a concern 
that she had gained notoriety by litigating against the DOC (ibid: 104).  If she stayed in the 
male estate, on the other hand, surgery might make her more vulnerable to sexual assault 
from other prisoners.  
Judge Thompson wrote an impassioned dissent (ibid: 70-112), fiercely critiquing the use of 
the en banc review to effectively re-try the case de novo, and strongly objected to the 
majority opinion on multiple grounds, including the spurious, thinly-veiled security 
justifications which the District Court, he felt, had rightly rejected.  He added that the fact 
“that Kosilek had gained notoriety by litigating against the DOC all these years – in other 
words, successfully pursuing her constitutional right to adequate medical care – hardly 
seems a compelling consideration” (ibid: 104). “The precedent the majority creates is 
damaging,” he warned, “it paves the way for unprincipled grants of en banc relief, 
decimates the deference paid to a trial judge following a bench trial, aggrieves an already 
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marginalized community, and enables correctional systems to further postpone their 
adjustment to the crumbling gender binary” (ibid: 112).  
Conclusion  
This chapter has taken many twists and turns.  Broadly, it has shown how legal, penal and 
medical power consolidated in the past to discipline prisoners’ bodies in line with sexual and 
gender norms, and how management of the transgender prisoner has now become 
normalised in this penal-medico-judicial nexus. It has demonstrated how recourse to human 
rights rhetoric helped NCCL, a human rights organisation, bring public attention to Linda 
Gold’s plight, and how the human rights-based principle of equivalence between prison and 
community healthcare, together with the NW Lancashire case (1999) (albeit not a human 
rights-based decision) helped secure a firmer footing for transgender prisoners’ right to 
access medical gender reassignment treatment, including surgery.  It argued that, when the 
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000, this strengthened the grounds on which 
transgender prisoners could bring complaints about their access to medical treatment 
before the courts, culminating in AB (2009), and that PSI 2011 sealed these developments 
into prison policy. However, the chapter was careful to critically assess these developments, 
following Foucault (1977), Smart (1989) and Sim (1990), and not to assume that they form 
part of a linear, grand narrative of reform and progress.   
The chapter showed how recourse to law and human rights often comes at a price, re-
entrenching  regressive discourses, such as the view that transgender people are mentally ill 
(NW Lancashire) and the unassailable truth that “full realisation of gender” is achieved 
through gender reassignment surgery not legal recognition (AB).  Recourse to law and 
  
314 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
human rights may also reignite harmful debates in public and political fora, particularly the 
view that transgender prisoners are “less eligible” or undeserving of NHS-funded medical 
gender reassignment treatment.  The chapter showed how PSI 2011 also perpetuated a 
medicalised view of transgender prisoners, by using the term “transsexual” throughout, and 
placing medical treatment at the fore of the policy (albeit now amended by PSI 2016). The 
chapter demonstrated that policy promises and rights rhetoric is not necessarily met in 
practice, and that, aside from wider issues regarding waiting times and resource constraints 
in the general provision of transgender medical treatment on the NHS, various barriers 
appear to be placed in the way of transgender prisoners’ access to medical treatment, 
ranging from denial of pre-existing hormone treatment and refusal to allow access to 
private medical treatment, to micro-mechanisms of power, such as misleading a prisoner 
that contact has been made with a gender identity clinic, and (possibly) lack of transport to 
a scheduled appointment with a gender identity clinic.  Meanwhile, the apparent current 
clinical compromise of providing only partial genital surgery (orchiectomy) to transgender 
women prisoners in the male estate, before they transfer to the female estate, seems to set 
them up to fail.  There is a paradox here, where the general public seems to be opposed to 
NHS-funding for gender reassignment surgery for transgender prisoners, but still regards 
transgender women with suspicion, and as risky, if they still have a penis.   
Judge Thompson’s powerful dissenting opinion in Kosilek tapped into the author’s growing 
suspicion that, when human rights developments threaten to erode the institutional gender 
order of the prison and the prison’s power over the regulation of gender (and perhaps when 
such developments are threaten to disrupt its internal logic of risk management, and its 
overriding prioritisation of security and control), medical and penal power collude to 
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maintain the status quo.  In Kosilek, the Court of Appeals joined in this collusion, effectively 
using the en banc review process to overturn a decision which was politically unfavourable, 
and to place power firmly back in the prison authorities’ hands.  This meant that they could 
continue to refuse gender reassignment surgery to a transgender prisoner who had been 
pursuing her constitutional right to adequate healthcare for over twenty years.210  However, 
perhaps the outlook is not so bleak.  In England, the courts in AB did not defer to the prison 
authorities’ decision, which – in conjunction with the gender identity clinic’s view that life as 
a woman in a men’s prison was not “real” enough – effectively barred her from ever being 
considered for gender reassignment surgery. Instead, the court ordered her transfer to the 
female estate.  This was a bold, human-rights based decision, which stands out in the 
transgender prisoners’ rights field, internationally, as does transgender prisoners’ right to 
NHS-equivalent medical treatment, despite its limits in practice.    
The next chapter presents the overall conclusion to the research. 
                                                          
210
 It must be noted that in the US, there is the additional, politically sensitive issue that granting gender 
reassignment surgery to transgender prisoners at the prison’s (and thus taxpayers’) expense, would place 
them in a more favourable position than transgender people in the outside community, who do not have 
access to publicly-funded surgeryMedicaid is now available for gender reassignment surgery in some states 
(most recently New Hampshire, Oct 2017) and court cases have been brought against the constitutionality of 
provisions which exclude it from other states’ Medicaid coverage, e.g. Iowa (Sept 2017). 
  
316 
 
BD-#31252501-v1 
Conclusion:  The Transformative Potential and Limits of 
Human Rights, and the Inexorable Logic of Risk  
Charting recent human rights-based legal developments, and their translation into official 
prison policy on transgender prisoners, the thesis has examined both the transformative 
potential, and the limits and risks, of recourse to human rights to effect reform, and to 
improve the liveability of transgender prisoners’ lives.  It has also mapped the emergence of 
human rights as a new discourse in relation to the governance of transgender prisoners, and 
presented it as a new object for study and critique.  The thesis has not only looked at law’s 
“sovereign” effects on the prison administration’s governance of trans/gender, but has also 
reflected on the deeper, discursive (norm-producing) power of law and human rights to 
alter the way in which the prison administration conceptualises gender and constructs 
transgender prisoners, and therefore governs them.     
A particular issue that this thesis has identified and explored is the emerging tension 
between law’s recent construction of the transgender prisoner as a human rights-bearer, 
and prison administration’s established construction and governance of the transgender 
prisoner as primarily “risky” and “at risk”.  The thesis has examined a number of conflicts 
which have already arisen in this contested, discursive terrain, and has traced them as they 
have migrated to the courts for judicial resolution.  It has also identified legal cases which 
settled out of court and complaints to the PPO and various voluntary sector organisations, 
to broaden the scope of the research.  The thesis has asked whether the liberalisation of 
legal gender, and the rhetoric of transgender prisoners’ human rights, is capable of 
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translating in the prison; whether human rights discourse has the power to alter the prison’s 
internal risk logic, and reconfigure its risk management techniques.   
The thesis has been set against a backdrop of continuing reports of self-harm and suicide 
among transgender prisoners,211 despite the introduction of PSI 2011 and the even more 
progressive PSI 2016.  Its analysis has been conducted in the socio-political context of the 
current prison crisis and the hostile environment towards any further expansion of both 
transgender rights and prisoners’ rights.  The thesis has reflected on the widespread 
concern about the risks of transferring transgender women into the female prison estate, 
after they have transitioned in the male estate, as exemplified by the highly charged 
reaction to Jessica Winfield’s transfer in March 2017, and subsequent reporting in 
September 2017 (see Chapter 4).   Ironically, Winfield’s transfer to the female estate was 
pursuant to a prison policy which was revised, in the autumn of 2015, due to public and 
political concern about the allocation of two transgender women to gender non-appropriate 
prisons. This has led the thesis to identify a significant distinction in public opinion between, 
on the one hand, transgender women (specifically) who have lived in their gender before 
imprisonment (whose gender is regarded as authentic, who are not seen to be risky to 
cisgender women, and who are regarded as deserving of rights and resources) and, on the 
other hand, those who transition in prison (whose authenticity and motives are regarded 
with suspicion, who are regarded as less eligible or non-deserving of rights and resources, 
and who are also constructed as risky). 
                                                          
211
 On 30 September 2017, press reported the fourth suicide of a transgender prisoner since 2015.  Jade 
Eatough had recently started to transition at HMP Parkhurst, and was on hormone treatment (Gardner 2017). 
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This conclusion has four parts.  First, it recaps the origins and objects of the research.  
Second, it retraces the steps of the thesis, highlighting and consolidating its major findings 
along the way.  The third part offers some broader, concluding reflections on the research.  
The fourth and final part discusses the contribution this research makes to the literature, 
and suggests potential avenues for further research. 
Origins and Objectives 
The research originated with an interest in, and concern for, the situation of transgender 
prisoners, and optimism at the human rights-based legal developments which had finally led 
to the introduction of official prison policy in this area, after years of prevarication and 
delay.  The research sought to explore the transformative effects of law, and especially 
human rights, on the liveability of transgender prisoners’ lives.  It situated the analysis both 
in its historical context, and in the contemporary socio-political landscape, so as to trace the 
continuities and discontinuities in the story of law, human rights, and the transgender 
prisoner.   
The first objective of the research was to examine the direct, “sovereign”, effects of law and 
human rights on prison policy and practice.  This objective was approached through a 
traditional legal analysis of human-rights based developments in legislation, prison policy 
(PSI 2011 and PSI 2016) and case-law, and through broader research into the instrumental 
effects of PSI 2011 and PSI 2016. 
The second objective was to reflect on the power of law and human rights to re-
conceptualise gender in the prison, and to change the way in which prison administration 
fundamentally understands, and therefore governs, transgender prisoners. This objective 
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was advanced through a Foucauldian analysis of law as a productive power, with normative 
effects. Chapter 2 (theory) explained how it is imperative to approach “the law” not simply 
as a “pure” power to “lay down rules” but also as a powerful, authoritative discourse in 
contemporary society.  Drawing on Foucault and Smart (1989), it argued that law’s power 
not only flows through its major “arteries”, in terms of legislation made by parliament and 
rulings made by courts, but is also dispersed through its “minute capillaries” (Foucault 
1979:96-7) to the deepest level of being, making people who they are, and producing “what 
it is possible to think, speak and do” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:  9).   
The third objective of the thesis was to reflect on the transformative potential of law and 
human rights, as well as the limits and risks of turning to law and rights, as a solution to the 
problems presented/ experienced by transgender prisoners. As a sex-segregated institution, 
with a binary gender society/regime, the prison usefully magnifies the way in which 
transgender people and their bodies are problematised in broader society, and the 
challenges faced by law, and its human rights discourse, in changing historically entrenched 
cultural truths about gender and transgender people. 
Retracing Steps and Discussing Findings 
This second part retraces the course taken by the thesis, and discusses its major findings, or 
landmarks, along the way. This part shows how the first two objectives of the thesis were 
met in the thesis’s combined analysis of the sovereign and normative effects of law and 
human rights on the prison’s governance of gender and specifically, transgender prisoners.     
The next part (Concluding Reflections) draws some broader conclusions, in response to the 
third objective of the thesis.   Whilst each chapter is approached in turn in this part, other 
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chapters’ findings may be integrated into the analysis, in pursuit of developing a more 
cohesive synopsis of the research findings.  
Chapter 1 started by setting the historical scene.  It will have become clear during the course 
of this thesis that it is extremely important to have a sense of this historical background, 
both for contextualising later legal, medical and penal developments, and for understanding 
the deep historical roots of much contemporary discourse around transgender people, and 
particularly transgender women.  This historical background has helped to explain why it is 
so hard for law and its “new” human rights discourse to shift many of the deeply-
entrenched “truths” about sex/gender and transgender people – including its own prior 
legal “truths” – and why they repeatedly resurface, and are reproduced and perpetuated 
even in the moment of reform.    
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the criminal justice system has been one of many regulatory 
mechanisms that have been collectively deployed to steer bodies into pre-determined 
binary sex/gender categories, as part of the governmentality of sex and gender (Foucault 
1978), and to punish and discipline those who do not conform to the “norm”.  It identified 
three historical discourses which continue to have particularly enduring normative power in 
the conceptualisation of transgender people, as demonstrated through the remainder of the 
thesis. The first powerful discourse, explored through the 1870 prosecution of Bolton and 
Park, is produced through law’s criminalisation of gender non-conforming men212 for 
“personating a woman for immoral purposes”. Law’s conceptualisation of transgender213 
women’s gender (in particular) as inauthentic, artificial, imitative, and deceptive even, has 
                                                          
212
 Those assigned male at birth. 
213
 It will be recalled that Chapter 1 argued that Bolton and Park’s case belongs more to a transgender, rather 
than a gay, history. 
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had remarkably enduring discursive power; so too its suspicion of their motives in accessing 
“women-only” spaces.  The second important discourse identified in Chapter 1 is the 
pathologisation and medicalisation of transgender people in medical science, as later co-
opted by law in Corbett (1970).  This potent consolidation of medical and legal power still 
informs the governance of legal gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and has 
deeply-entrenched, normative effects on society’s understanding of transgender people as 
suffering from a medical condition in the form of a mental disorder.  The third powerful 
norm, produced in Corbett, is that sex/gender is binary and is fixed by a certain biological 
“truth” at birth that can never be changed.  The thesis shows that this “truth” remains 
particularly powerful in social determinations of gender where access to “women-only” 
spaces, including women’s prisons, is involved.  
Having outlined, in Chapter 1, the historical background to law’s first definition of 
sex/gender, and its first construction of the “transsexual” in Corbett, Chapter 2 introduced 
the three theories which have informed and shaped the analysis of law and rights, gender, 
and risk, in this thesis.  It showed how Foucault’s work provides a common thread between 
the three fields, even though law and rights are not usually associated with his work. It is 
not necessary to revisit the theoretical framework in any detail here, as the individual and 
cumulative value of the these three fields have been demonstrated throughout the analysis 
in this thesis. However, it is worth recalling that Chapter 2 introduced some particularly 
important ideas around the conceptualisation, performativity and embodiment of gender, 
which enriched the analysis of law’s role in not only reflecting, but also producing and 
perpetuating norms around gender and transgender people.  The concept of “cis-sexism” 
(Serano 2007) has been particularly useful for drawing attention to law’s continuing 
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production of transgender people’s gender as inauthentic, artificial and imitative, in order to 
bolster cisgender identity as natural, real and original.  The judgment in Green (2013), 
discussed below, provided a particularly valuable example of cis-sexism in action in the field 
of transgender prisoners’ rights.   
Chapter 2 also introduced the concept of the transgender prisoner as “risky” and “at risk”.  
Understanding the broader backdrop of the “risk society” (Beck 1992), the continuing 
conditions of the “new penology” (Feeley and Simon 1990), and the governmentality 
approach to risk, has helped explain why prison management conceptualises transgender 
prisoners and their bodies primarily in terms of risk, and why it adopts such a precautionary 
approach to the management of the diverse and uncertain risks that they are perceived to 
present to the good order, discipline and security of the prison. This theoretical framework 
enabled the thesis to juxtapose the “new” human rights discourse around transgender 
prisoners (examined in Chapter 3) against the prison’s powerful, long-established discourse 
of risk, and to examine the emerging fault-lines between the two.   
Chapter 3 charted the emergence and evolution of transgender people’s human rights in UK 
law, which led, in AB (2009), to the court’s specific recognition of the transgender prisoner 
as a human rights-bearer.  It discussed the significance of the Human Rights Act 1998 in 
enabling prisoners (and others) to bring human rights cases directly before the domestic 
courts, and the important contribution made by the Gender Recognition Act 2004 in 
liberalising law’s conception of gender, and providing a procedure for transgender people to 
obtain legal recognition of their gender.  It showed how the Gender Recognition Act was 
pioneering at the time, as it did not require gender reassignment surgery, and seemed to 
dispense with the body and its biology in the governmentality of gender. Chapter 3 also 
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traced developments in transgender people’s right to protection against discrimination, 
culminating in the Equality Act 2010.  Significantly, the Equality Act broke free of law’s 
traditional medicalisation of transgender people.  It no longer requires transgender people 
to be under any form of medical supervision in order to benefit from its new, specific 
protections against discrimination on the grounds of “gender reassignment”, and prohibits 
the prison authorities from discriminating against transgender prisoners on this broader 
basis.  Furthermore, the Equality Act placed a new, positive public sector equality duty on 
the prison authorities to meet transgender prisoners’ needs and to tackle discrimination, 
harassment and transphobia in the prison estate.  It was this new duty, the thesis argued, 
which finally led to the introduction of PSI 2011, the first official policy on the “care and 
management of transsexual prisoners” in England and Wales.   
Chapter 3 (and the remainder of the thesis) showed that this apparently rosy picture of the 
transformative power of human rights to effect legal and policy reform is only half the story.  
As will be recalled from Chapter 2, Smart has argued that law is often presented as “a force 
of linear progress, a beacon to lead us out of darkness” (Smart 1989:12).  Remaining alert to 
Smart’s warning that we should not be “seduced” by law as a solution to social problems, or 
assume that “rights” will correct “wrongs” (ibid),  this thesis has closely scrutinised the way 
in which recourse to law and rights may have negative discursive effects, and re-entrench 
hegemonic norms, even in the very moment of reform. Thus, Chapter 3 not only examined 
the more obvious limits of these human rights-based legal and policy reforms, but also dug 
beneath their seemingly progressive surfaces, to unearth their subtexts, and their 
underlying construction of transgender people. This exercise laid the groundwork for 
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deconstructing the power of law and rights in Chapters 4 to 6.  Four main themes emerged, 
which proved particularly significant for the thesis: 
Gender as binary 
First, both the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and Equality Act reproduce and perpetuate a 
binary concept of gender, even in the face of ever-expanding and/or increasingly visible 
gender diversity in British society.  Transgender people are only granted legal recognition of 
their gender, and legal protection against discrimination, if they adhere to law’s insistence 
on complete and permanent crossings from one gender to “the” other gender.  This narrow 
construction of the transgender person who is deserving of rights is reproduced in PSI 
2011’s first construction of the “transsexual prisoner”.  Even though PSI 2011 allows for self-
determination in relation to the right to live and dress in one’s gender, a prisoner must 
define themselves on the policy’s narrow terms, as a “transsexual” who intends to make (or 
has already made) a permanent, binary gender crossing, in order to benefit from its 
provisions.  Chapter 5 discussed PSI 2016’s pioneering breaking of the binary, through its 
recognition of both the existence and the needs of a much broader range of transgender 
prisoners people to live and dress in the gender they identify with, or as non-gender, 
including prisoners with non-binary and fluid genders, and also “transvestites”.   
Medicalisation and pathologisation of transgender people  
Second, the Gender Recognition Act retains a medicalised model of transgender people. It 
makes legal gender recognition conditional on a pathologising, medical diagnosis of “gender 
dysphoria”, and a two-year “real life test”, which requires transgender people to prove their 
trans/gender authenticity, and, effectively, to prove that they are deserving of law’s 
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recognition.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated how much harder these “gendered rites of 
passage” (Sharpe 2007: 71) are for transgender prisoners transitioning in prison, and how 
much more difficult their negotiation of medical gatekeepers can be, in addition to the 
prison administration’s gatekeeping.  Whilst there are inevitably certain structural barriers 
to transgender prisoners achieving legal and medical gender reassignment whilst in prison, 
the thesis suggests that transgender prisoners face deeper, cultural barriers to transitioning, 
as their trans/gender authenticity is regarded with suspicion, and as risky, particularly if they 
are transgender women who first start to transition whilst in prison. 
Bodies and “biology” still matter 
Third, Chapter 3 showed that, under its progressive veneer, the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 has retained an expectation, if not a formal requirement, of gender reassignment 
surgery leading to “gender-congruent” bodies.  It showed that this expectation is 
reproduced and perpetuated by the courts, both in relation to transgender people 
generally, e.g. in Carpenter (2015) and in relation to transgender prisoners specifically, e.g. 
AB (2009). Chapters 3 and 4 showed that the court’s main concern in AB (2009) was that 
she should be enabled to proceed towards gender reassignment surgery, so as to achieve 
“full realisation” of her gender.  Her more fundamental desire to be recognised and to live 
as a woman in the female estate seemingly held less weight, even though she had a GRC 
legally recognising her as a woman.  Further, whilst ordering the prison authorities to 
transfer AB to a women’s prison, the court conceded that “gender-incongruent” bodies may 
affect the proper running and discipline of the prison estate, and held that, exceptionally – 
and notwithstanding the patently clear provisions of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 to 
the contrary – genitalia may override legally-certified gender for the purposes of 
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maintaining order and discipline in prison.  Thus, Chapter 3 found that Sharpe’s prognosis in 
2007 was right, and that bodies and the “truth” of a particular biological past continue to 
matter in the legal and penal governance of gender, and in society’s prevailing 
understanding of gender.  Chapter 3 further established that equality law has also 
repeatedly perpetuated the view that transgender women’s bodies are potentially risky to 
cisgender women in women-only spaces, and that transgender women are not “real” 
women, or equal to “biological” women when it comes to accessing “women-only” spaces 
and services, especially where cisgender women are considered particularly vulnerable, 
having experienced male violence.  This theme was explored further in Chapter 4. 
Cis-sexism and the hierarchy of gender authenticity 
Fourth and finally, Chapter 3 showed that, underneath the Equality Act’s progressive 
surface, its explanatory notes and codes of practice reproduce and perpetuate the view that 
transgender people’s gender is not authentic, and that equal treatment is predicated on 
being able to be read as cisgender. This theme was expanded upon in Chapter 5. 
Developing these themes in three specific areas affecting transgender prisoners’ lives 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 represented a shift in gear. They built on the more general framework 
established in the first three chapters, to advance the analysis, and develop the argument of 
the thesis, in three specific areas which affect transgender prisoners’ lives, namely prison 
allocation and segregation (Chapter 4), gender presentation (Chapter 5) and access to 
medical treatment (Chapter 6).  These chapters examined the way in which the new human 
rights discourse has started to unfold in practice in the prison, how it has altered, or has the 
potential to alter, not simply the instrumental management of transgender prisoners, but 
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also the previous discursive terrain.  They analysed the effects of the “new” human rights 
discourse on the prison administration’s understanding and regulation of gender, and in 
particular, on its conceptualisation and governance of transgender prisoners, as primarily 
“risky” and “at risk”.  The chapters considered whether the new discourse of transgender 
prisoners’ human rights has any real power over the prison’s “inexorable logic of risk”, and 
its priorities of maintaining security, good order and discipline in the prison estate, and 
keeping (particularly cisgender women) prisoners safe from harm. 
Chapter 4 showed how, historically, the prison administration’s “truth” of sex/gender 
developed separately from law’s “truth”.  Despite Corbett’s biological test of sex, which was 
based primarily on genitalia at birth, the prison administration maintained its historical 
practice of focusing on current genitalia to determine allocation within the prison estate. 
Law’s “truth” seemingly did not make internal sense in the prison.  Even when law’s 
conceptualisation of sex/gender was liberalised through the Gender Recognition Act 2004, 
the prison continued to govern gender according to its own rules, in its separate sphere of 
power.  It was not until AB (2009) that the prison administration’s practice was put to the 
test, where it had refused to transfer a transgender woman with a GRC to the female prison 
estate due to her male genitalia.  The court in AB refused the prison administration’s 
construction of AB as uniquely risky in the female estate, and therefore requiring long-term 
segregation, and held that this was a risk that could be managed, like any other.  This was a 
landmark, highly progressive ruling, leading to AB’s transfer to a women’s prison, and to PSI 
2011, which specifically states that transgender women are not uniquely risky, and that 
their risk profiles must be determined on the same basis as cisgender women.  
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Despite its positive outcome, the court in AB held that there may be circumstances in which 
the prison authorities may lawfully take into account a prisoner’s genitalia, notwithstanding 
their legally-certified gender.  The court expressed concern that, if taken too far, this could 
undermine the comprehensive gender recognition regime intended by the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, but nevertheless accepted that a prisoner’s genitalia might have 
implications for maintaining order and discipline in prison and effectively provided the 
prison authorities with an opt-out clause (although not subsequently taken up in PSI 2011).  
The judgment had further negative discursive effects, as it shored up the perception that AB 
was not fully a woman, despite her GRC.  As a “pre-operative” woman, she comprised 
“something other” than a “biological woman” and could not expect equal treatment with a 
“biological woman” under equality law.  Thus, law’s new “truth” of gender was not only 
refused by the prison administration, it was also diluted by the court, which perpetuated 
that notion that bodies and biology still matter at the specific site of the prison.  
Whilst PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 now require transgender prisoners with a GRC to be allocated 
a gender-appropriate prison (and provide for discretion in other cases), Chapter 4 showed 
how the prison administration continues to exercise alternative techniques of power over 
the governance of gender, through its practice of separating transgender prisoners from the 
main prison population.  It argued that this practice places transgender prisoners under 
conditions of “less eligibility” and is exclusionary.  Whilst officially presented as a protective 
measure, it perpetuates the notion that transgender prisoners are risky.  Placement in 
formal segregation conditions effectively punishes prisoners for being transgender, and, in 
the long term, has serious effects on their health and well-being.  As inhuman treatment, 
this practice also potentially breaches transgender prisoners’ human rights.  Chapter 4 
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found that, to date, law and human rights have had limited effects in this field, and that the 
courts have been reluctant to interfere with prison management decisions to formally 
segregate transgender prisoners where they cannot see any viable alternative, as 
demonstrated by Hunnisset (2017). The out-of-court settlement reached in XY (2017) 
suggests that law and human rights have limited ability to effect change in this field; 
certainly compensation and apologies after the event are not a solution.   
Chapter 5 examined the historical enforcement of gender norms through prison dress 
(including hair), and considered the emergence of much more subtle disciplinary powers 
over prison dress in the contemporary prison.  It highlighted certain differences between 
the male and female estate in their regulation of prison dress, which have primarily 
impacted on transgender women housed in men’s prisons. Examining the historical 
struggles of transgender women prisoners to present their gender in men’s prisons, it 
identified the prison administration’s early, meagre concession of permitting some 
transgender prisoners to dress as women only when alone in their cells, literally behind 
closed doors and out of sight.  It argued that the Equality Act 2010 led to PSI 2011 and PSI 
2016’s potentially transformative provisions, which make it mandatory for prisons to permit 
(and now, under PSI 2016, to enable) transgender prisoners to live and dress in their gender, 
whichever prison they are housed in, and on a self-determination basis.  Chapter 5 showed, 
however, that even the right to access gender-affirming clothing and items is translated by 
prison administrators into a risk which needs to be managed.  An analysis of Green (2013) 
identified an emerging fault-line between rights and risk in this field, and the considerable 
power of the prison administration to re-establish its power over this aspect of gender 
regulation, through the back-door of PSI 2011’s security exemption.  Even though the court 
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expressed considerable concern that over-reliance on the security exemption might render 
PSI 2011 a “pious list of worthy hopes with no practical application” (para 58), it deferred to 
the prison administration on every count, and held that it was not unlawful for it to deny 
Green access to a wig, tights and larger sized clothing.  Whilst observing that Green had “no 
access to female attire of the kind needed” (para 58), and that this might even prevent her 
from satisfying the “real life” test to obtain legal recognition of her gender through a GRC, 
the court nevertheless held that she had not been prevented from living as a woman.  
Further, it found no discrimination, on the basis that she was a “man becoming a woman”, 
and was not entitled to be treated as a woman until she obtained a GRC.  The court even 
remarked that she had certain “advantages” in “dress and lifestyle” compared to the 
remainder of the male population (ibid).  These findings not only contradict the Equality Act 
2010 and PSI 2011, they also have very harmful discursive effects.  
Chapter 6 examined the legacy of the medicalisation of transgender people, and the barriers 
to transgender prisoners’ access to medical treatment.  It took the introduction, in 1994, of 
a policy of NHS-equivalent prisoner healthcare as its central reform moment, although the 
specific, detailed application of that policy to transgender prisoner healthcare in PSI 2011, 
was also significant. This chapter demonstrated the sheer extent of prison medical power, 
historically, to discipline and punish transgender prisoners’ minds and bodies, by 
withdrawing hormone treatment, and denying surgical embodiment of gender, despite the 
dominance of the medico-legal model of “transsexuality” at the time, which recognised 
medical gender reassignment as its “cure”.  In risk terms, it argued that transgender bodies 
represent a risk to governance of the sex/gender binary, and need to be normalised.  The 
chapter considered the continuing centrality of genital reassignment surgery to legal, penal 
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and public constructions of trans/gender authenticity, notwithstanding the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004’s formal de-linking of gender from genitals.    
Chapter 6 also illustrated the numerous ways in which transgender prisoners’ access to 
gender-affirming medical treatment has continued to be restricted or denied, 
notwithstanding PSI 2011’s (and PSI 2016’s) promises.  It argued that prison administration 
has seemingly shifted its techniques of power, so as to minimise the risks presented by 
prisoners who first express that they are transgender whilst they are in prison.  Whilst this 
situation involves a number of complex management issues for prison administration, the 
thesis argues that the prison’s response is informed by a deeply-entrenched institutional 
and cultural suspicion (or disbelief) of trans/gender authenticity, and a fundamental concern 
about the risk that transgender prisoners in the male estate might be pretending to be 
women in order to access the female prison estate for “immoral” (sexual and/or criminal) 
purposes.  Finally, Chapter 6 reflected on the prison administration’s power of gatekeeping 
over a prisoner’s access to specialist gender services, and the power of gender identity 
clinics to determine whether prison life is a sufficiently “real life experience” for transgender 
prisoners to meet the requirements for gender reassignment surgery, and to determine 
what type of surgery they may receive, e.g. full or only partial gender reassignment surgery.  
Together, whether by design or by default, the thesis has argued that these acts frustrate 
prisoners’ access to medical gender reassignment, and minimise the risk of public backlash 
against transgender women prisoners (specifically) transitioning in prison, accessing 
expensive NHS-treatment, and being transferred to the female estate.  Thus, as in Chapter 5 
(gender presentation) the transgender prisoner is effectively set up to fail.   
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Contribution to the Literature and Future Directions for Research 
By mapping this previously unchartered field, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to 
the nascent literature on transgender prisoners in England and Wales, across the disciplines.  
It will help further the debate in a number of areas in relation to, for example, the power of 
law and human rights to effect genuine reform in the prison, the power of law and human 
rights to alter the cultural boundaries of gender and, particularly, the interface between  
trans/gender, bodies and risk.  It is hoped that research and activism will continue to 
flourish in this field, and will help contribute to improving transgender prisoners’ lives. 
So many needs and possibilities exist for research in this field, that it is difficult to map them 
out fully here.  However, as a priority (and as originally envisaged by the author in the 
context of this research project – see Introduction), qualitative research urgently needs to 
be conducted across a range of prisons into the experiences and views of transgender 
prisoners, those governing them, and those engaging with them in other capacities, e.g. 
prison healthcare.214  As a continuation of the current research project, such research would 
significantly help further its assessment, and sharpen its critique, of the effects of recent 
human rights-based law and policy developments (including PSI 2011 and 2016), on the 
governance and daily lives of transgender prisoners.  It would also help advance the current 
preliminary analysis of the efficacy and fate of the “new” human rights discourse, when 
pitched against (i.e. as a competing, rather than a “replacement” discourse) the established 
                                                          
214
 Shortly after submission, Community Innovations Enterprise (authored by Bashford, Hasan and Marriott) 
published Inside Gender Identity: A Report on Meeting the Health and Social Care Needs of Transgender People 
in the Criminal Justice System (2017).  https://www.ciellp.net/inside-gender-identity. (20 June 2018).  This 
report was commissioned by the NHS England, Public Health England and HMPSS to inform policy and practice, 
and to make recommendations relating to the health and social care needs of transgender prisoners, and 
other transgender people in the criminal justice system.  It is a very useful addition to the literature, drawing 
on the views of 55 individuals from the health care sector, the criminal justice sector, the social sector, 
academia, government departments, and three transgender prisoners (Methods: 11).   
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discourse of transgender prisoners as risk subjects, embedded in regimes preoccupied with 
gender authenticity and bodies.  It would be particularly important for such research to 
probe the perception and exercise of discretion by governors and other prison personnel, 
for example, in the context of transgender prisoners’ (and, under PSI 2016, also gender-fluid 
and non-binary prisoners’) gender presentation, where, as explored in Chapter 5, risk-based 
justifications are all too frequently relied upon to refuse transgender prisoners’ access to 
gender-affirming clothing and other items, thus emptying PSI 2011 and PSI 2016 of their 
progressive potential.  Conducting research from within the prison would also help ground 
the analysis in what the author has described in this thesis as the “visceral site of the 
prison”, and would give a fuller account of the realities of making decisions/ living with 
those decisions in the context of the current prison crisis, where prisons are generally 
overcrowded, underfunded and understaffed, and their conditions, for both prisoners and 
staff, are becoming increasingly violent and dangerous.  
A broader research project would also usefully take the current analysis beyond the 
confines of the prison, and more critically consider the tension between, on the one hand, 
human rights-based law reform, litigation and activism directed at improving the everyday 
lives of transgender prisoners in the here and now, and on the other hand, the more 
transformative, long-term project of deregulating trans/gender (which, by generally 
improving the liveability of transgender people’s lives, would also lessen their potential 
pathways to prison) and undoing the normalisation of the prison as a gendered institution.  
Some would also add working towards prison abolition as part of this long-term vision.   This 
tension is something that the author became increasingly aware of as the project 
progressed, and would like to develop further in future research. 
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Prison-based research could also take place outside the current legal/ human rights 
framework, of course, with the aim, for example, of exploring transgender prisoners’ 
identities, views and experiences of gender in prison. The large-scale, mixed-methods 
research project undertaken by Sumner, Sexton and Jenness in California, US, offers a prime 
example of the potential of such research, and the many different avenues it could take (e.g. 
Jenness 2010 and 2014; Jenness and Fenstermaker 2014; Sumner and Jenness 2014 and 
Sumer and Sexton 2015).   Such research would make a valuable contribution to current 
studies of gender in prison, which, as noted earlier in the thesis, still tend to take the subject 
of “women in prison” and “men in prison” as fixed, rather than fluid and contested sites, 
and thus further reinforce the gender binary. 
As noted in the literature review, some prison-based research has recently started to be 
published (albeit not yet of the kind envisaged here).  So far, it focuses on prisoners who 
have started to transition whilst serving long-term prison sentences in men’s prisons, and 
the staff who work with them. Stephen Whittle of Press for Change has remarked that his 
greatest concern is for transgender people when they first enter prison, and when they are 
in prison for a short period, before appropriate arrangements are put in place (Interview, 26 
Oct 2015).   Tara Hudson’s and Vikki Thompson’s cases provide clear support for such 
concern.  Future research in prisons would ideally capture a range of experiences, including 
those of short-term prisoners, and of transgender men, who remain a completely invisible 
population in current research.   
Ideally, future research would also be intersectional, and examine other vectors of 
identity/power which may influence the experiences and governance of transgender 
prisoners, in addition to, or more accurately coalescing with, their identification/ regulated 
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status as “transgender prisoners”.215  An exemplary piece of such interdisciplinary research, 
in the context of the English prison system is Coretta Phillips’ The Multicultural Prison: 
Ethnicity, Masculinity, Race and Social Relations among Prisoners (2012). Gabriel Arkles’ 
article on the regulation of prisoners’ race and gender though prison dress in the US (2012) 
offers a further excellent example. 
Concluding Reflections 
The thesis has covered a lot of ground and has followed many different strands of thought 
to reach its conclusion. Not all of these strands can be neatly tied together, which is 
frustrating, but not altogether surprising, as it reflects both the complexity of the field, and 
the challenge of researching a field with so little previous research to draw on.  This section 
concludes with some broader reflections on the research (the third objective of the thesis): 
first, the limits (and risk) of recourse to law and rights to effect fundamental reform in this 
field; second, whether the tension between rights and risk might be resolved or reduced; 
third, the need to address transphobia as the problem (or, in prison management terms, the 
risk), rather than the transgender person/prisoner; and fourth and finally, the limits of law 
and its rights discourse in reforming the cultural boundaries of gender and, thus, improving 
transgender people’s lives.   
The limits (and risks) of recourse to law and rights 
First, the thesis has demonstrated that human rights-based developments have greatly 
advanced the formal position of transgender prisoners in recent years, both in terms of 
                                                          
215
 Notably, the Equality Act 2010 not only consolidates previously separate anti-discrimination legislation into 
one overall act, but formally recognises the concept of intersectionality, through a protection against multiple 
discrimination, on up to two grounds (section 14).  This section has yet to come into force, however. 
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policy reform and in terms of prisoners’ power to challenge prison administrative decisions 
before the courts.  However, it has shown that, in the very moment of reform, recourse to 
human rights often further entrenches hegemonic norms.  Both the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 and Equality Act 2010 illustrate this dilemma of law reform, as they not only reproduce 
certain norms on their otherwise progressive legislative surface, but also do so, quietly and 
subtly, beneath, through their explanatory notes and guidelines.   
Similarly, the thesis has shown how recourse to human rights through the courts may 
(occasionally, as in AB) assist individual prisoners, and may also have a wider, positive 
impact on policy reform or prison practice, but that, even then, it often comes at a price.  
Sometimes that price is known in advance, sometimes the price is the very uncertainty of 
the outcome for the individual and the very uncertainty of its potential cost to the broader 
“cause”.  For example, the price may be the need to rely on a regressive argument in order 
to achieve the desired outcome, such as in NW Lancashire, where the applicants relied on 
an argument that being transgender is a mental illness in order to bring gender 
reassignment treatment within the remit of the NHS.  Or the price may be the negative 
discursive effects of the particular judgment, even if it is successful in its instrumental 
outcome.  For example, the courts may reproduce and perpetuate the construction of 
transgender prisoners’ gender as inauthentic, imitative and artificial (AB and Green), or 
endorse the negative view that transgender prisoners want to access special treatment, 
rather than simply asserting their rights (Green).   The  price may also be a legally perverse 
judgment, such as in Green, which set a regressive legal precedent in the field.   
Despite the bold decision in AB, it is increasingly being seen that the courts are reluctant to 
intervene in what they regard as prison management decisions (Green and Hunnisett), and 
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to solve what appears to be the impossible in a prison system and prison society built on the 
basis of a rigid gender binary (Hunnisett).  The very presence of transgender prisoners 
exposes the myth of that binary, and disrupts the established gender order and equilibrium 
of the prison; it is difficult for the court to resolve the fundamental risk that they represent 
to the prison’s established governance of gender. 
Resolving or reducing the tension between rights and risk  
Whitty has argued that, in order to realise reform on the ground, prisons might be 
encouraged to think of human rights as an organisational risk, what he coins “Legal Risk +”, 
so as to absorb them into prison risk management (2011). He recognises that this 
instrumentalist approach to human rights might be controversial.  Certainly, this thesis 
would conclude that a deeper, genuine commitment to prisoners’ rights is necessary for 
fundamental changes to take place in the governance of transgender prisoners.  However, 
even if human rights were conceived of as organisational risk, the thesis has surely 
demonstrated that Legal Risk+ to the prison is minimal in the current political climate, and 
thus unlikely to have any real traction.  Since the Government introduced sweeping cuts to 
legal aid for prisoners in 2013, the risk of prisoners bringing legal action against the prison 
has become even more distant than before, severely limiting their right of access to the 
courts.  Indeed only three judicial review cases involving transgender prisoners have, to 
date, been fully heard by the High Court, and only AB succeeded in overturning the prison’s 
decision.216 As already noted, the other case discussed in this thesis,  Green, together with 
                                                          
216
 The third reported case relating to a transgender prisoner in the English and Welsh prison estate, is H and 
Secretary of State for Justice. *2015+ EWHC 1550 (Admin). “H”,  a transgender woman who started to 
transition whilst she was in prison at HMP Elmley, a men’s prison, complained that the prison had not provided 
her with adequate access to a sex offender course, which she was required to complete as part of her 
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the court’s latest refusal of judicial review in Hunnisett, indicate a reluctance on the part of 
the courts to intervene in prison management decisions, even if they express concern about 
the prisoner’s situation.   
Furthermore, in the current political climate, the organisational risk to a prison’s reputation 
through negative media coverage, or voluntary sector reporting on transgender prisoners’ 
rights issues, is arguably limited. The wave of public sympathy towards Tara Hudson’s and 
Vikki Thompson’s cases in 2015 seems to have been short-lived, and, from subsequent 
media reporting, particularly of Jessica Winfield’s case, seems to be restricted to 
transgender prisoners who have lived in their gender before being imprisoned (i.e. whose 
trans/gender authenticity is not in question), and who are either on remand or serving short 
sentences (i.e. who have not been convicted of serious criminal offences, particularly violent 
offences against cisgender women).   
Tackling transphobia as the problem (or the risk), not the transgender prisoner 
Whilst human rights and equality-based arguments may enhance transgender prisoners’ 
legal options in the courts, and may provide a remedy for individual prisoners, they offer no 
remedy for systemic discrimination, harassment and transphobia in the prison population as 
a whole.  Until there is a fundamental change in how transgender prisoners are viewed and 
treated by other prisoners, prison staff and prison management, PSI 2016 is likely to have 
little effect, other than, perhaps, to add to management malaise about the administrative 
burden involved in housing transgender prisoners, and the considerable time required to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rehabilitation, and to progress towards her release. Her personal circumstances were very complex, and 
specific to her case.  The broader issue of transgender prisoners’ access to relevant rehabilitative courses, in 
order to progress through the system and towards parole, however, is an important one (although 
unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis).   
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manage the multiple and complex risks they pose, at a time when staff and resources are in 
particularly short supply, and the prison system as a whole is in severe crisis.217   
PSI 2011 recognised this broader problem, and required prisons to “put in place measures 
to manage the risk of transphobic harassment and transphobic hate crime” (para 3.5).   It 
advised (in much weaker terms) that it “may be useful to have education and training about 
gender reassignment and the prevention of transphobia” for prison staff and prisoners 
(Appendix B, para B.1).  When PSI 2011 was introduced, however, the Government stated 
that it did not envisage any nationwide prison training, on the basis that the PSI was “self-
explanatory” (Hansard HC Deb 27 Jan 2010, Col 862W).218  WESC expressed concern at the 
extent of misunderstanding and ignorance around PSI 2011’s provisions, and urged the 
Ministry of Justice to “ensure that staff are trained on [PSI 2016] and that its 
implementation is monitored” (para 321).  Whilst PSI 2016 promises that “training, guidance 
and awareness materials for the care and management of transgender offenders will be 
made available to all staff within NOMS following the release of this instruction” (para 9.1), 
it is not clear whether this training has been rolled out, and/or whether it comprises only 
materials, more paper, for staff to digest.   
Tackling transphobia in the main prison population requires a positive commitment to 
fostering equality and safety across the prison estate.  As Arkles has persuasively argued,  
alternative forms of safety need to be institutionally recognised and supported, which are 
                                                          
217
 As at 20 June 2018, this dire situation shows no signs of abating.  See e.g. Bulman 2018 and Savage and 
Townsend 2018.  
218
 Some prisons have, however, invited voluntary sector organisations to conduct education and training for 
staff and prisoners (e.g. GIRES and Press for Change, interviews 15 and 26 Oct 2015 respectively). 
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built through relationships and solidarity with other prisoners “across gender lines” (2009: 
531).   
The limits of law and rights discourse in reforming the cultural boundaries of gender  
Through the site of the prison, and the figure of the transgender prisoner, the thesis has 
illustrated the way in which the optimistic discourse of human rights meets with, competes 
with, and is often trumped by the unshakeable, inexorable, logic of risk.  It has 
demonstrated that law, rights and prison policy can only achieve so much.  This is not simply 
due to the precarious state of the prison system, and a dire lack of resources and staff time 
to devote to prisoner welfare.  A fundamental change of mind-set is required to effect 
systemic, cultural and institutional change.  Whilst there has been increasing social 
acceptance of transgender people in recent years, this seems to be predicated on a 
historical, narrow medical model of transgender people, which still expects genital 
reassignment surgery, as social proof of trans/gender authenticity, particularly when it 
comes to transgender women’s access to “women-only” spaces, like the prison.   
The thesis has shown that, in the final analysis, there are certain inescapable “truths” that 
contemporary society can’t seem to get beyond, namely that “true” gender is about bodies 
and a certain (legally- and socially-constructed) “biological past”, that transgender people’s 
gender is inauthentic, artificial and imitative, and that transgender women’s bodies are risky 
to cisgender women in “women-only” spaces. These three truths return like a Foucauldian 
wheel of power; it is not simply that prison administration tends to revert to the way things 
were always done (a propensity termed “carceral clawback” by Carlen 2002), but that it 
returns to the way it has always understood sex/gender and transgender prisoners, and 
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therefore governed them.  Certain norms are so culturally, socially and institutionally 
entrenched that the “new” human rights discourse simply does not (yet) make sense in the 
prison, or in wider society.   
Whilst human rights and equality discourse has led to an apparently liberalising moment in 
the re-conceptualisation of gender, the situation of transgender prisoners highlights the fact 
that law and policy does not yet fully translate.  The thesis demonstrates that the tensions 
are too great at this point, and that recourse to human rights always meets its limits on the 
ground.  The very visceral site of the prison, with its historical, genitalia-based, “flesh” 
borders, and its hyper-gendered prison society, provides a prime example of this limit on 
law’s power.  Indeed, prison may be the final frontier, where law and human rights struggle 
most to make their mark. 
The thesis has shown how law’s ability to reform the cultural boundaries of sex/gender, and 
to open up the cultural possibilities and liveability of trans/gendered lives, is limited. 
However, it has hopefully demonstrated that human rights is not an empty discourse, that 
human rights are not illusory, but that changing the gender order is a slow legal, political 
and cultural struggle, in which law and its human rights discourse can play a valuable part, 
both within the prison and in broader society.   
∞∞∞ 
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Appendix B:  Interview Schedule 
THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ADVOCACY FOR TRANSGENDER PRISONERS 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS ACTING IN A 
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY (VERSION 1, 20 MAY 2015, APPROVED) 
 
A. Advocating on behalf of individual transgender prisoners  
1. Has your organisation ever been involved in assisting, advising or advocating on behalf 
of individual transgender prisoners?    
If not -  proceed to part B questions. 
If so, please can you tell me about your organisation’s involvement.  In particular:-  
 What sort of involvement has your organisation had, and when?   
 What triggered your organisation’s involvement?   
 What type of issues have been raised with you by transgender people about their 
experiences in prison?   
 Have you been able to help, and in what way?   
 Have you relied on any human rights-based arguments in your advice to, or 
advocacy on behalf of, transgender prisoners?   
 If so, did you find the use of human rights arguments beneficial – if yes, in what 
way? And if not, why not?   
 How were the issues resolved?   In your view, were the issues resolved 
satisfactorily? 
2. Have you used PSI 07/2011 on the Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners in 
your advice to, or advocacy on behalf of transgender prisoners?  In what way?  Has 
this PSI been useful in your work, and how?  (Possible overlap with question A.1) 
3. In your general experience, what benefits (if any) arise from using human rights-based 
arguments to advocate on behalf of transgender prisoners?  
4. In your general experience what problems (if any) arise from using human rights-based 
arguments to advocate on behalf of transgender prisoners?   
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B.  Advocacy for policy reform [Voluntary Sector Organisations only] 
General Questions 
1. Has your organisation ever been involved in campaigning for the reform of prison 
policy regarding transgender prisoners?  If so, please can you tell me about your 
organisation’s involvement?  In particular:  
 When was this involvement, and in what way was/is your organisation involved?   
 What triggered your organisation’s involvement?   
 What types of issues were you/ are you campaigning for?   
 Did you rely/ are you relying on any human rights-based arguments in your 
advocacy?   
 If so, has the use of human rights arguments been beneficial to your campaign  – if 
so, in what way?  And if not, why not?   
 What was the outcome of your organisation’s involvement? (if relevant)  
Specific Questions (possible overlap with B.1) 
2. Was your organisation involved in the 1990s and 2000s in lobbying the Prison Service 
to adopt specific guidelines on the treatment of transgender prisoners?  If so, please 
can you tell me about your organisation’s involvement?  In particular: 
  When was this, and in what way was your organisation involved?   
 What triggered your organisation’s involvement?  
  Did you rely on any human rights-based arguments in your campaign?   
 If so, did you find the use of human rights arguments beneficial to your campaign – if 
so, in what way?  And if not, why not?   
3. Did your organisation participate in the formal consultation process for PSI 07/2011 
on the Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners?  If so, please can you tell me 
about your organisation’s involvement?  In particular:  
 When and how was your organisation invited to take part in the consultation 
process?    
 What was the nature and extent of your organisation’s involvement?    
 What was your experience of the consultation process?  
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 How important were human rights issues in the drafting and consultation  process of 
the PSI? 
 Did you find it productive for your organisation to be involved in the consultation 
process?   
 Were you satisfied with the outcome?   If not, what do you consider problematic?   
Was there anything significant that your organisation advocated for, which didn’t 
end up in the PSI?   
C. Other 
1. How do you think transgender prisoners’ needs could be better met within the prison 
system?   
2. Is there anything else that you think it would be helpful for me to know about the 
treatment of transgender people in prison, for the purpose of my research?     
3. Is there anyone you would recommend I speak to, for the purpose of my research?  
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Glossary219 
Being read as cisgender - if someone is regarded, at a glance, to be a cisgender man or 
cisgender woman. This might include physical gender cues, such as hair or clothing, and/or 
behaviour which is historically or culturally associated with a particular gender. 
Cisgender – someone whose gender or gender identity is the same as the sex they were 
assigned at birth.  
Cis-sexism – a term coined by Julia Serano to describe the pervasive perception of 
transsexual or transgender people’s gender as inferior to, or less authentic than, those of 
cisgender people (2007: 12). 
Gender dysphoria – used to describe when a person experiences discomfort or distress 
because there is a mismatch between their sex assigned at birth and their gender/gender 
identity.  This is also the clinical diagnosis for someone who doesn’t feel comfortable with 
the gender they were assigned at birth. 
Gender expression, gender performance or gender presentation  – how a person chooses 
to outwardly express their gender/gender identity, within the context of cultural and 
societal expectations of gender.  
Gender/gender identity - a person’s sense of their own gender, whether male, female or 
something else (see non-binary below), which may or may not correspond to the sex 
                                                          
219 Many of the explanations for these terms have been adopted or adapted from Stonewall’s glossary at 
http://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/glossary-terms. (1 Dec 2017).  Other terms and explanations have 
been added by the author for the purpose of this thesis, including by reference to Julia Serano’s glossary at 
http://www.juliaserano.com/terminology.html. (1 Dec 2017). 
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assigned at birth. In this thesis, the term “gender” is preferred, but the term “gender 
identity” is also widely used, including in international human rights law.    
Gender reassignment – to undergo gender reassignment usually means to undergo some 
sort of medical intervention, but it can also mean changing names, pronouns, dressing 
differently and living in one’s self-identified gender.  As will become evident in this thesis, 
the different meanings attributed to the term renders it problematic in law. In this thesis, 
“medical gender reassignment” and “legal gender reassignment” are used where precision 
is necessary, and “transition” is used as a general term to describe a person’s social 
transition, regardless of medical intervention or legal gender reassignment.  
Gender Recognition Certificate (“GRC”) – this enables transgender people to be legally 
recognised in their gender (or to “legally reassign” their gender) and to be issued with a 
new birth certificate. 
Gender reassignment treatment –  under the NHS transgender pathway, this comprises 
counselling, diagnosis of “gender dysphoria”, hormone treatment and gender reassignment 
surgery.  Whilst the term “gender-affirming medical treatment” is increasingly used in the 
US, and is preferable from the author’s point of view, “gender reassignment treatment” 
remains the standard terminology in the UK, both in the NHS and in the voluntary sector, 
and is adopted for the purpose of this thesis.    
Gender reassignment surgery – it is common for gender reassignment surgery to be 
referred to in the singular, and to mean genital reassignment surgery (phalloplasty for 
transgender men, and oridechtomy and vaginoplasty for transgender women).  A range of 
gender reassignment surgeries exists, however. These include double mastectomy and chest 
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reconstruction, hysterectomy and removal of ovaries for transgender men (available on the 
NHS, as a core treatment for those diagnosed with gender dysphoria); and breast 
augmentation, facial feminisation surgery, tracheal shave and vocal cord surgery for 
transgender women (non-core services, rarely provided by the NHS).  For a full list, see 
Annex 2 to the NHS Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline (NHS 2013/14).   
Homosexual – a historical, medical term used to describe someone who has an emotional, 
romantic and/or sexual orientation towards someone of the same gender.   
Non-binary – an umbrella term for a person who does not identify as only male or only 
female, or who may identify as both. 
Pronoun – words used to refer to a person’s gender - for example, ‘he’ or ‘she’. Some 
people may prefer others to refer to them in gender neutral language and use pronouns 
such as they/ their. 
Sex/Gender – used in the thesis where the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are interchangeable, as 
they have become under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, for example. 
Trans/gender – used to indicate that the issue relates both to transgender people 
specifically, and to gender more broadly.  E.g. trans/gender authenticity refers both to 
whether the person is regarded as authentically transgender, and to whether their 
gender/gender identity is regarded as authentic. 
Transgender – an umbrella term to describe people whose gender is not the same as, or 
does not sit comfortably with, the sex they were assigned at birth.  Transgender people may 
describe themselves using one or more of a wide variety of terms, including, but not 
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limited to, transgender, transsexual,  gender-queer, gender-fluid,  non-binary, gender-
variant, a-gender, bi-gender, trans man, trans woman, or they may simply prefer to be 
described as a man, woman or person. In this thesis, the terms “transgender woman”, 
“transgender man” and “transgender prisoner” etc. are used for the sake of clarity.   
Transgender man – used to describe someone who is assigned female at birth but identifies 
and lives as a man.  
Transgender woman – used to describe someone who is assigned male at birth but 
identifies and lives as a woman.  
Transitioning – the steps a transgender person may take to live in the gender with which 
they identify. Each person’s transition will involve different things. For some this involves 
medical intervention, such as hormone therapy and surgeries, but not all transgender 
people want or are able to have this. Transitioning also might involve things such as 
changing one’s name, telling friends and family, dressing differently and changing official 
documents.  
Trans-misogyny – a term coined by Julia Serano to describe various forms of sexism directed 
towards transgender women, and the way in which transgender women tend to be of 
particular “societal fascination, consternation, and demonisation” in considerations of 
transgender people (2007: 11-20). 
Transphobia - the fear or dislike of someone based on the fact they are transgender, 
including the denial/refusal to accept their gender. 
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Transsexual – this was used in the past as a more medical term (similar to homosexual) to 
refer to someone who has medically transitioned and lives in the “opposite” gender to the 
one assigned at birth.  Although many transgender people prefer the term trans or 
transgender, the term “transsexual” is still used by some people, and, notably, is still used in 
UK law.  In this thesis, wherever possible, the term “transgender” is used to avoid the 
medical connotations of the term “transsexual” and to refer to a broader category of 
transgender people than those who medically reassign their gender.  However, the thesis 
uses the term “transsexual” where specificity is required for the particular historical legal or 
medical context, or where it forms part of a quote. 
 
 
